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IG 2009-0384

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SEMIANNUAL REPORT

TO THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

JANUARY-JUNE 2009



[Redacted]
Acting Inspector General

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(U) A MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) The past six months were a time of change for the Office of Inspector General (OIG), as our Inspector General, John Helgerson, retired from the Agency. I am pleased to report that the important work of the OIG has continued, in part due to the high standards of quality and integrity that Mr. Helgerson embedded in the culture of the OIG. As this report indicates, the productivity of our office and relevance of our products remained high during the reporting period.

(U) Reflecting the growing importance of collaboration in the Intelligence Community (IC), the OIG continues to broaden collaboration with its IC partners. In May 2009, approximately 70 OIG officers participated in the 15th Annual Intelligence Community Inspectors General Conference, a one-day event that featured speakers and panels on a variety of topics and an opportunity to network with colleagues from throughout the OIG community. In addition, the Assistant Inspectors General for Audit, Inspections, and Investigations are all active participants in working groups composed of their counterparts from throughout the IC; these groups enable substantive collaboration and information sharing.

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~~(S//NF)~~ The Audit Staff continues to be heavily involved in the oversight of IC programs. This reporting period, the Staff completed a joint audit of [redacted]. The audit was requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and conducted by the Inspectors General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of the Treasury, and the CIA. The Staff also participated in an IC-wide review of the President's Surveillance Program (PSP). Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 required the inspectors general of the elements of the IC that participated in the PSP to conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The Staff published its results of the review of CIA's participation in the PSP in a report that will be included in a comprehensive report to be provided to the appropriate committees of the Congress in July 2009. Work continues on a joint audit of [redacted].

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~~(S//NF)~~ The Inspection and Investigations Staffs continued their outreach to counterpart organizations throughout the IC. Inspectors from the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency participated in our New Inspector Training Course. An OIG inspector participated as the CIA representative in a joint inspection, led by the National Reconnaissance Office OIG, [redacted].

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(U) At the request of the Congress, the Audit Staff completed an audit of financial management of a large [redacted]. Other completed work included an audit of the general controls over the payroll system and an independent quality control review of the Agency's Financial Audit Services.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) During the reporting period, the Inspection Staff continued its program of inspections of major Agency components. These included Africa Division (AF) in the National Clandestine Service and the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) in the Director's Area. The AF inspection found the Division to be very well-managed, efficient, and productive; in fact, the report contained a single, favorable finding and no recommendations for improvement. Notably, the Staff has not issued an inspection report without recommendations since September 2000. The OCA inspection reported positive information regarding that component's success in accomplishing its mission, as well as some challenges regarding recordkeeping and communications, among others.

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(~~C~~) The Inspection Staff also completed reviews of four diverse issues: [redacted]

[redacted] Leadership Training, [redacted]

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[redacted] and the Publications Review Board (PRB) Process for Book Manuscripts. [redacted]

[redacted] project was initiated at the request of the SSCI, which expressed concerns over a perceived lack of transparency of information about the program and absence of a detailed project plan for the research. The PRB inspection also responded to a request of the SSCI, this one aimed at determining whether the Board was in compliance with its own policies and procedures.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) During the reporting period, the Investigations Staff supported the Department of Justice (DOJ) on a number of prosecutions of Agency employees and presented Agency management and disciplinary boards with findings and recommendations from internal administrative investigations. The Staff's two and a half year investigation into the unlawful awarding of contracts by a former Agency executive ended with him being sentenced to 37 months of incarceration on one count of depriving the United States and its citizens of the right to his honest services. The Staff also supported DOJ in the arrest and prosecution of a former Agency employee for the theft and fraudulent use of US Government credit cards. This employee was sentenced to one year and one day of incarceration on one count of access device fraud. The Staff continues to work with DOJ on such ongoing cases as the destruction of videotapes related to CIA's interrogations programs, the importation of child pornography by a former Agency employee, the embezzlement of funds by a case officer, the theft of government property by Agency contractors, and false statements by an Agency security investigator.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The investigations of alleged abuse of detainees captured as part of the Agency's counterterrorism efforts and the questionable renditions of alleged terrorists remain high priorities for the Staff. As part of a DOJ led task force, OIG special agents are investigating allegations of abuse made by 16 high value detainees who were transferred to Guantanamo Bay. The Staff is referring the findings of these investigations to DOJ for prosecutive assessment.

(U) The OIG awaits the selection of a Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed IG to ensure the continued success of our independent oversight function at CIA. In the interim, I am confident that we will continue to promote organizational excellence through recommendations designed to promote efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in the administration of CIA activities. I appreciate the professionalism and dedication demonstrated on a daily basis by OIG officers as we carry out our mission.

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
Acting
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(U) STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

(U) This report is submitted pursuant to Section 17 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, which requires the Inspector General (IG) to provide to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, not later than 31 January and 31 July of each year, a semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the immediately preceding six-month periods, ending 31 December and 30 June, respectively.

(U) All audit activities of the OIG are carried out in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. All OIG inspection and investigation activities conform to standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U) The OIG has had full and direct access to all Agency information relevant to the performance of its duties.

(U) SUBPOENA AUTHORITY

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this reporting period, the IG issued two subpoenas, one involving allegations of fraud and theft and another involving alleged improper [redacted] prohibited by Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.

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(U) LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

(U) The OIG submitted no legislative proposals during this reporting period but continues to support legislation that would grant the CIA Inspector General the authorities provided other US Government statutory Inspectors General, including the authorities set forth in the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. Among other things, such authorities will help ensure the independence and effectiveness of the CIA Office of Inspector General, particularly with regard to the employment of OIG personnel and oversight of the CIA IG.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**(U) AUDITS**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The Audit Staff conducts performance and financial audits of CIA programs and activities, including those that have been mandated either by the Congress or through statute: the annual independent audit of the CIA's financial statements, the annual independent evaluation of the CIA information security program and practices required by the Federal Information Security Management Act, and periodic audits of CIA covert action programs. The Audit Staff also participates with other federal agencies and departments to conduct joint reviews of Intelligence Community (IC) programs and activities. The Staff conducts its audits in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

~~(S//NF)~~ This reporting period, the Staff completed work on a joint audit and a joint review. The Staff issued a final audit report on the [redacted]. The audit was requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and was conducted by the Inspectors General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of the Treasury, and the CIA. The Staff also participated in an IC-wide review of the President's Surveillance Program (PSP). Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 required the inspectors general of the elements of the IC that participated in the PSP to conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The Staff published its results of the review of CIA's participation in the PSP in a report that will be included in a report to be provided to the appropriate committees of the Congress in July 2009.

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~~(S//NF)~~ The Staff completed an audit of controls over the CIA's payroll system, [redacted]; and an audit of a covert action program. An independent quality control review of the CIA's Financial Audit Services was also completed.

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(U) COMPLETED AUDITS

(U) GENERAL CONTROLS OVER THE CIA'S PAYROLL SYSTEM (2008-0003-AS, JANUARY 2009)

~~(S)~~ As part of the audit of the CIA's FY 2008 financial statements, the Staff reviewed the general controls over the CIA's payroll system, [redacted]

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[redacted] automated general controls do not provide reasonable assurance that payroll data processed by [redacted] is complete, accurate, valid, and protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification. CIA officials have not developed, documented, implemented, and monitored internal controls to ensure that: only authorized individuals have access to [redacted] only authorized changes are made to [redacted] only authorized transactions occur in [redacted] and [redacted] security and application controls are not circumvented. [redacted]

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ INDEPENDENT QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL AUDIT SERVICES (2008-0009-AS, MARCH 2009)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Financial Audit Services (FAS), a component within the Directorate of Support, provides contract audit, business consulting, and training services to Agency and external customers. At the request of the Chief, Acquisition Services, the Audit Staff conducted an independent quality control review (external peer review) of FAS to determine whether FAS's internal quality control system provides reasonable assurance that FAS auditors are complying with established FAS quality control policies and procedures and generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) promulgated by the US Government Accountability Office.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ FAS received a modified opinion on its system of internal quality control, which means that the organization is not in full compliance with GAGAS. The review identified weaknesses in procedures related to professional standards that require audit organizations to: obtain periodic external quality control reviews on a three-year cycle; effectively document and communicate quality control policies and procedures to staff; conduct internal quality assurance monitoring; adequately supervise all staff; provide for the safe custody and retention of all workpapers and reports for a time sufficient to satisfy legal, regulatory, and administrative requirements; and meet requirements for continuing professional education.

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
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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]
(2007-0013-AS, JUNE 2009)

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The audit of the [Redacted] was requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and was conducted jointly by the Inspectors General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and the CIA.

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**(U) CIA PARTICIPATION IN THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
(2008-0016-AS, JUNE 2009)**

(U) Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 requires the Inspectors General of the elements of the Intelligence Community that participated in the President's Surveillance Program to conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The results of our review of CIA participation in the PSP will be included in a report to be provided to the appropriate committees of the Congress in July 2009.

~~(S//NF)~~ The CIA prepared the threat assessment memorandums that were used to support Presidential authorization and periodic reauthorizations of the PSP. CIA analysts and targeters, as PSP consumers, tasked the program and utilized the product from the program in their analyses.

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~~(S//NF)~~ A completed request for information (RFI) form was required to be submitted to the NSA to obtain information from the PSP. The RFI had to document a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the subject was engaged in or was preparing to engage in international terrorism in order for the RFI to be approved.

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Based on our review of a sample of RFIs from the CIA, CIA officers justified RFIs in accordance with program guidelines.

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~~(S//NF)~~ The CIA did not implement procedures to assess the usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether particular PSP reporting had contributed to successful operations. CIA officials were able to provide only limited information on how program reporting contributed to successful counterterrorism operations, and we were unable to independently draw any conclusion on the overall usefulness of the program to CIA.

~~(S//NF)~~ Several factors hindered the CIA in making full use of the capabilities of the PSP. Many CIA officials told us that too few CIA personnel at the working level were read into the PSP. [redacted] CIA analysts and targeting officers who were read in had too many competing priorities and too many other available information sources and analytic tools—many of which were more easily accessed and timely—to fully utilize the PSP. CIA officers also told us that the PSP would have been more fully utilized if analysts and targeting officers had obtained a better understanding of the program’s capabilities. Many CIA officers noted that there was insufficient training and legal guidance concerning the program’s capabilities and the use of PSP-derived information. The factors that hindered the CIA in making full use of the PSP might have been mitigated if the CIA had designated an individual at an appropriate level of managerial authority, who possessed knowledge of both the PSP and CIA counterterrorism activities, to be responsible and accountable for overseeing CIA participation in the program.

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(2008-0024-AS, JUNE 2009)

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**(U) STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
OUTSTANDING FROM PREVIOUS SEMIANNUAL REPORTS**

**(U//~~FOUO~~) THE AGENCY'S PROCESS FOR OBTAINING REFUNDS OR CREDITS FOR
UNUSED AIRLINE TICKETS (2005-0030-AS, APRIL 2007)**



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(U) INFORMATION OPERATIONS NETWORK (2006-0001-AS, JUNE 2007)



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~~(S//NF)~~ TERRORIST WATCHLISTING (2005-0016-AS, JUNE 2007)

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~~(C//NF)~~ CRIME AND NARCOTICS CENTER [Redacted]
[Redacted] (2006-0009-AS, AUGUST 2007)

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~~(C)~~ DOMESTIC LIVING QUARTERS ALLOWANCE PROGRAM (2006-0012-AS,
FEBRUARY 2008)

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(2006-0029-AS, FEBRUARY 2008)

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FOR THE

NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE (2006-0014-AS, JUNE 2008)

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
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(U) CONTINUITY AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CRITICAL CIA INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2006-0023-AS, JUNE 2008)




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(U//~~FOUO~~) THE CIA'S OPERATIONAL USE OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY (2007-0003-AS, JUNE 2008)



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(U//~~FOUO~~) REVIEW OF CIA'S PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ADDRESSING SECURITY OR SUITABILITY ISSUES OF EMPLOYEES (2007-0019-AS, JULY 2008)




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
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
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(2006-0026-AS, AUGUST 2008)



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~~(U//FOUO)~~ OVERSEAS CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION PROJECT
MANAGEMENT (2007-0016-AS, NOVEMBER 2008)



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
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
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**(U) INDEPENDENT AUDITS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2003-0022-AS, 2005-0001-AS, 2005-0033-AS, 2007-0002-AS, AND
2008-0002-AS)**



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(S) CONTROLS OVER PROPRIETARIES (2007-002A-AS, DECEMBER 2008)



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(U) SUMMARIES OF SELECTED CURRENT AUDITS

(U) COVERT ACTION ACTIVITIES

~~(S//NF)~~ Audits of covert action activities authorized under the Presidential Findings dated [redacted] were initiated in September 2008. The objectives of the audits are to determine whether: (1) the covert action programs address the objectives and adhere to the authorities set forth in the respective Presidential Findings and related Memoranda of Notification and are accomplished in an effective and efficient manner; (2) resources allocated to the covert action activities are properly managed and used for authorized purposes; and (3) covert action activities are administered in compliance with applicable CIA regulations and US laws. Audit fieldwork has been completed, and draft reports are being prepared.

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ [redacted]

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ The objectives of the audit are to determine whether: (1) the program's management office has the appropriate organization structure, authority, policies, procedures, and controls in place to manage new systems development projects, and (2) the program's management office has access to timely, accurate, and reliable information to support decisionmaking on systems development projects. The draft report is being prepared.

(U) THE COMMON WORKGROUP ENVIRONMENT 2 (CWE2)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The objectives of the audit are to determine whether: (1) CWE2 provides an effective computing environment for Headquarters and field activities, and (2) CWE2 is operated in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

(U) RELEASES FROM THE RESERVE FOR CONTINGENCIES

(U) The objectives of the audit are to determine whether: (1) effective controls and procedures are in place to ensure that releases from the reserve for contingencies are administered in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, and (2) funds released from the reserve are expended only for the purposes for which they were released.

~~(S)~~ **SELECTED CIA PROPRIETARIES**

~~(S)~~ The Audit Staff performs financial statement audits of selected CIA proprietaries. Three audits are under way. The objectives of the audits are to: (1) determine whether the proprietaries' financial statements fairly present, in all material respects, the financial position and results of operations in conformity with

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generally accepted accounting principles; (2) determine whether the proprietaries' financial transactions are reflected accurately and in a timely manner in the CIA's general ledger; and (3) evaluate whether the proprietaries' financial activities are consistent with CIA regulations and guidance and with applicable US laws.

(U//~~FOUO~~) SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTING WITHIN THE NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE

(U//~~FOUO~~) The objective of the audit is to determine whether justifications for sole source contracts in the National Clandestine Service are adequately documented; properly approved by the appropriate Agency officials prior to award; and in compliance with US laws and CIA regulations, policies, and procedures.

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(U) INSPECTIONS

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspection Staff is responsible for conducting inspections of CIA components to evaluate their mission performance, leadership and management effectiveness, and customer and partner relationships. The Staff also assesses major, crosscutting Agency issues to identify their efficiency and effectiveness and their compliance with law, Executive Orders, and regulations.

(~~S~~) During the current reporting period, the Staff issued inspection reports on Africa Division in the National Clandestine Service (NCS), [redacted] the Office of Congressional Affairs in the Director's Area, [redacted]

[redacted] Leadership Training, and the Publications Review Board Process for Book Manuscripts. In addition, the Staff commenced inspections of Agency management of external tasking, [redacted] and [redacted] the Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis in the DI, the Office of General Counsel in the Director's Area, and the Office of Technical Readiness in the Directorate of Science and Technology. Finally, the inspection of returning from external rotations continued.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff closed five inspections that were open at the beginning of this reporting period: The Counterintelligence Center, Agency-Wide Performance Against [redacted] Human Resources, Agency Language Capabilities, and [redacted] The

[redacted] The Staff also closed the inspection of Africa Division which was completed during the current reporting period, as it contained no recommendations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspection Staff continues to conduct a two-week course for new inspectors; members of other government agency inspection and evaluation staffs are invited to attend on a space-available basis. During the current reporting period, the Staff updated the course to include a more recent case study. The Staff also provides an instructional seminar for team leaders before the start of each inspection cycle and seminars for Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspectors and research assistants during the course of each cycle.

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³ (U) When a recommendation remains unsatisfied for five consecutive semiannual reporting periods, the OIG ceases efforts to track its implementation. If the recommendation is significant, the fifth report contains a statement setting forth the IG's view of the impact of the recommendation remaining unsatisfied.

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(U) COMPLETED INSPECTIONS

(U) AFRICA DIVISION, NCS (2008-0006-IN, APRIL 2009)

~~(S//NF)~~ The inspection found Africa Division (AF) to be a well-managed, efficient, and productive NCS component. Of particular note, NCS data from October 2007 through September 2008 showed that the Division-

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~~(S//NF)~~ Africa Division's operational priorities reflect US national security interests in the region—terrorism and other transnational threats, the presence and activities of third-country nationals from countries potentially hostile to the United States, and internal or regional crises that affect US interests. For most AF stations, the top operational priorities are counterterrorism; the recruitment of assets from hard-target countries

[Redacted]

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~~(S//NF)~~ Interviews with AF's CIA partners indicate that the Division has an excellent reputation within the Agency, and US diplomats and military personnel overseas provided mostly positive feedback regarding AF stations and officers. AF works closely with US military elements in Africa, mostly in support of counterterrorism activities, and its level of support likely will increase with the establishment of the US Africa Command.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Briefings, interviews, survey results, and documentation indicate that AF management—the front office, in particular—has excelled in leading the Division in the face of competing priorities, limited resources, and an often challenging overseas environment. Praise for AF senior managers' mission focus, substantive knowledge, mentoring, and communications skills was nearly universal from Division employees and senior officers elsewhere in the NCS. Despite its small size and difficult operating conditions, AF is highly productive and the work force's morale is high. AF officers say that the Division fosters a climate of mentoring and professional growth, and AF has established a reputation as a component that produces future NCS leaders. The inspection report presents one positive finding on Division management and contains no recommendations.

(U) The inspection is closed.

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**(U) [Redacted]
(2008-0007-IN, APRIL 2009)**


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(U) OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (2008-0011-IN, APRIL 2009)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The inspection found that, overall, the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) is successfully accomplishing its mission to advise CIA on matters pertaining to Congressional oversight of US intelligence activities and to coordinate the Agency's provision of information to the Congress. Internal customers, particularly senior CIA officers, commented favorably on OCA's support in preparing them for Congressional briefings and providing logistical and administrative services when OCA facilitates a Congressional event. Over the past two years, OCA also has made increased investments in its people and processes to better perform its mission.

(U//~~FOUO~~) That said, OCA faces a number of challenges. For example, internal customers raised questions about OCA's recordkeeping of CIA's interactions with the Congress,

[Redacted]

While Congressional staff members generally recognize the quality of OCA work, many told the inspection team that OCA needed to be more responsive to their requests, proactive in providing Agency success stories, and timely in providing input on draft legislation and informing the Congress through Congressional Notifications (CNs). Several of these areas noted for improvement have long been challenging issues because OCA shares responsibility for these activities with many other Agency components.

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
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(U) LEADERSHIP TRAINING (2008-0010-IN, MAY 2009)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The CIA Leadership Academy, Leadership Development Program, and Agency directorates have made significant but uneven progress since 2006 on improving the leadership training available to CIA officers. The quality, course selection, and capacity for leadership training have increased substantially. More Agency supervisors and managers have taken some form of leadership training than at any time in the past. Employees value the leadership training courses and utilize the training upon returning to their offices.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Despite this progress, there is room for further advancements in the areas of cross-Agency strategic planning, integration, and communication. The report contains four recommendations, all of which are significant.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The allocation of slots for leadership courses that are mandatory for certain promotions is disproportionate across directorate populations. This affects the Directorate of Support (DS) in particular because its allocation of Leadership on the Line (LOTL) and Managing and Leading Change From the Middle (MALCM) slots is substantially lower than it should be, given the DS's proportion of the overall managerial work force.



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
**(U) PUBLICATIONS REVIEW BOARD PROCESS FOR BOOK MANUSCRIPTS
(2008-0012-IN, MAY 2009)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) This inspection responds to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to determine if the Publications Review Board (PRB) complies with its own policies and procedures for the review of book manuscripts. Although the PRB reviews a variety of publications, such as books, academic papers, and journal articles, the inspection was limited to the review process associated with nonofficial book manuscripts.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The inspection found that, overall, the PRB book manuscript review process is a thorough one. Authors commended PRB personnel on their professionalism and courteous treatment throughout the review process. Most internal Agency authors are satisfied with the amount of information available to them on the review process, although external authors desire more information. From 2000 to 2008, appeals by authors have been minimal and do not appear to have hindered the PRB book manuscript review process.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The report includes five recommendations, one of which is significant. As to prepublication book manuscript review, the PRB continues to be challenged in meeting the 30-day review standard, which was determined to be the maximum time frame for PRB review as set forth in dicta in a 1972 decision by the Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. To address this, the inspection report makes a significant recommendation for the Associate Deputy Director, CIA to request the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to provide guidance to Intelligence Community agencies and departments on the timeline for coordination of book manuscript reviews and provide the OIG a memorandum documenting the results of this request. The OIG has received a copy of a memorandum from the Associate Deputy Director, CIA to the Director of the Intelligence Staff, ODNI, requesting this guidance. A related recommendation asks the Chairman, PRB to ensure that all authors whose book manuscripts require external review are immediately informed in writing of the date on which the PRB completed the CIA's portion of the review and the date on which the manuscript was provided to an external agency for review.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The report contains three other recommendations. To address the difficulty that external authors have in accessing information concerning prepublication review, one recommendation asks the Chairman, PRB to post an updated version of the Agency regulation that governs PRB activity to the CIA Link PRB Web site and the CIA public Web site. A second recommendation aims at addressing the existing inconsistency in the treatment of fiction and nonfiction book manuscripts



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(U) The recommendations and the inspection remain open.

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(2008-0008-IN, JUNE 2009)

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(U) STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS OUTSTANDING FROM PREVIOUS SEMIANNUAL REPORTS

(U) AGENCY LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES (2006-0008-IN, MAY 2007)

(U//~~FOUO~~) One significant recommendation was open at the beginning of this reporting period. It requested the Associate Deputy Director, CIA to provide a progress report on the new process for assessing language needs. The OIG has received a memorandum from the Associate Deputy Director, CIA describing significant steps taken to strengthen management oversight of the allocation of language-use positions and providing details on metrics that will be used to gauge progress in increasing the fill rate of these positions with language-capable officers. These actions satisfy the recommendation, and the inspection is closed.

(U) (2006-0009-IN, JUNE 2007)

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(U) APPLICATIONS SERVICES (2007-0001-IN, DECEMBER 2007)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Three significant recommendations remain open. One requests the Chief, Applications Services (APPS) to develop an implementation plan with actions and a schedule to achieve a strategic vision. The plan has been completed, and APPS indicates that it will provide a progress report in the next reporting period.

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(U) AGENCY-WIDE PERFORMANCE AGAINST
(2007-0002-IN, DECEMBER 2007)

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(U) EMPLOYEE ONBOARDING AT CIA (2007-0009-IN, JUNE 2008)

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(U) OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES (2007-0010-IN, JUNE 2008)

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(U) OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES (2007-0011-IN, JUNE 2008)

[Redacted]

(U) PERSONNEL PROTECTION CONTRACTORS (2008-0003-IN, OCTOBER 2008)

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(U) EAST ASIA DIVISION, NCS (2008-0004-IN, OCTOBER 2008)

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(U) FINANCE, DS (2008-0002-IN, NOVEMBER 2008)

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A second significant recommendation requested the Chief, Finance to develop a methodology to monitor compliance with the requirement for monthly cash counts by disinterested third parties, and to inform the Agency work force of the responsibilities and requirements of cash custodians and the need for third-party support. Finance indicates that it is receiving monthly disbursing reports with the cash count sheets—to include the independent counter's cash count sheets—from cash disbursers. In addition, Finance has published an Employee Bulletin detailing the proper handling of official funds by cash custodians. These actions satisfy the recommendation, and it is closed.

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(2008-0001-IN, DECEMBER 2008)

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NCS (2008-0005-IN, DECEMBER 2008)

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
(U) SUMMARIES OF CURRENT INSPECTIONS

(U) RETURNING FROM EXTERNAL ROTATIONS

(U) The inspection examines the effectiveness of the Agency's reintegration and onward assignment of officers returning from rotations outside CIA.

(U) AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF EXTERNAL TASKING

(U) The inspection explores how CIA manages tasking from external entities and how this impacts the accomplishment of mission objectives.



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(U) OFFICE OF COLLECTION STRATEGIES AND ANALYSIS

(U) The inspection focuses on mission fulfillment, customer and partner relationship management, and personnel and resource management effectiveness.

(U) OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

(U) The inspection focuses on OGC's performance against mission objectives, its interaction with partners and customers, and the effectiveness of its leadership and management.

(U) OFFICE OF TECHNICAL READINESS

(U) The inspection focuses on mission fulfillment, customer and partner relationship management, and personnel and resource management effectiveness.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**(U) INVESTIGATIONS**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Investigations Staff is statutorily authorized to receive and investigate complaints from any person concerning possible violations of laws, regulations, policies, and procedures, as well as allegations of waste, fraud, mismanagement, abuse of authority, and substantial dangers to public health and safety related to Agency programs and operations. Investigations are normally conducted unilaterally by Office of Inspector General (OIG) special agents, but other federal investigative components, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, can be called upon when law enforcement authorities are necessary. The Staff also oversees the Agency's grievance system and conducts proactive initiatives aimed at detecting and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff continued to focus its investigative efforts on thefts of US Government funds, conflicts of interest, contracting irregularities, false statements, and detention and interrogation issues. The Staff also completed several investigations that resulted in successful prosecutions by the Department of Justice (DOJ). In two separate cases, Agency officers entered felony plea agreements to embezzlement of official funds. In another case, a now former Agency officer pled guilty to theft and misuse of US Government credit cards and was sentenced to one year and one day of incarceration. A former Agency executive, who pled guilty to a one-count felony of honest services fraud and false statements, was sentenced to 37 months of incarceration. The Staff issues Employee Bulletins at the conclusion of many investigations to acquaint Agency employees with the serious consequences of violations of laws, regulations, and policies.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff continued resource-intensive investigations concerning detention and interrogation activities and questionable renditions. As part of a DOJ-led task force, OIG special agents are examining certain allegations of abuse made by the 16 high value detainees who were transferred to Guantanamo Bay.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As resources permit, the Staff initiates proactive investigations. Currently, the Staff's Financial Division is examining several contracting matters. In collaboration with the Audit Staff, the Investigations Staff has created a joint procurement fraud team [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Another proactive initiative determined that a number of Agency employees claimed to have degrees from fraudulent or unaccredited institutions. Almost half had received reimbursements from the US Government for this training. DOJ is pursuing prosecution of some of the employees. The Staff worked with appropriate Agency components to implement interim measures to prevent additional cases of applicant degree fraud, resulting in at least one applicant being screened out based on these measures.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Investigations Staff continues to broaden its collaboration with partners and outreach to stakeholders. OIG special agents have partnered with their counterparts [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Staff has established an outreach program with the Agency's Procurement Executive to assist in combating procurement fraud. The Staff also has begun monthly meetings with the Associate Deputy Director, CIA to keep him appropriately informed of the most sensitive cases while acquainting him with investigative methods and procedures.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Improvements in information technology are being implemented that enable special agents to work with greater efficiency. The Staff shortly will deploy a new Case Management System, the culmination of months of development and testing. Further expansion of Staff capabilities to acquire, search, and manage documents electronically will substantially benefit the timeliness in which investigations can be completed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff is at full strength with special agents having a broadly diverse set of skills and investigative and Agency experiences. Staff training and career development remain high priorities. In-service training occurs at least monthly and serves to keep investigators current with fast-moving substantive and technical developments.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff continues to oversee the Agency-wide grievance system. In addition to addressing grievance appeals, the Staff maintains close contact with the Agency's grievance officers. These efforts, together with the emphasis on resolution at the lowest possible level, continue to contribute to effective and timely grievance resolution.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**(U) COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS****(U) THEFT OF US GOVERNMENT CREDIT CARDS (2008-9074-IG)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) An employee admitted to stealing five credit cards backed by the US Government as well as separately applying for and obtaining two additional credit cards. In January 2009, the employee was arrested on federal felony charges of Access Device Fraud. In February 2009, he pled guilty to a one-count criminal information on the same charge. In May 2009, he was sentenced to a period of incarceration of one year and one day and two years of supervised probation. His Agency employment and security clearances were revoked. The former employee is required to make full restitution in the amount of

[REDACTED]

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(U) EMBEZZLEMENT OF US GOVERNMENT FUNDS (2007-8500-IG)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff completed an investigation that determined that an Agency employee embezzled [REDACTED] of government funds and made false statements in official Agency accountings. The employee did not pay two separate assets what the Agency had agreed to pay, and he converted the money to personal use. The employee admitted criminal culpability and, in June 2009, entered into a plea agreement with the government to one felony count of embezzling government funds. Sentencing will take place in late summer 2009.

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(U) IRREGULARITIES IN CONTRACTING (2006-8199-IG)

(U) The Staff completed an investigation into allegations that an Agency executive and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] improperly influenced the award of a contract to a friend whose company had no prior experience providing the contracted services. On 29 September 2008, the former Agency executive pled guilty to one felony count of Honest Services Fraud and False Statements. [REDACTED]

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(U) CONFLICT OF INTEREST: NCS OFFICER AT OVERSEAS LOCATION (2007-8723-IG)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff completed an investigation into an allegation that an Agency officer in a supervisory position took official actions on matters from which his wife—also an Agency employee—benefitted financially. OIG substantiated the allegation. DOJ declined prosecution. The Report of Investigation made four recommendations: to strengthen the process of approving tandem couples for overseas assignments and clarify legal and regulatory restrictions; to inform managers and personnel applying for overseas assignments of the updated requirements; to ensure that component attorneys brief tandem couples on legal restrictions on their new assignments; and to review the conduct of the Agency employees involved in the case to determine what administrative action, if any, was warranted. The National Clandestine Service and Office of General Counsel have addressed all of the recommendations, and the investigation is closed.

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(U) CONFLICT OF INTEREST: NCS OFFICER AT OVERSEAS LOCATION (2007-8724-IG)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff completed an investigation into an allegation that an Agency employee may have used his official position to participate in the process to hire his wife. OIG substantiated the allegation. DOJ declined prosecution. The Report of Investigation recommended that the employee's managers assess the effectiveness of the guidance and training provided to their employees on avoiding conflicts of interest and determine whether additional guidance and training are warranted. The recommendation has been satisfied and is closed. OIG issued an Employee Bulletin to all employees to remind them of the conflict of interest provisions of federal law and Agency regulations and refer them to the Office of General Counsel for answers to their questions on this issue.

(U) CONFLICT OF INTEREST: OFFICER ASSIGNED TO COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (2007-8502-IG)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Office of General Counsel reported an apparent conflict of interest to OIG concerning the spouse of a staff employee who was working for the same contract firm where the staff employee served as the Agency's representative. Additionally, the staff employee served on temporary duty at an overseas location where he supervised and directed the work of contractors from the same firm. OIG's investigation determined that the officer engaged in a conflict of interest in the discharge of his duties, as alleged. The investigation also determined that the staff employee identified the position for his spouse using non-public information. DOJ declined prosecution. The Report of Investigation recommended that the officer's managers determine appropriate administrative action regarding his actions. The recommendation has been satisfied and is closed.

(U) TIME AND ATTENDANCE FRAUD (2007-8586-IG)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff completed an investigation of time and attendance fraud that found that a staff officer was compensated [redacted] for 616 hours for which he did not work. DOJ declined prosecution.

[redacted]


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**(U) STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
OUTSTANDING FROM PREVIOUS SEMIANNUAL REPORTS**

~~(S//NF)~~ **THE RENDITION AND DETENTION OF KHALID AL-MASRI (2004-7601-IG,
JULY 2007)**



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**(U) PROCEDURES USED IN NARCOTICS AIRBRIDGE DENIAL PROGRAM IN PERU,
1995-2001 (2001-6654-IG, AUGUST 2008)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The report's three recommendations remain open. One recommendation calls for the Director, CIA to convene an Agency Accountability Board to review the performance of certain individuals. The Director convened an Accountability Board in December 2008, and its deliberations are ongoing. A second recommendation calls for the Associate Deputy Director, CIA to implement policy and procedures to ensure independence in Agency reviews of program failures. The third recommendation calls for the Deputy Director, CIA and the Office of General Counsel to implement certain actions to ensure adequate legal and managerial oversight of Agency programs.

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(b)(3) ~~(S//NF)~~ **MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEE [REDACTED] (2004-7589-IG,
AUGUST 2008)**




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**(U) CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
CONTRACTING OFFICERS (2007-8784-IG)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Staff completed an investigation of two Agency officers who accepted part-time employment with a contractor, whose Agency contract they had negotiated. DOJ declined prosecution. The Report of Investigation recommended that the conduct of the individuals be reviewed for appropriate disciplinary action. The recommendation has been satisfied and is closed.



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(U) STATISTICAL OVERVIEW

(U) Audit Staff

(U//FOUO) During the period 1 January to 30 June 2009, the Audit Staff completed four audits and issued reports containing 24 recommendations to strengthen internal controls over covert action programs, financial management, and information technology. The Staff also completed an internal review and a joint review. Twenty-six audits or reviews are currently under way.

(U) Inspection Staff

(U//FOUO) During the first six months of 2009, the Inspection Staff completed six inspections. At the end of the reporting period, the Staff also had seven ongoing inspections. In addition, the Staff closed six inspections.

(U) Investigations Staff

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Investigations Staff completed work on 92 matters of various types during this reporting period. Of this number, 19 cases were of sufficient significance to be the subject of a final report: four Reports of Investigation and 15 Disposition Memoranda.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this period, the IG formally referred eight matters to the DOJ based upon a reasonable belief that violations of federal criminal law may have been committed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Recoveries on behalf of the US Government during this reporting period, as a result of the Investigations Staff's efforts, totaled \$75,936.72.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 30 June 2009, 179 matters were in various stages of review by the Investigations Staff.

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**(U) COMPLETED AUDITS
1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 2009**

(U) Operations

~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

(2007-0015-AS, May 2009)

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

(2007-0013-AS, June 2009)

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(U) CIA Participation in the President's Surveillance Program (2008-0016-AS, June 2009)

(U) Procurement

(U) Independent Quality Control Review of Financial Audit Services (2008-0009-AS, March 2009)

(U) Financial Management

(U) General Controls Over the CIA's Payroll System (2008-0003-AS, January 2009)

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~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(2008-0024-AS, June 2009)

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(U) CURRENT AUDITS
30 JUNE 2009

(U) Financial Management

- (U) Working Capital Fund Cost and Pricing Models for Facilities Support
- (U) Releases From the Reserve for Contingencies
- (U) Independent Audit of the CIA FY 2009 Financial Statements
- ~~(S)~~ Three Selected CIA Proprietaries

(U) Information Technology

- (U) CIA's Hardware and Software Implementation Process
- ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)
(b)(3)
- ~~(C)~~ Common Workgroup Environment 2 (CWE 2)
- (U) FY 2009 Independent Evaluation of the CIA Information Security Program and Practices Required by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)

(U) Operations

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)
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- (U) Joint Review of the President's Surveillance Program (b)(1)
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(U) Procurement

(U//~~FOUO~~) Services Obtained Under Memoranda of Oral Commitment, Memoranda of Formal Agreement, Memoranda of Understanding, and Letters of Agreement

(U//~~FOUO~~) Contract Quality Assurance Activities for the SSI Services, Inc. Operations and Maintenance Contract

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Sole Source Contracting Within the National Clandestine Service

(U) Field Activities

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**(U) COMPLETED INSPECTIONS
1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 2009**

(U) Africa Division (2008-0006-IN, April 2009)

(U) (2008-0007-IN, April 2009)

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(U) Office of Congressional Affairs (2008-0011-IN, April 2009)

(U) Leadership Training (2008-0010-IN, May 2009)

(U) Publications Review Board Process for Book Manuscripts (2008-0012-IN, May 2009)

~~(S)~~ (2008-0008-IN,
June 2009)

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**(U) CURRENT INSPECTIONS
30 JUNE 2009**

(U) Returning From External Rotations

(U) Agency Management of External Tasking

(b)(3)

(U) Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis

(U) Office of General Counsel

(U) Office of Technical Readiness

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**(U) COMPLETED INVESTIGATIONS
1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 2009**

(U) Department of Justice Prosecutions

- (U) Embezzlement of US Government Funds (2007-8500-IG)
- (U) Theft of US Government Credit Cards (2008-9074-IG)

(U) Reports of Investigation

- (U) Conflict of Interest: Officer Assigned To Counterterrorism Center (2007-8502-IG)
- (U) Time and Attendance Fraud (2007-8586-IG)
- (U) Conflict of Interest: NCS Officer at Overseas Location (2007-8723-IG)
- (U) Conflict of Interest: NCS Officer at Overseas Location (2007-8724-IG)

(U) Disposition Memoranda

- (U) Time and Attendance Fraud (2006-8313-IG)
- (U) Allegation of Unapproved Collection Program (2006-8412-IG)
- (U) Possible Mischarging (2006-8458-IG)
- (U) Conflict of Interest by Detailee (2007-8510-IG)
- (U) Allegations of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (2007-8697-IG)
- (U) Allegations of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (2007-8698-IG)
- (U) Allegations of Abuse (2008-8964-IG)
- (U) Allegation of Fraudulent Information Influencing Personnel Evaluation Board (2008-9042-IG)
- (U) Possible Child Pornography (2008-9079-IG)
- (U) Alleged Misuse of Agency Computers and Related Equipment (2008-9082-IG)
- (U) Possible Child Pornography (2008-9087-IG)
- (U) Time and Attendance Abuse (2009-9133-IG)

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- (U) Alleged Time and Attendance Abuse (2009-9252-IG)
- (U) Alleged Time and Attendance Abuse (2009-9253-IG)
- (U) Allegation of Misuse of Position (2009-9270-IG)

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(U) CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS
30 JUNE 2009

(U) Category	Number of cases
(U//FOUO) Grievances	
Management and Supervision	2
Other	3
(U//FOUO) General Investigations	
Criminal and Prohibited Acts	
Assault	1
Conflicts of Interest	16
Embezzlement	10
False Claims - Other	7
False Claims/Statements/Vouchers	10
False Claims - Time & Attendance	22
Firearms	1
Management and Supervision - Administrative	4
Megaprojects	2
Misconduct - Employee	10
Misconduct - Management	6
Obstruction of Justice	1
Procurement Fraud	14
Regulatory Violations	2
Retaliation	1
Theft/Misuse of Government Property	16
Waste	2
Other - Administrative/Criminal	33
Unsubstantiated Allegations	16
(U//FOUO) Total Ongoing Cases	179

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Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General

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