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SECURITY INFORMATION

Air Pouch No. 75

NJA-A-21

Chief, NE

13 December 1952

Chief,

REDSOX

Operational
NOSTRIL Testing

1. Although the assessment of Nostril in NJA-A-13 was made prior to the receipt of NJA-W-13, the proposed operational use suggested in NJA-A-12 and 13 is consistent with the proposals outlined by Headquarters in NJA-W-13.
2. In line with the suggested testing of Nostril (see NJA-W-13), he was informed that the individuals listed on attachment (a) herewith are being considered for employment by the U.S. Rather than make the employment sound vague and mysterious, informed him that the individuals were being considered by Ambassador Locke's group in Beirut for work in connection with the refugees in the Middle East. Inasmuch as Locke's duties as U.S. coordinator of Point IV and refugee aid programs in the Middle East are well known throughout the Kingdom, Nostril accepted the statement without question. Thus our motive in submitting the names was more effectively masked. No reference was made to any contemplated use of the individuals for psychological warfare work.
3. As anticipated, Nostril readily agreed to assist that he understood the importance of checking on such individuals. As the names were read aloud one by one, he commented as shown below and made a note of the names for further checking.
4. Upon hearing the name of Izz ad Din Abu Bakir, Subject immediately interrupted with: "if he is Nawruz Abu Bakir, you better ask the authorities about him. He described Abu Bakir as approximately thirty-two years of age, the son of an Amman stonechipper and presently employed in the Income Tax office in Amman. He explained that when he reached Cairo in 1947 on his way to Amman to seek the final approval of the Jordan Government for the settlement of the refugees in Jordan, he met Abu Bakir in Cairo at a reception given in his honor by local Circassians. Waiting until everyone had departed, Abu Bakir, a student at the time in the Egyptian University, asked Nostril if he would be willing to translate a letter from Circassian into Russian. Nostril agreed. However upon learning that the letter was to be

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addressed to the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo and was largely a criticism of existing institutions in the Middle East together with a plea for Soviet assistance, Nostril refused. He concluded at the time that Abu Bakir was a fool, an Egyptian agent being used against the Soviets or a Soviet agent.

5. Upon arriving in Amman, Nostril met Abbas Mirzi, Minister of Interior at that time, and related the incident. Mirzi stated that although he had received two or three reports from the Egyptians regarding Abu Bakir's activity in Cairo, he was inclined to believe that he was mentally unbalanced. Upon learning that the Egyptians had reported the incident to the Jordan Government, Nostril stated that he dismissed the possibility that Abu Bakir was working for the Egyptians.

6. Nostril stated that Abu Bakir is anxious to immigrate to the Soviet Union and added that he believes he is registered with the Soviet Legation in Damascus and Beirut.

7. Upon hearing the names of Nazir Omar and Jawdat Khatib, Nostril again cautioned: "you better be careful." He related that in 1947 in Amman he met with Omar Nazir (Nostril knows him thusly), Jawdat Khatib, Nawruz Abu Bakir and Zuhair Mufti (presently in the Jordan Embassy in Washington) in private. In discussing the settlement of the Circassians in Jordan, Nazir pointed out that Jordan was not the place to settle in that was the real aim of the group. He then asked in confidence whether the Circassians really left the USSR with Soviet approval in order that they might proceed to the Middle East and fulfill the mission of convincing Middle East Circassians that they should return to the USSR. When Nostril failed to make an unequivocal denial, Nazir turned to the other three and exclaimed: "see, I knew it! I told you!"

8. Later when the refugees arrived and started criticizing life in the Soviet Union, Nazir, still under the illusion that it was a well planned Soviet operation, stated to Nostril, in the presence of Abu Bakir and Zuhair Mufti, that although he understood the necessity of criticizing the USSR on the surface, Nostril should caution his charges that they were too critical. Later, when Nostril started writing anti-Soviet articles for the local press, Nazir altered his thinking and decided that the refugees were not working for the Soviets.

9. In reference to Jawdat Khatib, Nostril pointed out that he did not commit himself in the sessions referred to above. However Nostril visited Khatib's home in 1947 and discovered several photos on the walls of Stalin and politburo members. On another occasion Khatib reminded Subject that after living in the Middle East for a period he would realize that life in the USSR was not unbearable.

10. Although the above was volunteered on the spot by Nostril immediately upon hearing the names, requested that he

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endeavor to check on the entire group, including those he had never heard of before. He was cautioned however not to go too deep in order not to divulge our interest.

11. The information on Khatib and Zuhair must be checked with information previously submitted by Nostril.

12. From the above it is apparent that Nostril has cleared the first hurdle of the testing. He volunteered the information above without any chance for advance preparation. Provided no questions arise as to his loyalty, integrity and ability with the submission of the information on the above individuals, we will request Headquarter's approval to lay on the cyphergraph testing in Beirut.

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Att. (a): List of names submitted to Nostril for operational testing purposes.

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