

Studies in Intelligence

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Iraq's 1963 Coup: A CIA Plot?

NR Record

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
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
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(U) . . . why write an article about something we didn't do? Partly to set the record straight, but also because the record reveals an interesting story in its own right.

(U) Introduction

(U) On the morning of 8 February 1963, units of the Iraqi Army launched a coup. First they assassinated the Iraqi Air Force commander. Next, Iraqi aircraft dive-bombed Rashid Airbase. Within hours, the Iraqi Army Fourth Tank regiment had surrounded the Ministry of Defense (MOD) compound. Other military units seized regime facilities and captured commanders loyal to the Iraqi prime minister, 'abd al-Karim Qassim. Meanwhile, armed squads of civilians went door to door, killing Qassim's associates and senior members of the Iraqi Communist Party. The coup's politicians, mostly from the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, announced the new National Council governing the country. Qassim surrendered the next day, and after a brief "trial," his captors executed him with a gunshot to the head and showed his lifeless body on television. On 11 February, the United States led the international community in formally recognizing the new government of Iraq.^a

(U) One author later called the coup "one of the most elaborate CIA operations in the history of the Middle East." Another identified the main coup leader—CIA Near East Division chief James Critchfield. A Saddam Husayn biographer concurred. As Operation Iraqi Freedom was getting underway in March 2003, a *New York Times* columnist noted the irony that CIA had installed the Ba'ath party in 1963 to begin with. Tim Weiner, in his history of CIA, *Legacy of Ashes*, called it a CIA coup. In a 2009 book, even the respected Rashid Khalidi, director of Columbia University's Middle East Institute, said CIA was behind the overthrow. In separate issues of the academic journal *Diplomatic History* in 2013, two more scholars suggested CIA complicity. CIA sponsorship of the coup is an article of faith among Iraqis. The problem is, it's not true. The February 1963 coup was not an agency-backed program in any manner.¹

So why write an article about something we didn't do? Partly to set the record straight, but also because the record reveals an interesting story in its own right.

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^a 'abd al-Karim Qassim was an Iraqi Army colonel who came to power in a coup on 14 July 1958. Readers familiar with Iraq in recent years will recognize the date, 14 July, as memorialized in the name of the 14 July Bridge on the southern edge of Baghdad's International Zone.

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
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A CIA Plot?**Washington treated the loss of Iraq as a crisis.**

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longer-term support to anti-communist proxies, abetted by a new emphasis in the US military and Kennedy White House on the discipline of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

(U) At that time, congressional oversight and scrutiny of covert action was also far less than it is today. The mid-1970s congressional investigations into covert actions revealed a range of embarrassing plans, including an alleged plot against Qassim involving a poisoned handkerchief. Though the handkerchief story does not appear to have been a serious plan (if ever a plan at all), it is true that, back then, CIA had greater latitude to explore circumstances for the elimination of a foreign leader. This would change as a result of the mid-1970s congressional investigations and media exposés, which led to greater restrictions—including the prohibition of assassinations—more oversight, and a rigorous process of securing presidential Findings. Due to a paucity of such measures in the early 1960s, however, the historical record is murky enough for conspiracy theorists (and some otherwise scholarly writers) to entertain stories such as the CIA's alleged complicity in the anti-Qassim coup of 1963.

(U) The Policy Background

(U) As 1958 began, the Cold War balance of power in the Middle East was reasonably tolerable to the United States, which counted Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia as “pro-West,” to use the term of the era. But over the course of 1958, the US position in the region grew precarious. Egyptian President Gamal

‘abd al-Nasser, the most notable Arab nationalist at the time, had joined his nation with Syria into an Egyptian-Syrian state called the United Arab Republic. In Iraq, Qassim ousted a Western ally, and US policymakers saw Qassim’s acceptance of military aid from the Soviet Union as disrupting the balance of power. By the end of 1958, the Soviet position in the Middle East had strengthened markedly.

Washington treated the loss of Iraq as a crisis. To coordinate a US response, the State Department created the interagency Special Committee on Iraq, with senior representatives from the State Department, NSC, CIA, and the US military. In today’s terms, this was essentially a recurring Deputies Committee meeting, together with the relevant agencies’ top Middle East hands. Committee members discussed the range of policy responses, including overt and covert use of force to unseat Qassim.

On the committee, the US military and CIA favored armed intervention, stating in April 1959 that “time is of the essence and . . . we had about reached the point of ‘now or never.’” In May, a CIA attendee insisted that the United States “should move with all dispatch to throw the Communists out of Iraq.” Committee members considered several ideas, such as supporting an Iraqi government-in-exile and even conventional military operations. But the State Department was cautious, noting the lack of an internal Iraqi actor with whom to partner, and believing that US action would be locally unpopular and counterproductive.³

enabling CIA to apprise policymakers of the likelihood that a regime change was coming. (In fact, the agency’s warnings of a coming coup have often served as “proof” for conspiracy theorists that we were in on the planning.) Importantly, the story is a window into a transformative period for US foreign policy in the Middle East that involved discussions not unfamiliar to us today: crises in Iraq and Syria, and presidential consideration of CIA covert action.

(U) The years of Qassim’s tenure, 1958 to 1963, were a period of transition for US covert action. In 1958, covert action’s reputation still benefited from the legacy of operations in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), which had made covert regime change appear relatively easy. In the late 1950s, CIA was still preparing stockpiles of arms and gear that could be delivered to anti-communist insurgents on short notice, should the United States see an opportunity to assist another overthrow. But events around that time began to shake the faith

as governments across the developing world appeared to be more—not less—vulnerable to communist influence, despite broad US overt and covert efforts otherwise. More dramatically, the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba soured the John F. Kennedy administration to such operations. By the early 1960s, the favored model was

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(U) Anti-Qassim Planning

[redacted] Though lacking orders to use force against Iraq, the inter-agency committee charged CIA with developing contingency plans in case a future development warranted covert intervention.

[redacted]

[redacted] **Though lacking orders to use force against Iraq, the inter-agency committee charged CIA with developing contingency plans in case a future development warranted covert intervention.**

[redacted]

unsuccessful civil war against (b)(1) Kurds in the north created ene(b)(3) within the Iraqi Army. Persecution of civilian dissent cost him a great deal of popular support. In June 19(b)(1) State Department said that “we(b)(3) very much in mind the desirability of early recognition of a non-Communist successor regime (provided it appears able to hold power),” and was ready, via the US Embassy in Iraq, to offer financial assistance to a new Iraqi government. This is, in fact, what would happen in February 1963.⁵

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3)

[redacted] By early 1960, policy-makers no longer viewed Iraq as a crisis. By then, an outright communist takeover of Iraq seemed unlikely. The Special Committee on Iraq disbanded in March. When John F. Kennedy took office the next year, his administration was somewhat hopeful about Iraq. In March 1961, the State Department wrote that “U.S.-Iraq relations during the past year have returned to a measure of normalcy . . . [and that] . . . indications are that further improvement can be expected.”⁴


(U) Through 1961, the US focus on Iraq shifted toward monitoring internal stability and preparing a policy response to any major changes. Qassim appeared vulnerable: his purges of military personnel suspected of disloyalty and an unpopular,

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A CIA Plot?



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THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

(U) Brief notes about or related to Iraq were included in some 20 issues of the Checklist during 1962. Most items dealt with regional relationships, Soviet military sales, and Iraqi conflict with its Kurdish population. The [redacted] items addressing coup possibilities are summed up in the last two entries of the year.

12 December 1962

Iraq. a. Plotting against Qasim by both Baath nationalists and Hashemite royalists is--yet again--well advanced.

b. One problem has been that the Baathists who have a better chance of success, have been waiting for a royalist assassination of Qasim.

[redacted]

c. We have reported plots against Qasim before and he is still around. Qasim's prestige is at a new low, however, and the current plans are unusually circumstantial. The Baath has in fact held rehearsals.

d. On the other hand, the Baathists do not have a good record for keeping coup plans secret; if we know of this one, Qasim's security apparatus probably does too.

20 December 1962

e. Iraq: Plotters called off the coup which they had planned [redacted] Timely reassignment of key military officers makes it obvious that Qasim's boys knew what was afoot.

1963

(U) Two items in January presaged the coup. One on 15 January noted that "the regimes of Jordan, Syria and Iraq are now plagued with serious domestic troubles and we would not be surprised to see the lid blow in any one of these countries." The second, devoted exclusively to Iraq took note of Qasim's "inept handling" of the campaign against Kurds in northern Iraq and pointed out the increase in military dissatisfaction with his leadership. The following item led the 8 February 1963 edition of the PICL.

8 February

Iraq a. The revolt against Qasim began this morning.

b. It is being led by Army officers, many of them members of the Baath party. Qasim virtually jarred the conspirators into action by undertaking within the past few days to purge army ranks of officers suspected of opposing him and by arresting a number of Baath party leaders.

c. Baghdad radio is in the hands of the insurrectionists. It claims that Qasim has been killed. (A background summary on the revolt is included separately.)

(Editor's note: See following page for the first page of the one and a quarter page summary.)

[redacted]

This graphic is classified [redacted]

ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Via cables, the State Department also apprised Washington of the coup, i(b)(3)(3) prospects, and the policy implications as the events unfolded. Much (b)(3) of the declassified State Department correspondence is now available to the public in the Foreign Rela(b)(1) of the United States (FRUS) se(b)(3) (b)(3) Also available now are the somewhat redacted PICLs and PDBs published during the Kennedy/Johnson administrations. (See following page for (b)(3)

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8 February 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Background on Revolt in Iraq

1. The Baath was formed in Syria in 1954 by Michel Aflaq and Akram al-Hawrani. It is "socialistic," pan-Arab, anti-West, anti-Communist, and the most widely organized political party in the Arab world today. However, it is rent with dissension and divided into pro- and anti-Nasir factions. In Iraq, the party pays lip service to Nasir's pan-Arabism, but it has no wish to see Iraq's identity submerged in a Nasir-controlled state. While anti-Communist, the Baath could not be expected to reverse present policy toward Moscow in such fields as arms procurement and trade. However, the Baathists would favor a more neutral policy between the Soviet Bloc and the West than has Qasim.

2. Several of the key leaders of the present revolutionary group have been identified as Baathist army officers. [redacted]

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3. The move against Qasim was sparked by a number of factors. Qasim has attempted persistently to crush the Baath. (The Baath in October 1959 nearly succeeded in killing him and he was hospitalized for two months.) His strongly pro-Communist policies, his unsuccessful 20-month old campaign against the Kurds, his bitter feud with Nasir, and the loss of face caused Iraq by his insane antics were further incentives to revolt.

4. The USSR has suffered a setback in Iraq. There is little doubt that the new revolutionary regime will do its best to crush the Communists for good. A blood bath is likely. Street fighting between Communists and anti-Communists is going on in Baghdad now.

5. The Arab World: Nasir will be given a great boost by the success of the coup--he will do

(U) The remainder of this paragraph briefly evaluates the impact of the coup on regional relationships. The next, concluding, paragraph suggests that if the "revolution" succeeds, the new government is likely to evolve into a coalition of anti-communist nationalist elements.

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
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a summary and background on the coup that was delivered to the White House with the morning's PICL.)

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] **The honeymoon between the US government and the new government in Iraq was short-lived: within months, extremist elements of the Ba'th were pushing the moderates out.** (b)(3)



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diplomatic relations with Iraq (b)(1)
until the mid-1980s. (b)(3)



(U) The Allegations of CIA Complicity

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] The honeymoon between the US government and the new government in Iraq was short-lived: within months, extremist elements of the Ba'th were pushing the moderates out. In July, 1963, CIA's Office of National Estimates noted "a growth of a spirit of violence and extremism, expressing itself in street killings and summary executions." By that time CIA assessed that the Ba'th "does not have broad popular support," and that its repressive measures were causing most Iraqis to oppose it. In November, a more radical faction consolidated power, at the expense of the remaining moderates and minor parties that had initially supported the Ba'th.¹¹

(U) In contrast to the above account, scores of books, articles, (b)(3) reviews, and blogs have asserted CIA responsibility for the coup, often invoking one particular line—quoting a Ba'th Party official as saying, "We came to power on a CIA train." The most confident assertions that the coup was a CIA plot all seem to track back to Said K. Aburish's *A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite* (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1997). Not everyone cites him directly: Lloyd Gardner cites Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, who cite Aburish; Rashid Khalidi cites Tim Weiner, who cites Aburish. In 1997, Andrew Cockburn wrote an article for the UK *Independent* announcing that "fresh evidence has emerged" that the coup was "organised and fine-tuned by the CIA." The new evidence was Aburish's book.¹³

(U) The United States continued to have uneasy relations with Iraq for several years. The United States evacuated its embassy during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War when it became one of the numerous US embassies throughout the Middle East to be targeted by protesters, angry over presumed US complicity in Israel's attack on its Arab neighbors.¹² With the exception of a small interest office beginning in the early 1970s, the United States would not have formal

(U) Problematically, *A Brutal Friendship* falls well short of any reasonable scholarly standard. According to one book review, most serious academics and career diplomats who had served in the Middle East dismissed the book. *A Brutal Friendship* is replete with conspiracy, hyperbole, half-truths, blurred context, and lack of sourcing for its boldest claims.¹⁴ The author's key sources for CIA

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(U) Former CIA analyst [redacted] may have inadvertently led some readers astray by stating in a 1988 book that the coup "was forecast in exact detail by CIA agents."

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complicity in the 1963 coup were left unidentified, and—for the quote about “coming to power on a CIA train,” he cited only an article in *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, an Arabic-language newspaper published in London, dated 14 February 1996. He provided neither context nor elaboration of the quote’s usage.

(U) An earlier version of the “train” quote appears in an article by writer Sami Yousif, in a multi-author volume called *The Gulf War and the New World Order* (Zed Books, 1991). According to Yousif, Ali Salih al-Sa’di said in 1971 that “we came to power on an American train.” Yusif gives no citation, and Yousif’s ensuing sentence suggests that al-Sa’di was actually talking about Ba’th-US cooperation in the period after the coup, i.e., that US support helped the Ba’th Party consolidate its power. It is an alarmingly spurious basis on which so many accounts of the coup have come to rest. (Nor is Yousif’s article compelling: his thesis is that the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was actually a covert, US-backed Iraqi invasion, deployed in order to justify further US intervention in the Middle East.)¹⁵

plotting; in fact, the reporting was so voluminous that the daily *Central Intelligence Bulletin* ceased highlighting each report as it came in and instead folded them in to the *Weekly Review*. But awareness does not equal complicity, and the inference that CIA’s knowing about something means CIA has therefore caused it is illogical.¹⁶

(U) Former CIA analyst [redacted] may have inadvertently led some readers astray by stating in a 1988 book that the coup “was forecast in exact detail by CIA agents.” This quote appears in several accounts as evidence of CIA complicity; however, the word “agents” is how CIA refers to *foreign nationals* who are recruited to provide secrets. [redacted] is correct that agents of the CIA reported the plans of the coup to CIA officers.¹⁷

Because CIA had links with a group beforehand, CIA directed its actions. This is a recurring fallacy in the literature on CIA, from the Cold War era to the more recent world of counterterrorism. In the 1950s and 1960s, the agency had contacts with scores of oppositionist groups in the Middle East, many of which would later emerge as adversaries. In some cases, [redacted]

(U) Themes of the Evidence Offered in Support of the Claim CIA Was Involved in the Iraqi Coup

Because CIA had advance information on the coup plans, CIA was responsible. It is true, as stated above, that the agency disseminated reports about the coup

the agency gave modest subsidies to some of their media outlets. In others, the agency used them to spread specific covert action themes. Hundreds of groups around the world received covert funding from CIA during the Cold War and afterward. In nearly all, a key CIA motive was

to gain intelligence reporting on their activities. [redacted]

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(U) Alleged admissions by then-NE Chief James Critchfield. Several authors allege that former NE Division Chief James Critchfield has acknowledged CIA responsibility. In one oft-cited quote, Critchfield says, “We really had the T’s crossed on what was happening. . . . We regarded it as a great victory.” The quote is from the aforementioned Cockburn biography of Saddam Husayn, *Out of the Ashes*, sourced to a personal interview with Critchfield in 1991—though with no context on exactly what part of the events Critchfield was talking about.

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[redacted] It appears that the quote concerned CIA’s reporting, not operations. [redacted]

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A CIA Plot?

(U) One wonders why CIA would have had to tell the conspirators—many of whom were insiders in the security services and savvy politicians—whom they needed to eliminate.

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[redacted]

(U) Other writers cite an interview Critchfield gave PBS, which appeared in a 2000 *Frontline* television special on Saddam Husayn. In it, Critchfield's comments that the agency was well-informed about the coup are used to suggest CIA involvement. But this is the fallacy addressed above, that foreknowledge equals control. Further, the writers ignore that elsewhere in the interview Critchfield says CIA wasn't involved. Nowhere in the public or classified record does Critchfield state that the coup was an agency operation.

[redacted] ***Because the United States welcomed the coup, it was complicit.*** One frequently-referenced passage is from NSC official Robert Komer, who on the day the coup began called it "a net gain for our side." Another is from Baghdad embassy political officer James Akins, who said that, "On account of the Ba'ath coup, we enjoyed better relations with Iraq." These and many quotations like them, in which US officials praise the overthrow, do nothing to demonstrate that the coup was a US program.

(U) Several writers point to the fact that US Embassy Baghdad contacted the rebels on 9 February, the second day of the coup, and promised them recognition if they succeeded. This is true, as a now-declassified cable from the embassy attests. According to an earlier Washington memorandum in June 1962, the State

Department had been prepared for such a contingency. But nowhere do these documents imply that the United States had brought on the coup; instead, they reflect the sort of pragmatic foreign policy decisions of the US government that occur as one regime appears to be well underway in supplanting another.

[redacted] In fact, policymakers preferred to wait until Iraq approached the United States [redacted]

ernment were well-known, as were the communist party members. The Iraqis themselves had the keenest understanding of who controlled the Qassim regime and the communist party—not Americans.

(U) Aburish and others claim that CIA broadcast the names of those to be killed over the airwaves from a radio station outside Iraq in order to inform the hit squads. King Hussein of Jordan once asserted that this was the case, which several writers have mentioned as evidence. But this also fails the common sense test: if CIA had given the coup its instructions via open radio broadcast—heard by large swaths of the population—why would this fact need to be "revealed" by one person years later?²⁰

(U) Has Anyone Gotten it Right?

(U) ***That the presence of lists of people to be eliminated implies a CIA hand.*** Another theme—and the most sensational—is the assertion that the thousands of deaths during and soon after the coup were CIA-ordered murders. Said Aburish alleges that CIA compiled lists of people to be killed, positing the number 5,000, but suggesting it could have been as high as 30,000. He fails to give compelling evidence for such a strong assertion, and an agency role in the killings makes little sense. One wonders why CIA would have had to tell the conspirators—many of whom were insiders in the security services and savvy politicians—whom they needed to eliminate. The senior security officials in the Qassim gov-

(U) Thankfully, yes. The best (though apparently least-read) histories from academia generally have it right. The superior account is by Hanna Batatu, in *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton University Press, 1978). Batatu mentions the allegations against CIA but says that agency involvement cannot be certain. Batatu points out the ease with which the information on whom to eliminate could have been gathered by Iraqis themselves.

(U) Another good source is that of Peter and Marion Sluglett, whose *Iraq Since 1958* (I. B. Tauris, 1990) says the compilation of the lists is a

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A CIA Plot?

matter of conjecture and was within the motives and abilities of many groups in the Middle East. Books by Ofra Bengio, Charles Tripp, and Phebe Marr also leave CIA out of the equation, and they consider internal Iraqi factors, such as Qassim's repressive measures, as influencing the coup. A well-researched 2011 article in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* discusses several of the joint security programs between the United States and Iraqi Ba'ath government, in proper context, without the allegation that CIA had been behind the overthrow. A recent book, *Mission Accomplished? The United States and Iraq Since World War I* (Oxford University Press, 2011), by Peter L. Hahn, gets it right—though one reviewer castigated him for failing to conclude that the coup was a CIA machination.²¹

(U) Some broader histories of the Middle East by reputable scholars have also avoided the canard. Malcolm H. Kerr's landmark *The Arab*

Cold War: Gamal 'abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970 (Oxford University Press, 1971) depicts the coup in indigenous terms with no mention of CIA. Odd Arne Westad, in his Bancroft Prize-winning *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2007) does not mention a US plot, when a lesser scholar would have had every reason to do so in a book about US and Soviet power abroad during the Cold War. Douglas Little has a good depiction of the internal dynamics of the coup in *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (University of North Carolina Press, 2002), which appropriately puts into context the US government's pleasure at Qassim's fall.²²

(U) In the end, a healthy skepticism might still prompt one to wonder whether there is some remote possibility that the 1963 coup was a CIA operation. We are, after all, in

the intelligence business, and we're supposed to be skeptical. Could this have been a program so secret as to have avoided leaving any trace, even today? Is the entire documentary record a collection of forgeries and "eyewash" records—and one that moreover has deceived the Cold War scholarly community and historians of the Kennedy administration? Was there a secret cabal within the US government powerful enough to topple foreign governments, but whose activities have never been revealed? Did the mid-1970s congressional committees in their wide-ranging access to government secrets miss this? (Or did they discover it and join the cabal?) At that level, only the most incorrigible conspiracy theorist would cling to the belief that CIA was behind the 1963 Iraq coup. The fact that many writers will do so, undaunted, is sure to keep the issue alive. For CIA historians, at least it keeps the job interesting.



Endnotes

1. (U) In order as cited in the paragraph: Said K. Aburish, *Nasser: The Last Arab* (St. Martin's Press, 2004), 213; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World War II* (The New Press, 2009), 196; Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein* (Harper, 1999), 74; Roger Morris, "A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making," *New York Times*, 14 March 2003; Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (Doubleday, 2007), 141; Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (Beacon Press, 2009), 151; Tareq Ismael, review of Peter L. Hahn, *Mission Accomplished? The United States and Iraq since World War I* (Oxford University Press, 2012) in *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 3 (June 2013), 605–7; Eric Jacobsen, "A Coincidence of Interests: Kennedy, U.S. Assistance, and the 1963 Iraqi Ba'ath Regime," *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 5 (November 2013), 1029–59.

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12. (U) Robert B. Semple Jr., "U.S. Flies Planes to Libyan Base and Beirut to Evacuate Citizens," *New York Times*, 7 June 1967, 18.
13. (U) Full citations for these works are provided in endnote #1. Cockburn, "Revealed, how the West set Saddam on the Bloody Road to Power," *UK Independent*, 29 June 1997.
14. (U) This is the present author's judgment, which several reviewers share. Middle East historian Daniel Pipes—controversial due to his denunciations of the academic field of Middle East history—called *A Brutal Friendship* "the slightly deranged musings of one out-of-touch intellectual." In Aburish's section on Iraq in the early 1960s, a pro-Qassim bias is apparent: "For twenty-four hours Kassem fought back, and throughout he behaved like a gentleman officer. . . . When the time to execute him came, he shouted, 'Long live the people' with a steady voice which betrayed no fear or remorse." Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 138–39.

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15. (U) Sami Yousif, "The Iraqi-US War: a Conspiracy Theory," in *The Gulf War and the New World Order*, Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., (Zed Books, Ltd., 1991), 51-69.

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20. (U) Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'ithists and Free Officers* (Princeton University Press, 1978), 985-86. Batatu recounts King Hussein's accusation but remains neutral on its veracity.

21. (U) Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, 966-994; Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (I. B. Tauris, 1990 revised edition, original 1987); Ofra Bengio, *Saddam's World: Political Discourse in Iraq* (Oxford University Press, 1998); Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3rd edition; Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Westview Press, 2012), 3rd edition; Steven Hahn, *Mission Accomplished?*; Weldon C. Matthews, "The Kennedy Administration, Counterinsurgency, and Iraq's First Ba'ithist Regime," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43 (2011), 635-53. In the June 2013 issue of *Diplomatic History*, political scientist Tareq Ismael reviewed *Mission Accomplished?* and offers several pieces of "evidence" that CIA was pulling the strings, but the evidence is nothing more than the fallacies mentioned in this article.

22. (U) Malcom H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970* (Oxford University Press, 1971), 3rd edition; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third-World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (University of North Carolina Press, 2002).



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