Approved for Release: 2024/11/13 C05160454

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MEMORANDUM	FOR: //EAB	>	FY
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FORM NO. | O | REPLACES FORM 10-101 | 1 AUG 54 | WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

(DATE)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/USSR

I ASSUME YOU'VE SEEN
THIS. ALS SEE MY NOTE
TO DICK KERR CARD ALSDONOS
WITH THE SAME SENTIMENTS.
AVOULD YOU DO THE NECESSARY
TO FORMULATE A COMMUNITY
CROUD IN THE SAME

Q-12
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: AND

MITH THE \$56 STUDY

ON CIVIC CHAEST, AND

MORE BROARY CUTTY THE

ENTIRE 155UE. I BUTION

STAN OR GEORGE SHOULD CARC

TOGETHER A COMMUNITY GROUP,

AS RECOMMENDED. DO YOU MACE)

Challe Ut

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 HAUG 54

(47)

9 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Charles	Waterman,	VC/NIC
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THROUGH

: Hal Ford, D/AG

SUBJECT

Status Report on Civil Unrest in the USSR

- 1. This memo (a) provides an update on developments related to the NICM <u>Dimensions of Civil Unrest</u> since its publication in April, and (b) makes several recommendations for additional follow-up activity.
 - 2. The key developments are these:

(b)(3)

of DDI's Analytic Support Group. He has written the just released companion study to the NICM which focusses on data problems and collection implications. This paper resulted as a routine follow-up report based on the capture-recapture model (discussed in the NICM's appendix) the ASG used to estimate the amount of civil unrest that has probably occurred but did not get reported for the period of the study.


o I have briefed DDO/IAD officers on the overall findings of the NICM.(b)(3)

0	I have briefed	(b)(1
		(b)(3
		Interest levels
	appeared to be high	

- o I have held preliminary discussion with CRES and the IC staff on some of the collection implications raised by this study.
- o I have briefed about 6 or 7 defense attaches and assistants who are either going to Moscow or who were home on mid-tour leaves. I also briefed a military attache going to Stockholm,

(b)(1) (b)(3)

- 3. The subject of civil unrest in the Soviet Union still continues to elicit widely varying, if sometimes erroneous, interpretations. Three recent examples stand out:
 - o In an article on improved food distribution in the USSR, the NID reported on 1 August that "food related worker unrest has declined since 1981." Because of the lag in reporting on civil unrest in the USSR--statistically demonstrated in the ASG paper cited above--there can be no empirical basis for that conclusion; the data simply aren't in yet. (The judgment itself could be wrong; it is surely misleading).



- o Based on an Intourist visit to a showcase mine in Donetsk, the Embassy in Moscow recently reported favorably on the discipline, salary, and working conditions of the Donetsk coal miners. Actually, the miners there and elsewhere in that region have staged impressive strikes in 1979 and 1980,

 gives no indication that their visiting officers (who returned "impressed") had any awareness whatever of labor unrest in the Ukrainian coal mines. (Other strikes by Soviet coal miners have reportedly occurred in the Artic, the Urals, Estonia, and Kazakhstan).
- The Washington Post article last April on the possible spillover of labor unrest from Poland into the Baltics also stated that, despite the apparent calls for strikes in Estonia, none had occurred there. This conclusion was also reported by our Embassy (which is probably where the Post's Moscow correspondent got his information). Actually, my data base shows about 9 strikes in Estonia, along with 18 demonstrations, 5 riots, and 7 acts of political violence--including 3 attempts to assassinate Karl Vaino the Communist Party leader there; all but two of these reported incidents occurred since 1979.

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- 4. In a memo I prepared 27 June on follow up measures, I suggested a range of actions that might be pursued to enhance our ability to better understand the scope and implications of civil unrest in the USSR, and some ways to exploit this phenomenon to US advantage. I need not repeat all those points here, but reactions to the NICM from interested readers (in DDO mainly, but also from DIA, INR, and NSC) have reinforced several of my earlier impressions. Let me reiterate a few recommendations:
 - We should institutionalize the analytical effort. More is needed than a one-shot study. Analysts here and elsewhere have not given the subject the analytical attention that it warrants.

0	Collection should be improved across the board.	
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3 To repeat an important sidelight of the study: ASG found that two-to-five times as much civil unrest may be occurring in the Soviet Union than we are seeing. Even if	•)

sidelight of the study: ASG found that two-to-five times as much civil unrest may be occurring in the Soviet Union than we are seeing. Even if these multiples should prove to be overstated, we should still be looking more thoroughly than we have been.

- O The study should be sanitized to SECRET, with fewer or no dissemination controls. I have started this effort but had to put it aside for the moment. Everyone agrees that its present distribution is much too restricted

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(b)(1) (b)(3) upgraded through improved collection and analysis that these interagency forums have spurred. The NIC would be a logical unit to chair the group—it would give the project the DCI's authority. it is properly an interagency effort, both Stan Moskowitz and are interested, and with the recent NICM this is where the most comprehensive work on the subject has been done (the first like it in 20 years).

5. I happily volunteer my services to develop more detailed recommendations, and to participate in a follow-on working group.

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	(b)(3)
NIC/AG	