

interrogation was very much more involved. SOHREIDER personally supervised the interrogation and laid down the methods to be followed.

2. INTERROGATION METHODS.

SOHREIDER claims that the kindness method was the only one he ever allowed to be employed. Interrogatees were given special quarters more comfortable than the normal prison cell and in addition they were given extra rations. SOHREIDER claimed that this method was nearly always successful. Asked as to the length of interrogations and number of interrogations used on a prisoner, he stated that they never lasted more than 24 hours and that only one or two interrogated a prisoner. When asked what methods were used when a prisoner would not talk after 24 hours of questioning, he blandly stated "Well we just had to do without the information."

3. AGENTS OR SABOTEURS CAPTURED IN HOLLAND.

SOHREIDER states that approximately 110 agents were captured in HOLLAND between Fall 1940 and the end of the War. Of these he has been able to remember the names of 75 of them. These are divided into groups, the first being those taken in between Sep 40 and Mar 43 and the second between Jan 44 and Mar 45.

(a)

1. v.d. HEYDEN
2. TER LAAK
3. TACONIS
4. LAUWERS
5. DE HAAS
6. BAATSEN
7. AKKERMAN
8. MOOLENAAR (perished)
9. v. STEEN
10. FICNAKER
11. REER
12. SEBES
13. KEVOS
14. BUTZER
15. v. BERTSCHOTER
16. JAMBROES
17. BUKKENS
18. BEUKEMA TOE WATER
19. DEBOOGLEVER FORTUYN
20. MOOI
21. v.d. POL
22. OREIT
23. RADEMA
24. HUNGER
25. DE JONGE (Jhr)
26. ALBIAS
27. MEYERINK
28. DOORLEHN
29. BOOGAARD
30. UEBINK
31. ?
32. v. OS
37. v.d. WILLEN, Pilot
38. v.d. WILLEN, Willam
39. REINDERS
40. FAR
41. KAMPHORST
42. FRUIS
43. FUNT
44. MINK
45. DE BRESY
46. v.d. GLESSIN

(b)

1. ADRIAANSEN
2. DIESFELDT
3. DE JONG
4. WEBSTER (to GERMANY)
5. v. BORSSUM BUTSMAN
6. IRISNIGT
7. LETTENBOER
8. v.d. SPRK
9. STEEN
10. HARTLIEF
11. KOOPMANS
12. v. DUIN (free)
13. VISSER (free)
14. POP KONLEK
15. SUTHERLAND
16. LENS
17. GELLOSSE
18. VEN
19. SEYBEN
20. SIEMA
21. v.d. WAL
22. BIALLOSTERSNI
23. BARME

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- 47. WEGNER
- 48. v. HEMERT
- 49. IJZEN
- 50. JOORDAAN
- 51. MACARE
- 52. POWELLE

4. FRANK (Sondorkdo F.)

SOHREIEDER gives the following details concerning the disappearance of FRANK and his gang:-

On the evening of 6 May FRANK telephoned SOHREIEDER to wish him goodbye as he was going away. SOHREIEDER told him to hold on and called KOLITZ in from the next room. KOLITZ insisted that FRANK meet him before he left and they arranged to meet him at the Hotel Promenade in 15 minutes. SOHREIEDER, KOLITZ and the SD man KNOLLE got into a car and drove to the hotel. There they found FRANK in ordinary seaman's uniform. KOLITZ told SOHREIEDER and KNOLLE to wait by the car and walked up and down with FRANK for about 25 minutes. When they were finished FRANK left and KOLITZ came back to the car. He said that FRANK had an idea he should go to the East and fight the Russians. KOLITZ claimed that he had convinced him that it was foolish as the whole thing was over and he could only do more harm than good by leaving and that he had talked FRANK around to his way of thinking so that he agreed to stay.

About 1800 hrs the same evening KOLITZ and SOHREIEDER went out in the RAJESSLAGER for a short walk and an OR came up with a message that there was a sailor who had been sent up to get BRUBOKNER's trunk. KOLITZ went over to the sailor, whom neither he or SOHREIEDER knew and asked him where BRUBOKNER was. The sailor replied that he was at the Hotel Promenade. Immediately both KOLITZ and SOHREIEDER drove to the hotel but there was no sign of BRUBOKNER, FRANK or anyone else from the Kommando. They searched the surroundings without finding any sign of them, but they did locate a Naval Unit not far away. SOHREIEDER is more or less certain that this was a Schnellboot Unit and was under comd. of a Leutnant MUELLER or SCHILLER or some similar name. Upon questioning this officer he vouchsafed the info that FRANK and three others had called that afternoon and had been given naval uniforms and that they had left from there to go to DEN HELDER.

Upon Dr. SOHOENGARTH being notified of this, instructions were telephoned to AMSTERDAM to the Einsatz Kommando that FRANK should be brought back. Whereupon Kriminal Kommissar ALBERS left immediately to bring him back. However, he also disappeared and it was not until the next day that Kommando Leiter Kriminalrat LAGERS notified Dr. SOHOENGARTH of ALBERS failure to return.

Above was sum total of SOHREIEDER's knowledge of l'affaire FRANK with the exception that he vaguely recalls a lorry having passed behind him while he was waiting for KOLITZ to finish his talk with FRANK. He believes there were three men in naval uniform in it, who were probably FRANK's men. He did not pay any attention to it at the time and it only occurred to him afterwards that it might have been them.

5. VEREWOLF & SONDEERKOMMANDO PROEBSTING.

SOHREIEDER expressed astonishment when told that his name was being associated with an underground stay-behind org. He disclaimed any knowledge whatsoever of any reason why his "fair" name should be associated with such a thing. However, after a night to think it over he puts forth the following suggestions as to why it might have happened.

- (a) SOHREIEDER returned to DEN HAAG 16 Apr. SOHOENGARTH returned about 20 Apr. and immediately called a meeting of all his chiefs.

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The meeting was primarily to announce that they were going to org a battle gp from all the available personnel who were NOT actually occupied with definite jobs in the Sipo. This was to include the Einsatz Kommandos from districts that the Allies had overrun and other surplus personnel from various centers. SCHRELEDER thought his name might have been mentioned in some capacity as assisting in the org and outfitting of the battlegp.

(b) On the evening 30 Apr he was called out from his house to see two Untersturmfuehrer. Both appeared to be Dutch. They stated they had come from BERLIN via the FRIESIAN ISLANDS and had been told to report to him for civilian clothes and false papers. They were NOT allowed to say what their job was. SCHRELEDER referred them to the Brigadefuehrer himself and stated that he had no authority to issue them with these things on their own words. They left and returned shortly after and stated that SOHNGARTH had okayed them and they were to get what they required. SCHRELEDER phoned SOHNGARTH's HQ for confirmation and found that they actually had been there. SCHRELEDER did not speak to SOHNGARTH himself and does not know who it was who guaranteed them at the other end of the line. SCHRELEDER then told his chief assistant (the Dutch detective SIAGTER) to fix them up with false identity cards. He was not able to supply them with any civilian clothes. The following day a third Dutchman also dressed either as an Obersturmfuehrer or Untersturmfuehrer appeared and asked for false papers. SCHRELEDER describes the third as being a very large man, both tall and broad with a head appearing too small for his body. Dark hair brushed slightly back and parted right. He came from some office in JAVASTRAAT. SCHRELEDER feels certain that this man had some connection with SKORZENY but just what he cannot remember. He never saw any of them again after these meetings.

(c) On 2 May Hauptsturmfuehrer PROEBSTING from the Sonderkommando UTRECHT telephoned SCHRELEDER to say that he needed EB's (Persoonen-afwijzen). SCHRELEDER replied that he had very few but PROEBSTING said that he needed 30. SCHRELEDER said that he knew that he did not have that many so he was asked if he could get 20. On checking with SIAGTER he found the required 20 and despatched SIAGTER to UTRECHT with them. SCHRELEDER questioned SIAGTER on his return and was informed that they had NOT had the necessary photos for them so they were NOT properly fixed up. After this he had no further comm with PROEBSTING.

6. SONDERKOMMANDO PROEBSTING UTRECHT:

SCHRELEDER disclaims much knowledge of this Kdo, apart from its comd and another man who is either Ober- or Unterstuflu by the name of BEHREND or BEHRTZ. All personnel are SD. SCHRELEDER thinks there were about 4 or 5 ORs as well as the two ofrs in the Kdo. He had heard that they had some connection with some Propaganda Coy of the Waffen-SS.

7. "NACHT & NEBEL"

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order to the effect that Political Arrestees, with the exception of the worst cases, would NOT be executed. Instead they would be transported to the Reich in strictest secrecy. Hence the term "Nacht und Nebel". The reason for the strictest secrecy was to give the impression that these Arrestees had been "un-leidig" to act as a deterrent. They could be held in GERMANY until the end of the War in Europe and then returned(?) This, SCHRELEDER claims, was merely another demonstration of GERMANY's kind feeling towards the Germanic Dutch people. This was partly carried out, but transport problems in HOLLAND were such that it made it very difficult to follow the very detailed instructions connected with their transportation. In this connection SCHRELEDER complained that the Wehrmacht having absolute priority on all forms.

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of transport things were very difficult from the Police Officer's point of view. Towards the end of 44 they were instructed to drop the name "Nacht und Nebel" and refer to this instruction as the "Keitel Erlass", but many of them still kept using the old name. When it was suggested to SCHREIEDER that the real reason for this was that these arrestees could be used in the secret underground factories as Slave Labour, he protested violently that he had no knowledge of any such things.

8. OTHER SKORZENY CONTACTS.

(a) WELL. SCHREIEDER only saw WELL once and that was in Dec 44 or Jan 45. His description of him was that he is a very big man who has all the appearances of a Hotel Waiter. He first heard about WELL when FRANK called him in Dec. 44 to enquire if SCHREIEDER knew of him.

(b) HEINDORFF. SCHREIEDER first saw HEINDORFF in ZWOLLE Oct or Nov 44. He was more or less certain that he was a SKORZENY man. He told SCHREIEDER that he had everything planned in GRENINGEN, but he needed vehicles. SCHREIEDER was unable to do anything for him so HEINDORFF went to RAUTER himself. Nothing more was heard about him until Dec when FRANK called up to say that HEINDORFF had been in DEN HAAG "organizing" cameras, etc. SCHREIEDER telephoned AHERNDS and asked him to keep these SKORZENY, and out of his hair, as they were causing him too much trouble.

SCHREIEDER describes HEINDORFF: Slim, small, with dark hair and eyes. Says that MUNT could describe him much better.

9. IVAL SCHUTZHAFT.

SCHREIEDER describes the methods of disposition of arrestees as follows: The Einsatz Kommando concerned with the arrest of an agent or saboteur turned in the complete report to the Abt IV Leiter, who signed it and passed it to the Schutzhaft Büro at Bis HQ. From here it was passed to BERLIN, where the type of imprisonment or other punishment was approved and the appropriate "red slip" was sent back to HOLLAND. Until such time as this was received the arrestee was held in the police gaol. On receipt of BERLIN's verdict the punishment described was carried out. The normal time between the notifying of BERLIN and the carrying out of the sentence was about three weeks.

Ostuf HEINRICH was the CO IVAL. He had formerly been the Commandant of the AMERSFOORT Concentration Camp. In early 44 he was relieved by Kriminal Inspektor WACKER who remained at AMERSFOORT until the camp was transferred to ILSSEN nr HAMBURG. Asked about the different types of imprisonment meted out in the concentration camps, SCHREIEDER evidenced the first signs of nervousness shown during the whole interrogation. He protested much too violently that he had never been allowed to go inside the camp himself when he wanted to interrogate an ? ? ? ? but that the case was always brought to him outside the camp itself. Then he stated that KOLITZ knew much more than he did about that sort of thing. When asked about "Stufe III" he attempted to disclaim any knowledge of such a thing. He said that he had heard of only Stufe I & II.

From some source SCHREIEDER had heard about the Allied findings at BELSEN and other concentration camps and protested that such things were almost beyond his belief. He expressed his horror that such things could occur and cited the incident that occurred in VUCHT camp about a year ago when the Camp Commandant was sentenced to 10 yrs imprisonment by the Hoch-SS und Pol.Fhr because he had overcrowded women in cells so that some died as a result.

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10. SCHOENGARTH & SCHREIEDER

SCHREIEDER stated that his contacts with the Bds Ehr had always been pleasant, but that towards the last SCHOENGARTH had become increasingly nervous and impatient about everything and had been somewhat difficult to please. SCHOENGARTH's habit of saying exactly what he thought without regards for consequences made him many enemies. However, SCHREIEDER respected him as a qualified Judge and claims he has a good legal mind. He attributes his trouble in POLAND when SCHOENGARTH was transferred to the Waffen-SS as due to his outspokenness having got him into trouble with some Gauleiter or Gruppenfuhrer of the SS over a matter of graft. However, his distinguished career in the Waffen-SS soon resulted in his reinstatement as Bdz HOLLAND.

11. RAUTER

SCHREIEDER states that RAUTER was definitely NOT qualified for the task he had in HOLLAND. He describes him as "The old outlaw who never shed his outlaw's skin". RAUTER did NOT get along with the older Police officials on account of his utter disregard for orthodox methods. He did NOT understand Criminal Police methods except from the criminal's point of view. RAUTER tried to keep everybody but himself away from the ear of the Reichskommissar. SCHREIEDER mentioned one incident when all the higher Police Officials were invited to an official Banquet at the Reichskommissar's house. SEYSS-INQUART was present during the meal, but immediately thereafter he and RAUTER disappeared and did NOT show up again for the rest of the evening, much to the disgust of some of the guests. With regards to the attack on RAUTER in Mar 45, SCHREIEDER states that the official assigned to the investigation was HARDERS. Results from the investigation were negative as they did NOT catch the actual gunmen. Approximately 80,000 bullets hit the car but only two hit RAUTER himself. SCHREIEDER claimed that all the hostages who were shot as reprisals were already condemned to death. The various Einsatz Kommandos were all instructed to prepare lists of the arrestees they were holding for the approval of the Bds to check over and tick off the names of those who could be "eliminated". In this connection SCHREIEDER states that one EK turned in a list of six names without individual findings as to the guilt of the arrestees but merely a group classification as sabotage suspects or something similar, thereby causing a great deal of annoyance to the Bds, which EK this was SCHREIEDER did NOT know.

12. OTHER REPRISALS

The first reprisal affair, involving the shooting of hostages in which SCHREIEDER had been interested was the abortive attempt to wreck a Wehrmacht leave train on the ROTTERDAM viaduct in the summer 45. The Wehrmacht demanded a large number of hostages although nobody was hurt, but the kind-hearted Gestapo talked them out of it and a compromise was finally made with 6 paying the penalty.

In order to preserve good relations with both the Dutch and the Wehrmacht, RAUTER ordered that in future (after the ROTTERDAM affair) the only hostages shot would be ones who were already awaiting the death penalty for other offences. SCHREIEDER stated that as far as he knew there was only one other occurrence of the shooting of hostages between the ROTTERDAM and RAUTER incidents and that was an attack on some Wehrmacht vehicles, but he claimed he did NOT know any details.

13. DUTCH POLICE OFFICIALS WITH THE BGS.

SCHREIEDER gives the following as the complete list of Dutch detective and police officials who worked with him and his minions. They were given an additional RM 30 per month as well as their pay from the Dutch authorities and also latterly some rations. They served mostly as interpreters and only did the

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initial questioning at the time of arrest. Almost invariably they were accompanied by a German. Most of them came from the DEN HAAG Police.

SLAUGHTER: SCHREIJDER's own right-hand man. SCHREIJDER claims he was far the best of all of them.

LEEMUIS: Worked with MUIFF (EK DEN HAAG)

VEEFKIND: Father.

VEEFKIND: Son.

PEGELS:

KAPTEIN:

POOS: Left Jan 44 to act as Transport officer for the Director General of Netherlands Police. Went to NIJMEGEN later to ZWOLLE and the AMSTERDAM.

WIMENGA

v. DIJK: Was taken into custody for graft of some sort in 44.

SAVENT:

14. CAPTURED ALLIED AGENTS.

SCHREIJDER states that all the agents they captured were Dutch, with one exception of WEBSTER. He makes these special remarks with regards to them:-

- (a) WEBSTER was sent to BERLIN on special orders from RSHA.
- (b) BYALOSTERSKI was captured by the Landmacht in Jan 45. He was reported to have been quite a long time in the country before his capture. SCHREIJDER thought that he had parachuted into HOLLAND as IO between the Dutch Government and the Underground. He attempted to escape while he was being brought into AMSTERDAM and later died from wounds received in AMSTERDAM hospital. He died before very much information, apart from his name, could be obtained from him.
- (c) HUITENBERG was captured end 44. He was an agent of the GDN but he was later released on condition of contact "Mioki" the reputed head of the organization, with a view to an exchange being carried out of certain GDN personnel for some SD personnel, who had been captured, in FRANCE.
- (d) Van DUIN and VISSER (Fliegerde Buerbauch) were the last two agents captured, but due to the approaching cessation of hostilities were both set free. VISSER was regarded as one of the best of the Allied agents and his activities were known long before his capture.

15. CAPT. ABEN. GIS AGENT VI.

SCHREIJDER wished to amend a former statement he had made at a previous interrogation. He had omitted to state that it had been planned to include ABRV as a released Dutch Agent in the exchange mentioned above (para. 14. c). At the last moment the plans were changed and he was NOT sent along.

16. POLICE TRAINING.

SCHREIJDER attributes most of the shortcomings of the Gestapo and SD to the fact that their training was so diluted with Propagand that men were put on to the job only half trained. He claimed that the Police Officials who qualified since 1933 had had 10% police and 90% political training with the result that when they were put on to a job many of them had no idea as to where to start. Instead of being given a thorough grounding in all aspects of police work they were only given intensive training in one particular aspect with the consequent result that they were always getting out of their depths. The only officials who knew their jobs were the pre-1933 ones.

17. WAR CRIMES.

Contrary to popular belief (states SCHREIJDER) the Gestapo is really a body of keen Police Officials working for the good of the public and the German Reich. They are all kind-hearted sympathetic Police Officials whose greatest wish is to be the friend and protector of the man in the street.

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None of the War Crimes were ever committed by them, but the whole of the blame lies on the SD and to some extent the Wehrmacht. It was always obvious that the Einsatz Kommandos which were headed by SD-men were responsible for any action that might be considered criminal. The other ones were models of just and proper behaviour and never committed anything approaching a War Crime. In fact the SD was always causing trouble for the Sipo at the RSHA in BERLIN.

21 Jun 45.

Robinson Opt.
1st Army Interrogation Pool Det.
c/o A.S.O., South Holland.

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