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Reference: 221-737, 746, 747, 748.

Operational Data, and Comments:

The most interesting factor about this report is the new desire on HATTORI's part to begin feathering his own nest and finding his own pipeline vis-a-vis the Japanese Government. Despite the denial of the American major in charge of certain POWACKNEY Operations, the NIHON GUMI MONDAI KENKYU KAI does apparently exist. We wonder if said operations officer has any realization of the extent of HATTORI's Japanese connections; from the supercilious tone of his apologia pro HATTORI, we would judge that he does not.

The other major item of interest is the split between TATSUKI and HATTORI, which can be exploited to our advantage.

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Subject: Advice to the Japanese Government on Rearmament: TATSUMI Eiichi and his Associates.

Report No: ZJI-771  
(PD-342)

Date of Information: As stated

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: As stated

Evaluation: C-2 except as stated

Date of Report: 13 December, 1951.

Source: [ ]

Sub-source for paras. 1-4: MATSUMI Takushiro; Date of Info: As of 26 Nov. 1951; Date Acquired: 7 December 1951

The Japanese newspapers in recent issues have reported that the Japanese Government is seeking the opinions of numerous military experts on the subject of rearmament. However, the military experts whose opinions are being sought on a consistent basis by the present government are just two. They are TATSUMI Eiichi, former Lt. General, AF, from the Army, and former Vice Admiral YAMAMOTO Yoshio from the Navy. Since one of these, TATSUMI, was an Embassy military attache and the other, YAMAMOTO, was a Naval aide-de-camp when Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru was Ambassador to Great Britain, they are highly trusted by YOSHIDA because of past friendship.

Various leading figures in Navy circles have cooperated closely and harmoniously on the rearmament issue. No such degree of factional strife exists among former Navy leaders as there is in the Army groups at present. The intentions and ideas of the Japanese Government, therefore, are brought to the attention of all the leading figures throughout the entire range of former Navy officers through the services of YAMAMOTO Yoshio. Former leaders of the Navy are devoted to the study of these intentions and of a possible rearmament program in full cooperation. YAMAMOTO is therefore in a position to represent to the government the views and conclusions of the entire Navy regardless of his rank and ability. (Evaluation of para. 2: C-4).

On the other hand, TATSUMI Eiichi is by no means in any position to represent the entire Army nor to be aware of rearmament studies being made by various groups of Army strategists. TATSUMI has no organization. Therefore, the main cliques of Army leaders can not get to know the government's position and opinions on the issue of rearmament, and can not make their own planning known to the government. (Sub-source opinion): Though what opinions TATSUMI is submitting to the Japanese Government on rearmament is unknown, a detailed plan for rearmament can by no means be worked out by TATSUMI and one or two of his friends alone. Even if such a program is attempted, it would be a hasty and imperfect one.

TATSUMI and MATSUMI Takushiro are not on bad terms, necessarily, but no operational connection exists between them at present insofar as rearmament is concerned. Prominent figures in the present government, particularly in

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an Attorney General's office... HATTORI has a very... HATTORI is all on the subject of rearmament... apparently because of the hostility of leading leaders and others to HATTORI.

Date of Issue: As of 2 December, 1951; Date Acquired: 10 December; Subject: HATTORI and others by eliciting. Evaluation: C-3.

Special Intelligence Sources on 26 November that HATTORI Akatsugu may be foolish enough to rely on HATTORI and do his work for him, but I (HATTORI) am not". He indicated that during the month of November, HATTORI had contacted him several times concerning the rearmament issue and had asked HATTORI many questions about the latter's studies on rearmament and opinions of what government policy should be. At first, HATTORI, encouraged by reports of HATTORI's warm feeling towards him and high respect for HATTORI's ability, gave out information and advice in general. However, two things annoyed him extremely: (a) HATTORI, when HATTORI queried him directly concerning what the government hoped or planned to do about rearmament and how they would use his planning information, became first vague and non-committal and then supercilious; (b) HATTORI had confirmed very definitely the general report that all recent candidates for posts in the National Police Reserve are queried very closely on past relationships with HATTORI, and if any connection to HATTORI is proven, or even suspected, of any such candidates, they are rejected by the police officials in charge; HATTORI asked HATTORI to do something about correcting this extremely unfair attitude and practice, not for his own sake but because many very able Police Reserve candidates were being rejected for service on the basis of that discrimination; HATTORI made only vague and listless promises and showed by his impatience with the topic being presented to him that he intended to do nothing in HATTORI's defense at all. As a result, HATTORI, who is patriotic enough to want very much at the present time to make his planning ability and the research experience of his group available to the Japanese Government, decided that under those circumstances HATTORI was not a desirable channel of approach. As a result, HATTORI seems to have re-established a fairly close connection to his predecessor as Chief of Strategy, G-1, former Lt. General INADA Seijun (of Masanori: 稲田 正純). HATTORI and his Demobilization Board associates have again become very busily engaged in what are obviously detailed strategic researches, but are being very secretive about them. At the same time, HATTORI has claimed at other times that the U.S. Army has given him no new directives on rearmament study, yet he has consulted quite frequently with INADA Seijun lately. INADA is the so-called military strategy expert of the Japanese Military Operations Research Committee (NEIGH GUMBLER RESEARCH CENTER) of the TANABE Research Institute "TANABE KENKYUSEI" as it is commonly called, directed by TANABE Tatsuzao, the former president of DSO (Defense Pictures) Association. The money behind this powerful research group comes from various sources, particularly former Nitsui-Mitsubishi interests, through the DSO. HATTORI apparently hopes to bring his researches and political circles to bear in this manner, since the DSO and its former president, INADA Seijun, are well acquainted and highly respected in the Liberal Party circles; it is not an unbridled strategy.

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The Japanese Cabinet has recently set up what is commonly known as the "Six-Man Committee" (Six-Man Committee). The actual purpose of this Committee is to give informal advice on the question of de-purge of remaining field grade Army officers andamura order of de-purging general officers. It is composed officially as the Japanese Government's Military De-Purge Committee. All of its members are highly trusted by present Cabinet authorities, but the closest to government circles at highest levels is of course MATSUMI. The actual number of members is believed to be seven, with the addition of MATSUMI. They are as follows:

- Former General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, age about 61;
- Former Lt. General MATSUKI (真木 正), age about 69;
- Former Lt. General KAMABE Torashiro, age about 60;
- Former Lt. General MATSUMI Eiichi, age about 58;
- Former Lt. General MIYAZAKI Shuichi, age about 55-6;
- Former Maj. General YAMAMOTO Naichiro, age about 54;
- Former Lt. General IIMURA Jom (飯村 稔), age about 59;

a. The oldest of these, MATSUKI, retired in the early years of the Pacific War, but came back on duty as a Reserves Lt. General, which rank he held at the end of the war. MIYAZAKI and YAMAMOTO are often associated with SHIMOMURA Sadamu in general rumors current in Army circles. IIMURA was formerly Chief of General Staff for Count General TERADACHI's South Asia HQ.

b. The actually assigned duties of this committee is to examine the records and recommend approval or rejection of the de-purge of former military officers. Its duties extend, however, to recommendations concerning what personnel might be suitable to consider for inclusion in any future Army. They are definitely not doing any research for the Japanese Government on the rearmament question as such, nor does the present Cabinet consult on the rearmament question regularly with any Army officer but MATSUMI.

d. The most interesting point concerning the committee is that at least four of the seven - SHIMOMURA, KAMABE, MATSUMI, and IIMURA - would like to be future Defense Minister or top-level "Special Advisor" on military affairs to the

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