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The 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: Looking Ahead (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

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August 1985*

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
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and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
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**The 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference:
Looking Ahead (U)**

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 8 August 1985
was used in this report.*

This year's Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference—the third since the treaty entered into force in 1970—will be a major indicator of the state of world nonproliferation sentiment and the level of confidence in the NPT itself. Many factors that marred the 1980 Review Conference, such as major tension in overall North-South political relations and the then urgent scramble to lessen dependence on fossil fuels, are now much less prominent. In addition, the behavior of significant NPT parties in preparatory meetings has been remarkably free of political contentiousness. Indications are that all major geopolitical groupings—West, neutral and nonaligned, and the East—want a successful review conference and are at least going in with constructive attitudes. [redacted] (b)(3)

We believe three outcomes are possible. A clear reaffirmation of the NPT would add to its authority, encourage still more countries to adhere, and demonstrate to potential proliferators the strength of international nonproliferation sentiment. A more equivocal outcome, in which the conferees neither reaffirmed nor seriously questioned the treaty, would be less helpful, but not injurious to US goals. NPT credibility would remain intact, and potential proliferators looking for a sign that world sentiment against proliferation is weakening would be frustrated. These two outcomes are about equally likely, and each is more likely than an outcome in which conferees question NPT validity or even threaten to withdraw. Such a negative outcome would undermine the treaty's authority and encourage potential proliferators. [redacted] (b)(3)

Whatever the final outcome, debate will be contentious:

- Arms control issues, in particular, will be sharply debated. Numerous countries repeatedly assert that, US-Soviet talks notwithstanding, the nuclear powers have failed to live up to their NPT arms reduction obligations and that the growing number of warheads in superpower arsenals is a greater world security threat than the spread of nuclear weapons to nonweapons states.
- Many Third World countries also maintain that the advanced countries have done far too little to meet their NPT obligations to help the nuclear “have nots” acquire peaceful nuclear energy for development purposes.


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We believe the Soviets want the review conference to succeed but are positioning themselves to use that forum for political advantage and to pressure the United States on arms control. In our view, Soviet announcement of a unilateral weapons testing moratorium is an attempt to take the "moral high ground" on arms control, to deflect neutral and nonaligned arms control criticism toward Washington, and to put the US delegation on the defensive on the issue of a comprehensive test ban. 

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The 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: Looking Ahead (U)

Significance of the 1985 Review

(b)(3) Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will gather in Geneva on 27 August for a monthlong assessment of the treaty's implementation over the past five years. Because the NPT is regarded as the cornerstone of global efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, the 1985 Review Conference will constitute a major indicator of general world nonproliferation sentiment and a barometer of the level of confidence in the effectiveness of the NPT. [redacted]

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The NPT was drafted in 1967-68 and entered into force in March 1970 with 43 parties. Today the NPT counts 129 parties and is the most widely subscribed arms control-related treaty in history. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, major parties include most of Western Europe and Japan. Significant nonparticipants are China, France, and states of proliferation concern such as India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and Israel. (U)

The treaty's broad objectives are to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, promote peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and encourage arms reduction efforts by the major powers. Because of its inclusive nature, it bears not only on arms control issues but also on nuclear trade and technology transfer, thus affecting the commercial aspirations of advanced and newly emerging nuclear supplier states as well as the efforts of nations aspiring to acquire or expand nuclear know-how. Consequently, the NPT impinges on East-West and North-South relations and, indeed, on security and economic relations among members of each group. (U)

(b)(3) This will be the third NPT Review Conference; previous reviews took place in 1975 and 1980. The final document issued by the 1975 Review Conference reaffirmed the basic value of the NPT and found that all parties--both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons states--had observed their basic obligations. Although the 1975 Review Conference produced a final declaration, serious disagreements emerged during its drafting, and several parties attached statements taking exception to some of its judgments. [redacted]

(b)(3) The 1980 conferees were unable to issue any such final document. Although no nation actually questioned the basic utility of the NPT in 1980, the proceedings generally mirrored worldwide political friction between the industrialized and the developing, nonaligned nations. The latter, increasingly convinced that the advanced nuclear states were not living up to NPT obligations, adopted confrontational tactics. In the end, neither group was willing to make the compromises necessary to produce a final document, and the conference ended in impasse. [redacted]

The treaty represented a "bargain" between the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear-weapons states, in which the latter agreed to forswear the acquisition of nuclear arms (Articles I and II of the treaty) in exchange for the pledge by the weapons states to work toward arms reductions (Article VI) and to assure access by the nonweapons states to nuclear technology for peaceful, development purposes (Article IV) subject to NPT-mandated safeguards (Article III). (U)

The Conference Setting: Optimism . . .

Numerous factors that complicated the environment surrounding the 1980 Review Conference are now either absent or much less pronounced:

- The general contentiousness that tended to mark North-South relations some years ago is subdued.

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That contentiousness produced a string of demands from the nonaligned nations in numerous world forums for increased power and a greater share of the world's resources.

nuclear exports and acknowledging the need for restraint and accountability in nuclear commerce.

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- World concern over the price and availability of fossil fuels is much less pronounced than in 1980, when oil scarcities and escalating prices spurred many nations, especially in the developing world, to scramble for energy security via nuclear power.

Preconference meetings and contacts have been marked by a noteworthy lack of political posturing,

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This was particularly true of the third and final NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee Meeting in Geneva in late April, attended by most of the significant NPT parties. The Soviets left believing that the outlook for the conference had improved considerably, and the US Mission noted that delegates of all stripes were consistently businesslike, despite the airing of some potentially contentious issues.

- Nuclear trading partners of the United States have grown to understand, if not to agree with, the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA)* of 1978.¹ At the last conference, they were still smarting from its effects.

[redacted] decisions on conference committee

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structure, presiding officers for committees, and the conference president proved much easier than in previous years. In 1980, by comparison, procedural issues were not resolved until the conference itself and then only after considerable wrangling.

- The world economic situation, particularly the debt crisis, complicates and slows efforts to undertake or follow through on expensive nuclear projects. For ample, Brazil and Argentina have, for financial reasons, had to curtail or stretch out some portions of their respective nuclear programs.

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Several important aspects of the world nuclear scene also contribute to optimism going into the review conference:

... Tempered by Concern

At the same time, problems are diverse and complex:

- In the five years since the last review and indeed since 1974 when India tested its device, no additional country is known to have detonated a nuclear explosion.²
- Since 1980, 18 additional nations have adhered to the NPT, adding weight to the arguments of nations urging nuclear restraint.
- According to press and diplomatic reporting, a growing number of countries even outside the NPT, such as China, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa, are adopting a requirement for safeguards on their

- The superpowers are more vulnerable now to charges of inadequate arms reduction efforts than they were in 1980 because of the failed promise of SALT II (strategic arms limitation talks), the Soviet walkout from the strategic arms reduction talks and intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations in 1983, and the US decision in 1982 not to resume talks on a comprehensive test ban.
- Third World allegations that developed nations have not lived up fully to a major NPT obligation have escalated in response to increased, concerted efforts by suppliers to control exports of sensitive nuclear technology.
- Countries of great proliferation concern—Pakistan and Argentina, for example—have made significant technological strides in recent years while remaining

¹ See appendix C for Glossary of Terms. (U)

² Technical specialists still disagree on whether a nuclear device was tested in 1979. A panel of experts concluded in 1980 that a suspicious signal picked up over the South Atlantic probably was not a nuclear explosion, but the possibility of its having nuclear origin could not be ruled out entirely.

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outside the NPT. Their example serves as a conspicuous reminder to the nonweapons states of the treaty's less than universal reach and efficacy.

- In February 1985 six nations—NPT parties Mexico, Sweden, and Greece, and nonparties India, Argentina, and Tanzania—met in New Delhi for a conference that strongly criticized the major powers' arms control efforts.
- In June 1985 a larger group of nations convened for a privately sponsored meeting in Geneva specifically to discuss nonproliferation. The superpowers were again the object of serious criticism on arms control, and there were proposals for greater sharing of peaceful nuclear energy.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Yugoslavia in recent weeks has emerged as the chief advocate of strong arms control criticism of the superpowers and that neutral and nonaligned nations are inclined to go along with such criticism.

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Key Substantive Issues

The substantive work of the review conference will be conducted by three main committees, each chaired by one of the major geopolitical groups represented in Geneva—the neutral and nonaligned, the East, and the West. No neat division of labor and issues will exist, however, and debate in one group will affect or overlap debate in the others.

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Arms Control: Focus of Discontent

Chaired by a representative from one of the neutral and nonaligned countries, Committee I will deal with arms control. This committee's agenda also includes the treaty's nonproliferation provisions, whose implementation record is considerably better today than most observers had expected when the NPT entered into force.

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Chances for a balanced debate are not good, however, given the depth and breadth of feeling on arms control matters. Many non-nuclear-weapons states are actively seeking a *comprehensive test ban (CTB)*, and demands for such a ban have been made repeatedly in the ongoing *Conference on Disarmament (CD)*. Members from all major groups—neutral and nonaligned (Sweden and Mexico), East (USSR), and even some in the West (Australia and Canada)—have advocated a ban and some will raise it in the review conference.

The United States is apt to take a good deal of the heat on the issue of a test ban. At the Conference on Disarmament in June, Brazil accused Washington of failing to live up to its NPT disarmament obligations and to its commitment under the 1963 *Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)* to seek to end weapons testing. We believe that in the same forum, Argentina opposed establishment of a test ban committee out of fear that it would enable the West to claim that progress had been made and thus deflect Third World arms control criticism. Although neither Argentina nor Brazil is an NPT party, we expect numerous Third World countries that are parties to reflect similar attitudes in the review conference. Moscow's recent announcement of a unilateral test moratorium will, we believe, incline Third World nations all the more to use the review conference to criticize the United States on this score.

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Sentiment on the disarmament issue seems unmitigated by ongoing arms reduction talks between the United States and the USSR. At the Conference on Disarmament, for example, Sweden observed that "the mere existence of bilateral negotiations is not enough, in the context of Article VI (on disarmament) of the NPT." Moreover,

[Redacted] the delegates of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are preparing a joint statement (b)(1) takes a similar position. (b)(3)

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Safeguards: The Link to Security

The East will chair Committee II, which will examine NPT safeguards provisions and their relationship to the treaty's nonproliferation provisions. Committee II will largely reflect the views of Moscow. Because the Soviets also strongly favor the NPT and nonproliferation, we judge that they will try to prevent Committee

- Iranian charges that Iraq attacked its Bushehr reactor construction site early this year. [redacted]

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The attacks on peaceful facilities issue arises from an even more fundamental question, that is, whether safeguards are or can be made effective enough to ensure that diversions of nuclear material can be detected and traced.

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The question of attacks on peaceful facilities—growing out of Israel's virtual destruction in 1981 of a safeguarded reactor in Iraq—carries the greatest potential for controversy in this committee. At issue is whether the application of *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*³ safeguards can or should be taken as ironclad assurance of a given facility's strictly nonmilitary nature. Egypt, seconded by Australia, has proposed formal steps leading to a blanket "prohibition" on attacks against safeguarded facilities. Should this proposal prevail, the Iraqis and other countries that apply safeguards but still have weapons aspirations would gain a political victory and at least a marginal degree of added security for their facilities. In contrast, some that have bitter rivals and unsafeguarded facilities could feel even more vulnerable than before to preemptive attack because their facilities would not be included in the ban. Indeed, Pakistan may feel particularly concerned on this

Peaceful Uses: Controversial But Manageable

During Committee III discussions of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and transfer of technology, chaired by the West, we expect substantial neutral and non-aligned criticism of Western positions and policies. Third World discontent with the extent to which the nuclear "haves" are sharing nuclear technology has emerged repeatedly in past review conferences and in a variety of other settings, such as the privately sponsored meeting in Geneva in June. It also was clearly a major concern of delegates to the review conference preparatory meetings

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[redacted] where countries such as Egypt and Bangladesh called for much greater access to peaceful applications of atomic energy.

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(b)(3)re, given its tense relationship with India [redacted]

[redacted] Arab delegations addressing this issue at the April preparatory (b)(3)etings did so in brief, businesslike fashion. Nonetheless, we judge that the issue will remain contentious. Other developments that could complicate Committee II discussions of the issue include:

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- Possible attendance by an Israeli observer. Israel, a non-NPT party, sent an observer in 1980. Its presence this year would improve Egypt's chances of attaining a favorable vote on its proposal.

[redacted]

³ The IAEA is inextricably linked to the NPT by virtue of Articles III and IV of the treaty, which address safeguards and technology transfer, respectively. It is largely through the Agency's safeguards inspection program that Article III is implemented, and the Agency's technical assistance program is an important means by which nations fulfill their Article IV obligations. The IAEA, headquartered in Vienna, numbers among its 112 members all five weapons states and some conspicuous non-NPT parties, such as Pakistan, India, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. (U)

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(b)(3) Relations among Western suppliers as well as supplier-recipient concerns will condition debate on technology transfer issues. Fundamentally, the US instinct to monitor and control the spread of sensitive nuclear know-how often conflicts with the desire of many Western suppliers to expand export opportunities or to pursue advanced technologies domestically. For example, only after considerable diplomatic pressure from Washington did Brussels, which was seeking expanded markets for its lethargic nuclear industry, decide not to pursue a potentially lucrative nuclear cooperation deal with Libya. [redacted]

(b)(3) Another example of the potential for friction among Western suppliers is the Swiss request to retransfer US-origin plutonium from France to West Germany. Because of concern about Bern's export policies and practices, as well as the proliferation potential of recycling plutonium, Washington delayed giving its permission, thereby arousing considerable Swiss ire. Although Switzerland finally received approval, it was conditional and on a one-time-only basis. [redacted]

The United States, the Soviets, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

We believe the Soviets attach great importance to this year's review conference and are disposed to make efforts in behalf of its success:

- (b)(1) (b)(3) • In the April 1985 preparatory meeting, the Soviets were helpful in securing approval of the new conference committee structure. [redacted]
- During US-Soviet nonproliferation bilaterals this year and last, the Soviets agreed on the need to highlight NPT security benefits to all nations, to use the conference to strengthen the treaty, and to avoid polemics.

(b)(1) (b)(3) [redacted]

⁵ Although Libya is a party to the NPT, it has repeatedly and publicly proclaimed its desire to acquire nuclear weapons. (U)

**Assisting Developing Countries:
UK and Egyptian Proposals**

Cairo and London have pushed proposals for new mechanisms to finance nuclear projects in developing countries that belong to the NPT. The British plan would cover diverse projects involving nuclear medicine, agriculture, and power; the Egyptian initiative would focus on power plants, in which Cairo has a particular interest. [redacted] (b)(3)

Both proposals have provoked considerable debate within the Western and Eastern Groups. The United States, Japan, the USSR, Turkey, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, and Italy, among others, registered concern over just how such new funds would be financed; whether they would undercut existing IAEA mechanisms; and, with their clear preferential treatment for NPT parties, whether they would give rise to charges of discrimination in the IAEA, many of whose members are not NPT signatories. [redacted] (b)(3)


At other times, the Soviets have taken more ambivalent nonproliferation positions, either because of their own regional interests or to gain political advantage on the world stage:

- In 1974 Moscow acquiesced in India's nuclear test, rather than risk straining its ties to that nation.
- In years past the Soviets have publicly impugned Western efforts to convince Israel and South Africa to join the NPT, thereby gaining stature among the world's nuclear "have-nots."
- In May 1985 the Soviets exploited the periodic meeting of the Latin American Non-Proliferation Organization, an agency of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with which both the United States and the Soviet Union are associated. [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] the Soviets reiterated their support (b)(3) NPT but criticized the United States in a number of arms control areas. [redacted]

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Despite agreement with the United States on the need to help the review conference succeed, the Soviets are likely to find opportunities to diverge from the United States. [redacted]

[redacted] although Moscow would not use its arms control concerns in ways detrimental to the NPT at the review conference, US officials should not expect Moscow to come to Washington's defense if others criticize the United States on arms control issues. [redacted]

On the basis of various sources, we believe that Moscow intends to avoid polemics at the conference and will not encourage nonaligned nations to make East-West arms control progress a prerequisite for a successful review conference. But if Third World

nations do single out the US arms control record for criticism, we expect the Soviets to feed that criticism by subtly maneuvering on the margins of the conference. If other factors make the review go awry, we fully expect that Moscow will make every effort to deflect blame and redirect it toward Washington.



Prospects

We envision three possible outcomes for the review conference. Two we judge to be equally likely:

- A clear reaffirmation of the NPT, which concludes that treaty benefits outweigh disadvantages.

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***The Soviet Union:
Taking the Moral High Ground***

The Soviets are positioning themselves to use the conference to political advantage and to pressure the United States on arms control. Moscow announced a unilateral weapons testing moratorium beginning 6 August, running through 1 January 1986, and invited the United States to do the same, in which case Moscow claims the halt on testing could be extended. We believe Moscow hopes the move will impress delegates both at the Conference on Disarmament—where test ban sentiment has been growing—and at the review conference. The move also aims, we believe, to portray the Soviets as conciliatory, innovative, and “committed” to arms reduction.

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Moreover, early this year Moscow completed a long-pending accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply safeguards at selected Soviet peaceful nuclear facilities. The Soviets agreed to inspections of 29 power reactors and four research reactors. By comparison, in a similar agreement, the United States lists as eligible for IAEA safeguards all facilities not of specific national security concern—numbering some 230. Even so, the scope of the Soviet offer was broader than expected. At the review conference, we expect Moscow to talk up both moves as it seeks to enhance its image and deflect criticism on arms control toward Washington.

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- An equivocal or indeterminate result, in which conferees merely sum up the proceedings without either revalidating or questioning the treaty’s worth.

And one we see as less likely than either of the above:

- A clearly negative outcome in which delegates strongly criticize the utility of the NPT, or even threaten to withdraw from it

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An unambiguous reaffirmation would be most favorable to US nonproliferation objectives. It would facilitate inducing still more countries to adhere to the NPT, a major US objective. It would also demonstrate to nonparty potential proliferators and to signatories still keeping open a weapons option that international nonproliferation sentiment continues to grow

and with it the potential political cost of running counter to that sentiment. An equivocal outcome would do less for US objectives but would still constitute an improvement over the 1980’s more negative results. Under this scenario, NPT credibility would, we believe, remain intact, and potential proliferators looking for signs that world nonproliferation sentiment has weakened would find none.

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We believe the chances for a reaffirmation of the NPT, after a recitation of its shortcomings, are better than they were before the 1980 Review Conference. The absence of animus thus far and the virtually universal endorsement of the need to work constructively and objectively indicate, in our judgment, that delegates will approach the 1985 review conference in a positive manner. We also believe that over the past five years, general acceptance of the need to restrain countries’ nuclear behavior has grown, despite criticisms heard about specific NPT provisions.

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
Despite our view that a favorable outcome is more likely, a number of factors could work to undermine the conference and produce a negative outcome. We judge it reasonable to expect that the lack of polemics so far will give way during the lengthy conference as complex issues tax the patience and diplomatic tact of the delegates. In particular, we expect the arms control issue to be fraught with possibilities for a conference-threatening impasse because of the persistent criticism of the superpowers in recent years.

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Other factors could pose problems. Several Western countries have shown a desire to alter some NPT-related practices, a tendency that could call attention to treaty flaws rather than strengths:

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expect the US delegation to be confronted with calls for Washington to join in the moratorium, to ratify the *Threshold Test Ban* and *Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties*, and to resume trilateral negotiations (with the United Kingdom and the USSR) on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

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General US involvement with Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan—all of proliferation concern—also has the potential to draw substantial criticism at the review conference. We believe that numerous neutral and nonaligned nations are considering voicing the contention that US nonproliferation policy is not consistently or uniformly applied. In such a formulation, the United States would be charged with dealing extensively with threshold states, such as the above three, while “discriminating” against other countries like Libya, Iran, and Iraq, all NPT signatories. We believe this kind of charge, no matter how spurious, could fall on fertile ground.


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Such proposals, if made at the review conference, would not only open additional, complex areas of debate but also signal neutral and nonaligned nations, who are already wary of some aspects of the NPT, that even US allies are critical of it. We believe this could lead to still greater neutral and nonaligned questioning.

In addition, some nonparties may lobby allies who are parties to affect, and possibly complicate, the conference outcome.

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Conference Pitfalls for the United States

Moscow’s recent announcement of a unilateral testing moratorium was timed, in part at least, to shift criticism toward the United States at the conference. By rejecting Washington’s suggestion that the two superpowers make a joint statement of support for the NPT just before the conference, Moscow further indicated the limits on Soviet-US cooperation at the conference. Thus, the stage is set for the United States to bear the brunt of Third World and Western criticism on the disarmament issue. In particular, we

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~~Secret~~**Appendix A****Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons⁶**

Signed at Washington, London, Moscow July 1, 1968
US ratification deposited March 5, 1970
Entered into force March 5, 1970

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty,"

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the

fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

⁶ *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 1982 edition, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 91. (U)

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Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful use to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special

fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing

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alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more

of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the

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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

This appendix is Unclassified.

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Appendix B Parties to the NPT^a

Afghanistan	Guinea	Philippines
Antigua and Barbuda	Guinea-Bissau	Poland
Australia	Haiti	Portugal
Austria	Honduras	Romania
Bahamas, The	Hungary	Rwanda
Bangladesh	Iceland	St. Lucia
Barbados	Indonesia	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Belgium	Iran	San Marino
Benin	Iraq	Sao Tome and Principe
Bhutan	Ireland	Senegal
Bolivia	Italy	Seychelles
Botswana	Ivory Coast	Sierra Leone
Brunei	Jamaica	Singapore
Bulgaria	Japan	Solomon Islands
Burkina	Jordan	Somalia
Burundi	Kenya	South Korea
Cambodia	Laos	Sri Lanka
Cameroon	Lebanon	Sudan
Canada	Lesotho	Suriname
Cape Verde	Liberia	Swaziland
Central African Republic	Libya	Sweden
Chad	Liechtenstein	Switzerland
Congo	Luxembourg	Syria
Costa Rica	Madagascar	Taiwan
Cyprus	Malaysia	Thailand
Czechoslovakia	Maldives	Togo
Dominica	Mali	Tonga
Dominican Republic	Malta	Tunisia
Ecuador	Mauritius	Turkey
Egypt	Mexico	Tuvalu
El Salvador	Mongolia	Uganda
Equatorial Guinea	Morocco	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ethiopia	Nauru	United Kingdom
Fiji	Nepal	United States
Finland	Netherlands	Uruguay
Gabon	New Zealand	Vatican City
Gambia, The	Nicaragua	Venezuela
German Democratic Republic	Nigeria	Vietnam
Germany, Federal Republic of	Norway	West Samoa
Ghana	Panama	Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of
Greece	Papau New Guinea	Yugoslavia
Grenada	Paraguay	Zaire
Guatemala	Peru	

^a As of 1 August 1985.

This appendix is Unclassified.

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Appendix C

Glossary of Terms

Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)

The weapons states have not succeeded in negotiating a CTB, which would ban all types of nuclear testing, including underground tests. Trilateral negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR broke down over verification issues in 1980 and have not been resumed. The US position is that a CTB remains a long-term goal that must be viewed in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and the maintenance of an effective deterrent. The United States has, therefore, given arms control priority for now to the achievement of arms reductions and to the strengthening of verification measures for existing agreements that limit nuclear testing. The United States decided in 1982 not to resume trilateral negotiations on a CTB. (U)

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The CD is the principal forum established by the international community for the negotiation (as opposed to deliberation only) of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. Created in 1979, the 40-member CD meets in Geneva for two three-month periods annually. It is the first such group in which all five nuclear weapons states participate actively. Members of the CD are now debating a mandate for an ad hoc committee to address the issue of a nuclear test ban. (U)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Established in 1957, largely at US urging, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization affiliated with the United Nations. The IAEA has two main functions: promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy and applying international safeguards when requested to do so by a member nation. Article III of the NPT calls upon non-nuclear-weapons state parties to conclude agreements with the IAEA for application of safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory or under its control (that is, full-scope safeguards). The same article prohibits provision of such material or

equipment for processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any nonweapons state unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to safeguards. (U)

Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)

Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty, this international instrument bans nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water, in outer space, or in any other environment if the explosion would send radioactive debris beyond the border of the country conducting the test. The treaty is of unlimited duration and has been signed by nearly 125 nations, including the United States, USSR, and the United Kingdom, but not China and France. In the preamble to the Treaty, LTBT parties state that they seek to achieve the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." (U)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA)

The NNPA is the major piece of legislation governing US control over its supply of nuclear material and technology. Enacted in 1978, the NNPA established a framework of export licensing criteria, including safeguards and consent rights to retransfers and reprocessing by export recipients. It also called for renegotiation of existing agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation in order to incorporate in them provisions mandated for new agreements, including full-scope safeguards. (U)

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)

This agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was formalized in 1974 but never ratified by the US Senate. Both parties agreed to apply a threshold of 150 kilotons to their underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The PNET is a necessary complement to the threshold test ban because there is no essential distinction between the technology used to produce a nuclear weapon and that used for explosions for peaceful purposes. The US

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continues to believe that ratification should not occur until verification procedures for the treaty are strengthened. (U)

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)

Signed in 1972, this instrument calls upon the United States and USSR not to conduct nuclear weapons tests of any type with planned yields exceeding 150 kilotons. Like the PNET, this treaty was never ratified by the US Senate, and the United States continues to believe that ratification must be preceded by improved verification procedures. Both nations have declared their intention to abide by the 150-kiloton threshold provided the other side does so as well. (U)

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