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This information was obtained by [] from TATSUMI in the interview on 25 March 1952.

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Subject: TATSUMI Eichi's Opinions Report No: ZJJ-69
 on Japanese Rearmament
Date of Information: 25 March 1952
Place Acquired: Japan, Tokyo Date Acquired: 27 March 1952
Evaluation: B-3 Date of Report: 4 April 1952

Source: Japanese military officer with intelligence experience, from TATSUMI.

In a lengthy conversation on 25 March 1952, TATSUMI expressed the following opinions and plans concerning rearmament.

1. The policy of the YOSHIDA Cabinet in organizing Japanese defense forces, under the direction of State Minister OHASHI Takeo, is to strengthen and enlarge the National Police Reserve. The number of college graduates who applied for commissions in the NPR (2,000 applicants for 500 vacancies) indicates that public feeling concerning the NPR and rearmament is not as bad as expected. Since many of the applicants were physically unsuitable, the NPR decided to accept only very well qualified persons and to disregard the set number of 500.
2. One of the most important points in formation of national defense forces is to avoid the recurrence of the strong inter-service rivalry which seriously interfered with Japanese military efforts during World War II. It would therefore be desirable to have a civilian defense minister, with separate army and navy departments subordinate to him, or to have separate departments for ground, maritime, and air forces. The former is the better plan, if a suitable civilian minister is appointed. Functionally, it is also important to have a separate and impartial materiel bureau, controlled by neither the army nor the navy, to allocate all materiel. Such an organ would eliminate the bitter rivalry in acquisition of supplies demonstrated between the army and navy during the war.
3. In 1953, an officer training school, tentatively designated the Defense Forces College, will begin giving a four-year course to high school graduates. Until officers trained in this school are ready for service, NPR officers will be selected from formerly low-ranking army officers.
4. A group of naval officers, including Vice Admirals FUKUTOMI Shigeru (福高繁) and HOSHINA Zenshiro (保科善四郎), both former chiefs of staff of the Combined Fleet, presented to FEAF Headquarters a plan for reorganization of the Japanese armed forces, claiming that they had obtained Premier YOSHIDA's approval. Their plan advocated placing the greatest importance on air forces, supplemented by sufficient naval forces to handle coastal defense and escorting of convoys. The ground forces were to remain within the bounds of the NPR, with some small improvement

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in arms and equipment. Some officers of FEAF and ComNavFE Headquarters appeared to be encouraging former Japanese naval officers to organize defense forces around naval and air units, and the Japanese officers were using this encouragement to establish their position with reference to future Japanese military power. YOSHIDA became very angry when their maneuvering came to his attention.

5. The YOSHIDA Cabinet has definitely decided that a central intelligence organization directly under the premier must be organized. The establishment of a national defense force, however, carries a higher priority, and until that is taken care of, no plans for an intelligence organization will be undertaken.

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