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CIAGI TR 84-016

Terrorism Review



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26 July 1984

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**Terrorism
Review**

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Cuban Support for Terrorism in South America (S NF)

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*This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor*

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**Cuban Support
for Terrorism
in South America** [redacted]

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In June 1983 Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez acknowledged publicly what other Cuban leaders, including Fidel Castro, had admitted in the past—that one of Havana's basic aims is to foster socialist revolution throughout Latin America. In formulating policies to attain this goal, Cuba divides countries of interest into two broad categories:

- "Operational targets," where either conditions are ripe for revolutionary activity or regimes have earned Castro's particular antagonism. Here Cuba encourages terrorist and guerrilla groups to cooperate and foment violence by offering training, arms, funds, technical support, and advice.
- "Political targets," where regimes are less vulnerable and revolutionary potential is low. There Havana seeks to improve diplomatic and economic ties to overcome its isolation, further Castro's Third World leadership aspirations, and compete with the United States for hemispheric backing. Even in those countries, Cuba sometimes supports leftist terrorist groups.

developments, along with growing Argentine-Cuban trade ties led Havana to scale back its involvement in 1977, although it has continued to train, fund, and offer haven to Montoneros who fought in the Nicaraguan revolution and are operating in Central America and elsewhere in the hemisphere. The Falklands war in 1982 produced closer bilateral ties and continued Cuban restraint in Argentina. After President Alfonsin's inauguration last December, Argentina granted Cuba trade credits worth US \$600 million over three years.

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Consequently, in the last 15 years or so, in almost every instance of leftist terrorism in South America a Cuban hand has been somehow involved. (Peru is the signal exception: the Sendero Luminoso apparently wants nothing to do with Havana.) [redacted]

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Argentina

Cuban connections with Argentina's terrorist groups—the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army—date from at least the early 1970s. Havana provided training, funds, and advice, particularly after 1974, when President Juan Peron's death led to a resurgence in terrorist activity. Following the military coup in 1976, the Argentine terrorist groups were crushed, and two Cuban Embassy employees suspected of aiding guerrillas were apparently killed. These

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