

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE  
IN TELEPOUCH

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EXO

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DIST 31 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

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17070-92-7

DOI

3.3(h)(2)

SUBJECT SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN LONG AN PROVINCE  
DURING DECEMBER 1967

ACQ

SOURCE

3.3(h)(2)

SUMMARY-- ACCORDING TO A PRISONER INTERROGATION THE VIET  
CONG /VC/ IN LONG AN PROVINCE ARE ATTEMPTING TO FORM VILLAGE-LEVEL  
LIBERATION COMMITTEES IN ORDER TO GAIN WIDER SUPPORT AMONG THE  
PEOPLE AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COALITION GOVERNMENT. IF A  
COALITION FAILS TO MATERIALIZE, THE LIBERATION COMMITTEES CAN BE  
USED TO SPEARHEAD A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF  
VIETNAM. THE VC HAVE REPORTEDLY DIVIDED SOUTH VIETNAM INTO TWO

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EDITIONS

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AREAS AND WILL CONDUCT A SEPARATE MILITARY PROGRAM IN EACH AREA. THE VC CONTINUE TO SUFFER FOOD, MEDICAL AND MANPOWER SHORTAGES, BUT THESE SHORTAGES DO NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED MORALE. THE LOW RALLIER RATE MAY BE PARTIALLY EXPLAINED BY THE CURRENT RICE HARVEST AND THE PROMISED HWLT IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN LONG AN AFTER TET. END SUMMARY.

POLICY

3.3(h)(2)

1. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE INTERROGATION OF

[Redacted]

PEOPLES' REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

MEMBER, THE VC ARE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH VILLAGE LIBERATION 3.3(h)(2)

COMMITTEES DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE 1967-68 WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN.

[Redacted]

THE VC FEEL THAT THEY LACK SUFFICIENT

CONTROL AT THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET LEVELS AND, IN ORDER TO COMPETE

WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/, THEY NEED TO ESTABLISH THEIR

OWN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIBERATION

COMMITTEES WILL HAVE TWO ADVANTAGES FOR THE VC-- IT WILL FACILITATE

THE FORMATION OF LOCAL VC GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE

EVENT A COALITION GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED AND, IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL,

THE COMMITTEES CAN BE CALLED UPON TO INSTIGATE A GENERAL UPRISING

AGAINST THE GVN. THE SOURCE STATED THAT DISTRICT, PROVINCIAL AND

CENTRAL-LEVEL LIBERATION COMMITTEES WILL BE FORMED DURING THE

SECOND PHASE OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. COMPETENT AMERICAN

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OBSERVERS IN THE PROVINCE BELIEVE THAT THE VC ARE ATTEMPTING TO DE-EMPHASIZE THE COMMUNIST OVERTONES OF THE 'LIBERATION' MOVEMENT AND, BY CREATING A NEW GOVERNMENTAL FRONT, PRESENT A NON-COMMUNIST OR NEUTRALIST FACE. THIS NEW FACE WOULD ALLOW NEGOTIATIONS TO BE STARTED WHILE THE VC CONTINUE THE REVOLUTION THROUGH POLITICAL ACTION INSTEAD OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. EXTENSIVE DEBRIEFINGS OF RALLIERS AND PRISONER INTERROGATIONS DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS INDICATED A FEELING AMONG THE VC THAT THE WAR WILL NOT BE WON ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT WILL BE WON BY POLITICAL MEANS. THAO STATED THAT THE VC HAVE DIVIDED SOUTH VIETNAM INTO TWO AREAS, AND THAT A DIFFERENT MILITARY PLAN WILL BE FOLLOWED IN EACH AREA. [REDACTED] THE AREA NORTH OF AN IMAGINARY LINE DRAWN ACROSS THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF III CORPS WILL BE THE SCENE OF THE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. THE AREA TO THE SOUTH OF THIS LINE WILL FOLLOW A PROGRAM OF TYING DOWN U.S. AND GVN FORCES.

3.3(h)(2)

OPERATIONS

2. DURING DECEMBER THE VC ATTEMPTED TO ISOLATE GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS AND DESTROY OR CUT LINES OF COMMUNICATION /LOC/. THE MAJORITY OF VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES WERE DIRECTED AT NATIONAL ROUTE 4, WHICH RUNS THROUGH LONG AN PROVINCE AND SERVES AS THE MAIN TRAFFIC LINK BETWEEN SAIGON AND THE MEKONG DELTA. AMERICAN OBSERVERS IN LONG AN BELIEVE VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES WERE INTENDED NOT ONLY TO CUT THE

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LOCS, BUT WERE ALSO DESIGNED TO PRESENT A SHOW OF VC STRENGTH TO THE POPULACE IN CONTESTED AREAS AND TO APPLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE AS A MEANS OF ENCOURAGING A CONDITION WHERE FAVORABLE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE INITIATED.

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3.

[Redacted] VC EFFORTS TO RECRUIT YOUTHS AND FEMALES INTO THEIR RANKS.

ACCORDING TO AN ALLEGED DISTRICT-LEVEL VC DOCUMENT [Redacted]

[Redacted] THE VC LONG AN PROVINCE 3.3(h)(2)

CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ISSUED AN ORDER ON 9 DECEMBER CALLING FOR RECRUITMENT OF ABOUT 1500 VILLAGE HAMLET GUERRILLAS BY 10 JANUARY 1968. ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENT EACH DISTRICT WAS REQUIRED TO RECRUIT 400 GUERRILLAS AND EACH VILLAGE WAS TO RECRUIT 100 GUERRILLAS. THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION THAT THE VC HAVE HAD ANY OUTSTANDING SUCCESS IN THIS RECRUITMENT DRIVE. AMERICAN OBSERVERS IN LONG AN BELIEVE THAT IN VC-CONTROLLED AREAS OF THE PROVINCE SOME SUCCESS WILL BE MET, BUT THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE VC CAN RECRUIT 1500 USEFUL GUERRILLAS WITHIN THE ONE MONTH TIME FRAME.

PROBLEMS

4. FOOD SUPPLY CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE VC.

NGUYEN VAN THAO STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE VC HAVE SUFFICIENT RICE, OTHER STAPLES SUCH AS MEAT, FISH AND VEGETABLES ARE BECOMING SCARCE. HE STRESSED THAT VC REAR SERVICE ELEMENTS AND MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE A

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GREATER PROBLEM OF FOOD SUPPLY THAN DO LOCAL UNITS BECAUSE THE GVN HAS DIRECTED ITS MILITARY ACTIVITY MORE TOWARD THESE TARGETS. THIS GVN MILITARY ACTIVITY ALSO HAS FORCED MANY PEOPLE TO MOVE TO MORE SECURE AREAS.

5. THE LACK OF MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES IS A CONTINUING PROBLEM FOR THE VC. GVN MILITARY AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ON MAJOR LOCS HAVE EFFECTIVELY REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF MEDICINE BEING TRANSPORTED TO THE VC BY SUPPLIERS FROM SAIGON. 3.3(h)(2)

 THE VC HAVE SOUGHT TO REPLACE A PORTION OF THEIR SUPPLY LOSSES, CAUSED BY THE GVN RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM, BY DIRECTING LEGAL RESIDENT VC AND FEMALE CADRES WITH FRIENDS IN GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS TO HAVE THEIR FRIENDS PURCHASE ANTIBIOTICS AND MEDICINES FOR THE VC.

6. THE ACQUISITION OF SUFFICIENT MANPOWER TO SUPPORT THE VC MOVEMENT CONTINUES TO BE A CHRONIC VC PROBLEM. ACCORDING TO RALLIER 3.3(h)(2)  
 GVN AND ALLIED SWEEPS AND PACIFICATION OPERATIONS HAVE FORCED PEOPLE TO FLEE TO GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS, THEREBY REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE MANPOWER POOL AVAILABLE TO THE VC. THAT THE VC ARE SHORT OF PERSONNEL IS SUGGESTED  THAT IN PAST 3.3(h)(2)

YEARS THE VC COULD CONSCRIPT LABOR FORCES TO ASSIST IN MINING ROADS AND IN REMOVING WOUNDED AND DEAD FROM THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT THAT NOW THREE-MAN UNITS CONDUCT THE MINING OPERATIONS AND VC TROOPS SOMETIMES

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LEAVE THEIR DEAD BEHIND AFTER AN OPERATION.

7. VC REACTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS ARE DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN. RALLIER FIGURES CONTINUE TO BE LOW AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN LONG AN FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. THESE LOW FIGURES SUGGEST THAT THE PROBLEMS FACED BY THE VC ARE NOT AS SERIOUS AS HAS BEEN BELIEVED AND THAT CADRES ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT DEVELOPS FROM THE CURRENT THEME BEING EXPRESSED IN THE PROVINCE THAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL CEASE AFTER THE TET HOLIDAYS. THE CURRENT RICE HARVEST IN LONG AN PROVINCE MAY ALSO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOW DECEMBER FIGURES OF TWO INFRASTRUCTURE RALLIERS. OTHER VC INFRASTRUCTURE LOSSES WERE 9 KILLED AND 12 CAPTURED.

3.5(c) 8. [Redacted] DIS EM-- STATE USMACV CORDS 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO [Redacted] CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

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