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SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

DESENSITIZED
BY DOI 70-17

[NJAW 13

6 November 1952

Chief of Station []

Chief, SR
Chief, NR

RRISGX/AR-ASTFR.

Operational Plan for Project AR-ASTER.

1. Project AR-ASTER has been approved by headquarters. The original project outline which was pouched to you under cover of BJAW-120 has been amended to replace [] with [] (the subject of BJAW-120) and NOSTRIL. The approved project amendments are enclosed as Attachment A.

2. As [] indicated to [], Project AR-ASTER is very important to RRISGX inasmuch as its successful execution will substantially increase the pool of agents who can be used for clandestine agent operations into the USSR. As such, every possible security precaution must be taken to insure that agents who are finally recruited for RRISGX have not been compromised during the spotting or recruiting process.

3. Following is an outline of the steps which headquarters recommends be followed in effecting the project:

- A. Operational testing of NOSTRIL.
- B. Polygraph tests in Beirut
- C. If above tests satisfactorily completed, NOSTRIL can then begin spotting.
- D. Determination of whether NOSTRIL should attempt actual recruitment of persons he has spotted.
- E. Recruitment.
- F. Removal of recruited agents from Jordan.

4. The following plan is suggested as a means of operational testing:

- A. NOSTRIL will be told that [] has been asked by the

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY []
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: [] EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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U.S. Government to gather information on certain Circassians in [] and Jordan; these Circassians are of interest to the U.S. Government as prospective employees for dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda and for other types of psychological warfare and as such must be predetermined to be anti-Communist and of definite pro-west inclination.

B. [] could then indicate to NOSTRIL that NOSTRIL's knowledge of the Circassians in Jordan and elsewhere will be of great help to [] in determining the suitability of these persons for this work prior to recommending them to the Government for employment.

C. [] would then give NOSTRIL a list of names of Circassians who are of interest to the Government as possible employees." Buried in this list will be the names of several Circassians who have been reported to be or to have been Communist agents and/or sympathizers. The information available to headquarters re these persons indicates that NOSTRIL may already know, or could probably learn with some effort, that these persons would be undesirable security-wise for any kind of employment by the Americans. (See Attachment B for list of persons reported to be Circassian Communist sympathizers and/or agents.)

D. None of the persons listed in attachment B are recent Circassian emigres, but are primarily descendants of the pre-World War I emigration. Unfortunately, headquarters has no information re other "old" emigrants who are known to be anti-Communist. Therefore, it is requested that [] attempt to obtain from sources other than NOSTRIL the names of several Circassians of the old emigration who are known to be anti-Communist and bury among them some of the names listed in attachment B. NOSTRIL will then be presented with a list of names of old Circassians who will be differentiated only by their orientation toward the Soviet Union. It is believed that if the names of any of the recent Circassian emigres were included in such a list, NOSTRIL might suspect that he was being tested or that DECLAIM was primarily interested in the recent emigres. Also, any of the recent emigres may be potential REDSOX recruits and as such should not be involved in a testing operation. Attachment B is also being sent to [] station for similar testing of [] It is therefore requested that [] inform headquarters soonest which of the names included therein will be used for testing NOSTRIL in order that [] will not be given the same names.

E. If such a list can be prepared which will not by its nature indicate to NOSTRIL that it is intended as a test for him, then the information which NOSTRIL reports on all of these persons can be checked by [] and headquarters. It is believed that if NOSTRIL's information re these persons approximates what is known at headquarters and in the field NOSTRIL will have proved himself to be reasonably reliable in spotting individuals for anti-Soviet work.

5. Assuming that NOSTRIL will "pass" this type of test, headquarters feels that he should then be submitted to polygraph testing in Beirut. Arrangements are now being made at headquarters to have a polygraph and experienced Russian speaking DECLAIM polygraph operator available in Beirut after December 1952. If and when NOSTRIL has successfully passed the test suggested in para 4 above, [] will

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be authorized to ask NOSTRIL to go to Beirut to take the polygraph examination. Inasmuch as Nostril might be reluctant to take such a test due to possible criminal and moral lapses in his past, and in order to maintain good polygraph procedure, [] should tell NOSTRIL no more than this:

A. NOSTRIL will be subjected to interviews and tests which will help us determine his suitability for the type of work we want him to do;

B. These interviews and tests will help us to determine his loyalty to us; and

C. [] has taken these same tests and at no time have they ever caused him any embarrassment or inconvenience of any kind.

D. If necessary, [] may assure NOSTRIL that we are not at all interested in any criminal, moral or other similar lapses in his past and that such things will not be covered in the tests and interviews. Also, if necessary, [] may tell NOSTRIL that he cannot be employed on a full-salary, full-scale basis until the interviews and tests are completed.

6. It is emphasized that [] not discuss any of para 5 above with NOSTRIL until headquarters authorizes. Once authorization is given, [] should adhere as closely as possible to the approach in paras 5A, B, C and D. If NOSTRIL should refuse to take such tests after this approach, we would do well to reconsider him as an operative under AE-ASTER.

7. Provisional operational clearance has been granted for NOSTRIL for evaluation and development only. This will allow DICLADM to proceed with the operational and polygraph testing suggested above. However, satisfactory completion of these tests will probably be necessary in order to procure a full operational clearance. Once this full clearance is obtained, NOSTRIL is instructed to begin the actual spotting phase of Project AE-ASTER. At []'s discretion, NOSTRIL can be told as much about this operation as is necessary to enable him to assess the persons he spots. The following is presented as a guide for []

A. NOSTRIL will spot Circassian emigres. The Circassians of primary interest to REDSOX are those who left the USSR in 1941 or later and who still have a fluent command of the Russian language. Single persons between the ages of 18 and 45 who are in good physical condition are most desirable. Men with families will be acceptable if they are otherwise well qualified.

B. These persons should possess strong anti-Soviet motivation and better than average courage. If recruited, they will be used for hazardous clandestine missions into the USSR.

C. An individual who successfully completes a mission into the USSR will stand a good chance of being brought to the United States and obtaining U.S. citizenship.

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D. Any person who is recruited by DYKLAHM will, from the time of his recruitment, be housed, clothed and fed by us; in addition he will receive a salary. He will also be thoroughly trained prior to his dispatch into the USSR in order to assure maximum chances for success.

8. It will be left to []'s judgement as to how much of para 7 above should be told NOSTRIL. It is felt that if he has some understanding of REDSOX agent requirements he will be better able to assess the persons he spots. When NOSTRIL is finally briefed re his spotting assignment, [] should inform headquarters exactly what NOSTRIL has been told.

9. For each individual he spots, NOSTRIL should provide that type of information which is requested in standard PRO forms I and II. NOSTRIL should procure this information without revealing to anyone (especially the subject being spotted) what he is doing.

10. After NOSTRIL has spotted a number of Circassians and headquarters has received the PRO-type information plus NOSTRIL's and []'s assessment of these persons, headquarters will initiate clearances for those who are favorably assessed. Under no circumstances should recruitment of any persons be attempted until headquarters authorizes. During this spotting process [] should try to determine if NOSTRIL could do the actual recruiting. This may be difficult for NOSTRIL to do since the chances of compromise immediately become greater once he shifts from spotting to recruiting. Also, if NOSTRIL were blown while trying to recruit, other persons whom he has contacted for recruiting or recruitment might become compromised by association. However, if [] believes that NOSTRIL could recruit and remain uncompromised, he should be allowed to do so since he probably would be better suited to persuade these people to do REDSOX work than an outsider or someone less well known to them. If [] feels that NOSTRIL should not attempt recruitment, headquarters would appreciate Kurnerford's suggestions as to how the final recruitment of these Circassians might be accomplished.

11. Whenever an actual recruitment is to be attempted, [] should submit a recruitment plan to headquarters for approval. This plan should specify in detail how the actual recruitment will be attempted, including the persons involved, the security measures which will be employed, and what will be done with the individual to be recruited if he refuses the recruitment proposal. A plan should also be submitted for removing the individual from Jordan if he accepts the recruitment proposal and an estimate as to how soon after the recruitment this should be done in order to maintain the security of the new recruit. Upon approval of these plans, headquarters will authorize the recruitment effort. It should be noted that [] will be doing the same type of work for REDSOX as [] and that it will be necessary to maintain close coordination between [] and [] stations and headquarters in order that NOSTRIL and [] do not "cross wires" in their work.

12. A maximum salary of \$150 per month has been approved for NOSTRIL. [] may begin payment of part or all of this salary as soon as NOSTRIL begins to undergo operational testing. It is requested that [] inform headquarters how NOSTRIL will be paid this salary and whether NOSTRIL will be paid the full amount. It might be desirable to withhold part of this salary in order to use the balance of

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it for various incentive purposes, e.g. persuading NOSTRIL to go to Beirut for polygraph testing. In view of NOSTRIL's present unemployment, will NOSTRIL be able to conceal the source of this income or explain it so that it will not arouse suspicion?

13. It is further requested that [] inform headquarters of the methods he has been using and will use in contacting NOSTRIL for briefing and debriefing purposes. If a new contact plan is anticipated for NOSTRIL after he becomes active under AE-ASTER, please submit it to headquarters also.

14. It is realized that field conditions of which headquarters is unaware may require some variation from the suggestions presented in this dispatch. However, it is believed that each of the steps in para 3 above should be followed in some way or other. Your comments and suggestions will be appreciated.

Attachments: (2)

Distribution:
L []
NE-2 1 ✓
CSR Chrono 1
SR-4 2

BY _____

KERMIT ROOSEVELT

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ATTACHMENT A TO NJAW-13

AMENDMENTS TO PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM: AE-ASTER

PART I

1. Area of Operations:

[] and Jordan.

3. Purpose:

a. Objectives:

(1) Spotting and/or recruiting of Circassian and other Russian emigres in the area of operations, in or outside organized emigre groups, who may be useful in REDSOX operations.

(2) Procurement of information on activities of local Circassian and other Russian emigre groups which will enable DYLAIM to better assess the REDSOX potential of these groups.

(3) Procurement of CE information on local Circassian emigre groups and Russian emigres outside these groups.

b. Targets:

(1) Local Circassian emigre groups.

(2) Soviet emigres not members of emigre groups.

c. Tasks:

(1) Recruit [] in the field, brief and train him for his mission in []

(2) Obtain full clearance for, and recruit, NCSTRIL, who will perform functions in Jordan similar to those performed by []

4. Personnel:

a. []-[]

[]
b. NCSTRIL- Operational clearance has been requested. NCSTRIL is a Circassian refugee who left the Soviet Union during World War II. He is young and extremely resourceful and has assumed leadership of the recent Circassian emigres in Jordan. He has been used as an unwitting source of information by [] station chief for the past year.

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5. Cover:

Both [] and NOSTRIL have ready-made cover. They are already the recognized leaders of the Circassians in [] and Jordan and can move freely among these people without question.

6. Control:

a. What control exists:

(1) [] desires eventually to bring his family to the United States. [] station chief is prepared to indicate to him that [] performance in his assigned mission may have a bearing on whether he can later come to this country. The salary paid [] and []'s desire to aid the Circassian cause against the Soviets are additional control factors.

(2) NOSTRIL will be paid a salary. Inasmuch as he is now nearly destitute, this salary will constitute a considerable control over him. NOSTRIL's violent anti-Soviet feelings provide an additional measure of control.

b. Motivation:

(1) [] is motivated by an extreme desire to do everything possible to achieve an independent Caucasus and at the same time to improve the plight of his Circassian people []. He is also imbued with a strong anti-Soviet feeling.

(2) NOSTRIL is strongly anti-Soviet and is a real Circassian patriot. His life has been largely occupied with fighting the Soviets and he is anxious to continue to do so in Jordan.

8. Special Equipment:

None.

9. Coordination:

This project will be coordinated with NE.

10. Timetable:

October 1952. Estimated duration of project is two years.

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PART II

11. Estimated Annual Costs:

Salaries of [] and NOSTRIL	\$3,600
Bonuses for [] and NOSTRIL	1,000
Operational expenses, including operational travel in the field.	900
Incidentals.	360
TOTAL ANNUALLY- - - - -	\$5,860

NOTE: Each of above items to be divided equally between [] and
[] Stations.

12. Special Problems and Commitments:

None.

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