

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days



Monday, 17 September 2001

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document

CIA PASS SEIB 01-217CHX

***** EYES ONLY *****



(b)(3)

OHE

DIST: 0250



(b)(3)

PASS SEIB 01-217CHX

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)

Iraq:

Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks [redacted]

(b)(3)

Several reports since last Tuesday suggest a possible Iraqi role in the attacks. These reports do not provide a compelling case that Iraq planned and perpetrated the attacks, but they do raise questions regarding Iraq's ties to one of the hijackers and possible Iraqi advance knowledge of the plot.

— In the most direct indication of a potential official Iraqi link, a foreign government service last Thursday reported that the local Iraqi Intelligence Service chief met in mid-April with suspected American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Mohammad Atta. The foreign government subsequently expelled the Iraqi for his involvement in an alleged plot to attack the Prague Radio Free Europe facility. [redacted]

(b)(3)

Other reports raise concern because they mention buildings that were struck or they imply foreknowledge of the event, although all of these reports came after the attacks.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Ties to Bin Ladin? [redacted]

(b)(3)

A mutual antipathy toward the US suggests that a marriage of convenience between Saddam and Usama Bin Ladin on terrorism is possible, if unlikely, as the two have deep ideological disagreements.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

— [redacted] Bin Ladin and Saddam established a relationship in the early to mid-1990s, brokered by Sudan.

(b)(3)

— Iraq's former Ambassador to Turkey may have facilitated meetings between Baghdad and Bin Ladin, [redacted]

(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

— [redacted] Saddam sent a trusted envoy to Afghanistan [redacted] to make a preliminary offer of safehaven to Bin Ladin, [redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Saddam's Political Calculations [redacted]

(b)(3)

Discovery of Baghdad's involvement in the attacks would set back all of the progress it has made in undermining UN sanctions and reintegrating Iraq into the region. Saddam's internal situation is secure, and he is making progress in ending his international isolation.

— He successfully thwarted US and British efforts in the Security Council in July to pass a revised sanctions regime, and he is gearing up for the next round in November by both pledging economic incentives and threatening Council supporters and neighbors. [redacted]

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)