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TS 64936

31 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Jackson

SUBJECT : Survey of the Office of Special Operations

1. The attached report on the Office of Special Operations is based upon my participation in certain parts of your survey of OSO during July and August 1951, plus independent conversations which I have held with Staff, Division and Branch Chiefs, reports which I have had prepared, and research into various OSO files.
2. Certain discrepancies in personnel figures may be noted. These are attributable to personnel in transit from headquarters to the field and vice versa.

*Lyman B. Kirkpatrick*  
 LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK  
 Deputy Assistant Director  
 Special Operations

FORMER NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 AUTHORITY: HR 10-2  
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I. INTRODUCTION

HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION. The Office of Special Operations is a direct carry-over from the Office of Strategic Services. When that organization was disbanded at the end of the war, the Secret Intelligence Branch and the X-2 Branch (Counterespionage) were retained as the Strategic Services Unit under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. When the President created the Central Intelligence Group in January 1946, the Strategic Services Unit was transferred to that organization and became the Office of Special Operations.



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II. FINDINGS - GENERAL

1. There is a high degree of professional competence among the Division and Staff Chiefs in OSO, although it is apparent that this professional competence has not always been utilized to its fullest extent in the development of an espionage service directed at the principal targets of intelligence.




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3. There is an extreme shortage of personnel in all classes, ranging from the Branch Chief level to the clerical level. Further, it is obvious that a considerable amount of valuable OSO effort is lost as a result of a shortage of clerical personnel to handle the paper work.



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Germany.

1. In the autumn of 1946 complete information was obtained on the deportation to Russia of German scientists and technicians, virtually at the moment of the occurrence. These deportations were among the first clear signals of Russian long-range intentions. During the next two years intelligence collected reflected phase by phase the Russian economic strangulation of Eastern Germany and Eastern Austria by means of reparations from current production and the seizure of key industries which were combined in Russian-owned corporations and ruthlessly exploited. In this connection it is to be noted that the inauguration of these corporations (SAGs in Germany, USIA in Austria) was reported in the inceptive phase (in the case of



USIA, the original Soviet plan was procured) and coverage has been maintained to the present. The above provided useful background information for the Four Power conferences held during that period.


2. Penetration of the East German police led to early detection of the second significant Russian move in East Germany, the formation of a paramilitary police force (HVA) intended to be the nucleus of a future German army. Continuing intelligence covered development of HVA through a series of reorganizations to the present static stage.

3. Penetration of the East German Foreign Ministry was also accomplished during this period.

4. A highly successful operation developed out of a plan to sabotage some phase of the nickel wire mesh production program in the Soviet Zone of Germany, following establishment of the fact that the mesh was a vital component in the Soviet atomic energy effort. The intelligence requirement for this operation encompassed all phases of mesh production from procurement of raw materials, specialized machinery and machine parts, through the techniques of production of the finished mesh, and finally, to the personnel associated with the wire-weaving industry. After intensive collection of further information from the field and a study of all possible applicable sabotage techniques, physical sabotage itself was eventually ruled out as not permanent enough in effect, and instead the course of denial of key technical personnel was chosen. This was in February 1951. From that date until 21-23 April when the so-called Master Plan was put into action, our bases in Germany, working chiefly through Berlin into the Soviet Zone, recruited and arranged for the defection of eleven technicians and craftsmen from three wire-mesh plants, the loss of whom would cripple the plants in question for the foreseeable future. The actual evacuation operation was successful to the last detail and was followed by the originally unplanned desertion of eight further technicians. It was estimated that this operation would delay from three to six months the completion of the first Soviet isotope separation plant using the wire mesh process and would delay Soviet production of atomic bombs during 1951-52 by a number estimated at six or more. In addition to its denial phase, the operation has produced a wealth of information leading to an important revision in our estimate of Soviet capabilities in the atomic energy field and has opened the way to further operations of a similar and perhaps still more effective nature. It should be emphasized that the above operation was the result of combined OSO-OPC planning in all its phases.

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


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
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
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
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


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


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