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4 November 1964

Research Note

Subject: North Pole Documents

1. Document L009-614 of Wash Reg Int file 113, OSS archives, contains photostats of materials given to the British SIS in May 1945 by a German Abwehr Major Bob Heuser, who claimed to have been collecting them for this purpose, and some typed pages he gave to an OSS officer shortly thereafter.

2. The typed pages are of antiquarian interest, being the copy of a psychological assessment of Ant. Hdl.'s agent 5025 (not 2027, which Gishes uses in his book), who was H. A. Edderhof (Gishes adds an extra f), the penetration that opened the way to North Pole. The assessment is signed by Eusterman, Gishes' principal assistant in the operation, and dated 2 February 1944 (when the deception was no longer productive but had not yet been terminated).

3. The photostats include, in addition to North Pole documents, a chronology of Heuser's assignments and purported efforts to help the British, some sample graphological assessments, and a report by Ant. Belgien on the penetration of a "Corps Franc-Belge d'Action Militaire" operating under

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London's direction. The North Pole documents are the following:

a. Personnel (7) and assignments in Ast. Edl. 3f, 1943.

b. Two-page summary of North Pole and its results, assembled on 25 April 1944 for the Abwehr War Diary from its month-by-month account of all 3f operations. Nothing startling; little detail except statistics. With respect to booty the latter differ widely from those Schreieder gives at the end of his book, for example:

	3f Summary	Schreieder
Automatic Pistols	200	3,000
Brass guns	60	300
Pistols	2,000	5,000
Grenades	8,000	2,000
Cartridges	50,000	500,000
Explosives	20,000 kg.	15,200 kg.

Also perhaps of interest, in view of Gishes' shabby treatment of Schreieder in his book (whereas Schreieder is most generous with Gishes in his) is the summary's acknowledgment that "the cooperation between [Gishes] and [Schreieder], as well as the definition of each's area of responsibility in the operation, were ideal and were also the prerequisite for the possibility of such an extraordinarily long-lasting operation."

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c. Two and one-half pages, undated, of typed notes on the detailed chronology of North Pole, probably taken by Heuser. Begins with list of all parachute drops showing date, drop zone, and (usually cover) names of agents if any. Misses a few, notably that of Dourlein and Bogart. Notes activities of F5025 (by number, not name) and GV784, presumably the staff agent Gisches refers to as "Arno." Gives the right call letters, UEL, for the London station Gisches calls FTX.

d. Four pages of reports from March 1943 on Operation Konvent, made possible by North Pole, in which Kees Vorrink's "National Committee" and attached spy service MID and sabotage net Delft were rolled up. Schrieider treats this operation in detail; a quick review reveals no discrepancies.

e. Three-page report of 10 August 1943 on other operations to which North Pole led, the most notable against the spy net WHH. Schrieider treats these too. (This report and those in d above are signed ^uEngswaldt, evidently the real name of Gisches' boss, whom he calls "Hofwald.")

f. Message transmitting London messages of 22 and 25 November 1943 which ^{was} ~~was~~ that "Brutus" (an agent sent in to guide the underground press whose first contact, with F5025, had been arranged over one of the North Pole circuits)

was known to the enemy, and concluding therefrom, with dubious logic, that Dourlein and Ubbink had reached Switzerland (they had). (Giske's three pages on the Brutus-Apollo case do not make this connection, and Schreieder appears not to have known that London had disclosed Brutus to be blown.)

g. Report of arrest 25 November 1943 of "Oom Jan" with extensive spy material and letter from Brutus to HQ; Brutus had asked F5025 to get this man safely to Paris. (Nothing on this in Giske or Schreieder.)

h. Giske's message 24 November 1943 reporting second escape of North Pole prisoners. He uses it to get in a stab at the "internal enemy" which obsesses him also in his book, the GSEA: "The outlook for Ast. Ndl. 3f's playback of 11 radio circuits with the English enemy and the whole North Pole operation must now be considered practically hopeless. For this most serious breach of security at so critical a time and for the probable destruction of a penetration that is decisive for our defense against the extensive buildup of the enemy secret service in the Netherlands, the SIFO must bear the sole responsibility."

On the same page is the first part of a plan to proceed with the arrest of all suspects in operations connected with North Pole.

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1. Report 6 December 1943 on the availability for trial of North Pole prisoners. This is the same document that is translated at end of Dourlein's book. (D. says it is from "Giskes' superior, Hempel"; here we have "signature illegible: Hempel?" Could it be ~~Hans~~^Kwaldt, or had there been a change of command?)

Note that the second name on the list is Van der Beyden, operator of transmitter NKA, whose case is not usually counted as part of North Pole but a prelude. The biggest factual discrepancy between the Giskes and Schreieder books is on this case. Giskes says only that he heard Van der Beyden had been arrested by SIPO and remarks that he should have been played back but the SIPO didn't have anyone capable of it. Schreieder says that Giskes was consulted, actually interviewed the man, helped persuade him to call London under control, and was present the next day when the attempt to get an answer from London failed. Moreover, according to Schreieder, Van der Rheyden (as he spells it) disclosed the code and security check of another agent operator, Alblas, who thereupon was monitored and finally arrested. Van der Beyden's name on this list and the notation that he had been promised a pardon substantiate Schreieder's story; the notes listed in c above also have "Van der Beyden turned around NKA: KBO London." Evidently Giskes was lying to protect the man, who was, as Schreieder notes, alive and in England ~~at the time~~.

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j. Giskes memo 12 April 1944 reporting transmission of final message over North Pole circuits. This version, in awkward English, seems more likely to have been what was sent than the smoother working in the Giskes and Schreieder books: instead of the elegant "We understand that you have been endeavoring for some time to do business in Holland without our assistance. We regret this the more ..." it reads "In the last time you are trying to make business in Netherlands without our assistance stop we think this very unfair ... "

The message was not, incidentally, transmitted over 4 circuits on 1 April, as Giskes' book says, but over one circuit that date, one on 3 April, and one -- partially, because of atmospherics -- on 4 April, before London refused further contact.

4. There are lots of minor discrepancies between the Giskes and Schreieder accounts, some out of carelessness -- note that De Jong, in his December 1962 paper, also makes this kind of mistake, saying two agents were dropped on 27 March 1942, when "Abor" (Baatsen) came in alone -- some when each tries to fill in the other's role, and some a result of fictionalizing. The latter are the most amusing. Both describe in detail the first agent drop reception, that of "Abor":

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Gishes: "The small sickle of the crescent moon swam low on the horizon among milky-grey clouds, which only allowed the light of a few stars to penetrate ... "

Schreieder: "The moon was shining so brightly that at times we could drive without lights. ... Full hung the moon in the clear, starry heavens."

Passed full moon in '42 was 31 March, 4th days later.)