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28 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: PHOENIX Committee
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SUBJECT : Status of DIOCCs and PICC-POs as of
28 February 1968

1. The following is an interim report of the current status and operational capabilities of established DIOCCs and PICC-POs subsequent to the Tet offensive. The data was submitted in response to a series of questions posed by the PHOENIX Staff. Complete reports have not been received from II and IV Corps. A supplementary report will be submitted at a later date.

2. Three of the Corps have given a brief assessment as to general effectiveness of DIOCCs during recent emergency and recovery phase, and as to DIOCC potential when more fully developed and practiced.

a. I Corps reported that prior to the Tet offensive, DIOCCs contributed considerable intelligence regarding the possibility of attacks. Because of the Tet holiday, however, most DIOCCs were severely understaffed or totally inoperative at the outset of the Tet offensive. In addition, the subsequent tactical situation in many areas prevented the DIOCC staffs from returning immediately to their posts. At the present, DIOCCs are operational with the exception of those in Thua Thien Province where the tactical/security situation limits or precludes normal operations. Indications are that DIOCCs will be highly valuable sources of intelligence once they become fully developed. Obstructions to effective operations continues to stem from DIOCC dependence upon US advisors, lack of GVN implementing directives, and Vietnamese apathy during week-ends, holidays and periods of extreme stress such as the recent VC/NVA offensive.

b. In III Corps the DIOCCs were very effective considering the fact that most DIOCC staffs and intelligence collectors from all programs were on Tet leave. In most cases the DIOCC was the only GVN office that remained open during Tet and through the crisis. III Corps considers the

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DIOCC potential as limitless. However, the DIOCC can be no better than the intelligence collecting programs of the Census Grievance, Revolutionary Development Cadre, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, Special Police, S-2, etc., supporting the DIOCC.

c. IV Corps reported that the Tet offensive had no appreciable effect on the PHOENIX program. However, the VC attacks have resulted in scattered personnel and diversion of resources into other efforts, i.e., defense and recovery, and will delay development and progress up to six weeks. Generally, DIOCCs were not involved in the Tet offensive; however, logic indicates that the DIOCC potential is good, when DIOCCs are manned, acquiring intelligence, supported by GVN commanders, and are in all other aspects operational.

3. As of this date complete reporting on the number of VCI eliminated during the Tet offensive, has not been received. However, reports which have been received are encouraging. Following are some significant reports which deserve particular note:

a. In Khanh Hoa Province many of the Provincial Interrogation Center employees never left the PIC for from six to eight days; practically all of their non-sleeping time having been devoted to work. Particularly commendable were the activities of the PIC Chief who controlled the overall interrogation effort, ran the Collation Section, processed reports for exploitation, and supervised the translation of all interrogations and documents into English. The morale of the whole group was very high. No less commendable were the actions of the exploitation forces, the Special Police (SP), the Police Field Force (PFF), and the National Police (NP). In spite of the heavy military commitment in and around Nha Trang, these forces were quick to respond to information given to them by the PIC. As a result, a total of approximately 66 VCI were eliminated; 60 proven VCI are currently in the PIC. "Many" sapper personnel have also been arrested/captured and killed. The Nha Trang VC City Committee (PRP) has been virtually eliminated. A member of the Dien Khan VC District Committee stated, during an interrogation, that the VCI organization in that district has been **decimated** to the point that it is totally ineffective.

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b. In Pleiku Province, five senior VCI, including two Province Committee members, are currently being interrogated in the Pleiku PIC.

c. In Kontum Province, an individual who described himself as the VC Chief of Security for Kontum City, rallied because he was hungry and because he believed he was unable to escape from GVN forces. Initially, he provided information on VC contacts in and around Kontum City and an in-depth debriefing is expected to provide current information on VCI identities at province and district level. He stated he would have been the VC Chief of Police for Kontum City had the VC offensive been successful.

d. Preliminary reporting from II Corps reveals that during the Tet offensive a total of approximately 150 VCI personalities have been eliminated. This figure is substantiated by name and position. In addition, approximately 90 NVN sapper personnel have been killed or captured.

e. In IV Corps, Hoa Tan District, Go Cong Province, discovery of a VC commo-liaison route by CG cadre proved quite lucrative. Their diligence culminated in a successful ambush during the night of 9 February resulting in the elimination (killed) of two provincial level VC officials; one was the VC Go Cong Province Chief and the other a VC provincial military affairs cadre.

4. Regarding significant damage to DIOCCs which cannot be repaired through local resources or within available PHOENIX Memo No. 6 funds:

a. I Corps reported no damage to DIOCCs.

b. II Corps reported that the Darlac Province PICC-PO was destroyed but a temporary PICC-PO has been re-established, however, no infrastructure information is being processed. In Tuyen Duc Province renovation had begun on a building for the PICC-PO. The building was damaged and repairs thereto are now deemed uneconomical. No damage to DIOCCs was reported.

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c. III Corps reported that all DIOCCs except Phu Hoa DIOCC in Binh Duong Province, are operational. The Cu Chi and Duc Hue DIOCCs in Hau Nghia Province, and the Phu Hoa DIOCC in Binh Duong Province, have been destroyed. However, these DIOCCs can be reconstructed through local resources.

5. The only reported lost or damaged equipment was the loss of 7 DIOCC typewriters which were looted from the RDC house in Vinh Long Province, IV Corps.

6. While it is too early to assess the total impact against the VCI during and after the TET offensive, it nevertheless has produced some interesting fringe benefits. In Quang Tri Province, past efforts to induce the Special Police to work with other GVN agencies have been successful only on a one time basis. As a result of the offensive, Special Police are now seeking out representatives of ARVN S-2, Military Security Service, and Census Grievance to compare information. A number of combined "in-city" operations have been initiated, and in most cases without the urging of U.S. advisors.

7. In summary, the VC TET offensive created less havoc than could be expected to the established PHOENIX organization and facilities. This was probably because the TET offensive was directed at populated areas rather than districts, villages and hamlets. However, there is reason to believe that a fully operational system of DIOCCs, developing both tactical and infrastructure intelligence would enhance the odds in favor of improved intelligence collection and early detection of the indicators of impending VC actions. Improved facilities for collation of this intelligence information at province level would serve further to improve our overall early warning capabilities.

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