

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

GANDIDA

VIA: _____
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO: MGKA 9047

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

KKJ

DATE: 20 June 1949

TO : Chief, Munich Operations Base

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe *elk*

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational

SPECIFIC - GANDIDA Stay Behind and Radio Operations

Ref: MGKA-6615 *where is this*

1. There appears to be at this juncture some misunderstanding as to what is desired of GANDIDA. Our main reason for querying GANDIDA on the subject of stay-behind and especially radio operations is to tap his knowledge and experience in this field. The possibility that he and/or his communication expert can be used in some sort of intermediary capacity in our own stay-behind operations is considered rather remote. We feel that Subject's treatise should be divided into two separate parts. The first part should summarize in detail his experience in setting up stay-behind net works during World War II, including as many specific cases as he can call to mind. Subject in his write up of the operations of WALLI III (Leitstelle Ost III) mentions R nets (stay behinds) only very vaguely and it is presumed that he was not overly successful in this field, however we would like all possible details on these nets. We are also interested in his estimate of his successes and failures and the underlying reasons thereof. Special attention in this first part of Subject's treatise should be given to: a) the choice of personnel selected for this work i.e. did he choose personnel from groups such as church, nationality groups and, if so, the results; b) his experience with the incorporating of existing positive or CE networks into stay behind nets shortly before they were overrun; c) the cover arrangements he made for his nets; d) the type of communications established for these nets; e) the type and amount of training and briefing given both in information gathering and in communication techniques; f) methods of control used after the net was overrun by enemy forces. In this regard, we are particularly interested in any provisions subject made for establishing nets in territory outside the USSR i.e. in the Balkans, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic.

2. In the second part of Subject's expose, we would like him to imagine that he has been given the assignment of preparing stay behind nets in the event of hostilities and the allied evacuation of Amzon. Emphasis must be placed on the fact that this is purely a theoretical problem. We would like to know exactly how he would go about setting up a net work here. This expose

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DATE 2007

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should cover the following topics:

a. Suitability of members of political, religious groups, ex-GIS etc.

b. Type of cover arrangements most likely to succeed during a theoretical Russian occupation; 1) type and amount of briefing and training of stay behind nets in both Commo and information gathering techniques; 2) the relationship between the stay behind net proper and its communication (theoretically radio) personnel.

3. We would be extremely interested in any other factors of stay behind nets which, although not included in the above, are apparent to GARDIDA. We would also welcome a statement of GARDIDA's radio expert's experiences in the communication problems of stay behind networks with special reference to training, to the choice of suitable candidates for stay behind operator's training thereof, the problems of pre-arranged signals and signal plans, the success or failure of his program during the war, especially in the countries outside of the USSR and his adaptation of these considerations to fit the present day situation in Germany.

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Chief, ROB

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