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DATE 2006

VIA: _____
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DISPATCH NO. EGNA-11115

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, F²
Attn: C

FROM : Chief of Base, Bonn

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CART/Liaison
SPECIFIC— Miscellaneous Information on BfV President
Hubert SCHRUEBBERS

DATE: 11 February 1957

Info: COS, Germany

1. To enable you to develop a clearer picture of Subject prior to his arrival, we are herewith compiling all the miscellany we have collected on him which has not previously been transmitted. There may be some repetition where isolated items have already been reported in other contexts.

SCHRUEBBERS' Views

2. On Personnel: EGNA-10980, 29 Jan 57 sums up this topic.
3. On Fiscal Matters: SCHRUEBBERS is taking a great personal interest in the financing of his agency. This he must perforce, since it is customary that the chief of any agency subordinate to a Federal ministry appear at the budget hearings to justify the estimates made, particularly if increases or additional personnel have been requested. Your files will show you that the former head of Department I, Leitender Regierungsdirektor Herbert BLANK had requested us for information as to how we handle budgetary matters. This was before SCHRUEBBERS' day, however, and we have never heard his reaction to the information imparted in DIR 01700 of May 55. We have noticed no special handling of the BfV budget, which seems to be worked out as openly as the budgets of other departments, except that the so-called Titel 300 (confidential funds) is not broken down. SCHRUEBBERS made his supplemental budget presentation the last week in January, and was said to have made a good impression on the parliamentary committee. We will try to get more information on this subject in the next few weeks.
4. On Operations: Although SCHRUEBBERS has reiterated to us his intention not to try and become an operational expert (and indeed, as we have reported, he missed his opportunity to acquire the basic knowledge necessary for complete understanding of operational matters when he first assumed his new position, by not spending some time with the various section chiefs to learn the operational facts of life), he has been heard to make rather disparaging remarks about some people in the Ministry who "have no understanding of operational needs". He does, however, show a greater political awareness than his predecessors of the need for timely reporting of matters of interest to various consumer agencies. For example, he recently caused the transfer of his Right Wing evaluation chief, (Dr.) Hans Karl Hermann NITHACK, because the latter delayed in the preparation of a long overdue roundup report of right radical activities - a matter of constant political concern to the coalition as well as the opposition. This report has now been finished by NITHACK's successor. While we have been impatient about SCHRUEBBERS' failure to get more actively behind the aggressive build-up of the [] undertaking, he

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has been exposed to plenty of potent argumentation from a number of allied services (British, Danish, Dutch and ourselves). We think he sees the problem now, but having a varied responsibility, cannot bring himself to strengthen this effort at the expense of other tasks. This seems to be part of what we think is his basic decision to make haste slowly. Or may be a typical bureaucrat's reluctance to "bother" the State Secretary.

5. On Foreign Liaison: In a conversation in August 1956, SCHRUEBBERS commented that there was much too much milling around in the security field among the three German services and the allies. He characterized as a messy picture the number of people dashing in and out of the BfV building. He then hastened to add that he recognized the help the allies had supplied and are supplying, and did not mean to derogate that help or the quality of the liaison or liaison officers, all of whom he esteemed highly. But, he went on, the present situation grew up during the occupation period and he is going to have another look at it when he has time. We note, on the other hand, that SCHRUEBBERS seems to take pride in the number of foreign services which seek BfV contact, and has told us about reciprocal visits with the Dutch and Danes. Most recently Major BRASSEUR, G-2 of Luxembourg paid a visit to the BfV. Typical of such visits seems to be the fact that SCHRUEBBERS handles them himself rather than bringing in his experts on various subjects in which the visitors are interested. In any case, the visitors do not generally seem to get below the department chief level, with the exception that Dr. Guenther NOLLAU usually is brought in somewhere along the line. We do not interpret the remarks above as forecasting any change in our access to BfV personnel. Indeed, since this conversation, more rather than fewer doors have opened up.
6. On Liaison with German Agencies:
- a. BND: SCHRUEBBERS' nose is obviously a bit out of joint with respect to GEHLEN's prominence, inside track and the nature of his relationship to his superior GLOEKE. In August last year, he commented unfavorably on the state of compartmentation within the BND and the snowballing effect of the many agent roll-ups GEHLEN has experienced. He also commented in what we thought was both a sour-grapes fashion as well as inaccurately, that GEHLEN was having trouble with his budget and with the integration of his personnel, which troubles SCHRUEBBERS ascribed to GEHLEN's not knowing his way around in governmental circles, having too long had the Americans to fight his battles for him. (Comment: In actuality, SCHRUEBBERS is highly envious of GEHLEN's immediate access to GLOEKE and on occasion the Chancellor, while he (SCHRUEBBERS) cannot rationalize with his bureaucratic past the necessity in his present job for making more opportunities for discussions of his own problems with H. v. LEX. At the time this talk was held, it should also be remembered that there was considerable tension between the BfV and BND arising out of the jurisdictional conflict around the [] target.) SCHRUEBBERS also talked last August about "numerous cases" in which the BND was not living up to the agreement delimiting CE jurisdiction (see EGNA-20174, 1 Aug 56 and EGNA-9595, 21 Aug 56). He took especial umbrage at the BND failure to observe its obligation to announce its CE cases to the BfV, and leave the running of such cases up to the BfV if (1) it is to become a case for executive action or (2) if Government employees are involved. The BND has the job, according to SCHRUEBBERS of being the clearing house for Spielmaterial, and may run CE cases in other than the two categories above. (Comment: We pointed out to SCHRUEBBERS in connection with his criticism in the CAVENUE realm that this would be a much less disputed field if the BfV actually proved itself to

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in a position to supply the needs of the BND, and that failure to do so was putting the BfV in this area at the mercy of whatever priority GEHLEN saw fit to assign this target. Since this argument clearly hurt, this aspect was dropped without further ado.) With GEHLEN himself, SCHRUEEBERS professes to have good relations, and says that they meet in Bonn about once every two months for "substantive" discussions. He has apparently a general invitation to visit BND headquarters, but he either has not yet found the time or the invitation has not been issued specifically enough.

- b. MAD: There has been little comment on his part on this subject except he indicated he was disturbed by signs that MAD was operating in the CE field on its own. (Comment: There exists a delimitation agreement between the two organizations which has been resting in the Ministry of Interior for several months awaiting approval. We have the translation of the draft which we have been holding pending its confirmation. Both we and the ODOPAL liaison officer to MAD will try to smoke out the final decision within the near future.)
- c. LfV's: SCHRUEEBERS' most recent comments on this subject are contained in attachment A of EGNA-10980 of 29 January 57. Aside from these critical remarks concerning the LfV's, we know SCHRUEEBERS seems to feel the importance of personal appearances at the various LfV's, feeling that personal contact on the top level has been far too infrequent in the past. There may also be a measure of political wisdom in this, since a number of the LfV's are manned at the top by SPD members, and as we have previously reported, SCHRUEEBERS is fully aware of the importance of keeping his fences mended with the political opposition.

7. On Public Relations: This subject is being treated in a separate memorandum.

8. On His Own Subordinates:

- a. HUBERT RADKE. As our reporting has frequently reflected, SCHRUEEBERS has little good to say for his deputy. He blames him for muddied work concepts (see paragraph 9d below), emotionalism and a military approach to life. He has remarked to us on more than one occasion of his having warned RADKE and GERKEN in advance of their appearance as witnesses at the trial to stick to factual statements and not get caught in expressions of opinion. He pointed out to us that although he could not and would not attempt to tell them what to say and what not to say, he was alarmed at the lack of discretion their testimony showed publicly. NOLLAU confirms this and says in fact SCHRUEEBERS was "appalled". He has asked NOLLAU if the latter thought the trial would have a deleterious effect on the BfV and NOLLAU replied he was forced to say that he did. SCHRUEEBERS may, according to NOLLAU, have experienced some "malicious pleasure" (Schadenfreude) at RADKE's plight, since the two men are frequently at odds on various matters.
- b. Hubert POLENZ. See comment in paragraph 14 below. It is widely said in the BfV, that despite his lack of experience in the BfV, POLENZ was thrown into the thick of the fray during the preparation of the BfV reorganization plan, as a demonstration of the President's confidence in him. From our own observations it would appear that SCHRUEEBERS reposed almost unlimited confidence in POLENZ on matters of organization and administration.
- c. Lorenz HESSEL-LORCK. HESSEL-LORCK is at present the chief of CE evaluation, but

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has been recently selected for the higher position of coordinator between the 3 operational departments - right wing, left wing, CE. BESSEL-LORCK, as a lawyer and extremely conscientious worker, is said by several persons to have the complete confidence of SCHRUEBBERS'

- d. Rudolf MERZ. The SPD's MERZ is kept well informed of developments within the BfV as part of SCHRUEBBERS' campaign to keep his political fences in repair.
- e. Richard GERKEN. From remarks he has made, it seems almost certain that SCHRUEBBERS would replace GERKEN if an acceptable replacement were available.
- * f. Guenter NOLLAU. See last page of dispatch.

9. On Miscellaneous Matters:

- a. Personnel Security: He has commented that the present security system where the security sections of the individual ministries will do their own background checking of their personnel is bound to collapse. Not only are these people largely untrained in this work - despite the periodic orientation sessions held by the BfV - but their inferior rank puts them at the mercy of their superiors in the ministries. The objectivity of an investigation conducted on a superior is clearly thereby impaired. He believes the BfV (presumably with LfV help) should do the background investigations to prevent them from becoming purely pro forma matters.
- b. Creation of a German IAC: We have suggested at various times when friction within the German community was evident that it might be both helpful to the member organizations as well as a feather in SCHRUEBBERS' cap if he were to propose the creation of something similar to the IAC to be subordinate directly to the Committee of State Secretaries, the nearest thing the Germans have to the National Security Council. SCHRUEBBERS agreed with the suggestion, but then, as indicated in paragraph 6a above, remarked that he meets GEHLEN about once every two months in Bonn and there is complete understanding between the two men. We suspect nothing will be done about this until or unless GEHLEN or the Ministry of Interior take the initiative.
- c. According to JAGUAR, SCHRUEBBERS regards the BfV as an instrument of the government in power, designed primarily to collect information on extreme political developments. They feel that despite the efforts to whack out an internal charter in the CE field, SCHRUEBBERS has little enthusiasm for this undertaking in the long run. (Comment: There would seem to be some support for this theory in the comment in paragraph 6a above.)
- d. SCHRUEBBERS does appear to be aware of the false emphasis in his office on the BfV as an intelligence rather than a security service. He points out that the confusion on this point stems largely from Vice President Albert RADKE, "who because of his background, cannot rid himself of the idea of the need for complete anonymity for the BfV". SCHRUEBBERS feels that the more the snooping aspect of the work is played down, the better off the BfV will be.

10. Views of Others about SCHRUEBBERS

Regierungsdirektor Albrecht KRAUSE, personal assistant to Minister of Interior Gerhard SCHROEDER. In discussing the program of suggested stateside visits for

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which we wished to get the Ministry's support, KRAUSE grimaced when SCHRUEBBERS' name was mentioned and said he was not the man to send. He would prefer to see someone go who would make use of the knowledge gained and would not simply use the trip to try and add to his personal prestige. When we challenged him for a suitable alternate choice, it became apparent that there was no one who filled the bill from all angles. He remarked further that SCHRUEBBERS worked too far from his people (a sentiment with which we fully agree) and spent too much time going to cocktail parties and too little quietly building up the BfV. (Comment: Since KRAUSE was fairly emotional on this point, and his work for the Minister does not give him any great intimacy with the security field, we did not pursue this discussion with him. Mention it simply because KRAUSE is per du with Ministerial Direktor Walter BARGATZKY, chief of Department VI - Public Safety - of the Ministry and it is therefore not unlikely that KRAUSE's views may reflect BARGATZKY's. This is all the more applicable as BARGATZKY is reputed to be much more interested in the development of the Bundesgrenzschutz and his extra-curricular activities as Vice-President of the German Red Cross than he is in the status of the German security apparatus. As a Department head, he wields considerable influence. The more so in view of his comparative youth (46 years old) for such a high civil service grade.)

11. Victor ANDERSEN, BSSO Liaison Officer. He commented twice to me, most recently in the presence of his chief, Keith RANDALL, Director of Security for BSSO, that during his visit to London in the spring of 1956, SCHRUEBBERS took no notes. Likewise on several issues he clearly failed to understand the import of what was being told him and to draw the appropriate conclusions. On his return to Koeln, SCHRUEBBERS asked ANDERSEN to write up for him the account of the trip, which ANDERSEN did. The British are also discouraged about SCHRUEBBERS' grasp or failure to grasp some of the fundamental operational tenets of the business he is in, but they do concur with us that SCHRUEBBERS is probably going to feel his way with great care, and possibly in accordance with a plan he may have worked out.
12. Konrad KOCH. In spring 1956, KOCH, who is outspokenly critical of many of his superiors in the BfV, several times commented upon the apparent indifference of the President who upon finishing up the leave he had accumulated in 1955 turned right around and went off on his 1956 vacation with disregard for the demands of the office. KOCH has taken frequent exception to SCHRUEBBERS failure to follow up on matters of clear operational importance which require handling on a level attainable only by the President himself. One such was (and is) the matter of getting the Ministry of Interior to face squarely the issue of whether or not there will be any inspection or control of the Soviet adherence to the travel restriction placed upon them last fall. Barring initiative on this question by the Ministry itself, it is clearly incumbent upon the BfV to keep this matter in the spotlight until or unless they are told by Ritter von LEX to forget it. According to KOCH, SCHRUEBBERS has a reputation at the Ministry of Defense (not further specified) as one without much ability to put a point across and anxious to avoid making trouble for his superiors. This judgment, according to KOCH is an echo of what was said of SCHRUEBBERS when he first came aboard at the BfV. (Comment: We are aware of no such initial judgments. KOCH, it must be said, is fairly representative of a group of the younger and abler employees who are not career civil servants and who censure SCHRUEBBERS for not sharing their views on the need for a career "intelligence" officialdom based on ability rather than academic background.)
13. Dr. Guenther NOLLAU. Concerning SCHRUEBBERS' effectiveness in representing the BfV

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with parliamentary committees, NOLLAU commented that the President does this job very well, prepares himself carefully and speaks with fluency and conviction. (Comment: [] confirmed that at the recent hearings on the supplementary budget, SCHRUEBBERS had given an excellent account of himself and had obviously made a good impression.)

14. Herbert POLENZ, chief of Department I. SCHRUEBBERS' status is about to be raised formally to that of Ministerial Dirigent, which will put him on the same level as BARGATZKY and General GEHLEN. (Comment: Though we may be mistaken, it is our impression that BARGATZKY is a Ministerial Direktor, the highest civil service slot below the State Secretary. At any rate, that is the position the slot calls for. BARGATZKY is SCHRUEBBERS' formal superior in the chain of command.) His access to Ritter von LEX and to Minister SCHROEDER is unhampered, although he must clearly have something worthy of the attention of these gentlemen. The rapport between LEX and SCHRUEBBERS is good, and the former gives what help he can to BfV plans consonant with the "political and psychological situation". (Comment: POLENZ is still fairly new at the BfV and we have not cultivated him as intensively as we would have liked to do. He is said to have been personally requested by SCHRUEBBERS for his present job and can therefore be expected - at least early in a liaison relationship - to appear to be in strong support of his chief, regardless of what his personal views may be.)
15. SPD. In view of the coming elections, the uncertainties created by the testimony of RADKE and GERKEN at the JOHN trial and the accompanying rumors re changes, we asked [] in conjunction with his recent reports on SPD predictions of future changes in the event of an SPD victory to get SPD views on the BfV. His account is attached hereto as attachment A.
16. Our Comment:
 Though the above is certainly not a positive report, it is certainly necessary that Headquarters have all available factors at hand as a basis for preparing the program. We trust that this, together with the previous material which has been forwarded, will suffice to give a picture of SCHRUEBBERS the man and the "professional". To put the foregoing remarks in focus, we believe that any person who does not enter this job as a ready-made expert is bound to be a subject of controversy. In an organization with the previous personnel policies of the BfV he is also bound to step on some toes. We, who are desirous of seeing the BfV improve in quality both for the sake of NATO security as well as for the improved product we would get, are naturally impatient at apparent lack of vigor on SCHRUEBBERS part. Nevertheless, we recognize the multiplicity of problems confronting the man and the indifferent quality of his top staff support. While there was clearly another way to go about the job, in view of political and regional factors at work, we cannot say with authority that the principle of making haste slowly is the wrong one.
17. Though this picture may occasion some reservations about the frankness of the briefing to be given SCHRUEBBERS, we feel that the content of the organizational program we have proposed is not a damaging one. We plan to spend as much time with SCHRUEBBERS

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and TOYKA as possible prior to their departure, and have already supplied them with some reading material on U.S. Government organization and functioning and the text of certain laws of interest to them. We would suggest asking SCHRUEBEERS for a copy of his report to the Ministry following his return.

Enclosures:

A/S; H/W. Attachment A - 3 cys

grh

Distribution:

3 - EE, w/att A 3 cys
2 - COS, w/att A 2 cys

- * f. Guenter NOLLAU. SCHRUEBEERS regards NOLLAU as probably the best head in the BfV, but is well aware of his being a controversial figure because of his background and because of his rather outspoken nature. He would probably show more confidence in NOLLAU if the latter were not such an obvious favorite of RADKE.


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11 Feb 1957

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TO: E }
 FROM: C }
 SUBJ: SPD Attitude toward BfV



1. Per your recent request for information on the above subject, I discussed it with IC on 1 February 1957. As it turned out, HEINE was the best man with whom to discuss it, because the Referat on police-security-intelligence matters, headed by Siegfried XORTLOFF, comes under HEINE's aegis. HEINE spoke freely with regard to the questions raised by me, and I believe him to have given us the true picture as of the date of the interview.
2. HEINE advised, first of all, that the BfV was no longer a subject of controversy within the SPD leadership. He advised that there had been a controversy about it until approximately six to eight months ago, that there always had been considerable feeling that the BfV was both an inefficient and ineffective potentially dangerous organization, and that this controversy reached its height in the months after the JOHN defection. HEINE advised that this problem had been discussed within the Vorstand at various times, but that he and others like him were finally able to convince the doubters of the need for the BfV and thereby were able to put the matter to rest. He said that this was possible after the doubters had not been able to satisfactorily contradict HEINE's two principal arguments: (a) in this day and age that every democratic state must have an organization of this type to protect itself against subversive elements and, granted that, (b) that it was much to be preferred to have such tasks handled by an essentially independent organization of the BfV type rather than have the GEHLEN organization assume them by default. HEINE's final remark on this particular aspect was that he feels quite confident that the problem has been settled once and for all as far as the SPD leadership is concerned (unless the BfV gets itself into some super-flap of one kind or another).
3. In reply to my direct question, HEINE advised that he believes it highly unlikely that the SPD will want to replace SCHRUEBBERS if it should form the next government after the elections. He said their relationship with SCHRUEBBERS is good, even if not particularly intimate. They believe him capable and efficient. He said that they almost certainly would not want to make a political football out of the BfV by appointing an SPDer to the BfV presidency in place of SCHRUEBBERS. He further stated that Rudolf MERTZ, an SPDer now with the BfV, cannot be considered for the BfV presidency since he is not considered to have sufficient ability or stature. HEINE said that, in the unlikely event that they would want to replace SCHRUEBBERS they would almost certainly choose an SPDer now heading one of the Laender LfVs and that among those Laender of North-Rhine-Westfalia probably would have the inside track. HEINE repeated, however, his belief that SCHRUEBBERS would be retained even by an SPD government.
4. While not directly related to the above subject, you might also be interested in another HEINE remark. He referred to the periodic conferences of LfV chiefs with the BfV and then stated that prior to each of these conferences he (HEINE) usually meets with these LfV chiefs who belong to the SPD. These pre-conference meetings are devoted to a general discussion of pending security problems (no operational details are discussed) and are also used to adopt a common line on politically controversial subjects which are expected to come up in the conference with the BfV.

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