

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: A-RR/S

INFO:

1 PRAG

U Paraphrase before con-
G municating to anyone.

A-DR

GUR

DO NOT REVEAL SECRET

2812

Frankfurt via War

Dated February 7, 1946

Rec'd 2:50 p.m., 8th

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

NIACT 36, February 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The German support was, for example to consist of making available intelligence re the European countries; furthermore it was promised to help out the Argentine wishes for weapons, deliveries and technical aid for the construction of radio communications. In accord with German foreign policy, the German Secret Service supported through its secret radio stations the building up of the Argentine position as leader state in a Latin American bloc which was to be formed.

Four. I know that the Secret Service communications through Becker and the Bolivian Major Elias Belmonte Pabon and the Argentine Govt were used for their plans for the construction of a Latin American bloc, especially in connection with a revolution (Elinos Umaturzas) in Bolivia. Belmonte was permitted to use (?) contact with the revolutionary group in Bolivia. I recall from reports that the Argentine Govt stood behind the revolutionary group in Bolivia, and had provided active economic aid.

I further recall that the German Secret Service communications were used to Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay on behalf of the Argentine Govt. The German Secret Service had likewise contact with Erral, that is through the leader of the integralist movement, Plinio Salgado, and his Secretary Albuquerque in Lisbon. The contact was personally established by me; it was with the aid of members of the Portuguese police. After the first assumption of contact, collaboration was continued through a representative of the German Secret Service in Lisbon, that is Sturmbannfuhrer Hassenstein.

Five. The Argentine

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SECRET

-2- MARCH 25, February 7, 1943 p.m. (SECTION THREE), FROM
Frankfurt via War

Five. The Argentine Ambassador in Madrid Adrian G. Escobar, had sought out contact with the German Secret Service through the Paris office. He was representative of a political line which had as ultimate goal the creation of a Catholic Latin American bloc like "Hispanidad". He was politically an exceptionally well-versed man, who also made use of German support for his political goal. Escobar had good connections with the Vatican; among other things he was to be used by me in this direction for the attempt at a peace compromise.

At the same time he was, by reason of his manifold political connections, used as a source of information. He was also to have been invited to visit Berlin, but this never came to pass. Becker received instructions to take up contact with Escobar after his return to Argentina in mid 1943. Mario Amadeo was known to the German Secret Service as an indirect source of information; Amadeo had, for his part, connections with Escobar. Amadeo and other members of the Argentine Foreign Office were in contact with Juan Carlos Goycochea in Spain.

MURPHY

BY

(*) Apparent omission. Verification to follow.

SECRET