


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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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
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


STRAINS IN THE ANGOLAN REBEL MOVEMENT

11

Dissidents within Holden Roberto's proclaimed government-in-exile and criticism elsewhere in Africa confront him with his most serious challenge to date.

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
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STRAINS IN THE ANGOLAN REBEL MOVEMENT

Angolan nationalist leader Holden Roberto is under increasing fire from dissidents within his movement and from critics elsewhere in Africa. As long as the squabbles inside the Leopoldville-based Angolan leadership persist, they will further hamstring the efforts of rebel forces inside Angola to cope with the continuing pressure from the Portuguese.

The rebellion's lack of progress is in fact at the root of Roberto's problems. His military forces are ill-equipped and poorly clothed and fed, partly because of his failings as an administrator. Although the Portuguese are not capable of wip-

ing out these forces, the rebels cannot do more at this stage than harass the Portuguese. Discontent apparently is endemic at the Angolan training camp in the Congo south of Leopoldville, and it probably was his desperate need to mollify his troops which led Roberto to announce in January that he would seek aid from Communist countries.

Both the military stalemate and Roberto's ill-planned lurch toward the Communists have reinforced the restiveness of his associates in his "government-in-exile." They have long chafed at his moodiness and his tendency to concentrate all authority--

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Asia-Africa

including control of funds--in his own hands. Most of them are irritated by his inefficiency, and many object to his narrow tribal outlook. "Foreignminister" Jonas Savimbi, an Ovimbundo from central Angola, and the movement's second most influential member, has repeatedly said he plans to oust Roberto, a Bakongo from the north.

committed to Roberto's group-- may have renewed pressure for the inclusion of rival groups in the government-in-exile.

Roberto may still be able to surmount these challenges. He has many things working in his favor: his proven ability to keep internal dissidence under control, the lack of unity among his critics, his control of funds, the support he has always received from Congolese Premier Adoula, and his established position as a leader of the Bakongo, who so far have done most of the fighting. The present discontent is his most serious challenge to date, however.

On the international front, 12 African states have recognized Roberto's proclaimed government but many of these have been disillusioned by the stalemate in the rebellion itself and by Roberto's inefficiency.

Algeria--which has given the Angolans most of their arms and training but has never been wholly

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