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Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. Because of the involvement of the source in the subject matter of the attached report, we are not disseminating it locally, much as we should like to as the Rusk Mission negotiates with OKAZAKI and as the Cabinet is interpellated in the Diet on the rearmament question. We leave it to your discretion as to whether a dissemination in Washington is appropriate.

2. TATSUMI first directly approached \_\_\_\_\_\_ at TATSUMI's residence on 20 January 1952, when he outlined his work for the Prime Minister, his own feeling of inadequacy for carrying out the details of the rearmament planning and his desire for \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to take an active part in the program, specialising in training and education. TATSUMI stated that he felt the MPR should be the basis for the future Japanese army, but \_\_\_\_\_\_ expressed his personal feeling that the NPR lacked the qualifications for serving as the nucleus of a sound military force. How this difference will be resolved is not yet clear.

3. HOSODA, a Maier General SUGAI (fmm) and \_\_\_\_\_ have been serving for some time as \_\_\_\_\_ "research colleagues", and they no doubt will be strongly called upon in his future endeavors. HOSODA was also approached directly by TATSUMI and seconded (\_\_\_\_\_\_ recommendations. TATSUMI desires that HOSODA study the question of remodeling the NFL ~ a defense force.

4. \_\_\_\_\_\_ was at first hesitant to accept TATSUMI's offer, feeling that he had a difficult job of convincing TATSUMI and other like-minded colleagues of the error of their views. Be consulted (\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ who, at our direction, encouraged him to accept, and later discussed the matter with ASHIDA Hitchi, who also desired that he participate with his "research colleagues" to prevent the jeeksying for pesibles of various

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# Security Information

other ex-military eliques. On 28 January, \_\_\_\_\_ gave his consent to TATSURI, who was to see the Prime Minister on the same day.

2 February 1952

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### Security Information

Bubject: Formation of Military Mvisory Report No: ZJL-798 Group to the Prime Minister

> Date of Information: See below Date Acquired: See below

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date of Report: 2 February 1952

Evaluation: C-2

Source: Former Japanese army officer

1. A four-man military advisory group will be formed in the very near future to advise the Prime Minister on military matters through <u>State Minister</u> DKAZAKI Katsuo. The members of this group were selected by former (General) <u>FATSUMI Eiichi</u>, who has been acting for some time as an unofficial military adviser to <u>Prime Minister</u> [for Still A Shigeru, particularly with regard to the problems of the National Police Reserve and the rearmament of Japan. Unofficial notification of their appointments was made to the members of the group on 28 January by <u>TATSUMI</u>, subject to confirmation by OKAZAKI within a few days.

2. The members of this group are:

Former(Major General) MIYANO Masatoshi, chairman Former(Colone) TAKAYAMA Nobutake (書山 右 託 ) Former(Colone) HOSODA Akira Former(Colone) HOGITA Kasuji

(Date of Information: 28 January 1952; acquired: 28 January 1952)

3. SUGITA has been a number of the so-called HATTORI KIKAN, but is no longer a close follower of HATTORI. Both TAKAYAMA and SUGITA have been advising TATSUMI for some time, as well as a former (Hajer General) TAKANETMA (form) and former (Bear Admirel) KAMAMOTO Teshie, shisf of the Maval Affairs Bureau during the latter days of Harld Mar II. YAMAMOTO is YOSHIDA's unofficial nevel adviser and maintains his offices within the Havel Demobilisation Bureau in Tokye.

4. <u>TATSUE</u> has been on the government payroll for some time. He admits that he is unqualified through lack of experience to draw detailed plans, and selected NIYAND and NODERA for this purpose on the recommendation of other colleagues. His actual function appears to have been simply a limiter efficer between the Prime Minister and GEQ, SGAP and the MPR.

(Dute of Informations #1 January 1958; acadirol: 21 January 1952)

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## Security Information

5. The advisory group will be on the official payroll of the Japanese Government, but its physical location is still indefinite. A suggestion by <u>TATSUMI</u> that offices be established within MPR headquarters was vetoed by MIYANO on the grounds that undue attention would be attracted to the group by the fact of their civilian clothes.

(Date of Information: 28 January 1952; acquired, 28 January 1952)