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April – September 2014

SEMIANNUAL REPORT



To the Director, Central Intelligence Agency



Office of Inspector General
Celebrating 25 Years of Dedicated Service

David B. Buckley, Inspector General

IG 2014-0348

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To the Director, Central Intelligence Agency



Office of Inspector General

Celebrating 25 Years of Dedicated Service



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(U) FOLLOW THE TRUTH, WHEREVER IT LEADS...



(U) MISSION

(U) To promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of CIA by providing timely, independent, and objective oversight, and by detecting and deterring fraud, waste, and abuse.

(U) VISION

(U) To be a world-class organization that provides reliable assessments and expert advice to the Director, CIA and other key stakeholders, objective and relevant information to the Congress, and challenging and rewarding careers for our professional workforce.

(U) VALUES

- (U) **Integrity** - Making decisions on the merits of every matter without regard to undue influence or favor.
- (U) **Professionalism** - Holding ourselves to the highest standards of accountability and independence and ensuring that our findings are accurate, objective, and timely, and our recommendations relevant, reasonable, fact based, and fair.
- (U) **Expertise** - Developing and leveraging individual and collective skills and experiences.

(U) DIVERSITY

(U) Diversity is integral to our mission success. We value a diverse workforce and therefore are dedicated to recruiting, developing, and retaining qualified individuals who bring to the OIG a variety of experiences, backgrounds, and skills. We are committed to maintaining a positive, equitable, and productive work environment where all employees—and their diverse thoughts and opinions—are welcomed, respected, and valued.

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(U) STRATEGIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES



(U) GOAL 1: EXECUTE TIMELY, OBJECTIVE, AND RESULTS-DRIVEN WORK TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL MISSION PERFORMANCE OF THE AGENCY.

- (U) Undertake work that focuses on programs and activities that are critical to the CIA mission and important to the Director and the Congress.
- (U) Conduct timely and objective audits, inspections, and investigations in accordance with professional standards.
- (U) Undertake work that improves mission performance of the Agency.

(U) GOAL 2: MAXIMIZE OUR VALUE TO THE CIA, THE CONGRESS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

- (U) Explain our mission to our customers and stakeholders and build collaborative, respect-based relationships.
- (U) Solicit from our customers and stakeholders ideas to increase the value of our work.
- (U) Provide accessibility within the construct of our confidential environment.

(U) GOAL 3: ATTRACT, DEVELOP, AND RETAIN A DIVERSE AND HIGHLY SKILLED CADRE OF PROFESSIONAL OIG OFFICERS.

- (U) Implement recruitment strategies that attract a diverse, highly skilled workforce.
- (U) Establish appropriate and measurable performance goals and appropriately and fairly recognize high performance.
- (U) Train our people to the highest professional standards.
- (U) Promote a productive and innovative work environment.
- (U) Provide knowledgeable, supportive, and inclusive leadership and ensure forthright, complete, and timely communications.

(U) GOAL 4: PROVIDE STRONG BUSINESS MANAGEMENT THAT MAXIMIZES FACILITIES, BUDGET, AND TECHNOLOGY AND ALLOWS OIG OFFICERS TO RESPOND OPTIMALLY TO MISSION NEEDS.

- (U) Establish corporate policies, metrics, and plans that drive performance; meet mission requirements; and encourage innovation.
- (U) Develop IT, workspace, and budget solutions that will optimally support staff-specific work processes and provide enterprise-wide insight and managerial information.
- (U) Proactively identify our business management requirements.

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(U//FOUO) I am honored to serve as the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, and I am pleased to present the IG Semiannual Report to the Director, CIA, which highlights key results for the reporting period 1 April–30 September 2014. This report is illustrative of the essential

work that the men and women of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) have provided in the areas of audit, investigations, and inspections. Our work has resulted in a number of significant recommendations to improve the effective and efficient operation of CIA's collection and analysis operations, Covert Action (CA) programs, financial management, and procurement oversight and contract administration.

(U) The OIG celebrates 25 years of independent and dedicated service in 2014. In 1989, the Inspector General (IG) was authorized in federal law (50 USC 3517), replacing the administrative OIG that had been in place since 1952.

(U//FOUO) Director Brennan and his senior leadership team continue to be actively engaged with us in a comprehensive review of outstanding OIG significant recommendations and are working to take corrective action. Implementation of OIG recommendations can be both complex and costly, and we continually work to identify practical solutions to reduce and/or resolve the risks identified by our work.

(U//FOUO) During this reporting period we issued 31 reports addressing a broad range of concerns pertaining to information security, corporate governance, CA activities, financial management, as well as procurement oversight and contract administration. OIG completed 61 investigations, handled 289 Hotline contacts, and continued to work closely with the CIA to resolve outstanding matters. I testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and briefed the President's Intelligence Advisory Board on our investigative work regarding unauthorized access to the RDINet, and also testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on our joint work with other OIGs regarding the OIG review

of information sharing prior to the Boston Marathon bombing.

(U//FOUO) As I have previously and repeatedly reported, my office's ability to properly represent the interests of the CIA in federal criminal investigations is constrained by the lack of authorities granted other federal Inspectors General. Last year, the U.S. House of Representatives and SSCI previously voted to approve additional personnel benefits, on par with other federal Inspectors General, yet the provision was not sustained in conference for the FY 2013 Intelligence Authorization Act. The Administration has included the provision in its request for legislative action to the Congress and the Director, CIA has written to the chairmen of the Congressional intelligence oversight committees in support. Having these critically important authorities would better enable my office to attract and retain employees to ferret out criminal behavior in CIA operations and activities.

(U//FOUO) I am very pleased to report that the operations of Audit, Inspections, and Investigations passed respective peer review during this reporting period. This was the first time the Investigation and Inspection components of the CIA OIG had been peer reviewed in accordance with the standards set by the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE).

(U) In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to Director Brennan, the Agency and the Congress for their continued support of the work of the OIG. A successful OIG is not possible without the collaborative efforts between the OIG staff and Agency managers to address OIG findings and implement corrective actions. I wish to thank them for their dedication and support and look forward to their continued cooperation as we work together to promote accountability, integrity, and efficiency in Agency programs and operations.

David B. Buckley
Inspector General
30 September 2014

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
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(U) OVERVIEW


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(U) ORGANIZATION CHART

DAVID B. BUCKLEY
Inspector General



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(U) THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) The OIG consists of the executive OIG and the following offices:

(U) Audit

(U//FOUO) The Office of Audit (Audit) comprises the Financial Management, Information Technology, Operations, and Procurement Divisions. Audit conducts performance and financial audits of CIA programs and activities, including those non-discretionary audits required by law or otherwise prescribed by Congress, such as the annual Independent Audit of the CIA's Financial Statements; the annual Independent Evaluation of the CIA's Information Security Program and Practices Required by the *Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)*; the annual review of the Agency's compliance with the *Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA)*; the annual risk assessment of purchase and travel card programs; and periodic audits of CA programs. Audit participates with other federal agencies and departments in conducting joint reviews of Intelligence Community (IC) programs and activities.

OVERVIEW

(U) Like most federal Inspectors General, the CIA OIG occupies a unique position within the organization. The OIG is the only element of CIA created separately by statute that has obligations and responsibilities to both the Director, the CIA and to the Congress. The OIG is an independent and objective entity with the mission to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct involving Agency programs and personnel, and promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency in Agency programs and operations. The statutory IG at CIA was established in 1989 (50 USC 3517). The IG is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and can be removed from office only by the President.


(U) The OIG conducts audits, inspections, investigations, and special assessments that result in improvements to CIA mission and business operations through Agency implementation of our recommendations. The OIG also investigates alleged violations of criminal and civil laws, regulations, and ethical standards arising from the conduct of Agency activities. The OIG has jurisdiction to review the programs and personnel of all Agency components [redacted]

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[redacted] as well as Agency contractors. We advance the Agency's mission and function by providing our findings and recommendations to the Director, the Agency, and the Congressional intelligence oversight committees.

(U) The OIG is committed to independently reviewing the integrity of CIA programs and operations. Developing an effective strategy, aligned with the CIA's Strategic Direction, is a critical aspect of fulfilling this commitment. Our current Strategic Plan can be found on the inside covers of this report.

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


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(U) Inspections

(U//FOUO) The Office of Inspections (Inspections) is composed of experienced officers, half of whom are on rotation to the OIG. Balanced staffing by skill set and Directorate representation are hallmarks of Inspections. Inspections conducts evaluations of CIA programs to assess mission performance, customer and partner relationships, and program effectiveness. Inspections examines major, crosscutting Agency issues to assess whether they are carried out effectively, efficiently, and in compliance with laws, Executive Orders, and regulations. The inspections endeavor to focus on areas of the highest risk to CIA programs and operations.




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OVERVIEW

(U) Investigations


(U//FOUO) The Office of Investigations (Investigations) conducts investigations of alleged violations of federal laws, regulations, and policies, as well as alleged waste, fraud, and mismanagement related to CIA programs and operations. Investigators are assigned to specialized divisions responsible for financial, intelligence, integrity, and computer crimes. Investigations also manages the CIA OIG Hotline

(U) In addition, Investigations has refined its policies and procedures to align more closely with the CIGIE Quality Standards for Investigations, as well as IG community best practices.




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(U) Resources and Administration



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(U) During fraud awareness presentations provided by Investigations to Agency staff, Agency officials are reminded of the whistleblower protections provided to Agency employees under the *IG Act*, Presidential Decision Directive-19, and the newly enacted provisions set forth in the *Intelligence Authorization Act of 2014*, and the implementing Agency regulations.

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(U) POSITIVE IMPACT ON AGENCY MISSION

(U) The following represents examples of OIG work that has had a significant, positive impact on the Agency's mission accomplishment during the reporting period. ¹

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
(U//FOUO) Enhancing Training of Certifying Officers. The OIG audit report *Controls Over the Approving Officer Authorities and Agency-Wide Certifying Officers Databases* (2011-0003-AS, September 2011)

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briefed to members and staff of the SSCI, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Judiciary Committee, House Judiciary Committee, and House Homeland Security Committee. A classified, combined final report of the reviews—*Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS*—and an unclassified summary were issued in April 2014. The coordinated reviews have been recognized with the CIGIE, Barry R. Snyder Joint Award for significant contributions through a cooperative effort in support of the mission of the CIGIE.

OVERVIEW

(U) COLLABORATION, INTEGRATION, AND ENGAGEMENT


(U) OIG officers actively participate in a wide range of collaborative activities designed to increase our knowledge of, and contribution to, oversight within the Federal Government.

(U) Community Collaboration and Integration

(U//FOUO) The IG is a statutory member of the CIGIE, and the IC Inspectors General (IC IG) Forum. The IG actively participates in the IC IG and CIGIE meetings and is a member of the CIGIE Legislative Committee.

(U//FOUO) OIG senior managers regularly participate in IC IG fora to include the Deputy Inspectors General Forum, the IC IG Inspections Working Group, the IC Audit Committee, and the IC IG Counsels Working Group. During this reporting period, CIA OIG officers actively participated in a number of joint efforts as follows:

- (U//FOUO) The Inspectors General of the IC, the CIA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted coordinated reviews of the extent and handling of information relevant to the Boston Marathon Bombings that were available to the IC in advance of the 15 April 2013 bombings. On 30 April 2014, the Inspectors General presented the results of the coordinated reviews and answered questions in open and closed hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The results of the reviews were also



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agreed to have the CIA OIG perform [redacted] the audits of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) financial statements for FY 2015 and FY 2016, as well as report on the ODNI's internal controls over financial reporting and compliance with laws and regulations. The FY 2015 audit will be the first annual audit of the ODNI's financial statements.

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OVERVIEW

(U) Outreach

(U) The OIG leveraged myriad opportunities throughout this reporting period to broadcast the OIG mission and strategy.


(U//FOUO) The IG and the respective office disciplines have strong relationships with members and staff of the Congressional intelligence oversight committees. The IG is committed to keeping the committees fully and currently informed of CIA OIG activities. To that end, the IG has offered to brief HPSCI and SSCI staff on the OIG's Semiannual Reports, WorkPlans, and the IG Statement of Management and Performance Challenges incorporated in the Agency Financial Report (AFR). In addition, the IG and his senior officers are available to brief HPSCI and SSCI staff members on completed work as requested. As a result of its statutory reporting, the OIG responded to various congressional requests for reports and information on the status of findings and recommendations from our audits, inspections, and investigations during this period.

(U//FOUO) The Assistant IG (AIG) and Deputy AIG for Audit participate in the quarterly meetings of the IC Audit Committee. Participants at these meetings discuss ongoing and planned audits from each of their respective staffs, sharing lessons learned and techniques used to audit the challenging and unique issue areas facing the IC. Also, the Committee coordinates on future Community audits, discussing audit methodology and staffing.

(U//FOUO) The AIG and Deputy AIG for Inspections participate in the quarterly meetings of the IC Inspections Committee. Participants at these meetings discuss ongoing projects and share lessons learned from completed projects and peer reviews.

(U//FOUO) The AIG for Investigations serves as a guest instructor for the CIGIE IG Investigator Training Program and Periodic Refresher Training Programs.

(U//FOUO) In response to a request from the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA IG




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(U) Training

(U//FOUO) The IG is dedicated to personally promoting a greater understanding of the mission and work of the OIG.



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OVERVIEW

(U) Inspections sponsors a biannual New Inspector's Training Course that is open to new inspectors across the IC IG community. The course uses a case study methodology to teach the process of inspections. Inspectors from CIA and NRO participated in the May 2014 session.

(U//FOUO) Investigations continued to conduct quarterly training on indicators of fraud, waste, and abuse in contracting, procurement, and finance for CIA staff officers, with specific focus on those serving in finance, support and contracting positions. Based on the feedback received from the first running in February 2014, the second and third runnings of this course were held on 13 May and 25 August 2014.

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
(U) PLANNING



(U) MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES FOR CIA

(U//FOUO) Based on the findings of audits, inspections, investigations, and special reviews, the OIG determined that the most serious management and performance challenges facing CIA at the beginning of FY 2015 are:

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(U) The IG *Statement of Management and Performance Challenges* and the Director's response were included in CIA's FY 2014 AFR. The management and performance challenges are not ranked in any order of importance. These challenges also served to inform our annual planning exercise.

(U) ANNUAL PLANNING

(U) On 29 September 2014, we issued our Annual OIG Workplan, identifying the audits, inspections, and other projects we plan to conduct during FY 2015. The Workplan provides broad coverage of the Agency's programs and operations, and is focused on issues of importance to the Agency's mission. The Workplan was distributed to CIA leaders, the IC IG, the ODNI, OMB and the Congressional intelligence committees, and is posted on the internal CIA website.

(U) In FY 2015, the OIG will focus efforts on evaluating and improving the Agency's economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the following areas:

- Financial Management
- Covert Action
- Procurement Oversight and Contract Administration
- Governance
- Information Security
- Collection and Analysis

PLANNING

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(U) STATUTORY REPORTING



(U) This semiannual report (SAR) is submitted pursuant to Section 17 of the *CIA Act of 1949, as amended*, which requires the IG to provide to the Director, CIA, a report summarizing the activities of the OIG for the immediately preceding six-month period.

(U) COMPLIANCE

(U) All OIG audit activities are conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. All OIG inspection and investigation activities conform to standards adopted by the CIGIE.

(U) PEER REVIEW

(U//FOUO) The IG directed that Audit, Inspections, and Investigations undergo respective external peer review in FY 2014.

(U//FOUO) In our SAR for the first half of FY 2014, we reported that Audit had successfully undergone a peer review by the Department of the Treasury OIG.

(U//FOUO) The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) OIG conducted an external review of Investigations. The NRC OIG report, dated 30 July 2014, concluded the system of internal safeguards and management procedures in effect as of 30 April 2014 for the investigative function of the CIA OIG is in compliance with the quality standards established by the CIGIE and the Attorney General's Guidelines. There were no

formal recommendations resulting from the peer review.

(U//FOUO) The NRO OIG conducted an external peer review of Inspections. The review, dated 13 August 2014, concluded the policies and procedures in effect as of 30 April 2014 for the inspections function have been designed and complied with to provide reasonable assurance that the staff is performing and reporting in conformity with the CIGIE standards reviewed. There were no formal recommendations resulting from the peer review.

(U) ACCESS

(U) The OIG continues to have full and direct access to all CIA information relevant to the performance of its duties.

(U) SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES

(U//FOUO) During this reporting period, the IG issued four subpoenas in support of an investigation into alleged travel voucher fraud.

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(U) AUTHORITIES REQUESTED



(U) AUTHORITY TO DESIGNATE POSITIONS FOR PAY AND BENEFIT PURPOSES

(U) The IG intends to continue his pursuit to gain the authority to designate positions within OIG as law enforcement officer positions. This authority is available to all Title 5 Inspectors General and the Government Accountability Office. In its efforts to recruit investigators with IG experience, especially those with supervisory experience, CIA OIG and the Agency are at a disadvantage due to the lack of this authority. To facilitate the recruitment and retention of skilled criminal investigators, the CIA IG must have the authority to designate certain positions within OIG as law enforcement officer positions. The lack of positions designated as law enforcement officer positions also limits the ability of the CIA OIG to rotate officers in from and out to other offices of inspector general, greatly impacting the exchange of ideas, experiences, and investigative techniques. This exchange is vital to the IG's efforts to augment the criminal investigative knowledge, skills, and abilities in the CIA OIG. These officers would be entitled to law enforcement officer retirement benefits under Title 5, Chapters 83 and 84.

(U) For FY 2012, FY 2013, FY 2014, and FY 2015 the IG submitted legislative proposals seeking authority to designate certain positions within OIG as law enforcement positions for retirement purposes. A Congressionally mandated study by the Office of Personnel Management OIG published in June 2012 supports the need for these authorities. The Director, CIA (D/CIA) has submitted letters to both HPSCI and SSCI in support of this initiative. The IG will continue to work with the intelligence oversight committees to obtain this authority.

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(U) PROJECTS



(U) AUDIT

(U) COMPLETED PROJECTS

(U//FOUO) Audit completed 24 projects that made 48 recommendations, including 24 which were considered significant.


AREA OF FOCUS	PROJECT NAME	PROJECT NUMBER	ISSUE DATE
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(U) Collection and Analysis

(U//FOUO) Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS

Combined IC IG Forum Report

April 2014



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(U) Covert Action

PROJECTS

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(U) SUMMARIES OF COMPLETED WORK

(U//FOUO) Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS (Combined IC IG Forum Report, April 2014)

(U) The Inspectors General of the IC, the CIA, the DOJ, and the DHS conducted coordinated reviews of the extent and handling of information relevant to the Boston Marathon bombings that were available to the IC in advance of the 15 April 2013 bombings. The results of the CIA OIG review, which were reported internally in draft (*CIA Handling of Information Leading up to the Boston Marathon Bombings* [2013-0024-AS, October 2013]), and the reviews conducted by the other participating Inspectors General were included in a combined final report and an unclassified summary.

(U) Based on information gathered during the coordinated reviews, CIA, FBI, DHS, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) generally shared information and followed procedures appropriately. There were areas where broader information sharing between agencies may have been required,

[Redacted]

However, the participating OIGs found no basis to make broad recommendations concerning information handling and sharing.

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PROJECTS

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PROJECTS



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PROJECTS

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PROJECTS



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
PROJECTS



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
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(U) 2014 Independent Evaluation of the CIA's Information Security Program and Practices Required by the *Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)* (2014-0018-AS, September 2014)

(U) *FISMA* requires federal agencies to establish agency-wide, risk-based security programs for the information systems that support the agency, including those systems provided or managed by contractors. The Act prescribes an annual process of self-assessment and independent evaluation of an agency's information security program and practices.

(U//FOUO) The OIG has completed 12 *FISMA* evaluations of CIA's information security program and practices. These evaluations have found that CIA generally complies with the requirements of *FISMA* and other applicable laws and regulations.



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
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
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**(U) FY 2013 Review of the CIA's Compliance
With the *Improper Payments Elimination and
Recovery Act (IPERA) of 2010* (2014-0009-AS,
April 2014)**



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
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
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
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PROJECTS



APRIL- SEPTEMBER 2014

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(U) INSPECTIONS

(U) COMPLETED PROJECTS

(U//FOUO) Inspections completed seven inspections containing 15 recommendations, including seven significant recommendations. These recommendations serve to: enhance Agency oversight and guidance; mitigate strategic and operational risks; drive more effective use of resources; and improve collaboration in the IC.

AREA OF FOCUS	PROJECT NAME	PROJECT NUMBER	ISSUE DATE
(U) Collection and Analysis	[Redacted]		
(U) Governance			
(U) Information Security			
(U) Special Assessment			

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) This table is SECRET//NOFORN.

(U) SUMMARIES OF COMPLETED WORK

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(b)(5)


[Redacted]	[Redacted]
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PROJECTS

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


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PROJECTS



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PROJECTS

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(U) Ongoing Audits, Inspections, and Reviews

The following Audits, Inspections, and Reviews, were open as of 30 September 2014:

(b)(3) **(U) Financial Management:**

- (U) Independent Audit of the CIA FY 2014 Financial Statements

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U//FOUO) Covert Action:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Procurement Oversight and Contract Administration:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Governance:

(b)(3)

(U) Information Security:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U//FOUO) Collection and Analysis:

(b)(1)
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(U) Research and Development:

(b)(3)

(U) Special Assessment:

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PROJECTS

* (U) Draft report issued.

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(U) INVESTIGATIONS

(U) COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS

(U//FOUO) Investigators completed 61 investigations during this period. These investigations resulted in the issuance of six Reports of Investigations and eight memoranda to management, reporting the results of the investigation. The remaining 47 matters were closed internally by the OIG. In these matters, the OIG conducted an appropriate investigation and determined either sufficient evidence of the

initial allegation could not be established, or that management corrective action was unnecessary. Investigations also worked with the DOJ in support in support of investigations and criminal prosecutions. The OIG formally referred 26 matters to the DOJ for prosecutorial consideration of violations of federal criminal law. In addition, the Agency took 11 disciplinary and security actions in response to OIG investigations and allegations processed through the OIG Hotline.

(U//FOUO) As a result of Investigations' efforts, [redacted] in recoveries were ordered on behalf of the U.S. Government.

(b)(3)

COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS	CASE NUMBER	ISSUE DATE
(U//FOUO) Alleged Misattribution of Detainee Intelligence	2010-09729-IG	April 2014
(U) Time and Attendance Fraud - Contractor	2012-10633-IG	April 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged <i>USERRA</i> Violation	2013-11231-IG	April 2014
(U) Alleged Misuse of Computer System by Contractors	2013-11412-IG	April 2014
(U) Alleged Solicitation of Business Using Agency Systems by Contractor	2013-11550-IG	April 2014
(U) Alleged Theft of Government Property	2013-11460-IG	April 2014
(U) Alleged Hunting Violation at CIA Facility	2013-11664-IG	April 2014
(U) Alleged Operational Risk at Hosting Provider	2014-11812-IG	May 2014
(U) Alleged Moving Company Fraud	2011-10492-IG	May 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Overcharging for PCS and Retiree Moves	2013-11339-IG	May 2014
(U) Alleged Conflict of Interest	2013-11423-IG	May 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Purchase and Distribution of Illegal Steroids in War Zone	2013-11523-IG	May 2014
(U) Alleged Worker's Compensation Fraud	2013-11611-IG	May 2014
(U) Alleged Worker's Compensation Fraud	2013-11612-IG	May 2014
(U) Alleged Misuse of Government Funds	2013-11618-IG	May 2014

PROJECTS

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(U) TABLE: INVESTIGATIONS COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS (CONTINUED)

COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS	CASE NUMBER	ISSUE DATE
(U//FOUO) Alleged Visa Fraud in Overseas Field Station	2013-11647-IG	May 2014
(U) Alleged Abuse by Staff Members of ComputerAdmin Privileges	2014-11768-IG	May 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Asset Mishandling in Overseas Field Station	2014-11876-IG	May 2014
(U) Alleged False Claim for Separation Maintenance Allowance and Other Benefits	2012-10920-IG	June 2014
(U) Alleged Time and Attendance Fraud - Contractor	2012-10969-IG	June 2014
(U) Alleged Theft of Government Property by Contractor	2013-11370-IG	June 2014
(U) Alleged Theft of Government Property	2013-11421-IG	June 2014
(U) Alleged Conflict of Interest by Staff Employee	2013-11591-IG	June 2014
(U) Alleged Reprisal of Former Employee of Contractor	2014-11786-IG	June 2014
(U) Alleged Conflict of Interest	2014-11941-IG	June 2014
(U) Alleged Destruction of Data by Contractor	2014-11957-IG	June 2014
(U) Alleged Weapons Violation by Contractor	2007-09771-IG	July 2014
(U) Alleged Contractual Improprieties	2011-10490-IG	July 2014
(U) Time and Attendance Fraud - Staff Employee	2013-11209-IG	July 2014
(U) Alleged Conflict of Interest in DS&T Training Program	2013-11322-IG	July 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Misuse of CIA Credential by Independent Contractor	2013-11389-IG	July 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Misuse of Government Funds by Cover Providers	2013-11442-IG	July 2014
(U) Allegation of Misuse of Authority	2013-11466-IG	July 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Domestic Violence Incident at Overseas Field Station	2013-11499-IG	July 2014
(U) Alleged Extortion by Contractor	2013-11508-IG	July 2014
(U) Alleged Contract Irregularity	2014-11686-IG	July 2014
(U) Alleged Violation of Post Employment Restrictions	2014-11690-IG	July 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Assault of Officer in Overseas Field Station	2014-11705-IG	July 2014

PROJECTS

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(U) TABLE: INVESTIGATIONS COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS (CONTINUED)

COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS	CASE NUMBER	ISSUE DATE
(U//FOUO) Agency Access to SSCI Shared Drive on RDINet	2014-11718-IG	July 2014
(U) Alleged Misuse of Agency Systems	2014-11815-IG	July 2014
(U) Alleged Conflict of Interest	2014-11863-IG	July 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Agency Impersonator [redacted] [redacted]	2014-11872-IG	July 2014
(U) Alleged Destruction of Government Information by Contractor	2014-11926-IG	July 2014
(U) Suspicious Error Message When Opening OIG Document	2014-12015-IG	July 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Wrongful Sharing of RH Material	2013-11358-IG	August 2014
(U//FOUO) Counterfeit CIA ID Used by Non-Agency Officer to Possibly Engage in Fraud	2013-11403-IG	August 2014
(U) Alleged Mismanagement of an Agency Program	2013-11411-IG	August 2014
(U//FOUO) Individual Arrested with Counterfeit Agency ID in MI	2013-11488-IG	August 2014
(U) Alleged Ethics Violation	2013-11571-IG	August 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Attempted Bribery in War Zone	2013-11582-IG	August 2014
(U) Alleged Theft of Government Property	2014-11674-IG	August 2014
(U) Alleged Abuse of Position and Authority by Contractor	2014-11696-IG	August 2014
(U) Alleged Accounting Reimbursement Fraud	2014-11772-IG	August 2014
(U) Alleged Employee Ethics Violation	2014-11838-IG	August 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Cash Shortage at Overseas Field Station	2014-11904-IG	August 2014
(U) Allegations of Mismanagement	2014-11921-IG	August 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Shooting Incident in Overseas Field Station	2014-11925-IG	August 2014
(U) Alleged Disclosure of Classified Information	2014-11959-IG	August 2014
(U//FOUO) Allegation of Exposure of a Covert Agency Official	2014-12012-IG	August 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Computer Misuse	2014-11973-IG	September 2014
(U//FOUO) Alleged Detainee Abuse [redacted] at Overseas Base (b)(3)	2014-12000-IG	September 2014

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PROJECTS

(U) This table is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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
(U) SELECT SUMMARIES OF INVESTIGATION



(U) This section summarizes significant investigations completed during this reporting period.


(U//FOUO) Alleged Visa Fraud in Overseas Field Station (2013-11647-IG, May 2014)

(U//FOUO) Alleged Misattribution of Detainee Intelligence (2010-09729-IG, April, 2014)




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
(U//FOUO) Alleged False Claim for Separate Maintenance Allowance and other Benefits (2012-10920-IG, June 2014)

(U//FOUO) Alleged USERRA Violation (2013-11231-IG, April 2014)



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


PROJECTS

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(U//FOUO) Alleged Domestic Violence Incident at Overseas Field Station (2013-11499-IG, July 2014)




(b)(3)
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DOJ, was based upon inaccurate information provided to the author of the letter. The OIG also determined that three persons were uncooperative with the OIG investigation.

(U) The OIG referred the investigation to the DOJ, which declined any interest in criminal prosecution.


(U) The D/CIA convened an Agency Accountability Board in response to the OIG Report of Investigation.

(U//FOUO) Alleged Misuse of Agency Systems (2014-11815-IG, July 2014)




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(b)(5)
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(U) Alleged Extortion by Contractor (2013-11508-IG, July 2014)



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(U//FOUO) Alleged Mismanagement of an Agency Program (2013-11411-IG, August 2014)



(b)(3)

(U//FOUO) Alleged Access to SSCI Shared Drive on RDINet (2014-11718-IG, July 2014)

(U//FOUO) The OIG conducted an investigation into the alleged improper access of a SSCI shared drive on the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Network (RDINet) by Agency personnel.

(U) The investigation concluded that five Agency personnel improperly accessed SSCI Majority staff shared drives on the RDINet. The report also concluded the CIA crimes report, alleging potential criminal conduct by SSCI staffers, filed with the

PROJECTS

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(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

(U//FOUO) Alleged Shooting Incident in Overseas Field Station (2014-11925-IG, August 2014)

(U//FOUO) Alleged Theft of Government Property (2014-11674-IG, August 2014)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(U//FOUO) Alleged Computer Misuse (2014-11973-IG, September 2014)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(U) Alleged Accounting Reimbursement Fraud (2014-11772-IG, August 2014)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

PROJECTS

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(b)(3) (S//NF) Alleged Detainee Abuse [redacted]
[redacted] at Overseas Base (2014-12000-IG,
September 2014)

[redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(U) Recommendation

(U) Mortgage Fraud (2012-10692-IG)

(b)(3)
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[redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(3)
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PROJECTS

(U) Prosecutions

**(U//FOUO) Theft of Classified Information
(2010-10875-IG)**

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[redacted]


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(U) HOTLINE

(U) The OIG Intake Unit is responsible for the OIG Hotline and complaint processing. The Intake Unit provides a confidential and reliable source for Agency employees, contractors, and the public to report fraud, waste, abuse, and gross mismanagement.


(U) During the period 1 April to 30 September 2014, the Intake Unit received 289 contacts from the Agency and the general public (see Figure 1). The OIG categorized the 289 contacts into 13 categories (see Figure 2). The OIG then processed the contacts according to the nature of the complaints (see Figure 3).

(U) FIGURE 1:
(U) Matters Received by the Following Methods
(Number of Contacts, Percentage)




(U) Figure 1 is UNCLASSIFIED.

(U) FIGURE 2:
(U) Matters Received by Category
(Number, Percentage)



(U) Figure 2 is UNCLASSIFIED.

(U) FIGURE 3:
(U) Matters Referred by Category
(Number, Percentage)



(U) Figure 3 is UNCLASSIFIED.

(U) Note: Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%.

PROJECTS

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
(U) STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS



(U) The figures below illustrate Audit and Inspections report and recommendation statistics through the end of FY2014. Figure 1 outlines the number of Audit and Inspections reports made by FY. Figure 2 outlines the number and status

of recommendations issued by FY. Figure 3 summarizes the number of open recommendations by directorate. Figure 4 illustrates the number of recommendations that remain open by FY, with a breakdown of significant and not significant.

(b)(3)



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(U) OUTSTANDING FROM PREVIOUS SEMIANNUAL REPORTS

(U) As required by statute, the following tables present the status of significant recommended actions that remain open from previous Semiannual Reports (SARs). The reports are presented in order of issuance date from most recent to oldest. The tables also present a summary of each significant recommendation and the status of the recommendation as of the end of the reporting period.

(U) There are four categories of reporting for the status of a recommendation: (1) no corrective actions taken, (2) corrective actions in-process, (3) corrective actions complete, and (4) closed without full implementation. Recommendations are considered "in process" when the responsible component has initiated corrective actions, but has not completed those actions. A recommendation is considered complete when the OIG has determined that the responsible component has satisfactorily addressed the recommendation.

(U) Investigations does not have any open significant recommended actions.

(U) TABLE 1 – STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: AUDIT

(U) As of the end of the previous reporting period, 31 March 2014, 135 significant recommendations issued by Audit and reported in previous SARs remained open. Audit issued 24 significant recommendations during this reporting period, as noted in the Completed Projects section, resulting in 159 open significant recommendations. Based on work completed by CIA, Audit closed 43 of these recommendations during this reporting period, and 116 recommendations remain open as of 30 September 2014.

(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT BEGINS ON NEXT PAGE.

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
[Redacted Content]			

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STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
[Redacted Content]			

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U//FOUO) Availability and Performance of CIA Information Systems (2012-0038-AS, February 2014)</p>			

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STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U//FOUO) The CIA's Contract Settlement Process (2012-0016-AS, January 2014)</p>			

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(b)(3)
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STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
[Redacted Content]			

(b)(1)
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STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS



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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) Evaluation Required by the Reducing Over-Classification Act (2013-0016-AS, September 2013)</p>	<p>(U//FOUO) REC 2: Implement effective, mandatory derivative classification refresher training for CIA personnel as required by Executive Order 13526, <i>Classified National Security Information</i>, and Agency Regulation 10-3. <i>Classification and Declassification of Agency Information</i>.</p>		

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
[Redacted Content]			

(b)(1)
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(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
[Redacted Content]			

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
[Redacted Content]			

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(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U//FOUO) BASIS Acquisitions Application Controls (2011-0027-AS, October 2012)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U//FOUO) BASIS Acquisitions Application Controls (2011-0027-AS, October 2012) (continued)</p>			
<p>(U) 2012 Independent Evaluation of the CIA Information Security Program and Practices Required by the Federal Information Security Management Act (2012-0012-AS, September 2012)</p>			
<p>(U//FOUO) CIA's Virtualized Information Processing Project (2010-0025-AS, September 2012)</p>			
<p>(U) CIA's Quantum Leap System (2011-0017-AS, September 2012)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) CIA's Quantum Leap System (2011-0017-AS, September 2012) <i>(continued)</i></p> <p>(U) CIA's Process for Investigating Leaks of Classified Information (2012-0002-AS, July 2012)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(5)			

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(U) Review of the CIA's Compliance With the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (2011-0029-AS, March 2012)			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS



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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<div style="position: absolute; top: 0; right: 0; width: 50px;"> (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(5) </div>			
(b)(3)	<p>(S//NF) Security of the DS&T Mission Systems</p> <p>(2010-0026-AS, September 2011)</p>		(b)(3) (b)(5)

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STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
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(S//NF) Security of the DS&T Mission Systems
 (b)(3)
 (2010-0026-AS, September 2011)
(continued)

(U) Controls Over the Approving Officer Authorities and Agency-Wide Certifying Officers Databases (2011-0003-AS, September 2011)

(C//NF) General Controls
 (b)(3)
 (2010-0002-AS, September 2011)

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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SECRET//NOFORN

(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(C//NF) General Controls</p> <p>(b)(3)</p> <p>(2010-0002-AS, September 2011) (continued)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
--------	---------------------------	--------	-------------------

(U) Independent Auditor's Report on the CIA FY 2010 Financial Statements (2010-0001-AS, November 2010)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(U) Common Workgroup Environment Version 2 (cwe2) (2008-0030-AS, May 2010)

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STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(U) Common Workgroup Environment Version 2 (cwe2) (2008-0030-AS, May 2010) (continued)			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

SECRET//NOFORN

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) Independent Auditor's Report on the CIA FY 2009 Financial Statements (2008-0027-AS, November 2009)</p>			

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) Independent Auditor's Report on the CIA FY 2009 Financial Statements (2008-0027-AS, November 2009) (continued)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) General Controls Over the CIA's Payroll System (2008-0003-AS, January 2009)</p>			

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

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STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) General Controls Over the CIA's Payroll System (2008-0003-AS, January 2009) (continued)</p>			
<p>(U) Independent Auditor's Report on the CIA FY 2008 Financial Statements (2008-0002-AS, November 2008)</p>			
<p>(U//FOUO) Review of CIA's Personnel Management Practices Addressing Security or Suitability Issues of Employees (2007-0019-AS, July 2008)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) Independent Auditor's Report on the CIA FY 2007 Financial Statements (2007-0002-AS, November 2007)</p>			
<p>(U) Independent Auditor's Report on the CIA FY 2006 Financial Statements (2005-0033-AS, November 2006)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) Independent Auditor's Report on the CIA FY 2006 Financial Statements (2005-0033-AS, November 2006) <i>(continued)</i></p>			
<p>(U) Independent Auditor's Report on the CIA FY 2005 Financial Statements (2005-0001-AS, November 2005)</p>			
<p>(U) Independent Report of Audit: FY 2004 Financial Statements of the CIA (2003-0022-AS, November 2004)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) Independent Report of Audit: FY 2004 Financial Statements of the CIA (2003-0022-AS, November 2004) (continued)</p>			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) TABLE 1: AUDIT (CONTINUED)

AUDITS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(5)			
(U) The Agency Debt Collection Process (1999-0034-AS, June 2001)	(b)(3) (b)(5)		

(U) This table is SECRET//NOFORN.

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**(U) TABLE 2 – STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:
INSPECTIONS**

(U//FOUO) As of the end of the previous reporting period, 31 March 2014, 32 significant recommendations that had been issued by Inspections and reported in previous SARs remained open. Inspections issued seven significant recommendations during this reporting period, as noted in the Completed Projects Section, resulting in 39 open recommendations. Based on work completed by CIA, Inspections closed six of these recommendations during this reporting period, and 33 recommendations remain open as of 30 September 2014.

INSPECTIONS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
[Redacted Table Content]			

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

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(U) TABLE 2: INSPECTIONS (CONTINUED)

INSPECTIONS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(5)			

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(U) TABLE 2: INSPECTIONS (CONTINUED)

INSPECTIONS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(U) Electronic Records Management (2012-0004-IN, June 2013)			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

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(U) TABLE 2: INSPECTIONS (CONTINUED)

INSPECTIONS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
<p>(U) Electronic Records Management (2012-0004-IN, June 2013) (continued)</p> <p>(b)(3)</p>	<p>(b)(3) (b)(5)</p>		
<p>(U) Agency Management of Human Resources:</p> <p>(b)(3)</p> <p>(2012-0009-IN, May 2013)</p>			
<p>(b)(3)</p>			

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STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) TABLE 2: INSPECTIONS (CONTINUED)

INSPECTIONS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
[Redacted]			
<p>(U//FOUO) DI-NCS Information Sharing (2010-0010-IN, September 2011)</p>	[Redacted]		

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

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(U) TABLE 2: INSPECTIONS (CONTINUED)

INSPECTIONS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(U//FOUO) DI-NCS Information Sharing (2010-0010-IN, September 2011) (continued)	<div data-bbox="456 285 971 1515" style="border: 1px solid black; min-height: 500px;"></div>		(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(5)
(U) Continuity of Operations (2010-0009-IN, June 2011)			
(U) CIA Performance on Diversity (2010-0001-IN, November 2010)			
(U) Logistics Support (2010-0004-IN, November 2010)			
(U//FOUO) Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis (2009-0004-IN, September 2009)			

(U) This table is SECRET//NOFORN.

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

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**(U) TABLE 3 – STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:
ASSESSMENTS**

(U//FOUO) As of the end of the previous reporting period, 31 March 2014, 7 significant recommendations from Assessments that had been reported in previous SARs remained open. Three of these recommendations were closed prior to the end of this reporting period, 30 September 2014.

ASSESSMENTS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(U) Review of High-Threat Training (2012-0014-AS, October 2012)			

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

SECRET//NOFORN

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(U) TABLE 3: ASSESSMENTS (CONTINUED)

ASSESSMENTS	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
(U//FOUO) Memorandum: Directorate of Science and Technology Accountable Property (2012-0031-AS, July 2012)	(b)(3) (b)(5)		
(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(5)			

(U) This table is SECRET//NOFORN.

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APPENDICES

(U) APPENDIX

(U) ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

(U) This list is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

(b)(3)	A		CIO	Chief Information Officer	
	ABS	Agency Business Systems	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency	
(b)(3)			CIAU	CIA University	
			CIC	Counterintelligence Center	
					(b)(3)
			CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency	
	ADDNCS/CI	Associate Deputy Director, NCS for CI	CIO	Chief Information Officer	
(b)(3)					(b)(3)
(b)(3)	AG	Agency Guidance			
			C/LS	Chief, Logistics Support	
	Agency	Central Intelligence Agency			(b)(1)
	AIG	Assistant IG			(b)(3)
	AIN	Agency Internet Network			
	AOA	Approving Officer Authorities			
	AR	Agency Regulation	CO	Contracting Officer	
(b)(3)	ARGO	Agency Regulations and Governance	COs	Contracting Officers	
					(b)(1)
	AUD	Audit			(b)(3)
	B				
	B&F	Budget & Finance	COTR	Contracting Officer's Technical Representative	(b)(3)
(b)(3)			CPC	Counterproliferation Center	(b)(3)
					(b)(3)
	BI	Background Investigation			
	C				
	C&A	Certification and Accreditation	CTC	CounterTerrorism Center	
(b)(1)			CWE	Common Workgroup Environment	
(b)(3)			CWE2	CWE Version 2	
			CY	Calendar Year	
			D		
			D/CIA	Director, Central Intelligence Agency	
			DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directive	
			D.C.	District of Columbia	
(b)(1)	CCM	CIA Contracting Manual	DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directive	
(b)(3)					(b)(3)
	CFE	Chief Financial Executive (NGA)	DHS	Department of Homeland Security	
(b)(1)	CFO	Chief Financial Officer	DI	Directorate of Intelligence	
(b)(3)			DNI	Director of National Intelligence	
	CI	Counterintelligence	D/NCS	Director of the National Clandestine Service	

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APPENDICES

(b)(3)	DoD DOJ DOS	Department of Defense Department of Justice Department of State		(b)(3)
(b)(3)			IC IC IG ICD ID IG	Intelligence Community IC Inspectors General Intelligence Community Directive Indentification Inspector General
(b)(3)	DS&T DS	Directorate of Science & Technology Directorate of Support		(b)(3)
(b)(1) (b)(3)			IM IMS INS InfoSec	Information Management Information Management Services Inspections Information Security
(b)(3)	E			(b)(3)
(b)(3)			IPERA IPS	Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 Imaging and Publishing Support
	EEO ERM EXDIR	Office of Equal Opportunity Employment Electronic Records Management Executive Director, CIA		(b)(3)
	F			(b)(3)
(b)(3)	FAR FASAB Board FBI	Federal Acquisition Regulation Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Federal Bureau of Investigation		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(b)(1) (b)(3)	FISMA Act	Federal Information Security Management	M MI	Michigan
	FY	Fiscal Year		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(b)(3)	G GAAP	Generally Accepted Accounting Principles	N NCS	National Clandestine Service
(b)(3)				(b)(3)
(b)(3)	GFE	Government Furnished Equipment	NCTC NGA NIP	National Counterterrorism Center National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Program
(b)(3)	H HR HPSCI HQS	Human Resources House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Headquarters		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(b)(3)			NRC NRO NSA NSS	Nuclear Regulatory Commission National Reconnaissance Office National Security Agency National Security Staff
(b)(3)	I			(b)(1) (b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

APPENDICES

(b)(3) **O**

[Redacted]

OCIO Office of the Chief Information Officer

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OGA Other Government Agency

OGC Office of General Counsel

OIG Office of Inspector General

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPE Office of the Procurement Executive

OPR Office of Personnel Resources

OS Office of Security

OSC Open Source Center

P

PAS Performance Appraisal System

PCS Permanent Change of Station

PE Procurement Executive

PM Program Manager

POV Personally Owned Vehicle

PP&E Property, Plant, and Equipment

R

RDINet Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Network

REC Recommendation

S

SAR Semiannual Report

SEA Subsistence Expense Allowance

SMA Separate Maintenance Allowance

SPS Security Protective Service

SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

T

TLA Temporary Lodging Allowance

U

U.S. United States

USB Universal Serial Bus

USC United States Code

USD United States Dollar

USERRA Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act

USG United States Government

V

VIP Virtualized Information Processing

W

WMA Washington Metropolitan Area

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