



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~



(b)(3)

*CL/S*

# National Intelligence Daily

**Tuesday  
24 May 1988**




TCS 2821/88 COPY 532

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 88-121JX  
TCS 2821/88  
24 May 1988

~~Top Secret~~




(b)(3)

**Contents**



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

**South Africa: Working To Preserve Regional Dominance ..... 2**



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)



~~Top Secret~~  
TCS 2821/88  
24 May 1988

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**SOUTH AFRICA: Working To Preserve Regional Dominance**

**South Africa's latest carrot-and-stick approaches to its neighbors are yielding mixed results.** [Redacted]

(b)(3)

A combination of military pressure and economic inducements has improved relations with Mozambique. A senior South African delegation will be in Maputo tomorrow to reconvene the Joint Security Commission, suspended by Maputo in 1985 following revelations that Pretoria had violated the Nkomati accord by continuing to aid RENAMO rebels. Despite the thaw in relations, however, Pretoria remains concerned about ANC infiltration through Mozambique, while Maputo continues to criticize South Africa for supporting RENAMO and for incidents such as a car bomb attack last month that seriously wounded a white AIC member. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

South Africa's relations with Botswana and Zimbabwe have deteriorated in recent months. Pretoria's rhetoric has become increasingly threatening following a spate of ANC bombings in South Africa in April and the recent discovery that the ANC has brought SA-7 missiles into South Africa. [Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

Despite the increased tensions, however, South Africa has recently improved its channels of communication—including ministerial-level contacts—with both Harare and Gaborone. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

**Comment:** Simultaneous use of diplomatic maneuver, economic inducement, and military pressure to demonstrate regional dominance remains a cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy. Foreign Ministry officials undoubtedly are pleased by recent successes with Mozambique and—to a lesser extent—with the improved contact with Zimbabwe and Botswana. Security issues continue to take precedence, however, and Pretoria will not hesitate to attack ANC targets in neighboring states—such as Zimbabwe and Botswana—when they are believed to turn a blind eye to ANC use of their territory. The discovery that the ANC has SA-7 missiles significantly increases the likelihood of a cross-border attack—perhaps before South African Republic Day on 31 May. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

~~Top Secret~~

TCS 2821/88

24 May 1988