

~~SECRET~~CI Memorandum No. 36
25 October 1956

TO: All Area Branches

SUBJECT: Significance of Developments of International
Communism After the XXth Party Congress
of the CPSU

1. Attached you will find _____ copies of a sterile paper, entitled as indicated above. The paper was originally prepared as a briefing and was delivered by C/CI/ICD in mid-September 1956. The present version has been suitably edited.
2. The paper will be of interest to field station personnel, specifically those concerned with Communist problems, as representative of the current thinking at headquarters on questions which continue to preoccupy specialists on Communism and Soviet affairs.
3. The attachment is cleared for passage to selected liaison services. It should be pointed out to recipients that this is not an official FBFRIME statement nor does it claim to be either definitive or final. It might be described as a paper put together for our own service as a "think" piece or as a guideline.
4. It is suggested that this paper not be handled as a routine transmission. It affords an opportunity to remind recipients of the favor they enjoy with KUBARK and, more important, to draw from them comments and appreciations which might embody new insights and the results of special skills.
5. Therefore, the reactions or comments of recipients are solicited, including any informal oral comments which may be received by field personnel who make use of the paper in liaison activity.

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Attachment

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The Significance of Developments in International Communism
After the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU

The Central Committee Resolution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (30 June 1956) presents the official position of the CPSU on the Stalin purge, or, as it is more commonly referred to, the matter of the Stalin denigration campaign.

This Resolution shows again that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is still hidebound by Stalinist dogma and approaches and is not yet ready to change or in anyway significantly modify the Soviet system and the Stalinist approach to things. Rarely has there been a piece so shallow and so hackneyed as this Central Committee Resolution of 30 June which purports to be the last word on the Stalin issue and which is obviously aimed at offsetting and controlling the debate raging in International Communism on the significance of the de-Stalinization campaign. This Resolution signifies Soviet concern with and about the reactions which the Stalin denigration campaign has provoked in the Communist Parties of Europe and elsewhere.

The de-Stalinization campaign and the forms which it has taken and the way in which it was handled by the Russians has, for the first time in the postwar period, created a definite crisis in the international Communist movement. It is difficult to say at this moment how deep this crisis is and to predict its further development. On the basis of available evidence it is fair to conclude that the de-Stalinization campaign, as handled by the Russians, has set in motion in the Communist movement a process of questioning the validity of the Soviet system as a whole. Once such a process starts it is impossible to determine how far it will go. A crisis, however, exists--a crisis which has touched and has affected the very core of Communist ideology. In response to this crisis, the Soviets and their 30 June Resolution made certain alterations in their presentation of the case against Stalin.

For the first time in the postwar period, then, the Soviets have been put on the defensive and have maneuvered themselves into an uncomfortable position insofar as the whole framework of Communism and Communist ideology is concerned. This is, for the moment and for the time being, good for the free world and bad for the Communist Parties, particularly in Western Europe. How long will the issue stay alive and how long will it continue to harrass and embarrass International Communism? From this vantage point, there seems to be a fair possibility

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that the issue will stay alive for some time to come and that the Soviets will have a difficult time putting out the brushfire which the secret Khrushchev speech caused.

The first question generally raised in the context of forming an opinion on the de-Stalinization process is: "Why did Khrushchev make his speech of 25 February 1956?" There is no good and definitive answer to this question. There are, however, several views and opinions and it may be useful to review them. In the first place it is worth remembering that the 20th Party Congress in its ^{open} sessions brought out the de-Stalinization process, particularly in the speech given by Mikoyan. Mikoyan delivered the blast against Stalin while Comrade Khrushchev kept on the sidelines. Thus, it can be assumed that the CPSU leadership had already arranged to open the de-Stalinization campaign at the 20th Congress. From the point of view of the Russians they apparently figured that it was to their long-term advantage both internally and externally to demolish the myth and legend of the Stalin regime. Externally, they may have figured that foreign governments, particularly neutralist governments, as well as public opinion could be favorably impressed with a position which appeared to change the modus operandi of the Soviet regime. They must also have figured that it would be a help to International Communism in its great effort to achieve unity of action particularly with Socialist and left-wing forces to be able to point to basic changes in the Soviet approach to foreign policy and ideological matters. In general, therefore, it is felt that the raising of the de-Stalinization issue at the open session of the 20th Congress is compatible with the general direction which Soviet tactics had been taking since early 1955 and with previous indications of the downgrading of Stalin. International Communism without the burden and onus of Stalinism would certainly, in the eyes of the Soviets, be a more effective instrument for the realization of the plans of the Soviet leaders. This Soviet perspective was re-emphasized again in the 30 June Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, which clearly indicated to the CP's that the de-Stalinization process was considered to be good for them and that, therefore, they ~~should~~ stop fussing about the complications which had arisen and, according to the Resolution, had even been anticipated and calculated by the Soviets when they launched the de-Stalinization campaign in February 1956. There is, then, a good argument for assuming that the de-Stalinization process was worked into the Soviet master plan in order to further Soviet foreign policy aims and in order to facilitate the work of the CP's in softening up their countries, their governments, their Socialist opponents and opposition in general. However, this argument does not fully explain why Khrushchev made his secret speech on 25 February and particularly why he said what he said.

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This, then, draws the focus on the internal significance of the secret Khrushchev speech and on the indications that it was made for internal consumption, especially for the consumption of the Party cadre assembled at the 20th Congress. An explanation given in this context is that the top Party echelon which had to run the country and the Party machine as a whole, could, after Stalin's death, not do so effectively without destroying the Stalin myth, because the Stalin myth actually obstructed effective leadership by the new rulers of the Soviet Union. In simple words this means, for example, a case like the following. Lysenko, the Soviet geneticist, claimed several times after Stalin's death that his (obviously unscientific) positions had Stalin's personal approval and implied that these positions were therefore correct. There are statements in the Soviet press and Soviet publications which bear this out. It is argued then, that this cannot be an isolated case; there must have been many other Soviet Party leaders, Soviet technicians, Soviet scientists, etc., whose justification in life and in their profession, however erroneous their position or their actions, was the fact that they had enjoyed Stalin's support and blessings. Such an attitude clearly obstructed the current leadership, and it became therefore necessary to indicate to the cadre in unmistakable terms that the new regime stood on its own feet, that the old regime was thoroughly discredited, wrong, evil and vile, and that the shots would be called from now on by the top men and no backtalking would be tolerated. In other words, it has been argued that the Khrushchev speech was necessary from the point of view of effective leadership. The ghost of Stalin, i.e., the attitudes developed under Stalin's regime, were obstacles in the way of the Khrushchev clique and obstructed their efforts to rule the Party and country. This thesis has certain merits but still does not explain fully the intensity of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.

There is another theory which has been advanced. It is the theory that the secret speech by Khrushchev could be well interpreted as a blackmail instrument to be used against actual or potential opponents. This theory has acquired some weight in the light of the 30 June CPSU Resolution, which came out with the rather surprising statement that already during Stalin's lifetime a Leninist nucleus existed among the CC members and ranking Army officers--a nucleus which at various periods, for instance during the war years, curtailed the power of Stalin. From the reference to the existence of such a Leninist nucleus, it is possible to argue that the people outside of this Leninist nucleus are intended to be identified more distinctly with the Stalin era and, further, are singled out to be attacked or destroyed as traitors when the need arises. The theory, then, is that by having his speech accepted by the Central Committee, Khrushchev obtained a "legal" basis for moving in on his actual or potential opposition and that, in having obtained this "legal" basis, he has strengthened his power position. By the same token he has also alerted the "non-Leninists" to his intentions. Thus, the question arises of the relative strength of Khrushchev and of the opposition, as well as the

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question of the possibility that a power struggle in the CPSU leadership may break out.

In the meantime, the answer to the question of why Khrushchev made his secret speech of 25 February is not readily available in one neat package. So much is clear, that the de-Stalinization campaign fits very well into the general design of Soviet foreign policy and the tactics of the broad united front and united action program of the international Communist movement. It is also clear that it fits neatly into the internal program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Lastly, as pointed out before, it may also fit into the personal designs and plans of Khrushchev and company.

Another question of interest is how the Soviets planned to handle the de-Stalinization campaign and what timing they had in mind. In this connection one may also ask to what extent their timing was upset by the publication of the Khrushchev speech and, by virtue of that upset, how they adjusted to the new situation. It is fair to conclude that the Soviets had in mind a rather slow process of de-Stalinization. Khrushchev himself, in his secret speech, said that there was no need for haste. Generally, it is felt that the Soviets had two treatments in mind: one for the Soviet public and the Communist Parties outside the Bloc, and another for the internal cadre of the CPSU and the Bloc Parties. The fact that they planned a slow tempo of de-Stalinization may be deduced from facts indicating that only relatively few select Communist leaders had direct and/or detailed access to the secret Khrushchev speech prior to the release of the speech by the United States State Department. There are indications that Ulbricht in Germany had access; there are indications that Togliatti had access; there are indications that other leaders in the Satellites had access to the speech, or at least to materials contained in it.

In the first phase, then, the Soviets had planned to effect de-Stalinization, particularly outside of the Soviet Union, very slowly through certain key leaders abroad. Thus, they intended to minimize the shock which they undoubtedly knew would ensue if the whole cadaver of Stalin and Stalinism were thrown up to the Communist movement at once. In this connection it is highly significant that the Pravda editorial of 28 March, which was the first reference to appear publicly in the Soviet Union on the de-Stalinization campaign, was conceived on a very lofty and academic ideological level, taking up only the question of why the cult of the individual was alien to the spirit of Marxism and Leninism and why, at the same time, the spirit of Marxism and Leninism did not rule out or obviate the need for strong leadership. Held against the Khrushchev speech of 25 February, the March 28 editorial of Pravda concealed the depth and intensity of the charges against Stalin brought forward by Khrushchev. This is pointed out to underline the thesis that originally the Soviet leaders had planned a gradual tempo in the de-Stalinization process.

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However, the tempo and the timing of the de-Stalinization campaign were upset by the fact that, first of all, the contents of the secret speech of Khrushchev leaked out to the Western press in March and finally were published by the United States State Department. There is no good evidence or argument showing that this was foreseen by the Communist leaders in the Soviet Union. Nor is there any good evidence to show that the Soviet leaders had planted "leaks" of the Khrushchev speech. It is impossible to see what advantage they would have gained from doing so. The stench of the speech must have been evident to the author himself, who admonished his audience to keep the speech inside the Party.

We are often inclined to overestimate Soviet capabilities for complicated and subtle plotting. The de-Stalinization process can be construed as such a "plot"--but only in a strategic sense. In simple terms it is a "plot" to make Communism and the Soviet leaders look good. To assume that the Khrushchev speech with its obvious omissions and falsifications could have been considered by the Soviets capable of achieving or contributing to their objective, seems far-fetched, as does the assumption that the speech was leaked for this purpose.

The only possible argument in favor of the assumption that the speech was deliberately "leaked" is that either a faction within the CPSU or a Satellite CP desired to nail Khrushchev down to the record to make absolutely sure that no retreat from the position taken was possible. Such an argument, however, excludes again any possibility that the speech was leaked in order to deceive the West.

The publication of the speech was a genuine shock to Party leaders and especially to the rank and file abroad. In this country the Communist Party went through a series of convulsions as a result of the publication. It is, of course, impossible to state whether all the other Communist Parties reacted with the same intensity. Nevertheless the shock and confusion effect were fairly general. What was and still is the nature of the shock? The shock was so severe because the revelations made questionable Communist doctrine and the Soviet system as a whole, since proof was offered that the man who had represented Communism as we know it and had created it as we know it, was a psychopath, a tyrant, a murderer, and an incapable leader so far as the affairs of his own country were concerned. This revelation struck at the core of the loyalty of the Communists to their cause, doctrine and organizational center. Another factor was that the revelation evidently undermined the wisdom and the efficiency of the Communist leaders abroad who for so many years had unquestioningly accepted the Soviet regime, the wisdom of Stalin, his integrity and his infallibility. The position of the Communist leaders abroad was placed in jeopardy by Khrushchev's revelations.

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An article written by the Chairman of the Communist Party of the United States already before the publication of the Khrushchev speech first pointed up the uncomfortable position of the leadership abroad. The article also pointed out that the de-Stalinization process had placed in jeopardy Communist discipline, and thus put the finger on a situation which became fairly general. When the position of the Communist leader is shaken or in question, his command relations to the rank and file, to the ordinary member and to the subordinate Party organization are also endangered. In general terms it is therefore quite understandable why the reaction of the foreign leaders outside the bloc was one of dismay. Disorientation among the rank and file was actually greater than the confusion on leadership level. This is natural, too, for the Communist rank and file is used to living in a semi-military structure where the decisions are made at the top and the "soldiers", as it were, simply execute orders.

Perhaps it is not necessary to emphasize our belief that the shock effect was genuine. However, it has been said that the Communist Parties reacted the way they did in order to fool the non-Communists, and that this was all pre-arranged with the Soviets.

Again, this is an over-simplification of the problem. It is an old axiom that personnel or policy changes on the top level of the CPSU almost automatically produce parallel changes in the leadership of foreign Communist Parties. And it is fair to state that the "new look" policies formulated by the 20th Congress required an eventual shake-up of the leadership of Bloc and Free World Parties. After all de-Stalinization represents a desymbolization and re-symbolization of the movement. Personnel changes as well as policy changes were therefore built into the 20th CPSU Congress design and, in this sense, it is permissible to speak of a "plot". Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the Soviets desired a shake-up on a time schedule and on terms beyond their control, i.e., as a result of disenchantment on the part of the rank and file or as a result of anti-Communist propaganda. Shake-ups effected under pressure would certainly not look like a genuine reorientation. Such would result only from an orderly and controlled process of "criticism and self-criticism."

The revelations of the Khrushchev speech, then, must have upset whatever plans existed concerning the demotion of Communist leaders outside the USSR. We feel that the debate raging in the Communist movement exceeded what we would expect to be a controlled process of self-criticism, thus interfering with prior Soviet plans for personnel changes. We feel, e.g., that the CPSU was forced to keep the Thorez-Duclos leadership in power in order to avoid serious ideological dislocations in C. France. We are not sure that maintaining a French

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leadership well-known for its Stalinist orientation was originally on the books. Similarly, the replacement of the Stalinist Rakosi by another Stalinist, Geroc, indicates a change in plans. We feel that Soviet plans on personnel changes were upset, and that they were forced to keep in place or promote men who would keep the Parties together rather than set up new figureheads who would look more respectable.

The reactions of the various Communist Parties were obviously not identical. So far as we can see, the Parties that are close to the Anglo-Saxon cultural stream were the ones that were more perceptibly affected than others. One may maintain speculatively that concepts of democracy and justice have left a mark even on the Communist brethren, and that it may be no coincidence that the Communist Parties of the United States and Great Britain and the Communist Parties in culturally related countries were more outspoken than others.

The Communist Party of the United States was one of the first to go on record as criticizing the Soviet leaders for their co-responsibility in the crimes perpetrated by Stalin and in demanding a fuller explanation from the Soviets.

In the course of the great and violent debate which ensued in the CPUSA, two trends developed. One wing criticized CPUSA and CPSU leaders heavily and urgently demanded fuller explanations. Another wing, which was somewhat more moderate, tried to strike a balanced position, criticizing the CPSU mildly and asking questions about co-responsibility of the CPSU leaders, while at the same time emphasizing the merits of Stalin and the good that he had done for the working class internationally and nationally. Eugene Dennis, Secretary General of the CPUSA, represented this moderate wing, and it is for this reason, we believe, that Pravda reprinted his article prior to the Central Committee Resolution of 30 June. The fact that Dennis' article was reprinted showed the sensitivity of the CPSU to the more poignant attacks from abroad questioning the motives and integrity of the current CPSU leaders. This sensitivity of the CPSU is further expressed in the editing and censoring of foreign CP reactions. Dennis' article, e.g., as reprinted in Pravda, did not contain his original questions pertaining to anti-Semitism in the USSR. The Central Committee Resolution of 30 June quoted only terms favorable to the CPSU position on Stalin. (See, e.g., pertinent quotes from the Chinese and the French Communist Party positions in the Resolution.)

The sensitivity of the CPSU expressed itself further in the irritation with which the 30 June Resolution treated Togliatti's now famous interview in Nuovi Argomenti. The Soviet Resolution states that Togliatti's position, according to which the Stalin system led to

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S E C R E T

degeneration, was absolutely unfounded. It is worth noting that the original Togliatti position included a reference in qualification of his position which attacked the CPSU leadership, and it is probable that it was for this reference, rather than for suggestion that degeneration had taken place, that Togliatti was censured. In other words, we believe that the irritation of the CPSU with the reaction of the CPs and the CP leaders abroad was genuine and that the Central Committee Resolution was designed to put the lid back on the Pandora's box which the release of the secret Khrushchev speech had opened. In our opinion, the intent was to return to the original schedule and pattern of a gradual de-Stalinization process which would have the appearance of a genuine re-orientation and not of a mere tactic or crisis.

In Europe it is, of course, Togliatti who commands attention. Togliatti is an outstanding Marxist theorist and practitioner. He is the leader of the strongest Party outside of the Bloc. He led his Party faithfully to a point from which it could seriously consider the various forces which could effect the acquisition of power. Some observers maintain that he, although always having toed the Party line, and although having always deferred to the decisions of the Soviets, is and has been in a way anti-Soviet, partly because his experiences in Moscow and the USSR before and during the war were humiliating and unsatisfactory. Not too much can be made of this, particularly because adequate evidence to bear out these reports is lacking. Togliatti was the first in Europe outside the Communist Bloc* to react to the revelations about Stalin--on 14 March, several days before the Western press began to leak the story of the secret speech. Terms later revealed in the secret Khrushchev speech were woven into Togliatti's first reaction, thus indicating familiarity with at least some of the material of the secret Khrushchev speech. Togliatti led the chorus of the European Communists after the release of the secret Khrushchev speech by the United States State Department. For these and other reasons, then, the question arose whether or not his position of criticism was thoroughly coordinated with the Western Communist Parties and perhaps with the Soviets as well. It was inferred that Togliatti may have coordinated with Tito, whom he visited before publication of his interview in Nuovi Argomenti. However, there is no evidence available showing that Togliatti coordinated his positions with the rest of the Western Communist Parties. Further, there were certain definite differences between his and the position of other Parties. Paul de Groot of the CP Netherlands actually opposed the Togliatti line.

* The Ulbricht statement of 4 March and the Trybuna Ludu editorial of 10 March foreshadowed the campaign.

S E C R E T

Thus, we do not believe that Togliatti coordinated his position with the rest of the CPs. Concerning the possibility that his criticism was coordinated with the Soviets, the following may be said. Obviously one cannot rule it out completely. Obviously also, the "new look" of the 20th Congress and its de-Stalinization program permit and invite criticism and, in this sense, are a "plot" to disestablish the fact of Moscow's hegemony over the Communist movement. Nevertheless, we feel that Togliatti crossed the line of permissible general criticism into the area of specific criticism of the CPSU leaders which, as the Resolution indicates, is not permissible.

The validity of the last question in this respect, i.e., whether or not Togliatti and Tito got together and worked out certain views and a common position, cannot be rejected out of hand. In his report to the Central Committee on 24 June Togliatti stated that he had refused Stalin's offer to become Secretary General of the Cominform in 1951. This statement can be interpreted as a gesture towards Tito, to show that Togliatti's heart was always in the right place. In our mind there is the thought that Tito and Togliatti may wish to assume the leadership of the Communist movement in Europe along the lines of national Communism and that the two men may have much in common. Tito's ambition and Togliatti's proved ability to mold a "national" Communist Party may, if we permit ourselves the luxury of a perspective, make a combination leading to a new type of Communist threat in Europe, where Stalinist Communism has been on the decline and where the reaction of Socialists to the "united front" offer has not been satisfactory to the Communists. The question, however, is whether such a perspective--if, indeed it should ever materialize--is a Soviet perspective as well. We do not think so. We do not think that the CPSU has relinquished its leadership role and is ready to accept the Tito-Togliatti idea of polycentrism.

In this respect, it is interesting to study a 12 July Moscow broadcast in Italian which represents the first clarification by the Soviets of what they mean when they speak about new forms of international Communist co-ordination. In essence, the broadcast commentary states that there was a time when the Cominform took the place of the Communist International and that the Cominform was dissolved when new circumstances arose. And then it goes on and stresses that the dissolution of the Cominform does not mean that "the Communist Party would be isolated and the workers' unity weakened." Since the 12 July statement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has further clarified its position on international coordination, particularly on 16 July. The trend observed on 12 July continued to the effect that the leadership role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is not to be questioned and that the dissolution of the Cominform is not to be construed as indicating that truly independent positions can be taken. Pravda went

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

even so far as to attack publicly the concept of national Communism. And Pravda also indicated that the united front with the Socialists should be understood to mean that the supreme role of the Communist Party in this united front should be relinquished. In other words, the Soviet position is again as it always has been, that the united front can be only on Communist terms and under Communist hegemony. These statements in Pravda have been very helpful in clarifying this talk about national independence of Communist Parties and their various roads to socialism. The statements show that the position of the 20th Congress is merely for public consumption and for propaganda purposes, but that the underlying basic concepts have not been changed. As a matter of fact, since the 20th Party Congress the CPSU has been quite busy coordinating the International Communist Movement. In the first place, the 20th Congress itself is binding not only for the CPSU but for all Communist Parties abroad. The resolutions of the 20th Congress have been so understood by the International Communist Movement, which is in fact implementing them, although against various odds and in face of various internal explosions. The CPSU has been busy talking to the delegates from France, Italy, Belgium and Great Britain among others. The CPSU sent Suslov, once identified as the chief of the Foreign Section of the CPSU, to the French Communist Party Congress in order to solidify the position of the leaders. Bulganin, Mikoyan and others have gone to Satellite areas, obviously for coordination purposes, and Satellite leaders, notably the East Germans, have been going to Moscow. All this activity and all these statements flashed through the smokescreen of the 20th Congress verbiage to bring home once again the fact that the CPSU leaders or, possibly, a leading faction or group in the Presidium of the CPSU, still cling to the concept that the movement is one, and one that must be centrally coordinated from Moscow.

The independence talk and the theses of the various roads to socialism sound good and are obviously conceived as propaganda assets. In formulating them, however, the Soviets have created another dilemma for themselves as well as for the international movement. If the Soviets cannot relinquish their claim to leadership and the prerogative of being at the head of the movement, their true role is bound to obtrude and show itself, as it has recently under the stress situation created by the de-Stalinization campaign. And as this basic position of the Soviets reveals itself almost automatically, it becomes counterproductive and hampers the efforts which the Communist Parties are supposed to make, i.e. to appear more independent and free of Moscow control. It is the old story of having your cake and eating it too. It is in this light that we return once more to the Tito/Togliatti situation and ask ourselves whether these two leaders can be used by the Soviets to reorient the Communist movement. We should like to say this: if the CPSU had ever planned to use them as a vanguard in the molding of a new and more independent-looking movement in Europe, they have by now been forced to modify this notion. One cannot condemn "National Communism" in one breath and preach "independence" in the other. These things do not go together.

S E C R E T

In brief, it appears to us that the Soviets' "peacetime communism", as against Stalin's "wartime communism", has brought on no significant reorientation of the fundamental political aims and methods of International Communism. The so-called "changes" pertain largely to Soviet foreign policy tactics and the handling of internal Bloc problems. Whether it hurts or not, the leaderships of foreign Communist Parties must fall in line--as always.

The 30 June Resolution of the CPSU called off the great debate* which was raging in the communist movement throughout the world under the flimsy pretext that the "enemy" has seized the issue and is embarrassing or trying to split the entire Communist movement. In the course of calling off the debate, the CPSU has tampered with historical facts, watered down its case against Stalin, and implicitly invited further criticism for being dishonest and not revealing all the facts about both Stalin and the Soviet system, and the co-responsibility of current leadership. The position of the 30 June Resolution is a defensive one and a direct result of the situation developing under the impact of the release of the Khrushchev speech.

The specific points in the 30 June Resolution showing a difference in position between the Resolution and the secret Khrushchev speech can be summed up as follows:

First, Khrushchev painted a dramatic and horrifying picture of the damage done by Stalin to what may be summarized as the Soviet system. He himself talked about perversions, flowering of bureaucracy, the atmosphere of mistrust and general pathological suspicion prevailing throughout the apparatus, the sterility and stagnancy of the Party, of Soviet science, of Soviet economy, etc. The Resolution, however, flatly states in a dogmatic and unsupported fashion that Stalin has not affected the system, that the system was such that no one man could ever change it. This shift reveals of course the

* A very good indication that the leading Communists abroad correctly interpreted the Resolution as a signal to end the debate has been shown by the Canadian leader, Tim Luck, who has written that "the statement issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU on June 30 marked the stage at which we as a party should...turn from retrospective preoccupation with the revelations concerning the cult of the individual and its consequences, back to Canada and the tasks involved in the struggle to unite the working class movement..."

S E C R E T

-11-

S E C R E T

great sensitivity of the Soviets to attacks which show that it was the system which gave rise to Stalin and not just historical accident, as they now would have it.

The second major shift pertains to the co-responsibility question. In his "secret" speech, Khrushchev pointed out that it was impossible to oppose Stalin, that nothing could be done because opposition simply meant death. In the Resolution, however, there is now reference to a so-called Leninist nucleus which is alleged to have existed at some unspecified period and is alleged to have taken on the leadership of the new course after Stalin's death. It is now stated that it was indeed possible to take counteraction during Stalin's lifetime, and it is alleged by implication that this Leninist nucleus took such counteraction, particularly during the war years when Stalin had given up the leadership as described in the Khrushchev speech. This is a new perspective on the co-responsibility question. Apparently distinction is made between members of this nucleus and the other leaders of the Soviet Union. The members of the nucleus have done all that could be done, even at the risk of being liquidated, although it is not stated how, all of a sudden, it was possible to take such risks. Conversely, those not in the Leninist nucleus are burdened with some responsibility for Stalin's crimes. If this position is meant to provide some answer to the Communists abroad, in order to calm them down and cut off their criticism of the current leadership, it is indeed a weak one.

Another shift pertains to the presentation of the Stalin case itself. In the Resolution the personal responsibility of Stalin was still mentioned and given fairly large proportions. But these personal features have now been linked up with the historical, objective circumstances justifying to a certain extent the restrictions imposed on the Soviet people. By bringing out these objective factors, the leadership obviously attempted to water down the case against Stalin. If there was any historical necessity for some of the things he did, then his personal responsibility cannot be as great as originally featured. Thus, the Soviet leaders maneuvered themselves into a rather paradoxical position. By calling upon historical necessity as justification, they have admitted that in principle the Soviet system is wedded to restrictive and repressive measures. The CPSU reaction to the Poznan riots bears out their basic attitude: dissatisfied workers equals foreign agent activity equals repression. It would seem to us that such weaknesses in the Soviet position should be apparent also to the Communist rank and file and some of the leaders abroad. And we are inclined to think the process of questioning, which has been going on for some time now, is not going to be stopped by self-contradictory clichés.

S E C R E T

SECRET

In sum, what we have seen during the past months was a definite crisis in the de-Stalinization program. More or less explosive reactions on the part of the Communist Parties abroad brought about a modification in the position of the CPSU, designed to reduce to a minimum the fermentation which the release of the secret Khrushchev speech accelerated. If that can be done, the Soviets will achieve the major objective which they originally had in mind. Obviously, they had in mind a whitewash of the Communist movement and the Communist Parties abroad for purposes of furthering the Communist cause throughout the world, by making it more respectable, making it more acceptable to the socialists and liberals, engulfing as it were the current political scene and absorbing all "progressive, liberal, socialist, leftist" forces into the Communist stream. Nevertheless, the crisis will make it more difficult for Communist Parties to achieve their broad united front aims, because what has been said, ^{has been said,} and what has been done cannot be undone. The stink raised by the Khrushchev speech can not evaporate overnight. The crisis has also produced increasing factionalism within many Communist Parties. Dissatisfaction with Party leaders is developing: if Stalin was wrong, why must the little Stalins be right? A fairly respectable Austrian Communist leader as well as a prominent Swiss leader have resigned from the Party. The British Communist Party has generated a small splinter group of intra-Party oppositionists. The Swedish Communist Party has suffered from a splinter movement. The Communist Party of Indonesia seems to be in the throes of a crisis at this moment: the current Secretary General is under fire by the former secretary general and his associates, who were previously ousted. Dissatisfaction with the leaders of CPUSA is evident. Some defections have occurred.

Will the Soviets let the process work itself out without interference? In our opinion the Soviets will favor any process which appears as a "genuine" de-Stalinization effort on the local scene, but will make sure that key positions are held by leaders whose loyalty to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is unquestionable and/or can be ensured.

Obviously there are a great many more things to be said. The Soviets have launched an experiment involving strenuous tactical re-orientation of the movement along the lines of the 20th Congress. It is obvious that things have not been going according to plan and that there must be disagreement on the top level in the CPSU concerning the questions of how far this reorientation is to go and what the limits of such a reorientation are. The zig-zag occurring between 25 February and 30 June indicates such a debate.

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The figure of Stalin was a symbol for the Communists, a symbol of Communism and the Soviet system. Such a symbol is not easily replaced, or for that matter obliterated. The drastic reorientation demanded by the CPSU in regard to the socialists is a thing that has caused other Parties and other functionaries to give voice to resentment and criticism. In some countries there has been talk about the dissolution of the Communist Party and merging it with socialist and liberal groups. We often wonder whether such a development is on the books in order to create a more viable and less obvious Communist group that will be able to manipulate the socialists. We do not know as yet how seriously to take the "dissolution" talks. The Communists are sure to develop certain unrealistic ideas today in their groping for new forms of Party work. The dissolution of the Communist Party and its re-emergence as a "Socialist" group may be one of these unrealistic ideas. The feeling that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has lost face and is no longer the infallible source of direction is shared by many Parties. It could hardly be otherwise in view of the poor handling of the de-Stalinization issue which we all witnessed.

Many wise observers of the Communist movement claim that the factions that may exist on the CPSU level reach into the international movement, and that certain foreign leaders abroad are tied up with factions existing at the CPSU level. This may offer an interesting yardstick against which to measure the various reactions and positions of CP leaders throughout the world.

More than ever will it be necessary to investigate penetratingly the relations of overt and conspiratorial CP leaders abroad with Moscow. They are the leverage for the implementation of the "new course."

More than ever will it be necessary to compare the local CP positions with the ideological line of the CPSU, in order to gauge exactly what this talk about national independence amounts to. More than ever will it be necessary to clarify the conspiratorial aspects of Party work in order to determine the true direction of International Communism.

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