

24 May 67

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

THE GREEK JUNTA

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24 May 1967

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 May 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Greek Junta

Summary

A month after their coup, the three principal military leaders of the new Greek Government appear to be developing a largely apolitical program for Greece. Although they have been working well together, the leaders general uniformity of outlook will be put to the test, should they stay in power long, by the need to establish policy on the more obviously political questions that are certain to face them. Moreover, despite their administrative abilities, they are without political experience and this could spell trouble in the months ahead.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and with the Clandestine Services.

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1. One month after the establishment of the military-backed government in Athens, the situation is outwardly calm, and there is no sign of any effective internal resistance to the regime. For the moment, although the public has not so far demonstrated support for the new regime, it appears relieved that the coup went off relatively painlessly and that there is in prospect at least a temporary respite from the political turbulence that has plagued Greece since the downfall of the Karamanlis government in 1963.

2. Three officers, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos and Colonels George Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos, have emerged as the most powerful figures of the new government. For the time being, at least, they are the key persons in any determination of the trend of events in Greece. Their backgrounds are similar but their personalities are not, and their ability to check any differences which arise among themselves will be critical.

Brigadier General Pattakos

3. Pattakos, 55, was born on the island of Crete. He had held his present rank for only three months at the time of the coup. As commander of the tank and infantry units stationed at the Armor Center just outside Athens, Pattakos played a crucial role during the seizure of power. Before the coup, he was considered pro National Radical Union (ERE) Party, pro-NATO, and pro-US. He has close relatives in the United States and two nephews serving as officers in the US Army, one of them in Vietnam. He has been described as a "courageous, decent man, and above all, very devout."

4. As interior minister, Pattakos presides over the program of investigation now being carried out regarding the several thousand political prisoners still in government jails and over the continuing campaign for the suppression of "leftists and anarchists." Pattakos has relinquished command of the armored troops in the Athens region and now seems to be devoting his entire time to his governmental duties.

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~~SECRET~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~Colonel Papadopoulos

5. Papadopoulos, touted frequently as the most powerful member of the triumvirate, was born in northern Greece. At 48, he has had a distinguished military career, graduating first in his cadet class in 1940, serving with General Grivas' resistance forces in World War II. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Intelligent and self-assured, Papadopoulos is a forceful speaker and is considered an excellent administrator and organizer. In dealing with the press and others who have quizzed him on the future course of events in Greece, he has fielded questions well and has given forthright and reasonable answers, but has occasionally demonstrated a touch of asperity.

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6. Papadopoulos' present post is that of minister to the prime minister, which allows him to exercise the authority of the prime minister's office while permitting a civilian--Kollias--to hold the title.

Colonel Makarezos

7. Makarezos, also 48, was born near Athens. Recently promoted to full colonel. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is apparently the most studious and best educated of the three, and has an academic background in economics, political science, and industrial management. Makarezos speaks limited English but fluent German, possibly acquired during his tour as Greek military attache in Bonn in 1963 and 1964. Although at ease in public appearances, he has kept more in the background than have the other two members of the trio. He, too, appears to be entirely pro-NATO and pro-US.

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8. As minister of coordination, Makarezos is chiefly concerned with matters of economic development and--apparently--with the "cleansing" and re-organization of the government bureaucracy.

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9. A number of other field grade army officers who were instrumental in carrying out the coup (the deputy prime minister, General Spandidakis, joined after it had succeeded) have remained shadowy figures whose significant functions in the government, if any, are still not clear. One of them, however, Lt. Col. Dimetrios Stametalopolos, was appointed director general of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation.

10. There have been reports stemming chiefly from speculation and gossip of nascent conflict within the junta, especially between Papadopoulos and Pattakos. This has been denied by both men, and the idea has been scoffed at [redacted]

[redacted] Nevertheless, the rumors persist, and even if they are untrue, constant reference to a conflict between Papadopoulos and Pattakos might in time serve to evoke it. At present, however, the triumvirate seems to be working well together.

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11. There are a few tentative indications of rivalry between Pattakos and Papadopoulos, however.

[redacted] Papadopoulos expressed unhappiness that US officials deal with the King and Pattakos rather than with him. For his part, Pattakos made a strong pitch to come to the US for the Greek-American celebrations scheduled for 21 May. Doubtless, either man would like to be considered the one with the "American connection," and if one is singled out the other could be alienated. The King, for his part, prefers to deal with Pattakos rather than with the austere and rather humorless Papadopoulos, and hopes to exert a moderating influence on the junta through him.

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The Leaders Speak

12. None of the military leaders of the new government has shown a great inclination toward speechmaking or public harangues, but all have been fairly explicit in statements to the press and in private conversations. Some indication of their thinking emerges from a sampling of their reported statements.

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Pattakos:

On the future form of government:

"We believe the parliament will be the Greek people".

"We will have the Greek people vote if they like the new constitution or the amendments we may make."

Papadopoulos:

On his attitude toward representative government:

"The meaning of freedom and democracy is diametrically opposed to that of anarchy."

On the precoup situation in Greece and measures needed to remedy it:

"We are before a sick man whom we have on the operating table, and if the surgeon does not fasten him to the table during the operation there is the possibility that he could lead him to death. The restrictions imposed by the government are only the bindings fastening the patient to the operating table."

On returning Greece to a representative government:

"Our intention is to bring back as soon as possible parliamentary government to this country, but don't ask me to become a prophet."

On the handling of political prisoners:

"They will soon be called by security councils which operate according to law and in which judges participate. If they are described as persons not dangerous they will be freed."

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On the effect of the coup on public opinion abroad:

"Saving the nation is more important than the effect on international opinion."

Makarezos:

On the security situation in Greece as of mid-May:

"We are certain that the Communist threat is over."

On the need for continued suppression of the leftists:

"We will never permit Greece to become a second Vietnam."

On the date when parliamentary rule can be restored:

"When social and political conditions in Greece are healthy and sound."

The Junta's Program

13. Immediately after the coup, it seemed evident that the new leaders lacked a well-thought-out program for running the country once they had control of it. In fact, they may have been somewhat surprised at the ease of their take-over. The consolidation phase, which they had probably envisaged as a lengthy one, was completed quickly, and the process of purging undesirable elements from the military forces and from the government bureaus had to be started. When questioned about their future plans for Greece, the new leaders had few specific positive aims they could incorporate in a general program for presentation to the public. Instead, while they dismantled the old structure, they found themselves obliged to react piecemeal to individual situations. For example, they issued a decree increasing benefits to farmers, and another--later rescinded--against beatniks.

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14. This conveyed an impression of a lack of planning and coordination. Nevertheless, although they did not begin their take-over armed with a ready-made five-year plan for Greece, the coup leaders have achieved impressive results in some of the things they have set out to do. They have restored public order and near-normalcy to Greek economic life and have sought to conciliate rural opinion by taking steps to increase farm income. They have won at least the reluctant cooperation of the King, and have achieved a limited degree of success in winning the confidence of Western governments.

15. As the new government moves into its second month, apparently convinced that its chances for survival at home and acceptance abroad are reasonably good, the outlines of its program for Greece are beginning to take shape. A full system of priorities may not yet have been worked out, but the following are quite likely among its aims:

- Restaffing the government bureaucracy with nonpartisan functionaries who combine occupational skill with integrity. This will be a difficult and frustrating task, which will either force the new government into compromises or delay its turning matters over to an elected government.
- Revamping the legislative and executive branches of the government to give increased power to the prime minister.
- Redrafting the constitution to provide checks on the direct action of political parties.
- Reversing the leftist-neutralist drift in Greek foreign policy which characterized the post-Karamanlis period, to include strengthening ties with the West and perhaps adopting a more forthcoming attitude toward Turkey.
- Emphasizing development projects in poor and backward regions, coupling this with a program of aid to villages. The importance of this objective was underlined by the recent surprise announcement of an \$840-million agreement with

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a California-based firm (Litton Industries) for the construction of roads, bridges, and other projects on Crete and the Dodecanese Islands. This basic agreement had been worked out by the Stephanopoulos government, but its implementation had been stymied by leftist parliamentary opposition.

--Modernizing and improving the image of the Orthodox Church by appointing clerical dignitaries sympathetic to the new government and by setting an official example of moralistic behavior in public life.

16. The domestic aspects of this program are essentially apolitical: they call mainly for effective, "decent" administration willing to ignore the complaints of special interests or the demands of the relatives of would-be contractors. If the junta stays in power for a prolonged period, however, it is likely to become involved in what will be more obviously political questions, at which point its present general uniformity of outlook will be tested by the need to provide specific policy answers. The junta members seem intelligent, able, and strong minded. They lack experience in political matters, however, and despite their administrative capabilities there could be trouble ahead. (Photos)

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Minister to the Prime Minister
Colonel George Papadopoulos



Minister of the Interior
Brig. Gen. Stylianos Pattakos



Minister of Coordination
Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos

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DISSEM AUTHORIZATION

MEMO NO 1113/67

DATE 24 May 67

Due Dates:

D/OCI Review _____
Dissem 24 May 67

SUBJECT: The Greek Junta

REQUESTED OR ORIGINATED BY: self-initiated

PURPOSE: Summary of composition of Greek junta and attitudes of three principal members, as well as symptoms of disarray in the junta.

ASSIGNED TO:

[Redacted]

GRAPHICS

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DISSEMINATION

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Category _____ Recommended to D/OCI

Category E Finally Authorized By:

Specified Other _____

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24 May 1967

Talking Paper for "The Greek Junta"

1. A paper on this general subject was suggested by D/OCI. The memo summarizes what we know about the composition of the Greek junta and the attitudes of its three principal members. It also discusses the symptoms of disarray in the junta.

2. The paper concludes that the junta members have basically a very similar outlook, and, for the time, are working well together. Their personalities differ, however, and there are signs of rivalry. Given their political inexperience, there may well be trouble eventually.

3. The memorandum was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and with the Clandestine Services. Recommend routine internal and external dissemination.

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