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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR GERMANY

FC  
A B/s  
NWC  
CE/R  
D/R

Berlin, November 21, 1945

1. Summary
2. Analysis
3. Answer
4. Memo


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No. 1417

SUBJECT: INTERROGATION OF WALTER SCHELLENBERG.

RECEIVED  
STATE DEPT.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.



Sir:

*H6E.W/11-20-45  
FC*

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's telegram No. 176 of November 20, 1945, reporting the high points of an interrogation of Walter SCHELLENBERG in Nuremberg. There is enclosed herewith a more detailed memorandum on the same subject.

Respectfully yours,

*Robert Murphy*  
Robert Murphy

Enclosure:

*Exec. att. given*

Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3928  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2006

FOR COORDINATION WITH *State Dept*

In duplicate to the Department.  
Copy for CE - Mr. Riddleberger.

DCR EUR Unit	
Asst.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Rev.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Col.	
Dir.	

File No. 320.02a  
miscellaneous/and

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*Interrogation of Schellenberg re: Amt VI, RSHA; at Nuremberg, 17 November, 1945, ...*

Interrogation of Schellenberg, 17 November, 1945, at Nuremberg, RSHA; at Nuremberg, 17 November, 1945, ...

AMT VI (C) - AMT VI (D)

Schellenberg was asked ... stating that the ... AMT VI in Madrid had worked ... and that ... had been financed and owned entirely by an agency of the Reich. He did so, his signature ... witnessed by Lt. Col. Smith ... Brockhart, ICD. The ... was desired by the Allied Joint Trustees in Madrid, in order to secure the shop through seizure and turn it over to United States authorities.

BELOMONTE AND THE BOLIVIAN REVOLUTION

*Amber*

The primary purpose of the interrogation was to discover what Schellenberg knew about the part played by Major Elias ELMORO PABON in the Bolivian Revolution of December 20, 1943; this information was desired in a top secret instruction from the Department of State. Belmonte, a former Bolivian military attaché in Germany, was exiled from his country and elected to stay in Berlin after the two countries broke diplomatic relations in 1942. While there, he had close relations with the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut and was employed as a Spanish Language Broadcaster of the Reichs Rundfunk. Belmonte left Germany for Spain in November, 1944.

Schellenberg proved himself a willing witness, if not too reliable; he had, however, little detailed knowledge of Belmonte's relations with Amt VI; these were carried on at a lower level. The Bolivian worked chiefly with Hauptsturmfuehrer Kurt GROSS, who in turn was under Obersturmbannfuehrer Theodor PAEFFGEN of Amt VI-D. Paeffgen has been interrogated at the Military Intelligence Service Center at Oberursel; Gross, who is still at large, is being sought by G-2. Belmonte also had dealings with SCHMIDTZ (fnu), who was Schellenberg's personlicher Referent and the contact between Amt VI and the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut.

The prisoner knew of Belmonte's connections with Amt VI-D, but averred he had never met the Bolivian personally, Belmonte first came to the RSHA recommended by General Wilhelm FÄRDEL, head of the IAI, as Schellenberg understood it. The relationship began in 1942 and continued rather closely until the end of 1943. After that, Belmonte continued his contact until he left for Spain. The Bolivian was permitted the use of Line 23, the SD transmitter to South America; through it he passed messages to Johannes Siegfried BUCHER, Hauptvertrauensmann of the SD in Argentina, to be relayed to comrades-in-arms in Bolivia. Schellenberg denied any knowledge whatsoever of the means by which this was accomplished; he had never heard of Dionisio FOLAMINI, he said. Neither did he recognize the names of Ruben SARDON, Victor PAZ ESTENSSORO, nor Angel RODRIGUEZ.

On the subject of Belmonte's financial help by the RSHA, Schellenberg was more positive. He asserted categorically that the Bolivian received money for the political intelligence which he passed on to Amt VI, both in Berlin and later in Spain.

George ...

Schellenberg's testimony to the effect that Belmonte contributed political intelligence to Amt VI directly contradicts ... Theodor Paeffgen, head of Amt VI-D.

delmonte spent a lot in Berlin, and the prisoner said that Amt VI was only one source of his presence. (Note: others were the IAI and the Weintraub.)

Belmonte also wished the IAI to help him return to Bolivia, both before and after the Revolution of 1943. At first he hoped to arrange passage on a submarine or sailing boat, but later he wanted to be shipped from Spain. Schellenberg understood that Belmonte was anxious to get back and take part in the new government ("Er wollte wieder ans Ruder kommen."). The politician's idea was that Karl Arnold, SD representative in Madrid, should arrange a clandestine passage through SD channels. Belmonte spoke of this project while he was still in Berlin, so Schellenberg assumed that it was his reason for going to Spain; this was only conjecture, however.

The prisoner admitted that the Bolivian Revolution of 1943 had been recognized as a step "in the same direction" as that taken by Germany under National Socialism, but insisted that the RSHA had had no hand in promoting the coup d'etat. Schellenberg emphatically asserted that he, personally, as head of Amt VI, had had one interest alone - that his agents abroad should be able to work efficiently without disturbance by the local authorities. For this reason he was always somewhat distrustful of South American revolutions, since any political upset always resulted in confusion and disrupted the flow of intelligence. After the Bolivian Revolution, however, the reports from there continued as before, as they did from Chile and Paraguay, until Becker's system broke down in mid-1944. Occasionally Becker passed on information from the United States, but it came from returning travelers or diplomats; there was no regular channel.

#### ARGENTINA

Schellenberg was asked if any Argentines had been a party to Belmonte's activities, and could only answer that he assumed so, since he knew the Bolivian had close contact with Argentina. Questioned as to the possible complicity of the Argentine Military and Naval Attaches in Berlin, SANTILLANA and CEBALLOS, the prisoner said he knew positively of no such connections; he did not reject the possibility, but the facts were not known to him.

Schellenberg averred positively, however, that both Santillana and Ceballos received gifts and champagne from Amt VI in return for political information; he could not swear that they had ever been paid in cash. Ceballos, especially, was very pro-German, and later collaborated with Karl Arnold when he was transferred to Spain. The Argentine attache did not send reports to the RSHA, but his material was incorporated into Arnold's regular communications.

In 1943, Ceballos solicited Schellenberg's aid, without success, for a project to establish a new Argentine airline between Spain and Buenos Aires. The attache hoped that his Government would be able to secure the approval and good will of England, while he himself wanted the German to furnish him with long-range CONDOR flying ships; there were still several old LUFTHANSA machines available in Spain, but they were not equipped to fly from Africa to the Brazilian coast without stops.

Asked what other South American diplomats had cooperated with Amt VI besides Belmonte, Ceballos and Santillana, the prisoner professed himself unable to recall any; he knew there were five or six.

The Argentine Revolution of June 4, 1943, was then introduced into the conversation, and Schellenberg was invited to comment on it. The prisoner affirmed that he knew there had been contact between SD representatives and the Argentines ("Ich weiß dass es eine Kontaktaufnahme mit PERON Kontakt hatte.") Schellenberg believed that the contact was from Becker through Oscar Alberto HELLMUTH; he knew that Hellmuth had contact with the SD, and also with RAMONEL, FARNELL and Peron. This was, of course, after June 4, 1943. Asked what kind of contact, the prisoner could only say that it was one of good will ("Ein Wohlwollen bestand"), and that the Becker organization was able to work better under the new government.

TRANSFER OF AGENTS AND FUNDS TO ARGENTINA\*

In a previous interrogation Schellenberg had made the statement that \$100,000 had been despatched to the RSNA organization in Argentina in early 1944, in two shipments by sailing boat; a third shipment for the same amount was planned in early 1945, but never materialized. The prisoner was questioned regarding his statement, since only one shipment, in mid-1944, had been accounted for to the knowledge of the interrogator.

Schellenberg clarified that the first of the two shipments was made to the Abwehr organization, not to the SD, and that it arrived probably in 1943. The prisoner believed that the two combined amounted to about \$100,000 in dollars, drugs and gold; he was not certain. Both projects were carried out by Naval Lieutenant SCHUCHMANN, of the Abwehr, by means of small sailing ships; both arrived.

The second sailing delivered the agents HANSEN and SCHROELL; the former a radio-man, the latter a microphotographer. Becker and his chief radio-man FRANZOK (alias Gustav UTZINGER) received the money and the two new agents, and despatched back to Germany the agents Heinz LANGE and Philipp IMHOFF. The latter two individuals reported to Amt VI and remained available for consultation for some months, after which Schellenberg knew nothing of their whereabouts.

THE SD AND THE ABWEHR IN ARGENTINA

Schellenberg recalled having read a list of Becker's agents, prepared with the purpose of awarding them decorations, and remembered that there were twenty-five; the majority were either Volksdeutschen or Reich Germans who had been hired locally. Since the prisoner was unable to recall names, several were suggested from the interrogator's memory. Schellenberg recognized the names of Wilhelm Otto SEIDITZ, Hans BLUME, Johannes Peter SZURAWS and, of course, Gustav Utzinger, as having been on the list. He did not recall Wilhelm ARNOLD, Herbert SCHUBERT, nor either of the BADE brothers. The prisoner volunteered the name of Herbert JURMANN, who threw himself out of a window and committed suicide when caught. Asked why Jurmann had killed himself, the prisoner said he understood it was to avoid betraying his companions.

Schellenberg said also that there was a German professor at one of the Argentine universities, a radio-physicist, who had been of considerable help to Utzinger. The name of Dr. Wilhelm ROEHLER was suggested, and the prisoner said: yes, that was the man. He was not sure 100%, but it sounded

\*See the interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen by this mission, October 19, 1945, for more authoritative details regarding the episode of the sailing ship.

like the names.

Becker worked with the Alwehr, and he had  
admitted that this was unusual. After the German  
Embassy in Buenos Aires and limited to the code-group a  
week, in late 1942, both the Alwehr and the Alwehr transmitted  
over the latter's identification of the code-group. The Alwehr was  
own code. The arrangement was still in Alwehr was  
absorbed by the SD in 1943.

The prisoner recalled the name of the former Naval  
Attache, Dietrich Utzinger, and said that either Becker or  
Utzinger had collaborated with him. Upon questioning, however,  
Schellenberg admitted that the Naval Attache had his own  
channel of communication with the OKW in Berlin, and that the  
joint transmitting arrangement had not been used until after  
the Embassy's code-groups were cut in late 1942.

Since Utzinger had passed his duties over to General  
Frederick Wolfe at that time and had left Argentina in  
January, 1943, Schellenberg was asked if it was not Wolf  
instead of Utzinger who dealt with the SD. The prisoner  
replied that he had been closely questioned regarding Wolf  
in London, but that he was sure he had never heard the name.  
He only knew that Becker's organization had lent the Alwehr  
organization the use of its transmitting facilities, after  
1942.

It was known in Berlin that Becker was a fugitive from  
the Argentine police after February, 1943, but the reports  
kept coming in; they were, however, few and far between.

#### THE GERMAN FIRMS IN ARGENTINA

Schellenberg had made a statement in a previous interroga-  
tion to the effect that at the end of 1942, an arrangement  
was made with TELEFUNKEN through which assets of this firm in  
Argentina were turned over to the espionage organization,  
while Telefunken received the equivalent in Reichsmarks in  
Germany. Interrogated on this point, the prisoner admitted  
that there had been several such cases, but insisted he  
could not recall the names. He was not sure that the first  
firm was Telefunken itself, believing rather that it was an  
electric firm owned by that company. Asked if STEUBENS-  
SCHUCHERT had not also helped the SD, Schellenberg merely  
said it might have done so; he could not remember.

Gustav Utzinger, or Utzinger, was originally a Telefunken  
man and had been very close to the Argentine Army, the  
prisoner asserted. He knew that the Army was interested in  
Utzinger's knowledge and technique; they wanted the Telefunken  
expert to set up a radio system for them as late as 1943.

Schellenberg's reliability in this instance must be considered  
extremely doubtful. The interrogator merely threw out the name  
as that of a Nazi doctor of whom he knew in Buenos Aires.  
Roehmer was a physician, not a radio-physicist, and was not  
connected with any Argentine university. Schellenberg obviously  
thought the interrogator knew all about it, and acquiesced in  
order to ingratiate himself. However, the prisoner was  
certain that a radio-physicist from an Argentine university  
had helped Utzinger and the SD.