


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(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGMA-32039



38

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 5 March 1958

FROM : Chief, Munich Base *Wm*

**DESCRIPTION**  
per DOI 70-17

INFO: COS/G  
SR  
CACROZE

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CART/Liaison/CABOLT

SPECIFIC— Progress Report, 1 - 28 February 1958

REFERENCE: EGMA-31278, 6 February 1958

HEADQUARTERS ACTION REQUIRED: None; for information and file.

JAN 11 1958

### Synopsis of Main Developments:


1. The case of the RIS courier, Walter VOSTRY, mentioned in Reference was discussed with CABOLT, who promised to try to obtain further material from Dr. Bernhard BADER. CABOLT began to devote more attention to Middle Eastern problems and described the situation among Mohammedan students at the University of Munich. He mentioned that the Egyptian Consulate in Bonn is now recruiting personnel for use against the British. On 21 February, CABOLT was informed of the case of Ernst ZIMMERMANN, a self-confessed RIS and MFS agent on a mission in West Germany. Munich Base admitted that we had not been able to break ZIMMERMANN and CABOLT was asked to arrange to have KD 2 pick up ZIMMERMANN. KD 2 cooperated and ZIMMERMANN was picked up from his pension the following day. However, it was necessary for MB to provide a written statement of what we had learned from ZIMMERMANN before the examining magistrate would issue a warrant for investigative arrest. The statement was provided and ZIMMERMANN was held for investigation by KD 2. On 26 February, [ ] met with CABOLT and Max NOETH, at NOETH's request. The meeting revealed that apparently NOETH is not happy with his present liaison contacts and he would like a more direct relationship with KUBARK if we are willing to be frank with him. NOETH also provided an insight into his own character and prejudices during the meeting.

### Developments:

2. Walter VOSTRY: [ ] described to CABOLT his lack of success in interrogating VOSTRY and asked that CABOLT try to obtain further material on VOSTRY from Dr. Bernhard BADER. CABOLT agreed, but had not produced anything as of the end of the month (see Contact Report #153).

3. CABOLT's Health: Early in the month, CABOLT learned that he had cracked a bone in his forearm in a fall which occurred in January. In addition, CABOLT was sick with the grippe for over a week, and this not only forced him to cancel his intended trip to Cologne, but also threw a wrench into our normal meeting schedule.

JOB # *62-150/6-2*  
Box # *1012*  
Restr to: *EE/G/L*



FORM NO. 51-28 A  
MAY 1949

*5 Enc*

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EGMA-32039  
Page 2

4. Yugoslav Consulate: CABOLT continued to mention his operation against this target and to inquire whether he might be upsetting something of ours by proceeding (see Contact Report #153).

5. Students: While discussing the political activities of Mohammedan students at the University of Munich, CABOLT again promised us a complete catalogue of foreign students at the University (see Contact Report #153).

6. Egyptian Consulate: CABOLT mentioned that he had heard that the Egyptian Consulate in Bonn is recruiting personnel for use against the British, but he was not able to elaborate (see Contact Report #153).

7. Danube Shipping: Satellite recruitment of agents among German sailors of the Danube fleet has become such a nuisance that CAVIRIL has been forced to issue standing instructions to the shipping companies concerning the way the sailors are to react if approached by a Satellite IS (see Contact Report #153).

8. Ernst ZIMMERMANN: [ ] explained that we had been trying to debrief ZIMMERMANN, who claimed to be an agent of the HIS and MFS on a mission in West Germany. CABOLT was given a brief outline of ZIMMERMANN's story on 21 February and was asked to have KD 2 apprehend ZIMMERMANN for further questioning. CABOLT completed the arrangements and ZIMMERMANN was picked up by KD 2 on the same day but retracted his story and refused to incriminate himself in any way to KD 2. CABOLT called MB and asked if we would prepare a written summary of ZIMMERMANN's admissions for presentation to the examining magistrate. The statement was prepared and passed to GILLBERGER of CAVIRIL on 22 February. While discussing this case with various CAVIRILites on the phone, [ ] learned that GILLBERGER is really HIERL. MB's statement caused the examining magistrate to issue a warrant for ZIMMERMANN's detention in investigative custody. One noteworthy point in this case was the fact that as of the end of the month there had been no complaints from anyone in CAVIRIL or KD 2 concerning the handling of the case. (See Contact Reports #154 - #156.)

9. Max NOETH: On 20 February, [ ] met with CABOLT and NOETH in response to NOETH's request. Although NOETH had some pointed questions which he wanted answered, it appeared that the main purpose of the meeting was to allow NOETH to explore the possibility of a closer working relationship with KUBARK through [ ] NOETH purposely phrased his requests so that they demanded a clear answer, and he stated that he expected nothing less than that. In [ ] opinion, if NOETH receives answers which are satisfactory to him, he will be willing to institute and may press for closer working liaison with KUBARK at the expense of other ODYOKE agencies in this area (see Contact Report #157).

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EGMA-32039  
Page 3

Comment:

10. If our reading of NOETH's purpose is correct, we want to exploit the opportunity which he has offered us. From a preliminary check it appears that we will be able to answer truthfully that none of the persons mentioned by NOETH are working for KUBARK. If detailed tracing reveals that this is the case, we intend to sail the following course:

a. [ ] will call NOETH direct and say that he has the answers to NOETH's queries. He will invite NOETH to lunch on the pretext that he wants to deliver the answers personally, so that NOETH can ask questions and be convinced of the honesty of our replies. The tenor of the conversation will decide whether or not we suggest that NOETH bring CABOLT to the meeting. We would prefer that the meeting be held without CABOLT.

b. If the meeting arrangements work and NOETH is convinced of the honesty of our answers, [ ] will adopt the attitude that there is no reason why similar problems which may arise in the future cannot be resolved by such frank, personal discussions.

c. Since there is no point in badgering NOETH with day-to-day requests, we intend to maintain the present relationship with CABOLT while attempting to cultivate NOETH both professionally and socially every time a suitable occasion arises.

Attachments:

11. Enclosed as Attachments A through E are Contact Reports 153 through 157 covering February 1958.

Approved: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

Attachments:  
A - E h/w

Distributions:  
3 - EE w/atts  
2 - COS/G w/atts  
2 - SR w/atts  
2 - CACROZE w/atts

FBS:pbp [ ] [ ]

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JAN 11 1962

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Att A to 32039

*Att. 11*  
30

Meeting between CABOLT and  
1200 - 1300, 3 February 1955  
Cafe Alte Roerse

Report of [redacted]  
**DESENSITIZED**

1. Contacts: On the morning of 3 February, [redacted] 70-17 called CABOLT to say that he had returned from interviewing Walter VOSTRY. CABOLT suggested that we meet that day to discuss what could be done with the case. We arranged to meet at noon in the Cafe Alte Roerse.

2. Walter VOSTRY: [redacted] described his interview with VOSTRY and said that he had not been able to obtain much information from VOSTRY, who had no desire to cooperate. CABOLT suggested that it might be more profitable to interview VOSTRY after sentence has been passed and VOSTRY has no further reason to hide information. [redacted] agreed that this might be worth a try and asked that CABOLT determine from Dr. BADER when VOSTRY will be sentenced and what he will probably receive for punishment. [redacted] also asked that CABOLT try to get VOSTRY's notebook from Dr. BADER, as this may well contain a carbon sheet such as the one which [redacted] once brought with him made up to look like an ordinary notebook sheet. CABOLT said he would try to get the book if it is among the evidence now in BADER's possession. CABOLT also suggested that we might like to get to Leonid WATIN, who seems to be of continuing interest to the RIS; by contacting WATIN now and setting up a commo system, we might be able to receive prompt notification if the KIS attempts again to reach WATIN. CABOLT said that if we are interested in trying this, he will not pass the WATIN lead to the LFV Baden-Wuerttemberg, so that we will have a clear field. [redacted] thanked CABOLT and said that he would consider this problem, but at the moment he admitted that he could not think of any assets who could be used for a logical, natural approach to WATIN. Nevertheless, CABOLT said he would not pass anything to Baden-Wuerttemberg, so that if we do decide to contact WATIN, we will not have to worry about local interference. (Note: The Kronach police had already traced WATIN with the Stuttgart police, so we must presume that the LFV Baden-Wuerttemberg knows something of the case.)


3. CABOLT's Health: [redacted] asked if CABOLT had ever been to a doctor about his left arm, which was still in a bandage. CABOLT replied that he had visited a doctor, who x-rayed the arm and learned that one of the bones in the forearm was cracked. The injury does not require a cast, but it will have to remain in a tight bandage for some time, and the arm is of no use.

4. [redacted] This case is still quiet. CABOLT sent one of his men to find out whether Petro IVANOVKO had really moved from his former address. The man came back and said that IVANOVKO is still in business at the same place, despite the KD 2 report that IVANOVKO had moved. Apparently KD 2 was deceived because IVANOVKO has the Germanized version of his first name, "Peter", on his shop, and does not use his family name on the business. CABOLT presumes that the KD 2 man went to the address, saw the name Peter, and jumped to the conclusion that IVANOVKO had left, without ever checking to see if this was really the case.

5. Inu WILD: CABOLT admitted that he had made a mistake at a recent

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meeting when he had said that the new RD 2 investigator is named [redacted]. The man is really named GOESCHL. (Note: A criminal Kommissar GOESCHL ran the RD 2 interrogation of ABLASSO, according to the RD 2 report which we received through CAROLT. See BMA-30947, 10 January 1946.)

6. Detention of Couriers: CAROLT had not yet seen KADAR to discuss the detention of stateless persons again. He promised to do this in the near future when he goes to talk to BAUER about VOSTRI. [redacted] pointed out that VOSTRI admits that he has both East German and Soviet documents and that he could qualify as a citizen of either country. [redacted] asked CAROLT to determine KADAR's opinion of how a man like VOSTRI would be classified by the German courts.

7. Meeting with KOETH: CAROLT mentioned again that KOETH wants to talk to [redacted] about a political case, and this time CAROLT added that the case concerns someone who was tied up with K. MARK. CAROLT continued to maintain that he did not know the details of the case. KOETH was away and was not expected to return until 6 February, so CAROLT suggested that the meeting would probably take place on 7 February. [redacted] said that he had nothing planned for that date and would be glad to call on KOETH.

8. Trip to Cologne: In discussing plans for the meeting with NORTH, CAROLT mentioned that he planned to spend a few days in Cologne the following week. While in Cologne, CAROLT hopes to be able to acquire further information on ARDEACON and copies of the threatening letters to German government officials, mentioned in previous meetings.

9. Yugoslav Consulate: Once again CAROLT mentioned that his operation against the Yugoslav Consulate is ready to begin, if we have no objections. As before, [redacted] replied that we have nothing going in this area and would be glad to see something done. (Note: CAROLT's procrastination and continued questioning about disturbing some operation of ours makes it appear that he may have knowledge of an AIS operation against the Consulate and he may be just as interested in learning the details of the AIS operation as he is in mounting his own operation. If this is the case, the activity being conducted is not being run by NB. ODORAL may have something going in this field, but they have never mentioned it to us, and probably will not do so, as such an operation is quite likely something which should not come under their jurisdiction. We intend to ask whether they have an operation in this field, but do not expect a positive answer.)

10. Mohammedan Students: CAROLT asked if we had any information on the formation of Mohammedan student groups in connection with the new alignment in the Near East. When [redacted] replied that he had not heard about this, CAROLT said that some of the Egyptian and Syrian students have been banding together and agitating among the other students from that part of the world to join them. The amount and fanaticism of the agitation has reached such a stage that CAVIRIL is beginning to worry about where it will all end.

11. Student List: In this connection, CAROLT said that he had received the catalogue of foreign students at the University of Munich, but he had not been quite satisfied with the results, so he sent it back to his specialist for

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some connections are finished. CABOLT expects that the finished list will be available in a few days and we will receive a copy.

12. Egyptian Consulate: On the same general topic, CABOLT mentioned that he had heard that the Egyptian Consulate in Bonn has been recruiting persons to work against the British. He had no details of this story, but hopes to get more while he is in Cologne.

13. Danube Shipping: CABOLT continued to talk about various topics without being prompted and he went on to say that Rumanian and Bulgarian IS recruiting among German sailors of the Danube fleet has become so widespread that it poses a threat to German shipping into the Balkans. So many passes have now been made at sailors visiting Balkan ports that CAVRIL has finally issued standing instructions to all sailors that if they are approached by a Balkan service, they are to agree to work, and then are to report the approach to their company at Regensburg, as soon as they return to their home port. The company has instructions to report such cases to CAVRIL, but CAVRIL does not plan to do anything unless the approach is made to an officer. Judging by past cases, there is no point in trying to run the average sailor as a double agent, as he has not the intelligence to support the role, nor a regular schedule which takes him to the Balkans at frequent intervals. CABOLT admitted that he had not been able to determine why the Balkan services persist in trying to recruit sailors, as they are no more effective as agents for the opposition than they are as double agents for CAVRIL. [ ] suggested that he could see two reasons for recruiting such types: 1) they might perform support missions for other agents in the West, or 2) they might serve as sources of background material on the persons in the company office who are also probably targets for the Balkan services. [ ] commented that if he were in CABOLT's position he would take a good look at the persons employed in the personnel and finance sections of the shipping company offices, since such persons would be the most likely targets for recruitment. CABOLT said he had not thought of this possibility and he made a note of the item.

14. What is CAVRIL? At the end of the meeting, [ ] suggested in a joking manner that CAVRIL needs a good public relations officer. To prove his point, he described his conversation with Frau HOLZKI, investigating magistrate in Kronach. HOLZKI had said that he did not know how to proceed in a case like that of VOSTRY, as neither he nor anyone else in the Kronach police or judiciary had enough experience in espionage cases to know whether VOSTRY was telling the truth or not. [ ] had suggested that HOLZKI call on CAVRIL for aid, whereupon HOLZKI had asked what CAVRIL was. CABOLT's reply to this dig was that HOLZKI must be a new man who is not yet familiar with the Bavarian organizations. Nevertheless, he finally agreed that it might be a good idea to take steps to see that the provincial courts are aware of the existence of CAVRIL and know what it can do to help them in cases of espionage and subversion.

15. Next Meeting: CABOLT said he would contact [ ] on 7 February to set up the meeting with NOETH. On 7 February CABOLT called to say that NOETH had a full schedule and would not be able to make a meeting that day. CABOLT said he did not plan to leave for Cologne until 11 February, so he would call [ ] on 10 February about a meeting. On the morning of 10 February, [ ] called CABOLT's office and learned that CABOLT was out sick. [ ] talked with LECHNER, who learned from NOETH that the matter to be discussed had been dragging on for some time and could wait another couple of weeks.

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Attachment to EGMA- 32039

Meeting Between CABOLT and [ ]  
0915 - 0945, 21 February 1958  
Cafe Franzmann

Report # 154

1. Contact: On the afternoon of 20 February, [ ] called CABOLT's office and said that he had something important which had to be discussed in a hurry. CABOLT had no more time that afternoon, and he said that he had to attend a conference the following morning. However, he agreed to a short meeting before his conference, [ ] agreed to meet at 0915 hours in the Cafe Franzmann.

2. Ernst Richard Friedrich ZIMMERMANN (DOB, 26 March 1934; POB, Gross-Sokirna, Kreis Freiberg, Saxony): CABOLT was told that we had acquired another "guest," but this time we had been very careful to observe all the rules laid down by the KD 2 in connection with [ ] The "guest" was a man named ZIMMERMANN who had come to our attention a couple of days before. We had been talking to him, but had not held him at all. He was staying in a pension and our man had picked him up there in the morning and taken him back there at night, so ZIMMERMANN was free to do whatever he wanted, and could flee without our knowledge or intervention. CABOLT expressed his pleasure with this arrangement and agreed that there should certainly be no complaints that we had detained or held ZIMMERMANN illegally. After making this point, [ ] went on to say that ZIMMERMANN had told a very confused story, first claiming that he was a KGB officer, and later retracting this and stating that he was an agent of the RIS and the MFS, on an agent-spotting mission in West Germany. ZIMMERMANN claimed to have taken part in previous operations in the West, including a kidnapping plot in West Berlin. However, he refused to divulge any details and it looked to us as though breaking him would be a long, painstaking job. Furthermore, ZIMMERMANN was completely documented as an East German citizen, although he swore that he was really a Russian and that most of his documents were false ones which had been prepared for him by the RIS. CABOLT was given ZIMMERMANN's documents and some of the odd points about them were explained. Then [ ] explained that because of ZIMMERMANN's confused citizenship status, and because breaking him will probably require several weeks of work, we wanted to get ZIMMERMANN into German hands as soon as possible, so that no one could possibly think that we were overstepping the bounds of permissible activity. CABOLT was asked if it would be possible to turn ZIMMERMANN over to the LKA for further investigation and interrogation. CABOLT replied that he would have to go through the Ministry to get the LKA to take the case, and this would take about eight days. Therefore, he suggested that ZIMMERMANN be turned over to KD 2, as in this instance KD 2 could not possibly have any objections concerning the manner in which we had handled the case. Skeeluke agreed somewhat reluctantly and we then discussed the best manner of performing the transfer. [ ] said that our interrogator had given ZIMMERMANN an ultimatum the previous evening—either ZIMMERMANN produced a true, correct story the first thing on the morning of 21 February, or we would refer the whole matter to the German police. Our interrogator had gone out to see ZIMMERMANN and was at that

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Attachment to EGMA-32039  
Page 2

moment probably listening to ZIMMERMANN's latest story. Because of the possibility that ZIMMERMAN might have changed his mind, [ ] wanted to be able to talk to the interrogator again before closing the deal to transfer ZIMMERMANN to KD 2. CABOLT was in sympathy with this request, so the following plan was devised. [ ] would return to his office and consult the interrogator while CABOLT went to his conference. At about 1300 hours, CABOLT would call [ ] and ask whether he should notify KD 2. If ZIMMERMANN had not started to talk, we would take him to his pension and tell him to wait in his room until we contacted him again. CABOLT would pass the case to KD 2 and give them the address of the pension where ZIMMERMANN was staying, and KD 2 would go there and apprehend ZIMMERMANN, without anyone from [ ] office being present at the time of the apprehension. [ ] gave CABOLT the address where ZIMMERMANN was living, so that CABOLT could pass this to KD 2.

3. Conversation with Max NOETH: CABOLT suggested that we get together again the following week and set a date for [ ] to see NOETH about the political case involving a KUBARKer. [ ] agreed.

4. CABOLT's Trip to Cologne: CABOLT did not go to Cologne, as he had been sick with the flu for the past week and had not been able to get away.

5. [ ] CABOLT had queried Cologne three times about the results of the further interrogation of [ ], but had not yet received an answer.

6. Interviews with Emigres: CABOLT said that one of his co-workers had been in Cologne for a short visit and had picked up the following information on the interviews of Russian emigres now being conducted by the German police. Originally, the Soviet authorities gave the German Foreign Office a list of emigres, with the request that the Germans determine whether the individuals on the list were still alive, and if so, where they were living. This list was passed to the local Foreigner's Offices, with the request that the persons listed be traced and asked whether they objected to having their current addresses given to the Soviets. After learning that a specific emigre was living at a certain address, the Foreigner's Office passed the buck to the local Police Bezirk Headquarters, which was asked to interview the individual and determine whether he was willing to have his current address passed to the Soviets. However, in some instances, Bezirk officials exceeded the limits of the request and went on to ask whether the individual was interested in repatriation. It appears that many of the cases in which this was done concerned emigres who were undesirables and whom the local police wanted to get out of their hair.

7. Banderists: CABOLT mentioned that the Banderists are extremely angry at the Americans at the moment, because Yaroslav ~~W~~ STETSKO (DOB, 19 January 1912; POB, Tarnopol) applied for a visitor's visa to the USA, but at the last moment

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Attachment to ECMA-32039  
Page 3

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the request was denied by the US Consul General in Munich. [ ] asked how the Banderists manage to keep going and sending their representatives all around the world when such projects cost money and allegedly no one is supporting the Banderists any longer. CABOLT replied that the Banderists claim that they receive financial assistance from individual Ukrainians now in the USA. The British supported Bandera up until about 1951, but CABOLT was recently assured by a British representative that this support is no longer being rendered in any form.

8. Termination: By this time, CABOLT had to run to make his conference, so the meeting was terminated.

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Attachment C to DCMA-32039

Conversations with CABOLT  
21 February 1958

Report #155

1. At about 1600 hours on 21 February, CABOLT called MB and talked with [ ] about the case of Ernst \*ZIMMERMANN (DOB. 26 March 1934; POB, Gross-Schirma). [ ] answered the call because [ ] was not available at the time. [ ] did not give him name, but said that he was aware of the ZIMMERMANN case and could discuss it. CABOLT explained that ZIMMERMANN had been picked up by ED 2, but that he had denied any connection with the RIS or MFS and unless we could produce some evidence of such a connection by the following morning, ZIMMERMANN would have to be released. According to CABOLT, ED 2 wanted either a witness or a statement of the material which ZIMMERMANN had admitted to an official American agency. [ ] replied that we could not provide a witness, but that we could prepare a summary of the story ZIMMERMANN had given us. CABOLT also suggested that if we had a written statement which we had taken from ZIMMERMANN, this would suffice as evidence, but [ ] was forced to reply that due to the need for speed in handling the case and the number of different stories which ZIMMERMANN had told, it had not been possible for us to pause long enough to get him to commit any single story to writing.

2. At about 1700 hours, [ ] returned to the office, and during a series of phone conversations with CABOLT, the following agreement was reached. We would prepare a statement containing a summary of what ZIMMERMANN had told us. The document would be in German and there would be two copies provided, so that CAVIRIL could retain one and pass the other to the examining magistrate. [ ] would meet someone from CAVIRIL in the Cafe Franzmann at 0830 hours on 22 February, and turn over two copies of the statement. CAVIRIL would then pass one copy to ED 2 for presentation to the examining magistrate, who would study the material and decide whether to issue a warrant for ZIMMERMANN's arrest and confinement in investigative custody.

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Attachment 2 to EGMA-32039

Meeting Between HIERL and [ ]  
0830 - 0835 hours, 22 February 1958  
Cafe Franzmann.

Report #156

1. Shortly before 0830 hours on 22 February 1958, [ ] went to the Cafe Franzmann to wait for someone from CABOLT's office to pick up the material on Ernst ZIMMERMANN. Promptly at 0830, the man whom [ ] knew as Hillberger from the [ ] case appeared and joined [ ] Hillberger said he was there to pick up the ZIMMERMANN report and [ ] passed him the material. Hillberger said that he was on his way to KD 2 and would deliver the report so that KD 2 could show it to the examining magistrate. Hillberger only stopped for a few minutes and left without discussing anything other than the ZIMMERMANN report.

2. At about 1130 hours that morning, [ ] called CABOLT's office to ask whether the report had been sufficient to cause the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The secretary who answered the phone said that CABOLT had not been in that day, so [ ] asked for LECHNER. The secretary replied that LECHNER was not there either, but she offered to go and get LECHNER's deputy, Frau HIERL. In a few minutes, a man who sounded like Hillberger came to the phone. From his remarks it soon became clear that he was the man who had met [ ] earlier that morning. HIERL explained that a warrant had been issued for ZIMMERMANN, who had confessed that he had worked as an internal agent for the RIS and MfS. ZIMMERMANN had told KD 2 that he came to the Federal Republic from the DDR because his mother had learned that he was an agent and had thrown him out of the house. (Note: HIERL has been mentioned by CABOLT several times before, and from previous conversations, it appears that HIERL is the RIS expert within CAVIRIL. He is probably identical with Georg HIERL, listed in EGMA-3823, 2 March 1954, as II/O in Abteilung II of CAVIRIL. MB has no other trace on Georg HIERL and the 1957/58 Munich phone directory does not list anyone by this name.)

*seemed to be an R.F. agent*

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Meeting between Max NOETH, CABOLT and [ ]  
1430 - 1530 hours, 26 February 1958  
Cafe Alte Boerse

Report #157

1. Contact: During the afternoon of 25 February 1958, [ ] called CABOLT to see if there was anything new on Ernst ZIMMERMANN. CABOLT had nothing recent on this case, but he said that Max NOETH wanted to talk and suggested a meeting for the following day at 1330 hours. [ ] agreed. On the morning of 26 February, CABOLT called to ask if the meeting could be postponed until 1430 hours, as NOETH had to be out of the office until about 1400. Again [ ] agreed.

2. General Remarks: When [ ] reached the Cafe Alte Boerse at 1430, CABOLT and NOETH were already there, but they had not yet received their order, so they could not have been there more than a few minutes. After greetings were exchanged, NOETH started right out by commenting on the ZIMMERMANN case. He blasted KD 2 for the inefficient way it is handling the interrogation and CABOLT added that ZIMMERMANN will probably be released for lack of evidence at the end of eight days. NOETH went on to say that the whole situation is the fault of the Americans, who guided those who wrote the present German laws governing security organizations such as the LfV. The authors went so far to insure that there will never again be a strong, centralized German secret police, that they completely hamstringed the organizations which were founded. NOETH commented heatedly that the present lack of a strong security organization will inevitably lead to an authoritarian regime in Germany, either of the Left or the Right. The German citizens do not know how to make a democracy work and in their eagerness to have everything as free as possible, they have only succeeded in making things easy for a determined subversive group to deprive them of their democracy. NOETH said that what Germany needs is a man like SALAZAR in Portugal, who is "teaching his people democracy," but maintaining a firm control of the government to insure that no one abuses the freedoms which have been granted. NOETH commented ruefully that men like SALAZAR are hard to find and there is no one on the German scene who could play such a role, although they would like to try.

3. Oswald KAWALLA (DOB, 25 December 1894): NOETH then asked if the name KAWALLA meant anything to [ ] When [ ] replied that he had never heard of anyone in our group by that name, NOETH said that KAWALLA was an elderly man who had been arrested by the Czechs in about June 1957 on a charge of committing espionage for the West. The newspapers had just announced that KAWALLA had been tried and sentenced to 25 years. According to NOETH, KAWALLA should never have been recruited, because he is an old man and will not live to serve out his sentence. NOETH also said that KAWALLA was a respected man in Germany and the fact that he was recruited and then caught is bound to

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Attachment E to ECMA-32039

Page 2

cause adverse comments concerning the service which used him. If KAWALLA did not belong to us, then the only other solution was that he worked for the East Bureau of one of the political parties, as NOETH claimed that the LfV had checked everyone else and had been informed that KAWALLA was not employed by any of them.

4. Jochen WILLKE (Munich 23, Inertlstrasse 2): NOETH then asked if [ ] knew Jochen WILLKE, editor of the "Muenchner Illustrierte." [ ] replied that he knew the name but had never had anything to do with the man. NOETH then launched into a harangue which went about as follows: This WILLKE is one of the biggest swine in Germany. He has done everything possible to destroy democratic government and impair the creation of a German army. If you want to see a sample of his work, I will give you photocopies of an article he wrote for the Austrian "Soldatenseitung" in Graz on the anniversary of HITLER's birthday. And just recently, he was invited to visit your Mediterranean Fleet as the guest of the U. S. Navy. Upon his return, he wrote a series of articles for the "Muenchner Illustrierte" about what he had experienced, and published a picture of himself on the bridge of one of your ships, talking with the captain. But, despite the fact that he was a guest and was well treated, in the final paragraph of his articles he referred to the Americans as warmongers. Your people made a mistake in inviting this man to observe your fleet. He is despised by many Germans, and this is not just political jealousy. It is the responsible Germans who hate him for what he has tried to do to the present German government. And when such people see how well WILLKE stands with the Americans, it reflects adversely on the Americans. And that is not the worst of it! Now I have read in the newspaper that WILLKE received a gold medal as a souvenir of his visit to the fleet. This is an insult to all respectable Germans! NOETH did not seem to expect a reply to this tirade and [ ] did not attempt one. When NOETH finally ran down, he said that he would assemble the material which his office has on WILLKE and give it to CABOIT for passing to [ ] so that [ ] will know just what kind of a person WILLKE is.

5. BfV Scandal: NOETH went on to say that the Germans have their own problems in the field of public relations and he asked if [ ] had read the blast against the BfV published in the last (19 February) issued of "Der Spiegel." [ ] said that he had and asked what had caused the attack to be published. NOETH replied that the article was written by someone in the BfV who was passed over in the recent reorganization and who wants to drag down those above him so that he can rise. NOETH would not name the man, although he claimed to know who was responsible for leaking the information. However, NOETH said with a laugh that [ ] could figure out who was responsible, as the man had made an error which even the lowest level agent would never commit. He forgot to name himself in the list of people mentioned in the article. According to NOETH, President Hubert SCHRUEBBER of the BfV will probably be required to appear before a government commission and the resulting flap will go on for some time.

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Attachment E to EGMA-32039  
Page 3

*Handwritten:* H. C. C. Bamberg, West Germany

6. Josef SCHNEIDER: NOETH then reached into his briefcase and took out a thick file, explaining that it contained the background of the case which he had wanted to discuss with [ ] NOETH provided the following explanation of the affair: One of NOETH's friends from the old Abwehr organization is now a journalist. When hearings were being held to clear the name of Josef "Ochsensepp" MUELLER, the journalist covered the proceedings. One of the witnesses interviewed was a certain Josef SCHNEIDER from Bamberg. The journalist interviewed SCHNEIDER and the two struck up an acquaintanceship which has lasted to the present. SCHNEIDER has claimed to the journalist that he works for the AIS and has at one time or another mentioned that he works out of an office in Tegernsee Landstrasse (McGraw Caserne) and that he had been to HEIDELBERG to make a report. SCHNEIDER also claims that his daughter is married to an American serviceman who is stationed in France, and at one time SCHNEIDER went to visit them. If all this is true, NOETH feels that it is a scandalous situation, because SCHNEIDER has a long record with the LfV and the Bamberg police as a Communist or Communist Party sympathizer. NOETH read [ ] excerpts from a recent Bamberg police report on SCHNEIDER. The report stated that SCHNEIDER had been sentenced to life imprisonment for Hochverrat in 1942, but was released at the end of the war. He is now a member of a Communist front organization in Bamberg and is known to the police there as a staunch party-liner. NOETH went on to say that in his opinion there is a basic difference between Hochverrat (espionage) Landesverrat (subversion or sabotage). If someone had committed Landesverrat by shooting HITLER, NOETH would have been pleased and personally would have considered the man a hero. But anyone guilty of Hochverrat has betrayed his fellow Germans and co-workers and such a sentence should remain valid despite changes in government. Since SCHNEIDER was guilty of Hochverrat, he is still guilty and should be in jail, but this point really does not matter, as he has enough CP connections at present to enable the LfV to have him jailed on new evidence. However, before having SCHNEIDER arrested, NOETH wants to be sure that SCHNEIDER is not working for the AIS. If he really is an AIS agent, NOETH will not bother him. NOETH continued approximately as follows: I want to know whether SCHNEIDER works for you. I have put such questions to ODOPAL on many occasions in the past, and have never yet received a clear answer. This is the first chance I have had to put such a question directly to someone from KUBARK, although I used to talk to [ ] and for a change I would like to receive a concrete answer, either yes or no. If you come back to me and say, "Mr. NOETH, I am not allowed to talk about this case," that is also an honest answer and I will understand and respect your reply. But let us have no more of this vague nonsense which means neither yes nor no. I am curious to see how you will answer, but I have told you how I feel and what I want, and I hope you will bear that in mind. [ ] assured NOETH that he would do his best to obtain a clear answer concerning SCHNEIDER's status. NOETH promised to provide a written summary of his file on SCHNEIDER, plus SCHNEIDER's personal data, so that there will be no chance for error in our conduct of the trace.

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Attachment E to EGMA-32039  
Page 4

7. ROHDE & SCHWARZ: [ ] said that he had heard that Dr. Lothar ROHDE is due to go to the USA for a month starting about the beginning of March. We have heard that he wants to talk to some American government officials about something important. However, we have learned that ROHDE does not have a valid US visa at present, so we would like to know if it is true that he is going to the USA, and if not, where is he going. NOETH turned to CABOLT and asked if that was the same ROHDE who was in contact with the British. CABOLT said yes, but made shushing motions with his hands in an obvious attempt to keep NOETH from going into this aspect of the case. NOETH suggested that CABOLT check on ROHDE's proposed trip, and CABOLT agreed to do so.

8. Ukrainians: [ ] gave CABOLT the names of two Ukrainians now in Valka, who are believed to be RIS agents dispatched to penetrate the Banderists. The slip given to CABOLT read, "PROTSAYLO and KOZAK, in Valka." (Note: This referred to MIHALI PROTSAYLO (DOB, 14 June 1929; POB, Miklotin) and Volodymyr KOZAK (DOB, 1 August 1907; POB, Galicia).)

9. KUBARK's Position: After referring again to the lack of any satisfactory answers from ODOPAL, NOETH made substantially the following remarks: I do not see why you allow the things that ODOPAL and ODUNIT are doing. You are supposed to be the highest organization of its type in your government. Yet ODOPAL and the others run around here getting into all sorts of things and causing trouble for everyone. Your Mr. Asham should pound on the table and lay down the law and say that this sort of thing must stop. If you are going to be the boss, then you should act the part and exert some control over the other organizations. [ ] listened to this without comment.

10. General Comments: Although NOETH's remarks sound harsh when committed to paper, the atmosphere of the meeting was quite friendly. NOETH said that he would like to get together with [ ] again in the near future and he never made any remark which seemed directed at [ ] personally. It appeared that the point of the exercise was that NOETH is not satisfied with his current liaison arrangements and that for personal reasons, either professional or political, he wants what he is sure is a direct contact to a working member of KUBARK. Although [ ] has never admitted being a member of KUBARK in his conversations with CABOLT, by a process of elimination CABOLT could determine [ ] affiliation. [ ] feels that if NOETH receives satisfactory replies to the questions he raised at this meeting, he will be willing to continue this type of contact. We intend to try to cultivate the contact.

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