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PERTINENT INFORMATION

Report from [ ]

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If the young able officers should unanimously refuse to enter the Police Reserve, a big gap would likely arise between the Government and former regular officers which would lay the groundwork for serious trouble in the future. If HATTORI were to stand in between them in an attempt to introduce their opinions to the Government and ask for reflection on the Government's methods of selection, it is most highly likely that the Government would think that HATTORI was obstructing or trying to obstruct young officers from entering the Police Reserve with some ambitious design. Yet it was the officers themselves who also violently opposed the Government's selection methods.

e. Source advised HATTORI:

"You may be dissatisfied in many respects with the attitude of the Government, but the important thing is not to get involved in such a matter. But the way to do it is to advise capable persons to enter the Police Reserve. Otherwise, the establishment of the strong army you hope for will become a matter of the far distant future."

f. A few days later, Source met HATTORI and asked him how the recruitment of the Police Reserve officers was going on. HATTORI answered very optimistically that, with their attitude changed, quite a few capable officers were planning to enter the Police Reserve. The development of armament issue would eventually take the course he had once speculated, HATTORI added. HATTORI appears to have individually persuaded the anti-government officers to apply for recruitment.

g. According to the statements of HATTORI, Major General Willoughby issued a directive to the Japanese Government for a mass depurge of former regular officers a few days before he left Japan. After the departure from Japan of Major General Willoughby, however, the Government gradually limited the number of those to be depurged. HATTORI believes that this is a sign of antipathy on the part of the Japanese Government toward him since he was too intimately associated with Major General Willoughby. Or he feels it may be just a malicious plot of the IWAKURO Group.

Rearmament Programs of HATTORI, SHIMOMURA, and TATSUMI.

(Source information based upon eliciting from HATTORI on 22 and 24 Sept. 1951.)

a. Though it is highly likely that neither HATTORI, ~~SHIMOMURA~~<sup>SHIMOMURA</sup>, nor TATSUMI has a separate plan for rearmament at present, ~~HATTORI~~<sup>HATTORI</sup> may have one of his own. HATTORI's armament program is believed to be largely affected by the opinion and advice of SHIMOMURA Sadamu. Consequently, it is almost true that HATTORI's program was fashioned jointly by HATTORI and SHIMOMURA. Practically full details of HATTORI's planning are contained in an article entitled "Should A National Defense Army be Established in Japan?" carried in the April, 1951 issue of "The Mainichi Information Report" published from the Mainichi Press. (Cf. Attachment to this report.)

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- b. There is not a single one among former officers whose rank is above Lt. Colonel who is not concerned with rearmament. Almost every one of them recognizes the necessity of rearmament. But, they are acutely aware of the fact that they are purged. Of course, they anticipate the arrival of the day of depurging, but they do not think that day will come earlier than anticipated. When asked to express their opinions on armament, they are willing to meet the request. However, they do not think they are in a position to organize a rearmament program. It is impossible and prohibited for a purged to propagate and spread among the people the importance of armament. Particularly, therefore, former generals are of the opinion that they have been cut off from the world, even though they have many opinions on armament; but they have and feel no responsibility, no desire and no aspiration to take upon themselves positively the formulation of a rearmament plan. It may be well to regard an ambitious exception like TANIIA Isamu as a crackpot.
- c. The rearmament program can not be executed in a really responsible manner by one person alone, however capable he may be. The more complex the nature of rearmament is, the greater number of capable staff officers it requires. Since HATTORI was fortunately connected with an organized group of the Demobilization Board, he could quite easily collect the staff operations officers necessary for the task. In fact, he has the largest number of efficient staff officers in his "colleagues" group. Before the present issue came to the fore, HATTORI made a great many efforts to get able officers of the former Army's central agencies to work at the Demobilization Board and NYK, regardless of the rearmament plan. Few have such a close connection with as large a number of young able officers as HATTORI. Therefore, HATTORI does not find it quite as difficult to contemplate formation of a new Army. On the otherhand, young officers have seldom even maintained contact with former generals after the Surrender. Even though some do, their number can not be compared with the number of those working for HATTORI. The number of officers who are on intimate terms with SHIMOMURA and TATSUMI is almost negligible. SHIMOMURA and TATSUMI or even IWAKURO Hideo may be capable of working out an outline of a rearmament program, but they have few subordinates who could map out other practical details of the program. However large the number of excellent staff members recruited may be, the plan can not be made in their head alone. The collection of records and data is indispensable. And these materials are most sufficiently procured by the Demobilization Board in Japan. Judging from these points of view, it was only HATTORI who had a large staff and also sufficient available data. No one can compete with HATTORI in ability, sufficiency of data and number of staff officers.  
(Source Opinion)
- d. The facts are that ever since Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, there have been assertions for the absolute necessity of maintaining armed forces in the country. But, positive advocacies for rearmament really began when the establishment of the Police Reserve was demanded by General Arthur in his letter. This fact is commonly known to SHIMOMURA and TANIIA as well as to the general public. If HATTORI had been in a position to formulate the program, there are no doubt that he would have been able to execute it.

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Army has placed HATTORI with the responsibility for the work, there was no opposition from other quarters. Thus, HATTORI's planning was tentatively completed without being bothered by rivalries. Fortunately or unfortunately, however, HATTORI and his staff officers were not permitted to join the Police Reserve. The establishment of the Police Reserve then stimulated the people in general to review the rearmament issue. The deterioration of the Korean War situation led a part of public opinion to the adamant insistence upon the necessity of rearmament. It was in those days that ISHIZUKA and TANIDA were rumored to be contemplating rearmament. By the time such a rumor went around, HATTORI's plan for the Police Reserve had been already completed.

- e. Though their stands differ from one another respectively, SHIMOMURA and MATSUI and HATTORI are all very close friends. It is quite unlikely that SHIMOMURA and MATSUI had been competitively drawing up their own plans for rearmament while HATTORI was doing it by order of the United States Army.

(1) HATTORI told Source several times that among the former Japanese generals now living, no one was so excellent as SHIMOMURA both in character and mental ability. He added that he often called on SHIMOMURA and looked to him for guidance. Although HATTORI was ordered by the United States Army to form the Police Reserve, he stated that he did not intend at all to become the chief in carrying out rearmament. If it were possible to choose a leader of the new army from among former generals, he would like to put up SHIMOMURA, he maintained, because none than SHIMOMURA is better qualified for the position.

(2) (Para. (2) and (3): Date of Information: 3 Oct 1951; Sub-source: HATTORI Yoshitane; Eval: C-3)

MATSUI Michi's comments were that although HATTORI is a target of various denunciations, MATSUI felt HATTORI had neither selfish intention nor ambition. It is absolutely not his idea to have his group monopolize formation of the new army. If HATTORI were allowed, he would choose SHIMOMURA a supreme commander of the new Army, MATSUI believed.

(3) In a lecture to make SHIMOMURA the chief of the new Army, TANIDA Isamu brought a list of the leaders of the new Army of his own choice to SHIMOMURA. Upon taking a look at the list, SHIMOMURA promptly saw through TANIDA's intention to disturb HATTORI's plan. At the same time, SHIMOMURA could note that TANIDA was fairly well acquainted with HATTORI's plan. SHIMOMURA did not care for TANIDA and informed HATTORI of the latter's conducts and gave HATTORI a warning of the TANIDA-HORIBA plot.

Source Comment: A variety of these facts as HATTORI presented them indicate that SHIMOMURA is undoubtedly on HATTORI's side and fully acquainted with his armament plan. In drawing up the armament plan, HATTORI seems to have

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conferred with SHI UOBU at least on its fundamental issues, framework, etc. Consequently, it is close to the truth to draw the conclusion that HATTORI's plan is worked out jointly by SHI UOBU.

2. Judging from the remarks of HATTORI and YAMAGUCHI, it is true that the latter often pays a call on the former. YAMAGUCHI told HANEKE Yoshitane on 3 Oct. 1951, "Since the attention of the world is focused upon us, I endeavor to get along with HATTORI as much as possible. But when I have to see him on business, I call at his house at night secretly."

These facts are evidence of the solid trust and good-will YAMAGUCHI has toward HATTORI. Source had an opportunity to meet HATTORI on 5 Oct. Source learned from HATTORI of the bulk of what HANEKE had told him of YAMAGUCHI's plan. At that time, HATTORI showed an attitude as if he was greatly surprised with the fact that YAMAGUCHI placed such a great trust in him. In spite of the fact that HATTORI had no grudge against YAMAGUCHI, he had never supposed that YAMAGUCHI trusted him so much. It was evident from the conversation that YAMAGUCHI does not give much explanation to HATTORI about his planning studies. In other words, YAMAGUCHI does not seek HATTORI's opinion at all in drawing his own plan. YAMAGUCHI is in the position of closest military advisor to prime minister YOSHIDA, who is reported to have consulted the former on all occasions concerning the rearmament issue. If YAMAGUCHI had a thorough knowledge of HATTORI's plan, his advice to YOSHIDA would be based upon HATTORI's planning studies. He apparently does not have such knowledge, however, so he must have his own plan upon which his suggestions to YOSHIDA are based. If so, his plan is probably not worked out as precisely and minutely as HATTORI's, which is based upon Demobilization Board records, materials, files, and planning studies.

3. YAMAGUCHI Eiichi's other opinions on rearmament and his comments on the persons in question were as follows: (Source: HANEKE; Date of Info: 3 Oct. 1951.)

- (1) Although a war between America and Russia is inevitable in the future, it will not take place soon. Should a war break out in the immediate future, America is not prepared to strike a fatal blow upon Russia promptly. It requires a vast amount of resources to bring Russia to total defeat. However rich a country America may be, it cannot complete mobilization within a short period. At least until 1953, it will be impossible. Judging from the recent decline in American production of war materials, America herself does not appear to anticipate the outbreak of a war in the near future. Russia is not at present contemplating commencement of a full-fledged war either. A war would proceed on in favor of America, if it occurs now. A war would become one of long duration if it starts now. The Arian communication plan would be much more favorably put into practice by having a minor conflict like the Korean War occur in Far East and a similar one in the Near East rather than one full-scale worldwide catastrophe.
- (2) The rearmament of Japan can not quickly be realized. The Japanese financial condition can not at the present time afford the early implementation of rearmament. The national life is too hard presently. Furthermore, the expediting of rearmament of Japan would only rise to unnecessary odium of the PHILIPPINE Government and of British Commonwealths, and such circumstances would lead Japan to

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unfavorable position. Therefore, the urgent steps Japan has to take are to strengthen and reinforce step by step the present Police Reserve instead of regimenting a new Army rapidly. Thus, it is much wiser to await the arrival of the appropriate time for the development of the existing Police Reserve into the equivalent of a national defense army with due consideration of international situations.

(Source Note: Prime Minister YOS. IDA and Source are both in complete agreement to this opinion of HATTORI's)<sup>3</sup>

- (3) Nobody is more qualified than HATTORI to assume the leadership of the new Army in the future. He is wonderful both in character and ability. Anyone who has once met him is completely charmed with him. A variety of malicious criticisms are pelted at him in the public, but he is an entirely unselfish person. Even after the departure from Japan of Major General Willoughby, Source believes the trust of the U.S. Army in HATTORI has never changed.
- (4) The Japanese Government is planning the breakup of the Demobilization Board on the grounds of administrative retrenchment and so on. But, so long as HATTORI enjoys a high popularity of the U.S. Army, the plan would be futile.<sup>4</sup>
- (5) But, the only trouble lies in the subordination of HATTORI. They sometimes make rash statements unnecessarily: "We colleagues are strongly united" or "We maintain consistent local defense organizations throughout the country". ICHIDA, too, is a fine man, but he lacks a discreet attitude. For such a reason, the Japanese Government entertains an antipathy for the HATTORI Group. It fears the HATTORI Group and is trying to stamp HATTORI out. The insistence upon the dissolution of the Demobilization Bureau is a sign of antipathy which the Japanese Government has for HATTORI.
- (6) The general public hold TAKAKA Shinichi, chief of G-1, the Operational Section General Staff Office in the early part of the Pacific War, former Lt. General of the Army, HATTORI and ISUJI Masanobu the most responsible among living persons for having waged the last war. In other words, these three are looked upon as truly responsible for having brought about the Surrender. Such a criticism is equivalent to a death blow for HATTORI. However, fair consideration of the most eligible person to be made a leader of the new Army in the future can result in the appointment of no one but HATTORI. The members of HATTORI's Group should take these points into special consideration, refrain from making irresponsible statements which are quite likely to incur the antipathy of the Government as well as the people, and act as considerately as possible until the right time has come.