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# Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

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**Thursday, 16 May 2002**

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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**Iraq:**

**Seeking To Expand CW Production Capability** [redacted]

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*Iraq in the past three years has sought foreign equipment and chemicals that would give it the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents for a limited strategic stockpile,* [redacted]

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[redacted]

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*Al Tareq probably is connected to Iraq's CW program and could be converted quickly to CW precursor production.* [redacted]

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[redacted]

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*Iraq is trying to procure [redacted] precursor chemicals, probably to replenish its pre-Gulf war CW precursor stockpile and to restore its ability to produce nerve agents.* Iraqi entities have sought dual-use precursors in the EU, the Middle East, Asia, and Australia, but the status of the negotiations and the intended use of the materials are unknown.

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[redacted]

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16 May 2002