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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chief

International Security Issues Division
Office of Global Issues

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SUBJECT:

The 1985 NPT Review Conference: Implications
of Consensus [Redacted]

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1. The attached memorandum offers an intelligence perspective on developments at last fall's NPT Review Conference. It is intended primarily as a record of how issues transpired and how key delegations approached and reacted to the interplay of issues. Overall, we believe the conference outcome represented a significant revalidation of the NPT but that the treaty nonetheless remains vulnerable to pressures arising from disarmament concerns and the intrusion of largely tangential political issues. [Redacted]

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2. Comments and questions are welcome and may be addressed to [Redacted]

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International Security Issues Division, OGI [Redacted]

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Attachment:

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Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

31 July 1986

The 1985 NPT Review Conference: Implications of Consensus

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Summary

Last fall's month-long NPT Review Conference in Geneva produced a clear consensus that the treaty continues to contribute to world security. This outcome was due in part to a relative lack of North-South political tension, which in the previous review conference had led to virtual dead-lock. We also believe that US-Soviet cooperation in support of the NPT contributed significantly to consensus. Arms control emerged as the single most important issue for debate, with widespread criticism of super-power arms limitation efforts to date. We judge that most parties believe the long-term viability of the NPT depends in large measure on super-power progress toward nuclear disarmament. The challenge NPT supporters face now is to convert the momentum gathered in Geneva into the energy needed to sustain the treaty until 1990, when its adherents will again review its implementation, and, in the longer term, until 1995, when they must decide whether to continue it indefinitely or to extend it for a fixed period or periods. [Redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by [Redacted] Office of Global Issues. Information available as of 31 July 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, [Redacted] International Security Issues Division, OGI, [Redacted]

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The 1985 Review Conference: Implications of Consensus [REDACTED]

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The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons took place in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985 with 86 parties in attendance. (See Appendix for list of attendees.) Despite heated controversy on a number of thorny issues, the parties found themselves in agreement on the basic issues of nonproliferation, thereby tipping the balance in favor of a positive outcome. In the end, the 1985 conference produced a clear consensus that the treaty is an instrument of global security, reaffirming the predominant international sentiment against proliferation.

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Conference Atmospherics

Although the preconference climate was less highly charged than in 1980, potential pitfalls were diverse and complex:

- The superpowers were more vulnerable to charges of inadequate arms reduction efforts than they had been in 1980.
- Iraq was certain to raise Israel's 1981 attack on the Osirak reactor, a move with potentially damaging consequences for the IAEA General Conference, which followed the review conference.
- Technological strides by nonparties such as Pakistan and Brazil served as conspicuous reminders of the treaty's less than universal reach and efficacy.
- Egypt was likely to push for a new mechanism to finance nuclear projects in developing country parties, a proposal that threatened to undercut the IAEA.
- The United States delegation was under instructions to leave the conference should Israel be denied observer status while others were granted such status.

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After the conference, delegates were in the main satisfied: the treaty had been revalidated by consensus, the final declaration contained several precedential and constructive provisions, the gentleman's agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union had held, and conferees of all stripes had demonstrated a heartening desire to preserve the treaty's integrity. [REDACTED]

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On the other hand, some clouds were visible on the horizon: conferees had broken with the tradition of decisionmaking by consensus by voting on a procedural motion, an open split between Washington and Moscow had occurred on the test ban issue, the conference had been held hostage by regional politics, and some significant issues had been finessed or not addressed at all (for example, full-scope safeguards and activities of threshold states other than South Africa and Israel). [REDACTED]

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The NPT Bargain: Differing Perceptions Frame Debate

As was the case at the two previous review conferences, the course and nature of debate were dictated by differing views of the proper balance among the treaty's nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use provisions. Specifically, Third World nations focused upon the link between controlling the spread of sensitive nuclear technology and progress in the area of arms control and disarmament. As they see it, the nonnuclear weapon states have largely upheld their obligation not to pursue weapons programs, whereas the weapon states have failed to live up to their obligation to disarm. [REDACTED]

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The weapon states, on the other hand, emphasized the explicit link between the NPT's nonproliferation and safeguards provisions and international and regional peace and security. They admitted that arms control progress had been slight over the last five years, but rejected accusations that they had failed to pursue such progress in good faith. [REDACTED]

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As for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, developing states complained that adherence to the NPT has failed to gain them full access to the nuclear fuel cycle. The suppliers pointed to their record of technical assistance to the Third World and showed no inclination to loosen controls on exports of sensitive materials, equipment, or technology. [REDACTED]

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These varying interpretations of the NPT's obligations and constraints threatened to destabilize the regime in Geneva. In fact, the conference was characterized by a spirit of compromise made all the more noteworthy in view of such fundamentally differing perceptions of the NPT's objectives and implementation. [REDACTED]

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Sources of Harmony

[REDACTED] numerous, diverse factors contributed to an outcome that reinforces the nonproliferation imperative. In our judgment, the most salient factors are a widespread belief that the NPT is simply too important to risk for the sake of temporary political gain, the lack of solidarity among the neutral and nonaligned group, US-Soviet cooperation before and during the conference, and the three-committee structure. [REDACTED]

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NPT's Contribution to Security: Not Worth Risking

We judge that last year's willingness to compromise can be traced primarily to the widely held view that the NPT contributes inherently to world security. Opening plenary statements revealed that nations in all three geopolitical groups believe the NPT has value despite their differing expectations and opinions regarding its implementation. [REDACTED]

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Throughout the runup to the conference, the United States had urged key members of the neutral and nonaligned group not to lose sight of the security benefits of the

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NPT during the review. Egypt, among others, took the message to heart. [redacted]

[redacted] Egypt campaigned actively among the Arab and African delegations, emphasizing the risks of a failed conference and the need to preserve the NPT system. (b)(1)

In fact, [redacted] some of the NNA nations seemed even more eager to ensure a successful review conference than the nuclear weapon states and their allies. In [redacted] the hectic consultations on Mexico's disarmament resolutions [redacted] accused the major neutral and nonaligned states of deserting Mexico one by one in a bid to ensure adoption of a consensus document. Mexico, too, compromised in the end. [redacted] (b)(3)

Within the Eastern Bloc a desire for consensus was also evident. [redacted]

[redacted] the Eastern Group had decided to give priority to a final document and to work for this goal as long as possible, [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] the Bloc countries had sought to avoid confrontation throughout the conference and had labored on behalf of a reconfirmation of the NPT. [redacted] (b)(3)

Last year's less confrontational mood also derived from a fear of damaging the NPT by repeating the failure of 1980. Since then, we judge, many nations have come to view rivalries such as the one between India and Pakistan as a proximate danger. Accordingly, they have come to place greater stock in the NPT as a hedge against the growing threat posed by regional nuclear disputes. In their view, another discordant review conference could only endanger the NPT and weaken that hedge. [redacted] (b)(3)

NNA Performance--Disunited and Ineffective

In 1980, members of the neutral and nonaligned group coordinated extensively before the conference, delivered complementary opening statements, and exercised exceptional diplomatic skill in maintaining group solidarity. Their refusal to accept a bland declaration on arms control led directly to that year's deadlock. [redacted] (b)(3)

By contrast, uncertainty characterized NNA performance in 1985. During preconference meetings in Geneva, the neutral and nonaligned nations were unable to adopt common positions [redacted]

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Even traditional hardliners Yugoslavia and Mexico moderated their stances. [redacted]

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In our judgment, the poor performance of the NNA can be attributed in part to the growing crisis within the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). NAM delegates have increasing difficulty maintaining solidarity and lining up support in multilateral forums, especially those that handle political matters.

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US-USSR Cooperation: A Necessary Ingredient

US-Soviet preparation for and cooperation during the conference and their common stake in an outcome that shored up the regime prevented divisive superpower confrontation. In Geneva, both delegations lived up to their agreement to exercise restraint with regard to arms control. In Moscow, however, TASS and Pravda carried articles during the conference that sniped at Washington's nonproliferation record, violating the spirit of the gentleman's agreement.

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Both delegations' willing admissions that progress on arms control had been slim since the last conference partially defused NNA criticism on disarmament. At the invitation of the conference's preparatory committee, both nations circulated documents detailing their intersessional activities related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, thereby disarming developing country accusations on that front as well.

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The delegations worked together constructively on the Friends of the President Committee, a group formed to help the President resolve difficult issues. Even when the committee dealt with the contentious nuclear testing issue, on which the Soviets had seized and occupied the high ground from the first day of the conference, the Soviet delegation helped hammer out a compromise.

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Not unexpectedly, some nations viewed US-Soviet cooperation less benignly.

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Committee Structure: Expanded and Effective

[REDACTED] allocation of issues to three main committees* versus the traditional two neutralized some potentially negative aspects of the 1985 review by diffusing criticism and forcing difficult issues into discrete, manageable debates. Most importantly, the new structure fostered consensus by giving more countries a stake in the outcome. In the end, conferees clearly chose not to sacrifice one committee's gains because of another's omissions or commissions. [REDACTED]

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Conference Dynamics

[REDACTED] points to complex interaction between delegates and issues during the month-long conference. Its four phases -- opening plenary, main committee work, preparation of the final document, and final plenary -- witnessed both the vagaries of multilateral diplomacy and the singleminded determination of individual delegates. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets: Maneuvering for Advantage

Conferees repeatedly and forcefully expressed their frustrations over superpower failure to achieve progress on arms control and isolated the United States on the issue of a comprehensive test ban. By contrast, the review conference gave the Soviet Union an opportunity, which it seized upon, to present itself as an arms control advocate in tune with the neutral and nonaligned, an image it has been cultivating ever since. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets positioned themselves before and during the conference to use the forum to their political advantage and to pressure the United States on arms control. They seized the advantage on the test ban issue during the opening plenary, when the Soviet delegate read a message from General Secretary Gorbachev pointing to the desirability of a full ban on nuclear testing and citing Moscow's previously announced testing moratorium. The Soviet statement also plugged Moscow's voluntary offer** to the IAEA, which was concluded in February 1985. The first inspection of Soviet facilities -- one power and one research reactor -- took place a few days before the conference opened, an event obviously timed for maximum effect in Geneva. (U)

The Soviet Union achieved its most notable success of the conference by contributing to the isolation of the United States and the United Kingdom on the test ban issue. The language on this issue in the final report represents the first open split on

*Committee I assessed the disarmament and security aspects of the treaty; Committee II, a new committee at this conference, dealt with nonproliferation, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and Committee III reviewed provisions dealing with peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**An arrangement whereby a nuclear weapon state permits the IAEA to apply safeguards at civil nuclear facilities. The NPT requires safeguards only of nonnuclear weapon state parties.

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the NPT between the United States and the USSR since the treaty entered into force 16 years ago. Had the matter been put to a vote as Mexico proposed, the Soviet victory would have been unequivocal. Moscow was discreetly passive on the voting issue but, keeping its options open, had informed the neutral and nonaligned group that it and its satellites would support the Mexican resolutions if consensus proved out of reach. [redacted]

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KEY DELEGATIONS

Egypt

- Conference President Muhammad Shakir performed adequately if not forcefully. [redacted]

[redacted] he was unable to force a settlement upon Iran and Iraq, whose dispute threatened to scuttle the conference.

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- Led coalition of African and Arab countries who insisted upon a total prohibition of nuclear transfers to Israel and South Africa.
- Tabled interim draft that led to resolution of issue of attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities.
- Proposed fund to finance nuclear power projects in NPT developing countries but acquiesced to East/West concerns in the end.
- Instrumental in engineering deal to permit seating of Israel and PLO. [redacted]

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Mexico

- Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles led neutral and nonaligned offensive on comprehensive test ban, called for vote on his disarmament proposals if consensus not attained, and generally practiced brinksmanship [redacted]

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Sweden

- Ambassador Ekeus chaired drafting committee.
- Hardline considerably moderated compared to 1980, but pressed on test ban nonetheless.
- Actively engaged in hammering out compromise on issue of safeguarding peaceful nuclear facilities.
- Introduced but did not press resolution calling for complete separation of civil and military fuel cycles. [redacted]

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Iraq

- Along with Yemen and Morocco, resisted seating of Israel.
- Ambassador Al Kital, determined to return to Baghdad with conference action on Israel's attack on Osirak, resisted compromise until final day. [redacted]

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Iran

- Nearly brought down conference at eleventh hour by insisting upon reference in final document to alleged Iraqi attacks on its Bushehr reactor. [redacted]

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Australia

- Ambassador Butler instrumental in last-ditch efforts to salvage consensus during final plenary.
- Along with Canada, urged immediate negotiation of test ban and, in disarmament committee, introduced formulation that would condition full implementation of NPT thereupon. [redacted]

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Sri Lanka

- Ambassador Dhanapala chaired disarmament committee [redacted]

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West Germany

- Ambassador Wegener pointedly criticized Soviets during disarmament statement, charging them with violating the disarmament provision of the NPT when they walked out of intermediate range nuclear force talks in 1983 and questioning their adherence to any testing moratorium. [redacted]
- Blocked consensus on full-scope safeguards in committee. (U)

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How the Issues Played Out

Comprehensive Test Ban

As expected, deliberations on a test ban offered the greatest potential at the outset for impasse. The Eastern Bloc, the neutral and nonaligned, and most of the Western states favored resuming trilateral negotiations, whereas the United States and the United Kingdom insisted that radical reductions in existing arsenals are the necessary first step to lasting arms control. Mexico insisted that its test ban resolution be put to a vote if consensus could not be reached, thereby threatening the outcome of the conference.

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Despite the overwhelming sentiment in favor of a test ban, the pro-vote contingent was never absolutely sure it could muster enough votes to ensure victory. Parliamentary maneuvers designed to prevent a vote had been initiated

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In the end, the United States, the USSR, and Mexico, among others, engineered a compromise that left US isolation thinly veiled but avoided a vote that would have removed the veil entirely and set this and future conferences on the path toward divisive vote-taking. The final declaration expresses the regrets of the majority "except for certain states," a reference to the United States and the United Kingdom, that a ban had not been concluded; the view of those "certain states" that reductions in existing arsenals are the highest arms control priority; and the readiness of the Soviets to negotiate. Because the final document assigned the highest priority to negotiation of a test ban in the Conference on Disarmament, the United States can expect to face continued resistance to its position in that forum.

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Nuclear Programs of Israel and South Africa

Led by a coalition of African and Arab countries, conferees repeatedly and vociferously criticized the nuclear programs and ambitions of Israel and South Africa and called for a total prohibition of nuclear transfers to those two countries. The reasons for singling out Israel and South Africa appear to have less to do with proliferation concerns, however, than with Arab and African preoccupations about the Middle East conflict and apartheid.

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Moreover, none of the other threshold states was subjected to similarly harsh treatment.

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In the end, the issue was resolved in a manner consistent with US interests-- concern was expressed about the nuclear programs of the two countries and calls for prohibiting transfers were noted, but no conference action was invoked. Nonetheless, its political genesis and Washington's relationship with Tel Aviv and Pretoria are certain to cause the subject to resurface in other nonproliferation forums. [redacted]

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Israeli Observer Status

This issue, which was resolved before the main committees got down to work, was fraught with pitfalls:

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- Denial of Israel's right to observe the conference could have undermined its already tenuous position at the IAEA, whose general conference followed immediately; and
- Seating of the PLO as a state would have set a dangerous precedent in the UN and other international bodies wherein the US had sought to prevent such recognition. [redacted]

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the NNA accepted a conference decision to seat Israel in order to preserve the spirit of compromise. The conference also amended the rules of procedure to create a special category for the PLO as a "national liberation organization." [redacted]

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On balance, the PLO request for observer status -- its first ever -- improved Israel's chances of being seated by serving as a bargaining chip for the otherwise intransigent Arab nations. [redacted]

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Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Proposals by New Zealand and others that the conference endorse the newly negotiated South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty failed. Instead, the committee agreed upon language that noted the treaty and welcomed it as consistent with the NPT. This issue, which created little furor in Geneva, will be revisited once the treaty's protocols are open for signature by the nuclear weapon states. [redacted]

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Full-Scope Safeguards

As in 1980, debate on full-scope safeguards* proved fractious. Major suppliers Switzerland, Germany, and Belgium expressed continuing reservations about requiring such safeguards as a condition of supply, a position advocated by Canberra and Ottawa. The disagreement was papered over when Switzerland and Belgium grudgingly accepted a vague compromise formulation that fell short of endorsing full-scope safeguards but tilted in that direction. Germany held out longer but eventually conceded. [redacted]

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In any event, the commitment of traditional suppliers to full-scope safeguards and controls on sensitive technology is certain to be tested severely in coming years as new non-NPT suppliers enter the competition for a shrinking market. [redacted]

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Attacks Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities

The issue of attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities and how to characterize Israel's 1981 bombing of an Iraqi research reactor proved every bit as politicized in this forum as it has in the IAEA and in the Conference on Disarmament. Iraq was determined to return to Baghdad with some conference action on the issue and, during the early going, the other Arab nations stiffened Iraq's resolve. As debate progressed,

*Safeguards that are applied to all existing and future peaceful nuclear activities in a nonnuclear weapon state. Equivalent to the safeguards required of nonnuclear weapon state parties in the NPT.

**Following the Indian detonation in 1974, the major nuclear suppliers convened in London to discuss common multilateral export policies. Members of the group, known as the London Suppliers' Group or Club, published their export guidelines in 1976 and have not met under that rubric since that time.

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support grew within the Western Group for including at least an historical reference to the attack. Ireland even suggested a need for new treaty provisions to protect nuclear installations. [redacted]

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Early Iraqi demands that the conference adopt a resolution condemning Israel, a precedent-setting procedure, gave way later to insistence on specific language on Israel in the final document. On the last day of the conference, after the Friends of the President Committee rejected Iraq's demand for sanctions against Israel, Iraqi Ambassador Al Kital agreed to language expressing the conference's profound concern and recalling the 1981 UN resolution on the attack. No call for conference action was approved. [redacted]

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For many delegates, the bloom had long since faded from this issue, which has been debated at length in the UN and the IAEA for five years. As in those forums, Iraq's persistence in Geneva diverted delegates' attention from the more pertinent business of the conference and caused the expenditure of much political capital in order to preserve consensus. Baghdad's loss of face in Geneva, its defeat at the ensuing IAEA General Conference, and last year's UN General Assembly resolution that seeks to return the issue to the IAEA almost certainly guarantee the continued presence of this thorny issue on the nonproliferation agenda. [redacted]

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Fund to Finance Power Projects

Egypt ran into heavy opposition when it proposed a fund to finance nuclear power projects in NPT countries. Arguments from both the East and West centered on where financing would come from and whether such a fund would undercut existing mechanisms within the IAEA. The Soviets flatly refused to commit any hard currency, [redacted] whereas the nonaligned nations were solidly behind Egypt. The impasse was broken when Egypt acquiesced to alternative language calling upon the IAEA to initiate a specialists' group to study how to assist the nuclear power programs of the developing nations. [redacted]

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Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

For the first time, conferees endorsed the view that the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) have not been demonstrated. This view complemented other conference language that blurs the distinction between peaceful and military devices by stating that any further detonation by a nonweapon state would constitute a serious breach of the nonproliferation ethic. [redacted]

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Iran/Iraq Squabble

An eleventh-hour spat between Iran and Iraq nearly caused the downfall of the conference. Iran wanted a reference in the final document to alleged Iraqi attacks on Iran's Bushehr power reactor construction site*. Iraq objected to such a reference, setting the stage for impasse. After hours of wrangling and caucusing, the squabble was finally resolved at 5 a.m. when Iran and Iraq agreed to delete the disputed sentence from an otherwise consensus text as long as their verbatim statements were appended in annexes to the final report. Exhausted delegates then adopted the final declaration by consensus. [redacted]

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This episode demonstrates both the strength and fragility of the NPT: strength in that conferees of all persuasions, fearing impasse over an issue related only indirectly to the NPT, labored diligently for consensus throughout the grueling all-night session, and fragility in that the treaty was held hostage to this and other peripheral political issues throughout the month-long conference. [redacted]

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Near-Term Spillover

Reaffirmation of the NPT in Geneva influenced other bilateral and multilateral forums in the months following the conference. (U)

IAEA

Most participants in the IAEA General Conference, which convened in Vienna immediately after the review conference, had been hoping to remove from their agenda once and for all the polarizing repercussions of Israel's attack on Osirak. An Iraqi victory on this issue in Geneva would certainly have prejudiced the outcome in Vienna, but with Iraq's defeat fresh in their minds, IAEA delegates blocked renewed calls by Iraq for sanctions against Israel. (U)

IAEA Director General Hans Blix took the review conference recommendations about the IAEA seriously. [redacted]

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[redacted] With Argentina's Admiral Castro Madero as the chairman of the IAEA group and India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt as members, the outcome of the one-year study is certain to reflect the prevailing view among the nonaligned and neutral nations that the IAEA's technical assistance programs should be greatly expanded. Moreover, the group, whose report is scheduled to be completed in the summer of 1987,

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may well be influenced by the outcome of the PUNE* conference during the spring of that year. [redacted]

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Blix also used the recommendations and their endorsement at the US-USSR Summit in November 1985 as a convenient hook on which to hang an appeal for additional resources for the Agency. [redacted]

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UN General Assembly

Sponsors of the test ban resolutions at the 1985 UN General Assembly clearly awaited the outcome of the review conference before tabling their motions in New York. New Zealand and Australia fueled their traditional "urgent need" resolution with the conference's statement urging negotiation of a ban in the Conference on Disarmament, the very statement to which the United States and the United Kingdom had taken exception. Mexico misrepresented the final declaration's treatment of a test ban in its two resolutions by implying there had been a consensus in Geneva to call for immediate negotiations. The first resolution, cosponsored by Sweden, appealed to the Conference on Disarmament to establish a committee to negotiate a comprehensive test ban**. The second, which grew out of consultations in Geneva, urged conversion of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) into a full test ban. As expected, all three resolutions passed overwhelmingly. [redacted]

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Exasperated by debate on the Osirak matter at the review conference and at the IAEA, General Assembly delegates passed Iraq's resolution condemning and sanctioning Israel by a distinctly smaller margin than in 1984. On the other hand, Syria has taken advantage of the fact that the UN resolution remands the issue to the IAEA by inscribing in the issue of the threat posed by Israel's nuclear program on the agenda of the September 1986 General Conference, thus perpetuating an already protracted debate. [redacted]

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The 1985 Summit

Although conferees expressed regret that the last five years had yielded no progress on nuclear disarmament, the generally positive outcome of the conference played well at the November Summit Meeting. In their joint statement, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev noted their satisfaction with the results and reaffirmed their commitment under the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. (U)

*UN Conference on the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, scheduled for March 1987.

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To a certain degree, the relationship between a positive review conference and a successful summit dictated the behavior of the Soviet NPT delegation. [redacted]

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[redacted] Soviet and Eastern Bloc delegates consciously sidestepped confrontation with the United States in order to avoid poisoning the atmosphere before the summit. [redacted]

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Looking Back to the Future

Most of the issues that framed debate in Geneva and preoccupied review conference delegates are neither new nor likely to be resolved in the near term. They not only reflect past behavior but point to challenges to the long-term well-being of the nonproliferation regime. These issues will, we judge, assume increased importance as 1995, a watershed year for the NPT, approaches. At that time, adherents of the treaty must decide whether to continue the treaty indefinitely or to extend it only for a limited period. [redacted]

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Arms Control

Events in Geneva indicate clearly that the developing states consider the long-term health of the NPT to be dependent in large measure upon superpower progress on nuclear disarmament. Because many NPT parties persist in measuring arms control progress largely in terms of a comprehensive test ban, that issue seems destined to play a significant role in determining the viability of the NPT, and therefore, the nonproliferation regime. [redacted]

(b)(3)

We believe many nations have become still more chary of Washington's arms control stance, given the continuation of its nuclear testing program. The joint US-USSR discussions on testing held in Geneva in July 1986 are probably viewed as a positive step but will not assuage their concerns unless a substantive outcome ensues. Much of Moscow's recent test ban propaganda played well in the Third World, reinforcing Third World bias against US insistence that real arms control means that deep, verifiable reductions must come first. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

The Soviet Union, in the meantime, can be expected to continue exploiting to full advantage its common position with the neutral and nonaligned nations on the test ban issue. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

It also seems likely, in our view, that the final declaration's test ban provisions will spark the movement, unveiled at the conference by Uruguay, toward converting the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) into a comprehensive test ban. A Mexican resolution to [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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(b)(3)

that effect passed overwhelmingly at the UN indicating that the votes needed to convene an amending conference could easily be obtained. Even though the United States and the United Kingdom could block such an amendment by exercising the vetoes they hold as depositaries of the treaty, the mere holding of an amending conference would certainly focus unwelcome attention upon the issues. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

The Challenge of Tangential Issues

Injection into the NPT dialogue of issues related only indirectly to nonproliferation is potentially very harmful to the integrity of the treaty. Evidence of the debilitating effect of extraneous political debate is abundant in the annals of the UN system and, since 1981, in the IAEA, but this is the first time that the NPT has been affected by such divisiveness. Episodes such as the Iran/Iraq squabble, the Israeli/PLO observer controversy, the Osirak matter, and calls for sanctions against South Africa and Israel demonstrate the treaty's fragility but also its strength: fragility in that the treaty was held hostage to peripheral issues throughout the month-long conference but also strength in that conferees of all persuasions, fearing impasse over such issues, labored diligently for consensus throughout the session. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Trend Toward Voting

NPT conferees' break with the tradition of decisionmaking by consensus constitutes an unfavorable presentiment for the 1990 review conference. Although the break occurred on a procedural matter--a motion during the final all-night plenary that debate be closed on the Iran/Iraq--conferees narrowly avoided voting on Mexico's disarmament resolutions. East-West unity staved off vote calls from the neutral and nonaligned in 1985; unless progress on arms control is forthcoming, no amount of persuasion or cajolery is likely to prevent voting on matters of substance in 1990. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Dilemma for Washington

The prospect of NPT adherence by the remaining threshold countries presents a dilemma for the United States. On the one hand, Washington is a pillar of support for the treaty and actively seeks its universal adherence. On the other, realizing that adherence does not guarantee nonproliferation but does facilitate access to nuclear technology, Washington restricts exports of sensitive technology as a matter of national policy. Moreover, in the case of Libya, Iran, and Iraq, whose motives and regimes are suspect despite their membership in the NPT, the US attempts to retard their nuclear development. Thus, the dilemma is how to continue preventing such countries from gaining access to weapons-related technology without seeming to undermine the basic principles of the NPT. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

North Korea's accession to the NPT last December exemplifies this paradox. On the one hand, entry of this threshold state into the fold is an important step on the road to universal adherence and, once safeguards are being applied by the IAEA, will be a welcome assurance of the peaceful nature of a previously suspect program. On the other hand, it will test anew the commitment of nuclear suppliers to facilitate exchange of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy--as is required of NPT signatories--

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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(b)(3)

when the recipient state has a checkered history with respect to international commitments. Moreover, if North Korea turns to and is rejected by Western suppliers who distrust its commitments, as has happened with Libya and Iran, Third World complaints that the NPT is discriminatory will be reinforced. [redacted]

(b)(3)

South Korea's reaction to North Korea's accession belies the conventional wisdom that the NPT enhances security, in our view. Seoul is clearly worried that, international safeguards notwithstanding, Pyongyang will now have unfettered access to technology that could help it develop a weapons capability. In fact, South Korea views the North as a greater threat now than before it adhered. [redacted]

(b)(3)

[redacted]
~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Appendix

Attendance at Third NPT Review Conference

NPT Parties

- | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Iran | Poland |
| Australia | Iraq | Portugal |
| Austria | Ireland | Romania |
| Bangladesh | Italy | Rwanda |
| Belgium | Ivory Coast | San Marino |
| Bhutan | Japan | Senegal |
| Bolivia | Jordan | Seychelles |
| Brunei | Kenya | Somalia |
| Bulgaria | Republic of Korea | Sri Lanka |
| Burundi | Lebanon | Sudan |
| Cameroon | Libya | Sweden |
| Canada | Liechtenstein | Switzerland |
| Cyprus | Luxembourg | Syria |
| Czechoslovakia | Malaysia | Thailand |
| Denmark | Maldives | Tunisia |
| Ecuador | Malta | Turkey |
| Egypt | Mauritios | Uganda |
| Ethiopia | Mexico | United Kingdom |
| Finland | Mongolia | United States |
| German Democratic Republic | Morocco | Uruguay |
| Germany, Federal Republic of | Nauru | USSR |
| Ghana | Nepal | Venezuela |
| Greece | Netherlands | Vietnam |
| Guatemala | New Zealand | Yemen, Peoples Democratic Republic of |
| Holy See | Nicaragua | Yugoslavia |
| Honduras | Nigeria | Zaire |
| Hungary | Norway | |
| Iceland | Panama | |
| Indonesia | Papua New Guinea | |
| | Peru | |
| | Philippines | |

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

NPT Signatories*

Colombia
Yemen Arab Republic

Observer States

Algeria
Argentina
Bahrain
Brazil
Chile
Cuba
Israel
Pakistan
Spain
Tanzania

Observer National Liberation Organization

PLO

Organizations

IAEA
League of Arab States
OAS
OAU
OPANAL (Agency for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America)

Nongovernmental Organizations

43 Total

This Table is UNCLASSIFIED

*Both have since ratified the NPT.