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1. [redacted] quartering in LOC VINH, TRANG BANG District, TAY NINH Province, underwent training in preparation for attacking cities from October 1967 to January 1968. Although studies were couched in general terms and no city was identified as the object of attack, the team was told to take advantage of city topography while attacking. The team members learned that infantry should be utilized in attacking houses, using such weapons as grenades, AKA rifles and B40's. They studied a two to three-page document on attacking cities. Team 2, in particular, practiced house attacks. Team members learned to crawl to the door of a house to toss a grenade inside; to fire an AKA rifle inside after throwing the grenade and observe signs of life; and to enter the house if no one inside was left alive. If the house were a two-story one, the team learned that two team members must fire upstairs from the outside of the house while the others penetrated the house and tried to rush the stairs. They were told to first attack the front of the house first, and if the house had several entrances to attack them also. The largest door was considered the easiest to attack.

3.3(h)(2)

2. On the evening of 29 January Team [redacted] consisting of 14 men led by [redacted] began to move. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

The other eight had left with [redacted] on 29 January. The group was informed the evening before that it was going to celebrate TET in Saigon; it was not advised that there would be a battle there. Source's group was led to a house on LE VAN DUYET Street at 1300 hours, 30 January. They remained there until 1900 hours and cleaned weapons cached there. No one in the group carried a weapon into Saigon. The GVN police had already arrested occupants of the house; the house was in the name of CHU BAY. Since no one was there to receive the infiltrators, their guide remained there and cooked for them. At 2100 hours, the team was led to TRAN QUY CAP Street where Team Chief [redacted] told the soldiers to prepare their weapons. [redacted] were already in place at TRAN QUY CAP; the three team members, [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

who joined them there were assigned the task of cleaning weapons already stored there which they did until the middle of the night. (Source was later told that the GVN police knew about this house because one of his comrades led them to it. This was revealed to Source by his VN interrogator.) The team assembled with weapons and remained in the house until 0230, 31 January, when the other 8 team members arrived in a vehicle driven by [redacted]. At 0230 they studied a sand table of Independence Palace to learn its topography; Source claims that his group was told to attack the Palace only 15 minutes (0245) before they actually commenced, at which time they received the order to attack the Palace in full strength (14 men) and defend it to the last man when Allied forces tried to drive them out. They were told to expect no reserves or reinforcements. The team was not advised of fighting in other cities or even of other attacks taking place in the capital region. The soldiers did not expect support from the local populace and did not receive it at any time. Although afraid of dying, the members of the team were determined to successfully attack the Palace to show that no place in Saigon was safe from the VC. This fact alone, according to [redacted] would make the attack a success.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

3. The team went in three vehicles from TRAN QUY CAP to the attacking site. [redacted] drove one car; [redacted] team member [redacted] drove one, and [redacted] drove the other. The 14-man team opened fire on the Palace at 0300, 31 January 1968, and continued fighting until the afternoon of 1 February. Source, [redacted] and eight other team members withdrew at 0800 hours, 31 January to the corner of NGUYEN DU and THU KHOA HUAN Streets where they remained until 1800 hours. One team member was killed there. The team first stayed in a large building on the corner

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and then crossed the roof to another house next door where they remained on the roof until 1 February when GVN Military Police discovered them at 0900 hours. [redacted]

[redacted] Inasmuch as they had been instructed to fight to the last man, they rationalized their surrender by deciding that orders no longer pertained since they were not inside the Palace grounds. They were afraid, hungry, and had received no moral or material support from the people in the house who were on the ground floor. At the time of surrender Source had an AKA and one magazine (30 rounds); other team members had AKA weapons and magazine rounds.

3.3(h)(2)

4. The 14-man team was equipped with the following material after its arrival in Saigon: eight kilo charge TNT; seven kilo charge TNT; four hand grenades for each man; 14 AK submachine guns (one for each team member); 120 rounds (four magazines) for each man; three B40 rockets (30 rounds total); two Colts, 12 MM, and three magazines (about 7/8 rounds per magazine); two small gasoline drums containing C4 substance.
5. Source believed that the attack on the Palace would be successful because it was a surprise attack. Although he believes that he failed personally, he nevertheless feels that the fighting was necessary because it was his duty to resist the United States. Most of the people who comprised his 14-man team were about 20 years old; the team leader was over 30, and one man was over 40. Source felt that younger men were better suited for this type of mission.
6. The team was compartmentalized and did not know about the movement of other troop units. Source claims that the team did not know the identity of other targets in Saigon or the number of troops attacking them. The other section of the [redacted] had been sent on an unknown mission to an unknown location.
7. Team [redacted] also received political training at LOC VINH prior to the TET attack on Saigon. They studied a one-page political document, high echelon resolutions, and the following subjects: (a) the United States' position in SVN, including world public opinion about United States actions; active opposition of other countries to United States aggression in SVN; opposition of the allies of the United States to escalation of the war; United States citizens who had relatives in SVN; urban struggle and anti-American demonstrations in SVN; failure of the United States Army to master the battlefield and VC victories.
8. (Interrogator's Comment: Source was initially very uncooperative. He did not want to disclose the fact that he studied English for three months. He refused to disclose fully old unit designations or past unit activities, especially those of Team [redacted] Through repetitive questioning and prodding, the interrogator was able to extract the above information from Source.)

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