

(20)

20 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

BEST COPY  
AVAILABLE

SUBJECT : Status Report on MHCHAOS Activities

1. There has been a drastic reduction in traffic and requirements concerned with MHCHAOS-related matters during 1973, partially a reflection of the end of American military activities in Southeast Asia--(resulting in the elimination of the draft and the demise of massive domestic and international antiwar activities) and partially a result of "present realities"--which has led to the cessation or the "withering away" of requests and requirements by the White House and the IEC for special studies as well as such routine monthly efforts as the "Calendar of Foreign Events" which focused on upcoming international activities designed to support/encourage and coordinate efforts in conjunction with domestic extremist/militant plans and actions.

2. The breaking-up and the dissolution of major United States' antiwar groups and organizations has, in turn, resulted in a radical decrease of trips to Hanoi by American militants and has very significantly affected the number of visits/consultations/strategy sessions with DRV/PRG representatives [REDACTED]

3. The above developments in the "radical/militant antiwar" sector were preceded by a similar trend in the extremist youth/New Left circles, the "deserter support and inducement" field, as well as in the so-called "underground media/Liberation and Movement News" field.

4. Finally, the dissension among American black political extremists and hijackers abroad, i.e., the break up of the [REDACTED] Black Panther Faction [REDACTED] and other similar fractionalizations, to a great part the result of an inability of the main protagonists to capitalize on their status as "international revolutionaries," have reduced these activities to a shadow of former dimensions.

5. The major effort in the MHCHAOS-related field has been and remains directly responsive to requirements levied upon the Agency by the FBI. These requests were separate from the White House requirements although, in many cases, they involved parallel matters or were interrelated. They were and remain as follows:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date

17 APR 1978

a. Requests for information concerning hostile contacts and activities abroad of designated American groups, organizations or individuals, especially with the Soviets, Chinese Communists, Cubans, North Koreans, North Vietnamese, representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, or any foreign revolutionary organizations.

b. Requirements of a specific nature involving the contacts/activities of selected American citizens abroad, the majority of them being the subject of active security investigations of a counterintelligence nature; or requests for information on related targets.

6. Examination of the total MICHCHAOS communications for March and February 1973 (304 cables), establishes that 215 cables, or 70.7% of the total traffic, resulted directly from the above FBI requests which, in the main, deal with obtaining counterintelligence information on hostile linkages abroad of designated Americans/group leaders who may or may not be simultaneously involved in domestic dissident activities and some of whom could, by the nature of their past histories, also be involved in terrorist activities/planning, certain Weatherman fugitives being a case in point.

7. The analytical survey which covers both (a) MICHCHAOS operational cables and (b) reports to the FBI in the form of special counterintelligence memoranda also reflects that the volume of operational traffic, after reaching a high point in 1971 (829 cables), diminished during 1972 (817 cables), and has dropped sharply for the same period in 1973 (304 cables); i.e., the operational cable traffic for 1973 shows a 62.7% decrease from the corresponding two months in 1972. Similarly, the counterintelligence memoranda, after a high point in February and March 1971 of 131 submissions, dropped to 61 for the same period in 1973.

8. The overall picture in the continued reduction of MICHCHAOS-related traffic from June and August of 1972 to the corresponding period of 1973 is reflected in the following breakdown:

a. Cable traffic for June 1972:

In	107
Out	119
Total	226

## b. Cable traffic for July 1972:

In	113
Out	99
Total	<u>211</u>

## c. Cable traffic for June 1973:

In	73
Out	33
Total	<u>106</u>

## d. Cable traffic for July 1973:

In	47
Out	27
Total	<u>74</u>

e. Correspondence with the FBI, June 1972:  
(Responsive to their requirements)

In	7
Out	36
Total	<u>43</u>

## f. Correspondence with the FBI, July 1972:

In	7
Out	51
Total	<u>58</u>

## g. Correspondence with the FBI, June 1973:

In	1
Out	23
Total	<u>24</u>

## h. Correspondence with the FBI July 1973:

In	1
Out	12
Total	<u>13</u>

9. The reduction in traffic as a whole has been accompanied by a general dismantling of our human and our technical assets in the field. This was not done primarily because

[REDACTED]

we have thought it to be politic "at this period of time," but, more to the point, because we could not justify these activities any longer in terms of the MICHAOS effort since the targets and the activities of the target individuals and groups have shifted in emphasis or have ceased activities of previous priority concern altogether.

10. We have, therefore, turned over [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] we have sus-  
pended [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] pending a decision by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] on [REDACTED] eventual resumption under their ex-  
clusive [REDACTED]. We have turned over [REDACTED] assets [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] because their targets have become exclu-  
sively [REDACTED].  
We have terminated [REDACTED] assets [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An asset [REDACTED] who was and  
remains engaged [REDACTED] has been turned over to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and another asset who is now targetted exclu-  
sively against [REDACTED] has been turned over to [REDACTED]

11. Having previously terminated an asset [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and another one [REDACTED] because of (a) unsuitability  
in one case and (b) lack of access in the other, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12. This may be the point to mention that our experience gained during the last five years in the field of MICHAOS has enabled CIA to speak with increasing assurance and pertinence on the problem, rather than simply furnishing desirable foot- notes for "a preconceived hypothesis." We have often been able to place ongoing developments in perspective, and that, in some cases, to very high level customers.

13. At this stage then, the MICHAOS effort is reduced to servicing a decreasing number of FBI requirements on specific individuals, such as the former Black Panther Party extremist/hijackers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] keeping track of other militant extremists in such places [REDACTED], as well as trying to cover indications of [REDACTED] support to [REDACTED] extremists and others. On the Cuban target, in response to an FBI requirement, we still regularly report [REDACTED] as well as periodic reporting, again in response to a specific FBI requirement, of some individuals, [REDACTED]


14. Therefore, more than ever at this stage, MHCHAOS activities are the direct result of FBI requests which, in the main, concern themselves with obtaining counterintelligence information on hostile linkages abroad of designated domestic groups and leaders who are involved in domestic dissident activities, either at present or who, by the nature of their past activities, merit continued coverage, certain violent Weatherman fugitives being a case in point.

15. A note might be made that while the current standing requirements levied on us by the FBI (copy attached) appear formidable, in many cases they have been overcome by events, i.e., in the antiwar field the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice is defunct, the deserter field is of no more interest to us, the Puerto Rican target is no longer being serviced.


16. In essence then, the residual MHCHAOS task remains the continuation of selective collection abroad of information on hostile foreign efforts to exploit/encourage/manipulate/support domestic/extremists/terrorists in the U.S., a reduced effort which reflects the changed circumstances, concerned primarily with Cuban subversive efforts, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Because of the Agency's permanent CI responsibilities abroad, we remain interested in any evidence that the four other Communist powers (the Soviets, the Chicom, the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese/PRG) are persisting in their efforts in seeking to exploit and exacerbate domestic American problems through direct or indirect links with selected American activists/extremists.

17. Of equal importance to the above is the availability of data in the MHCHAOS holding on foreign groups or individuals



who have cultivated contacts with American extremists/radicals in joint efforts to exacerbate domestic dissidence. In some cases this covers persons in the international terrorist field as well; the holdings obviously represent a unique, albeit also very sensitive, capability.



Attachment: a/s