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TO: SAINT, Washington
FROM: SAINT, London
SUBJECT: SHELLENBERG Autobiography

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BRIGADENFUEHRER SCHELLENBERG
Anschef VI

Autobiography, compiled during his stay
in Stockholm, June 1945.

The sudden change from the high tension of my last weeks in Germany to the calm and peace of my present abode compels me to write an account of the events of these last weeks. A full comprehension of what I had to live through will not be possible without taking into account:-

- 1) That this statement can only be compared with sketches in a diary - that is, it is mainly a collection of chronological jottings from memory - and
- 2) That these last weeks were but the manifestation of long-felt presentiments and forebodings.

Since these are just diary sketches, I have done my best to avoid a completely false picture of my own situation emerging by holding fast to my professional training and the resulting basis for my political convictions.

The latter years of my studies were decisively influenced by financial difficulties at home and my own need of money. My entitlement to a state grant I had to prove by passing diligence examinations (Fleisspruefungen). Then after I had passed the "Referendar" examination on 18.3.33, the question of a further state grant depended on my belonging to the Party and Organisation. That was the first reason why I joined the Party and the SS in June 1933. That I thus joined the SS was not the result of any political conviction. It was because the majority of my student colleagues did not join the S.A., but also went into the SS. The uniform pleased us better. We were looked on unfavourably as undergraduates and as late-coachs (people joining in May and June). Duties consisted of stupid exercises three times a week in the evening or late afternoon and mostly the whole of Sunday. I was soon employed at the office desk, and there had to produce plans for the training in "Weltanschauliche Schulung" which, because I was a lawyer, I based mainly on old Germanic law and similar subjects. Through legal colleagues I was transferred to the Government presidency at Frankfurt/Main as "Referendar" for training in the administration. There, as well as the administrative police training, I was given State police training. Here I made the acquaintance in 1935 of an inspecting senior SS-Fuehrer from Berlin, who requested that I should be sent to Berlin to the Reichs Minister for Justice for a time, to write a state legal work on "Reichsreform". This order pleased me because the work interested me, and as legal Referendar I was relieved of all material difficulties. Further it was intended that I should enter the legal practice of a friend of my father's. For this purpose I left Berlin in 1936 and put in 6 months intensive work at the Supreme Court at Dusseldorf, then 2 months in the legal practice of my father's friend. I represented him there and passed my Assistant-Judges examination with distinction. After long discussion with my father's friend I decided to go for another year to Berlin, he himself agreeing to keep a partnership in his lawyer's practice open for the present. At that time everything pointed to the "Rechtsanwalt" disappearing altogether, for legal reform was tending so acutely towards nationalisation, that this branch of the profession was almost generally discredited as being "liberal".

In Berlin I worked during 1937 on the question of "Reichsreform" again, and on the legal questions of the supply and the career of the SS in relation to the Civil Service laws, to the Armed Forces, etc. In

1938 I worked on question of international law, legal questions concerning Sudetenland, Danzig, Austria and at the same time I was occupied with mobilizing an entire Reich Administration.

At the beginning of 1939 I was appointed Chief of Counter-espionage. This department of the State police, formed from the old Landespolizei, could only be occupied by an experienced lawyer, as the punishment laws were most complicated, and legal simplification and a continuous collaboration with Reichs Court, - Supreme Reichs Court - was necessary. I was occupied with this until 1941.

As I had been taken on in 1937 as "Regierungsassessor" in the Ministry of the Interior, I was, as a civil servant, promoted to the rank of "Oberregierungsrat". It is interesting to note that I was paid as a Civil Servant and the held the S-rank as a purely honorary title. On my promotion to "Ministerialdirigent" at the end of 1944 Himmler, against my express wish, on the suggestion of Kaltenbrunner, appointed me Major General of the Police. I had occasion to inform Himmler in several reports, that I was not in agreement with my adopting Police work as a profession, I had not been trained for it, and I requested my transfer back to the Ministry of the Interior as "Oberregierungsrat" or "Ministerialdirigent". Himmler was unsympathetic to my continuous pressure on this question, but one day stated that he wished to compensate me, that he had appointed me Major General of the Waffen-SS, that is with a definite Armed Forces rank. So on 30.1.1945 I was appointed Major General of the Waffen-SS and paid accordingly.

In 1939 I had attempted to obtain leave from the Ministry of the Interior and the SS-Service, and to obtain an officer's commission at the front, as I wished to practice as a lawyer at the end of the war. I could not carry out this plan, as Himmler forbid it. He believed that he could compensate me by doing me the favour of sending me as a liaison officer to the OKW for 2 months.

During this entire time I studied the results of our foreign policy and all questions connected with it. My specialized knowledge gave me new ideas on the European economic situation, and I again came into contact with leading German economic experts. From working with these, I realised that there were problems of economic espionage in Germany and its prevention which so far had not been solved, and saw above all the great importance of economics in the life of the State. This persuaded me more and more to occupy myself with the question of the basic principles on which German foreign policy, and particularly German foreign commercial policy, were to be carried out. In this one thing stood out more and more clearly: Germany and many authoritative Germans were beginning to form a completely false impression of the entire outside world, that is, they neither had an instinctive nor an acquired understanding for foreign countries. There was no breadth of political experience. There was, perhaps, enough, where the German people had penetrated, but not elsewhere, even in the nearer European areas.

These thoughts drove me, as if by an inner force, to go whole-heartedly into the question of forming a Central Information office for foreign countries. There was no such central office for the political and political-economic sections in Germany. The military information service was narrowly confined to military matters. In 1941 I was at last able to devote my whole attention to this question and I worked on it until the end of the war, although in 1944 the military section was given to me as well.

The results of this work confirmed me in my convictions, and I recognised more and more clearly the mistakes and faults of the Regime, which I had seen earlier on. Apart from many local defects of

incompetent officials the crux of the matter was the absence of the principle of selection, the fact that ability was no criterion and that important positions were given to stupid or unworthy men. If there was anything approaching selection of the individual, it was to be found among the good elements of the SS. In Himmler I saw a man, much discussed, but about whose alleged brutality I was never able to decide completely. I never got to the bottom of that matter during all those years. Perhaps my work was too difficult, for it held me prisoner and diverted me from other problems. He was the only man I could see in the whole corrupt Government "set-up", who could with any success have stood as a factor for order against the many "Tin-gods" (Paspa's), large and small, of the Regime.

My conviction was, that if I could convey generally to the organisation and its head a knowledge of the formative political forces of the world, that is a knowledge of foreign countries, there was a chance to protect Germany from the yawning abyss, which I had seen coming since the end of 1940 onwards.

The task itself had two main objectives:-

First to put the task as such into effect, at the same time to use the results to provide Germany with an antidote to the obstructive Fuehrer - Ribbentrop policy. The Reichsfuehrer was the only real counter that one could use at all for this purpose. It was up to me to work to this end and to inform him as completely as possible of the true disposition and distribution of world potential and I considered him to be sensible and clever enough to be able still to reach a compromise with the outside world.

It was along and tiring road that I had to travel, a road presumably predestined, and in the end without result. It was not lack of will and industry, but stupidity, vanity and brutality on the one hand (my enemies inside the RSHA) and the indecision of the Reichsfuehrer himself on the other, which ruined all these plans. This refers to the practical application of the results, i.e. the formation of a sensible and progressive foreign policy. The main task itself, with its manifold difficulties, was obstructed by the very nature of the German character. Either, because it was not understood, or worse still, because it was believed unnecessary - thus Ribbentrop.

The Fuehrer would have nothing to do with me and my work. The only person who more or less understood me was Himmler, although he too, with his National-Socialist prejudices and policeman's way of looking at political events made things difficult for me. With him, in the course of time, things took a turn for the better and he gradually began to understand me better. Unfortunately the results were never such as were absolutely necessary, since his hesitancy always spoilt everything. For me personally it was often a struggle, in which I had to play Don Quixote, while "Riesinante" was the weak humanity, and the "Windmill Sails" were the above mentioned prejudices of the Regime and the German character itself. That I did not give up this struggle, one must understand, was because I love my country, and was determined to guide thing into the right path. I believed that the easiest way to achieve my plan, was through the only man who was capable of offsetting Hitler.

Already in 1940 I counselled peace with France, in 1941 I warned against a war on two-fronts and saw the danger threatening in Russia. At the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 my report on Russia lead to Hitler, and later Himmler, wanting the instigation of Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner to imprison me and my associates in a concentration camp for defeatism. In 1943 I managed to save Switzerland from being invaded by Germany, thanks to my adept dealing with General Guisan. In the same year I attempted through von Papen in Turkey and several Turkish contacts,

to solve the Ukrainian and Crimean-Tatar questions; via Spain Portugal and Sweden I had contact with individual personalities in England and America and tried even at this time to persuade Himmler to compromise.

The position in Rumania and Bulgaria and the turn of events there were so devastating for me that, in view of the incomprehensible stubbornness of Ribbentrop, Hitler and all the others who had to do with those questions, I thought seriously of giving up my efforts.

All the same I worked on, for as I said at the beginning of 1944 in a conversation with Gottfried von Bismarck: "One must do everything to try using the strongest man of the Opposition (inner Opposition) to prevent the coming chaos while there is still time".

Gottfried von Bismarck, whose life I had an opportunity of saving at the beginning of 1945 by interceding with Himmler, was ostensibly concerned in the 20th July. The accusation demanded the death penalty. Himmler wished at first to enforce it. I managed to persuade him not to, by using the argument of my Swedish friends, with whom von Bismarck had good connections: "The death of the living descendant of the great Bismarck will have as bad an effect in England against Germany as the 'V'-weapons". Himmler was very impressed with the importance that was placed abroad on von Bismarck, and obviously discussed the matter thoroughly with Hitler. Von Bismarck was, as I know from Kaltenbrunner, unexpectedly acquitted. My talks with Himmler resulted not only in his being not transferred to another prison, but in being merely confined to his estate. I also gave advice on this matter to the Bismarck family via a Swedish connection. I do not wish to mention my role in the 20th July attempt in these diary sketches.

One thing I did achieve in the course of this year and that was to give myself such a position with Himmler, that I could always be sure that I myself and my work would always be judged by "non-party political" standards. Added to which Himmler had a personal liking for me. This was first evident in 1940 when in spite of great obstacles he allowed my marriage to my wife, who was of pure Polish descent on her Mother's side. In all, the higher "standard", cost daily battles, each day brought new difficulties, but I had the advantage of being able to work in Germany itself on a broader "national" basis. The result of this was, that I came up against the State police and the Security Police more and more, as under the cloak of my foreign activities I silently protected many "Untrustworthies" (Unzuverlaessiger) and so-called "shady individuals" (Schraeger Voegel) - in themselves good Germans, who know my honest wish and who helped me in spite of all political difficulties.

The more critical the whole military and political situation, the more difficult was my own personal situation. Slanders, serious insinuations and the resulting surveillance made this life of uncertainty often unbearable. My only protection, of person or position, was the increasing trust I found in Himmler's eyes, which proved so powerful as to prevail against the strong attacks of Bormann or Kaltenbrunner. The latter announced about 1½ years ago that he had sufficient proof in his possession to prove that I worked for the Secret Service. Or, as in March 1945, that immediate measures must be taken against me, as I had taken my wife and children to Lake Constance and that they were on the point of fleeing to Switzerland.

This gives a small idea of the atmosphere when at the beginning of February the report came from Envoy Thomsen, Stockholm, that Count Bernadotte was intending to come to Berlin to talk to Himmler. The personal representative of Ribbentrop, Geheimrat Wagner, came to me twice on behalf of his Minister on the day the report arrived, to ask me, if I, with my personal contacts in Sweden was behind this plan.

Ribbentrop and Kaltenbrunner saw in me the motivating, and therefore responsible force behind the pardoning and freeing of the so-called seven Warsaw Swedes, and both attempted to make out mostly through the Swedish Press, that my active participation was a sign of political stupidity in Sweden. The Fuchrer was encouraged in his antipathy towards Sweden by everyone, and above all by the reports on the training of Norwegian police in Sweden which were shown to him.

The freeing of the seven Warsaw Swedes lasted in all over a period of almost 3 years. I worked out this case in detail in closest contact with Herr Kersten, Generaldirektor Moeller and Brandin. It was then possible after much effort and domestic quarrelling, to have them first pardoned, then, in time evacuated from Berlin and given better accomodation and food, and finally to have them freed.

How much effort and trouble, and I must add personal danger I thus directly involved myself in must be kept for a more detailed account. It should not remain unmentioned that here too a lucky chance gave me decisive help. In the same Corps - Students Corps - (Studentenvereinigung) of which I was an active member - was Reichsjustizminister Dr. Thierack. Unlike myself, he had withdrawn from the Corps for party political reasons. In spite of, or perhaps because of this, he was slightly embarrassed with me, as I believe in his inmost self he still clung to the student corps tradition. This fact was of inestimable value in my personal discussions with him on the question of their evacuation and accomodation and the presentation of my case to Ribbentrop and Hitler, because had he used all his means to work against me, it would have been almost impossible for Himmler, with the existing difficulties vis a vis Ribbentrop and Kaltenbrunner, and also the adverse attitude of Hitler, to bring this matter to a successful conclusion. It is important to mention at this point the motive for the decisive, final step Himmler took with Hitler. All my attempts to exert influence in the matter so far had only prepared the ground, I now submitted a report to the effect that as well as commerce having been suspended between Germany and Sweden, I felt convinced from my secret service information, that Sweden was playing with the idea of entering the war against Germany at the end. A favourable treatment of the case must have a favourable effect on Swedish circles interested in Germany, that is, ensuring the non-entry of Sweden into the war. That was Himmler's true motive, without which the humanitarian step could scarcely have been taken.

At the same time I should like to mention, that I do not wish here to make any explanation of the individual actions, which I myself have carried out, either in connection with the freeing and pardoning of the seven Warsaw Swedes, or the Norwegian students, or the individual cases which were transmitted to me on Swedish recommendation - WALLENBERG, BRANDIN, KERSTEN, etc.

I explained to Geheimrat WAGNER with truth, that I know nothing of the proposed journey of Count BERNADOTTE. I informed KALTENBRUNNER and HIMMLER of my talk. HIMMLER found the occurrence very interesting, but was all the same somewhat angry that it had occurred via the Legation and therefore through the Foreign Office, as he was thereby forced to treat the visit officially and to report to HITLER. He therefore ordered KALTENBRUNNER, at the time HIMMLER himself was commanding Heeresgruppe WEICHERL and was with his Staff in PRENZLAU, to take a suitable opportunity of talking to HITLER and to bring his attitude into a more sensible and practical form. I admit that I pretended that the visit of Count BERNADOTTE was politically somewhat more interesting than I confessed to myself, in order to keep inside watch on these political events in the interests of HIMMLER whose attention was diverted by military claims. KALTENBRUNNER, who at this time was present every midday at a long discussion of the military situation at the Chancellery and often following

this was closeted alone with the Fuehrer, probably in order not to receive a refusal personally, requested Gruppenfuehrer FEGELIN to ask HITLER. FEGELIN announced the next day HITLER's refusal and explained this with HITLER's words: "One can do nothing in this war with such silly fools."

In the meantime Count Bernadotte had however already arrived in Berlin. I thereupon spoke personally to Himmler by telephone and begged him earnestly not to disregard this gesture of Sweden, he must receive the Count. I emphasized at the same time, that I could well imagine that apart from all technical questions, only one or another aspect could prove politically interesting. After much humming and ha-ing he agreed to the following alternative proposal: Kaltenbrunner should speak to Ribbentrop, at the same time I should talk to Ribbentrop's personal representative, Geheimrat Wagner, both with the object, that Ribbentrop should receive Count Bernadotte without Hitler's knowing of it in advance, and without mentioning the refusal that Hitler had already given to the visit. If Ribbentrop agreed to receive him, then Kaltenbrunner and I could receive the Count afterwards, thus Himmler would have gained time, and thus one could see how the matter would work itself out further.

The actual course taken by this first visit was that Count Bernadotte, who got in touch with me from the Swedish Legation, was bidden first to Kaltenbrunner and myself, and then, on the same morning went straight from us to Ribbentrop.

At this first discussion, at which I kept myself very much in the background, I felt immediately in sympathy with the Count and was able on two decisive points to guide the discussion along the lines which the Count wanted it to take. I gave the Count to understand my honest opinion regarding Sweden and it was decisive for myself and my plan, namely under all circumstances to bring Count Bernadotte to Himmler, that the Count intimated to Kaltenbrunner at the end of his discussion, that he wished to be allowed to speak to Himmler himself, as he had something to say to him alone. I personally saw in Count Bernadotte's visit a possibility of putting into effect my original idea of getting Germany out of the war, and regarded this connection with Sweden, from this standpoint, as a particularly happy one, since politically Sweden must be particularly interested in the peace of the North ern area. In requesting this the Count brought his line of interests into harmony with my original endeavours to support Denmark and Norway. These interests if rightly used by Germany, would prove a profitable partnership for both Sweden and Germany, if Sweden acted as intermediary for a compromise peace. There was also the humanitarian side which had always moved me deeply, and about which I felt something absolutely had to be done. In order to circumvent Hitler's negative attitude, I had to take a chance and try to get the slow-thinking Kaltenbrunner over to my side despite all his personal antagonism towards me and to counter Himmler's equally negative attitude, which was due to his occupation with the military situation.

Immediately Count Bernadotte had left the house, I took the following steps: I praised Kaltenbrunner for the splendid way in which he had conducted the discussion with Count Bernadotte, for the subtlety with which he had cleverly adapted himself to all the Count's questions, and how he had really given a good example of Austrian ball-room diplomacy. I took this opportunity to tell him what I had long wished to say to him, and what I intended to say to Himmler, whom I next talked to him, that in this critical situation Ribbentrop must be removed and Kaltenbrunner made Foreign Minister. Kaltenbrunner swallowed the bait so greedily that I thought he would take line and rod as well. In the telephone conversation which followed he was the most ardent of champions of the necessity of a meeting between Count Bernadotte and Himmler despite the Fuehrer's having forbidden it. Himmler declared himself ready to meet Bernadotte, but Kaltenbrunner was excluded from the meeting itself, which so embittered and so to speak sobered him, that in

a short time we were once more at daggers drawn. The meeting between the Count and Himmler took place two days later at Hohenlychen.

On the journey there I spoke openly to the Count of how I personally viewed the political situation, and in particular of my attitude towards Sweden. We were soon on such good terms that I was even able to give Count Bernadotte some tips about the coming interview, in regard to the idiosyncracies and peculiarities of Himmler. I knew that the Count's original plan to take the Danish and Norwegian prisoners for the duration of the war to Sweden and to intern them there, could not succeed and advised him to start with the compromise suggestion of a central camp for the prisoners in northwest Germany. Himmler, with whom I had an opportunity of speaking immediately after his discussion with the Count, was very favourably impressed by their conversation. He requested me to keep in close contact with the Count, and to keep an eye on the actual execution of the scheme which, as he himself knew, would meet with difficulties from Kaltenbrunner and Mueller and, in some circumstances, also from Ribbentrop, and to help when I could. I was to inform the Reichs Foreign Minister immediately of the essential content of the discussion and to acquaint him with the decisions reached, so that Ribbentrop could give the official working on the matter to the Count, and so cover Himmler with Hitler.

I next informed Kaltenbrunner of the positive results of the conversation, and he immediately began to reproach me for influencing Himmler far too strongly in favour of Count Bernadotte and the fulfillment of his wishes. He immediately drew Gruppenfuehrer Mueller into the discussion, who on several points brought up the supposedly insuperable difficulties entailed in the practical carrying-out of the matter, and finally announced his opinion: "This entire matter is utopian, because I am not in a position to provide lorries and petrol to drive these widely scattered Danish and Norwegian prisoners about. Nothing can be done regarding camp Neuengamme as the camp is completely overcrowded. It is always the same when so-called politicians spin their tales to Himmler." I repudiated the objection regarding the lorries and petrol, explaining that Sweden could provide these. Owing to the stiffness of my suggestion Mueller agreed, without fully considering the implications. I stated further, that the Reichs Foreign Minister, who also wished to receive Count Bernadotte, should be informed of this point, so that Ribbentrop could, so to speak, put it to the Count as a German suggestion to help in putting the plan through. I also telephoned immediately to Standartenfuehrer Dr. Brandt, so that Himmler should know of the extension of the plan. On the next day Mueller again began to remonstrate with Kaltenbrunner about the idea, saying that the Germans, and above all the countless columns of refugees could not be expected to have to watch Swedish Red Cross omnibuses driving past them with prisoners. The situation once again grew critical and the whole plan was endangered, since Himmler considered this objection very important. I removed it by suggesting that the transports should only be allowed to travel by night and declared myself ready to provide the personnel to ensure the observance of this agreement from my own department.

This introduction of personnel loyal to me directly influenced the fate of many, for the fact of their working in the many camps, from which the Swedish Red Cross was transporting Danish, Norwegian, Polish and Jewish prisoners, introduced so much uncertainty in the issuing of orders, that the camp commandants when pressed by them, were prevented from carrying out the "orders of the Reichsfuehrer". Many instructions therefore which, as it turned out, were issued by Kaltenbrunner and other offices and which were definitely not orders of the Reichsfuehrer, were never acted upon. The problem of overcrowding in Neuengamme camp, or getting the transports through, of the Swedish Red Cross's right to visit the camps, of issuing visas to individuals to whose exit journey Himmler had agreed and also to collective transport; all called for a

considerable amount of tact and work to overcome the refractoriness and offensiveness of the unwilling police officials. These things will be reported separately in the appendix. (By my partner 'Goring!')

It may suffice at this point, if I refer to my, so to speak, best witness in this whole matter, Count Bernadotte himself. He knows how much resistance, almost chicanery, it cost to solve the humanitarian questions involved and thus to free Germany and perhaps, thereby Europe from this war.

At that time, too, I had a serious conversation with Himmler - as I had so often. It was after a military conference of his Generals at Army Group Vistula that I put to him the approaching break-up of the Reich as an almost inevitable event, and I implored him at least to use the hand of Sweden, by acting on his own, to convoy the German wreck into the harbour of peace, before it capsized. I suggested to him he might ask Count Bernadotte to fly to General Eisenhower to convey an offer of capitulation from Himmler. After a very excited discussion, in which I also made it clear to Himmler, that I considered his place to be in Berlin and not as the C. in C. of an Army Group, to which Hitler's entourage had appointed him for the second time in order to keep him away from Hitler. I made him the definite suggestion, that he should return as quickly as possible to Berlin, and there set about making preparations for a peace on his own, with or without the use of violence. Himmler gave in to my insistence and gave me that night the fullest powers to talk to the Count. The next day he rang me up and began to take back everything, obviously being influenced by the "Ecsse" action in Stockholm, and merely permitted me to keep in good touch with the Count and to get him, circumstances permitting, to fly to General Eisenhower on his own initiative. From then on, it was the beginning of March, there began a daily exchange of telephonic conversations between Himmler and myself. Neither Kaltenbrunner nor Himmler's entourage took much notice of this. It was a fight, in which I fought like a Devil fighting for a soul.

I had given Count Bernadotte a comparatively wide insight into this silent quarrel. After long discussions we agreed, that as soon as Himmler finally brought himself to act, I should get into touch with him immediately. Even then it was my intention to fly with him myself to General Eisenhower. Unfortunately I was unable to bring Himmler to make a decisive move. My arrangements with Count Bernadotte went so far, that were the Reich area to be split, as was possible, and Himmler, circumstances permitting, to fly to the South with me, I should still be able to get to the Count via the Swedish Legation in Switzerland.

Count Bernadotte went twice more with me to Himmler. Once it was exclusively on Swedish Red Cross business. The last visit will be dealt with later. It is of interest to remember that during the second visit there was a long discussion on the King of Belgium and his family and his place of residence, and that at the urgent request of the Count on 4/5 I again brought up the matter, with the result that Kaltenbrunner in the Southern area was ordered to take King Leopold without delay to the Swiss frontier and hand him over to the Swiss authorities. Kaltenbrunner appeared not to comply with this order, that is, I could not then check up on the outcome, because I was constantly shifting about.

Amongst other things about his conversation with the Reichs Foreign Minister Ribbentrop the Count told me, that he had seldom been able to get a word in. Ribbentrop had stated his opinion of the political situation and said that, if the Western Powers were to have no consideration for her, Germany would just become bolshevistic. Ribbentrop had amongst other things, made the interesting statement that he, Ribbentrop, had started to try to get into conversation with the Western Powers through his own private channels in Stockholm. That he should say this to him seemed

very strange to the Count. I must have sounded, in my opinion, like an insult, especially as it afterwards came out, that it was a question of the "Hesse" action.

It will give a particularly good picture of the fight I had been making for the last years and weeks, if I attempt to sketch the efforts I made despite all previous vain attempts to bring about some solution of the Jewish question in Germany - that is to save, so to speak, at the last minute those Jews still alive in Germany.

1. Already in 1943 I had both used and helped Herr Medizinalrat Kersten, Himmler's personal doctor, in many humanitarian questions. We had early discussed the possibilities of achieving a humanitarian solution of the Jewish question in Germany. His relations with Himmler were entirely personal, which was most useful in influencing him to pass our humanitarian projects. After he was going to Sweden and was only temporarily in Germany, I did not let my personal connection with him be broken off, so as not to lose this means of influencing Himmler.

2. At the end of October 1944 I arranged a meeting between Herr Altbundespräsident Musy and his son and Himmler. I took Herr Altbundespräsident Musy to see Himmler at Vienna, where he was conducting business in the southeast. During the journey from Berlin to Vienna via Breslau, as on the previous evening, I had an opportunity to discuss thoroughly with him the principles of the Jewish question in Germany. I told him that I had had no part in the events of the last few years and had no direct influence at all. He could not, therefore, expect any concrete help from me, such as their release from imprisonment, etc.

Herr Altbundespräsident Musy was obviously aware of my attitude to the Jewish question. He fully understood my position and appreciated my silent efforts to do good in individual cases. I have been the protector of many Jewish families, of many partial Jews and of mixed couples. The Cassel family and Major a.D. Schmidt are examples. He knew my every imprudence endangered not only my own life, but what was more important to me, my wife and children. He was astounded to learn that he was better acquainted with many things than I, and the insight I then gave him into the structure of the State - and Administration showed him how deliberately the "System" isolated the individual and his work, the realisation of which only came to one slowly, since the Regime - System - State and Party were each played off against the other. He realised, too, that though I had obviously remained "Trustworthy" as far as the State was concerned, I had latterly become "Untrustworthy" in the eyes of the Party hierarchy.

It was, as one can see, my strength, as well as my weakness, that I had never possessed enough power against Kaltenbrunner and his friends.

In his first conversation with Himmler, Herr Altbundespräsident Musy discussed the question of a final settlement of the Jewish problem and urged Himmler at great length to free at least the Jews still imprisoned in Germany. The possibility was also discussed, that if such a settlement was carried through, Germany should receive tractors, lorries and in certain circumstances foreign exchange, for a definite number of Jews. Himmler had obviously determined on having this as a result of previous undertakings, of which I had no idea - Manfred Weiss-Konzern, the activities of Standartenführer Bucher with Sali Meyer etc. I made no secret of the fact that in my opinion this was a completely impossible attitude of Himmler's. Herr Altbundespräsident

Musy did not oppose it, so as not to destroy the basis for further discussion. Here, too, I studied Himmler. In his tactics he was as changeable as a chameleon and one had to watch him carefully in order to be able to get on with him at all. As I had only discussed questions of foreign policy with him for years, I had not come up against this before. I noticed that even in 1944 he obviously did not consider the solution of the Jewish question as a matter of foreign policy, but more as a question of internal politics in relation to the Party clique on one side and to the Fuehrer on the other. There was no doubt, for so I felt, that he wished to free himself from the chains of the party, but he had not the courage to take any decisive step. I think that he considered the solution I proposed to be the moral one, but considerations of internal politics made him bring up the question of a quid pro quo, often in an ugly way. I explained the internal problems involved to Herr Altbundespraesident Musy, as well as I understood them.

The question of an agreement between the American and Swiss Governments, whereby Switzerland was to be declared a Transit State. Generally speaking this was just a preparatory discussion, although questions of principle were touched on. Nothing was definitely fixed, as Herr Altbundespraesident Musy wished first to settle its wider implications with the Jewish organisation. On parting, I left Herr Altbundespraesident Musy in no doubt, that I, personally, would do everything to see that the solution of the problem was in no circumstances made dependent on material gain. The only thing possible to ask for in this connection, would be certain political agreements. Herr Altbundespraesident Musy agreed with my standpoint.

Himmler requested me to maintain contact with Herr Altbundespraesident Musy and to assist him with the competent State police offices in the freeing of individual Jews and Frenchmen which had been agreed to. I next got into touch with Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo, and requested permission to be allowed to concern myself personally with these prisoners. Mueller refused this, on the grounds that I was not a member of the Gestapo and could not therefore be allowed insight into internal service procedure. He referred me to the competent officers in the individual state police offices and merely allowed me to get in touch with these. In this way I managed to trace the prisoners and to obtain for some better accommodation and food, the right to receive parcels from abroad, and for others civilian clothes, accommodation in hotels and their despatch abroad - Alain Thorel, Brueder Rottenberg, Familie Donnobauer, Familie Rosenberg, Dr. Stiansny, Helene Stein - This entailed endless finicky dealings with the offices of the State Police.

During the second conversation on 12/1/1945 at Wildbad/Schwarzwald between Himmler and Herr Altbundespraesident Musy the following decisions were arrived at, thanks to my active intervention:

1. Every fortnight 1 train with about 1200 Jews would leave for Switzerland, travel conditions, food etc to be as good as possible.
2. That the Jewish organisations, with which Herr Altbundespraesident Musy worked, should actively support the settlement of the Jewish problem permitted by Himmler, with the object of initiating a fundamental change in world anti-German propaganda.
3. At my suggestion it was agreed that there should no longer be any monetary payment made, but that a definite sum per train should be transferred to and held in trust by, Herr Altbundespraesident Musy, of which we should later have free use. Himmler started by speaking of using this money for tractors, cars, medical supplies or similar things, but let me persuade him that this money must be handed over to the International Red Cross.

The despatch of the first train went through at the beginning of February and worked splendidly. Herr Altbundespraesident Musy produced the publicity that had been agreed upon - for example the statement by President von Steiger of Bern, and the New York Times' article of 8/2 etc. and also the proof that 5,000 Swiss francs had been deposited with him as trustee - end of February 1945 -

On this last point I informed Herr Altbundespraesident Musy both at the end of February and again in the middle of March that it had been decided on Himmler's authority that this sum and those to come at the end of the undertaking should be given to the International Red Cross.

I also informed Herr Kersten of this decision, whose help I had enlisted in influencing Himmler towards a solution of the Jewish problem, when he was there in March. Unfortunately Kaltenbrunner got Hitler to stop any further transport of trains to Switzerland. Hitler forbade any German, under threat of death, to help not only one Jew more, but interestingly enough also any American or English P.O.W. to cross the frontier. Each attempt was to be reported to him personally.

Hitler was shown a de-cyphered report from a de Gaulle agency in Spain in which it was asserted, that Himmler, through his deputy Schellenberg, had made a deal with Herr Altbundespraesident Musy to obtain right of asylum for 250 "Nazi-leaders" in Switzerland. This obvious lie all the same made Hitler issue the above order, and it had unpleasant results for me personally. Altbundespraesident Musy was extremely distressed that his undertaking had been stopped and in my presence shed tears of anger and of bitter disappointment. During his last visit to Berlin we decided together to make one final effort. I suggested to Himmler, he should ask the Western Powers for a 4-day truce on land and in the air, in order to use this time to conduct all Jews and other foreign prisoners in an orderly manner through the front lines, and thus show Germany's "good will". I brought the head of the P.O.W.'s administration, Obergruppenfuhrer Berger, in to this project. Berger had always laid great store by my opinion and as a result of my advice and his not passing on many of Hitler's orders, had saved the lives of thousands. Altbundespraesident Musy and I thought that if such a 4-day truce was agreed to, as was to be expected, we would approach the Allies with the offer not through the Press etc., but seriously through official channels, which, in certain circumstances, might lead beyond the rescue of these people to discussion of a compromise, which would be to everybody's benefit. Himmler did not have the courage to discuss this matter with Hitler. Personally obviously agreeing with the plan, he consulted the chief of the "Camerilla" which surrounded Hitler, Kaltenbrunner, who then indicated his refusal by saying to me: "Have you also become an idiot". That was on 3/4/1945.

Herr Altbundespraesident and I were agreed that there was only one thing left to be done, to persuade Himmler to give strict orders in view of the rapidly deteriorating military situation, that no further concentration camps, which could expect to be overrun, should be evacuated. Himmler gave in after a long discussion. In this I had the support of Herr Kersten, who by urging of Himmler from the Stockholm end, that the camps should not be evacuated, did much to obtain his agreement.

On 7/4 I was able to inform Herr Altbundespraesident that it had been decided to do this, and that it was Himmler's express request that it should be transmitted without delay to General Eisenhower. Altbundespraesident MUSY, in spite of being over 70, started off by car the same night, and informed me three days later, that Washington had received the report and reacted favourably. Altbundespraesident Musy immediately sent the car back from Switzerland with his son to collect some Jews, promised him by Himmler himself, from Buchenwald. (Bernard Beaber,

Bernheim de Villiers) Musy junior reported to the Commandant and was badly received, and as he saw the approaching evacuation of the camp, came to me in Berlin on 10/4 thoroughly disgusted.

I had really believed that Himmler's original order would be carried out whatever happened. After Musy's disclosure I went into the whole question, although I myself had absolutely nothing to do with these police matters. I found out that Himmler, as a result of countless intrigues, once again was completely discredited with Hitler, and that orders had been given through Kaltenbrunner to evacuate all camps again. So far the state of affairs was plain. Now I was still uncertain, how matters stood in regard to the P.O.W. camps. I cleared this up with Berger, who, in contrast to Kaltenbrunner, had not passed on the order for the fresh evacuation of P.O.W. camps. I complained of the whole situation in a blitz-telephone call to Himmler, who was obviously very disconcerted by the extent to which orders were by-passing him, and he promised me to act. An hour later I spoke to Dr. Brandt on this question, and he assured me that Himmler was doing everything possible, to ensure that his promise that the camps should not be evacuated, was kept. It was thanks to Himmler's energetic intervention throughout this period, as I may well say at this point, that we at least succeeded in getting favourable orders issued and in preventing the worst effects of Kaltenbrunner's and others contrary orders, thus effectively saving the lives of countless people. Himmler was particularly grateful to me for this, when Herr Korsten came to visit him with Herr Masur, a representative of Herr Storch of Stockholm, who had the authorisation of the Jewish world congress to discuss matters with Himmler, as otherwise he, Himmler, would not have been able to talk to them at all.

Since we had not so often Altbundespraesident Musy and I were on intimate terms. We understood each other well. He told me much out of his rich political experience, while I took the opportunity in return, of explaining to him the burdensome career I had in my position. His great understanding made it easy for me to confide in him all the difficulties of the situation, in the hope that, together, we might avoid as many of them as possible. He once made the suggestion that whatever happened Harriot should be freed, a gesture which would do a real service to France, while it would show that I had the political situation at my fingertips. Altbundespraesident Musy was prepared to intervene in London, so important did he consider the question. I discussed the matter with Himmler, who sharply turned it down, obviously after taking Kaltenbrunner's advice.

All this time various other Swiss friends were continuously requesting that the former Minister, Rinaud, be freed, but nothing came of it, because of Kaltenbrunner's opposition. I tried at least to have the relatives of General Giraud sent to one of my Swiss friends, who could pass them on their way, but all various attempts to do so failed. It required altogether six weeks of systematic pressure on Himmler to get him to give me permission to free them, against the wishes of Kaltenbrunner and Mueller. I had many difficulties to overcome in getting their release made fittingly - patrol cars, etc. - My collaborator, Eggen, helped me considerably in this matter, and also personally saw them set across into Switzerland. General Giraud sent me a personal letter of thanks, but unfortunately this is no longer in my possession.

To round off the complete picture, the following still remains to be mentioned.

Through several Swiss friends I was in contact with the President of the International Red Cross, Professor Dr. Burkhardt. He, also, was obviously striving to make Germany adopt a generous attitude on

the question of political prisoners, particularly those of French and Polish nationality, as well as on the Jewish question. He told a certain German friend of his in mid-March, that he considered it would be a good thing, if he could meet Himmler once. I worked on Himmler for several days to get him to write to Prof. Burkhardt and suggest a date for meeting. Himmler kept putting off giving a definite decision, then discussed it with Kaltenbrunner and got him to ask Hitler, if he - Himmler - might meet Prof. Burkhardt. Hitler refused this categorically. For tactical reasons I suggested to Himmler that he should authorize Kaltenbrunner or myself to act, Himmler decided on Kaltenbrunner, in order thus to cover himself with Hitler. Kaltenbrunner informed me of this decision and instructed me to prepare a letter to be sent to President Burkhardt. This I did. Kaltenbrunner covered himself, on Himmler's orders, by informing Ribbentrop. Kaltenbrunner's and Himmler's plan was that, if the meeting should become public knowledge through the press, they could tell Hitler, that it was Ribbentrop who was responsible for the visit. President Burkhardt reacted favourably to the letter. A discussion was held between President Burkhardt and Kaltenbrunner, for which I prepared all the material from the German side. President Burkhardt was obviously very pleased with the outcome of the conversation as it meant for him the beginning of the International Red Cross's at last taking a decisive hand in the many pending questions concerning political prisoners, as well as P.S.O.W. He confirmed the conversation in a long letter and made concrete suggestions on the procedure to be adopted, according to category and urgency, in the exchange of prisoners of all nations. When shown this letter, Kaltenbrunner declared that it was far too concretely formulated. It was a particularly skillful, legally drawn-up letter, whose individual proposals he could not fulfill at all. He declared himself only prepared, in order to save appearances, to allow the International Red Cross, with Himmler's permission, to take a large number of French women from Ravensbrueck. Kaltenbrunner kept me in general from having anything to do with putting this through, in order to prevent me continually pressing for an answer to Burkhardt's letter. I again drew Himmler's attention to this matter, and pointed out how Professor Burkhardt must lose confidence in us if his letter were not replied to, and delaying tactics used etc. Himmler could not be moved to take the matter energetically in hand. I could only job my friends in Switzerland off with what news I had, as from then on any further means of contact was closed to me. Thus this attempt, too, to solve these humanitarian problems on this basis, was destroyed.

One final important point that needs to be stressed is that of my work together with Count Bernadotte, particularly on the Jewish question. Notwithstanding that the Count's mission was in connection with the Danish and Norwegian question, a very delicate one, the Count had intervened in the Jewish question during his conversations, and had drawn attention to the importance of improving the situation of the Jewish inmates of the camp. Count Bernadotte had skillfully managed to get the Danish Jews out. With the backing of the Count's authority I was able to insist on an alleviation of the treatment of the Jews. During his negotiations with Himmler, the Count had always emphasized, and requested, that the Jews should receive better treatment. Here, too, we tried to achieve a complete settlement. The discussion between the Count and Himmler at the end of March and the beginning of April 1945 was of particular significance. After a detailed conversation Himmler promised the Count that on the approach of the Allies the camps were not to be evacuated, and would be handed over to the latter in good order, in particular Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald and Theresienstadt, as also the camps situated in Southern Germany. This conversation brought the seesaw of controversy to an end and enabled me thereafter to point out to Himmler, that he had made a promise to the Count and this must be kept. Even if it was not

possible to save all the inmates, a large part of them were saved, which I was only able to achieve, because I was always able to fall back upon the promise given to the Count.

On 21/4 I was at last able to set in motion the release of the Jewish and other women from Ravensbruck, thanks to the last discussion between the Count and Himmler. Himmler gave me full domestic powers to act as I thought the circumstances demanded.

I took all these examples to explain to Himmler again and again the complete confusion of the situation, and warned him that for his hesitant attitude and obvious blindness he would one day be held responsible before history for having endangered the whole biological substance of the German people. In our many discussions he always countered this by saying that he had built up the Order of the SS on the principle of loyalty, and that he was not in a position to break this principle, as otherwise he would destroy his own principle. I explained in long discourses that the Order of the SS, measured against the life of a nation was only a small scotch, and that the whole German people, after its inhuman sufferings expected at last a rational act of deliverance, and in fact saw him as the man who, so far, collected no riches for himself. The answer was always the same: "So you are demanding that I should set aside the Fuehrer". There were times when the answer could not be "Yes", as otherwise I ran the risk of being set aside myself, especially as the influence of Gruppenfuhrer Fegelein, Kaltenbrunner, Obersturmbannfuhrer SKORZENY and co. was often still too powerful, particularly in view of their right of direct reference to Hitler - Frau Fegelein is the sister of Eva Braun, Hitler's friend. Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny were friends of both women.

Himmler often spoke during these conversations of Hitler's deteriorating health. To my retort, how was it then, that he still had so much influence; Himmler replied, that his energy was undiminished; the completely unnatural life he lead, turning night into day and sleeping at most 3 - 4 hours, his continuous activity and constant outbursts of fury, completely exhausted his entourage and created an unbearable atmosphere. I often suggested that perhaps the attempt of July 20th had, after all, injured Hitler's health, particularly his head. Himmler thought this possible. He mentioned, above all, the constant stoop, the pale visage and the severe trembling of his left arm and the operation on Hitler's ear which took place in November, obviously as the result of the concussion of the brain he had received. He spent eight days in bed in November.

As a result of this, I spoke at the beginning of April to my friend the Director of the Physch. Dept. of th Charite, Prof. de Crinis. I brought up the matter of Hitler's health, whereupon he spontaneously answered: "I am of the opinion, that Hitler's completely crippled movements, which I observed in pictures on the News, are the visible signs of Parkinson's disease." I arranged a meeting between Himmler and de Crinis. Himmler brought along Reichsgesundheitsfuhrer (Reichs Health leader) Conti to the meeting. Himmler listened to their statements, as de Crinis later informed me, with great interest and considerable understanding.

13th April 1945

Several days later, on 13/4, Himmler had me come to see him at Wustrow, where we walked in the woods and he said to me: "Schellonberg, I believe nothing more can be done with Hitler. Do you think de Crinis is right?". I answered; "Yes, It's true I have not seen Hitler for over two years, but from all I have seen of his actions recently, inclines me to think, that the last moment for you to act has now come."

I took this opportunity of pointing out to him the necessity of a radical solution of the Jewish question, as he had promised Altbundespräsident Musy in September. We mentioned Herr Kersten, and the possibility of his coming with Herr Storch to Germany in the next few days to discuss the Jewish problem with Himmler personally. As the visit had already been suggested, while Himmler was still unable to bring himself to give a definite answer, I explained to him, that both out of regard for Herr Kersten, as for the basic considerations, the date of the visit could not be put off any longer. Himmler felt how fundamental a step such a meeting with Herr Storch, later Musy, would be, how it would constitute an act, that must have frightful consequences for him during Hitler's lifetime, as well in regard to his Party colleagues, as also for the Jews. This was one of the reasons for his constant vacillation. I encouraged him in every way, to avail himself of the discussion, perhaps only because I felt that this discussion might one day be of symbolic importance. Himmler said: yes, he was prepared to do this, but if Kaltenbrunner should discover it, it would be almost impossible to carry it out, as he would then be completely dependant on Kaltenbrunner who could report it to Hitler at any time. I suggested to Himmler, that as Kaltenbrunner had already had himself sent by Hitler to the Ostmark, this should be repeated on some pretext or other and the meeting with Storch could then take place at Herr Kersten's estate.

Himmler was in great mental distress. Even openly he had been almost completely thrown over by the Fuehrer - Hitler had ordered, at Fegelein's suggestion, the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler" to take off their armbands as a humiliating punishment - He said that I was the only one besides, perhaps, standartenfuehrer Dr. Brandt, that he could completely trust. What should he do? He could not kill Hitler, could not poison him, or arrest him in the Chancellery, as the whole military machine would then come to a standstill. I explained that all this was of no importance, he had only two possibilities, either to go to Hitler and openly inform him of all that had happened during the last years and persuade him to resign. Himmler retorted, that would be completely impossible, Hitler would get into one of his rages, and shoot him out of hand. I replied: "Therefore one must protect oneself from this. You have enough high SS-leaders, who are in a position to prepare and carry out such surprise arrests, and if there's no other way, the doctors must intervene." Our walk lasted 1 1/2 hours. Himmler was unable to reach any decision, but wished to bring together Prof. de Crinis; Prof. Morell, Hitler's physician. Dr. Stumpfegger, the second Dr. - an SS-Fuehrer and Hornmann.

I asked Professor de Crinis about the result two days later, he said with disappointment, that he had discussed the symptoms of the probable Parkinson's disease particularly with Dr. Stumpfegger. Dr. Stumpfegger had not been of the same opinion, but had had to admit many of his arguments. They had agreed on certain medicines. He had then prepared in his clinic. Dr. Stumpfegger had, however, not sent for them. Dr. Stumpfegger had also wanted to get medicines, so it was quite possible that Dr. Stumpfegger would never collect the medicines from his clinic. I informed Himmler of this, who urgently begged me never to say a word about these matters.

Another thing I pointed out to Himmler was the senselessness of the Wehrwolf organisation, which would only land the German people in more suffering. This organisation would open the floodgates of crime, as every criminal would claim it was a national duty. Added to this was the irresponsible way in which these things were emphasized by Germany, it was even announced over the Deutschlandsender and the Hague-Convention was thus voluntarily renounced. I closed my speech with the words: "Criminal and stupid." Himmler was obviously

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so worried by this battle of wills with me, that after a passionate outburst, without paying any attention to what I had said, he replied, "I must consider, whether I can do anything at all to clear the matter up".

In the days following 13/4 - the date of our walk in the woods - all the things I had been watching for months and over which I had so often struggled with Himmler, began to move with breathless speed. Through a trustworthy colleague from my office - Obstlt. von Dewitz - I got in touch with Reichsfinanzminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk during the first weeks of April. We had several conversations together and agreed that the war ought to be brought to a speedy end, in order to save as much as possible of the biological substance of Germany. Since I was able to speak openly on these matters with Himmler at this time, but von Krosigk was not, as Himmler had quarrelled with earlier in the year, I brought the two together for a discussion in the afternoon of 19/4.

19th April 1945

I lunched beforehand with Himmler, Berger, Obersturmbannführer Grothmann, and Dr. Brandt. Himmler was very nervous. Berger attempted to guide the conversation round to the subject of Fegelein's failure and the general seriousness of the situation and Hitler's reaction to it. Himmler checked this and took the wind out of Berger's sails by saying, that, such and such a situation existed, he knew very well, the only important thing was how this could be altered, and obviously he, Berger, had nothing new to say about that. Berger was put out, and only managed to make disconnected general conversation. Grothmann also had a slight passage of arms with Himmler, because he pointed out, as was his duty, that the Walloon Division under Degrelle was no longer very reliable. Obergruppenführer Steiner had brought this to his notice. Himmler worked himself up over Steiner and gave various instructions, which Grothmann, rightly defending Steiner in this case, misunderstood, and the whole thing resolved itself into a lengthy discussion between them. Himmler was by then so jumpy that he ended by asking me, what he wanted to meet von Krosigk for; the meeting almost did not take place.

Reichsarbeitsminister Seldte was present, as well as Reichsfinanzminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk. Von Krosigk and Himmler talked together alone, whilst I and Seldte also withdrew to talk things over. Seldte was of the opinion, that Himmler should take over the state powers, force Hitler on his birthday to broadcast a manifesto to the German people stating that a general election would be held, a second Party formed and the People's Courts dissolved. Seldte discoursed for over two hours on this subject and then started asking me, what chances I thought a defence of the Alpine area would have. To this I answered, that I saw absolutely no hope from the military point of view, but that it was only by some last, quick political action that anything, in the circumstances, could be achieved. In the meantime the conversation between von Krosigk and Himmler had finished. I then spoke to von Krosigk, who was very pleased with his discussion with Himmler, although we both knew that it was all far too late and that there was no longer any hope of success. All the same we kept to our original plan.

We then talked of Reichspräsident von Hindenburg and several of von Krosigk's experiences with Hitler, Ribbentrop's failure, etc. Von Krosigk urged me to go on influencing Himmler to risk the decisive step with Hitler or without - Von Krosigk, I believe, wrote a letter to Himmler the next day, in which he reminded him again of their discussion, and urged him to take decisive action, as he was answerable

to the entire German people. I asked von Krosigk if he had informed the Reichsfuehrer of all the plans we had discussed. He said that he had, and had laid particular emphasis on the .

As we drove from Krosigk's home to Iphenlychen Himmler thanked me for arranging the discussion with von KROSIGK. I told Himmler, that in my opinion, von Krosigk, as I had known for a long time, was the only person in Germany he could make Foreign Minister.

Back at Iphenlychen, the military report gave a very depressing picture. I urgently counselled Himmler not to travel to Berlin the next day for Hitler's birthday. He did not, however, . . . do so. Meanwhile Himmler, in my presence, repeatedly telephoned to Fegelein at the Reichs Chancellery, on military matters, also the report came in that Herr Kersten and Herr Masur had arrived at Tempelhof airfield and had left for Hartzwalde. As Count Bernadotte was also expected in Berlin at this time, and there was danger that the two meetings would overlap with the military situation so difficult, Himmler asked me to drive to Herr Kersten that night and begin the first preliminary talks with Herr Masur and fix a meeting for him with Himmler in Hartzwalde at a time I considered suitable.

After supper, which we had all together, at Iphenlychen, and at which there was also Gebbhard, whom I completely detest as a person, as a Doctor I should not like to judge, I intentionally brought up the question of sending Berger to South Germany, in order once again to emphasize the importance of our action. I thought of Berger as a foil to Kaltenbrunner in the Southern area, as I completely mistrusted Kaltenbrunner in every respect, and did not know if even my family would be safe from him. As far as I was concerned, Berger would only be there to keep me safe. Interestingly enough, Himmler did not agree, but immediately started talking about Kaltenbrunner, whom he now tried to make out as a politically wise and far-seeing and very judicious man. From the coldness of my reaction he was able, as always, to see my attitude, however, it seemed that my obvious disagreement only made him hold forth the more about Kaltenbrunner's alleged services in the old days. Gebbhard knew nothing of my approaching journey to Hartzwalde, so I used his ignorance, which had to be maintained for reasons of secrecy, to put an end to this discussion of "Kaltenbrunner", by hinting that my further work of this night could scarcely be reconciled with Kaltenbrunner's 'political cleverness'. Himmler stopped finally and the subject was changed.

Shortly before twelve I took my leave, as Himmler had ordered another bottle of champagne - contrary to his usual practice - in order to drink to Hitler's birthday at midnight. We went out of our way, because we tried several short-cuts along country lanes, and, finally just before Hartzwalde we were held up by aircraft obviously coming back from Berlin, which dropped flares. We arrived at Gut Hartzwalde about 0230. Everyone was already fast asleep.

20th April, 1945

As I had to share a room with Herr Kersten, we had an opportunity of exchanging a few words in the morning about 0400 hours. He was very annoyed over Himmler and his vacillating behaviour and thought that a discussion between Himmler and Herr Masur could hardly lead to anything now, but all the same this would be a way for Himmler once again to show his "good will". Kersten then again brought up the subject of my negotiations with Herr Masur and said that it had been a good thing that the settlement of the Jewish problem had been divorced from monetary considerations and that, as he had heard from me, the money deposited was to be handed over to the International Red Cross. I explained to Herr Kersten how difficult the whole situation had become for me just recently, but how I had tried by every means to have this conference take place. I then at some length detailed Kaltenbrunner's recent behaviour, which Herr Kersten noted with great interest and which, from his knowledge of the facts, he could continually confirm.

In the morning of 20.4. at 0900 hours - Herr Kersten had got up somewhat earlier - I was woken up by the noise of aircraft flying overhead. While I was still shaving a heavy bomber had evidently dropped a bomb over Hartzwalde, which had fallen about a km. away near a small-gauge railway. Not a pleasant surprise for Herr Masur, with whom I had breakfast and, afterwards, our first conference. Herr Masur was at first somewhat nervous but then I found a point of contact with him and we discussed freely all the problems that interested us. I also explained to Herr Masur at fairly great length why the Masur business in Switzerland could no longer be continued. He regretted this very much and said that all the same he would be interested to know how such things took place in Germany. In the early afternoon I went for a walk in the wood with Herr Masur again, when he enquired about many things in Germany regarding which I, as far as it was possible, willingly gave him information and explanations. He laid great stress on being able to leave Berlin again by plane whatever happened, at the latest by Monday. He could not agree to any postponement of his meeting with Himmler, as he would then regretfully have to depart, without having had the talk. I knew that Himmler intended postponing the talk again and my task now was to see that the agreed date was adhered to under all circumstances.

On my return from the walk I was rung up from the Swedish Embassy where Count Bernadotte was staying. The latter told me that he would like to talk to Himmler once again, but that he must, whatever happened, leave on the 21st, i.e. the next day, at 0600 hours in the morning. His departure could not be postponed under any circumstances. The task now was to bring Himmler and Herr Masur together and to ask Count Bernadotte to a place, where he too could talk undisturbed with Himmler that night. I did hope, that everything I had discussed with the Count would now, at the very last minute, be decided upon. In order to adhere to the final date of departure I had the Count taken to Hohenlychen, where he was to be looked after on my instructions.

I myself drove about 1700 hours to Wustrow, to Zichten castle, to wait for Himmler there. Dr. Brandt tried in various ways to hasten Himmler's departure from the Reich chancellery in view of the time fixed for the meeting, but this was obviously impossible because of an air raid. Himmler did not reach Wustrow till about 2230 hours. Even before supper I explained the situation regarding Masur and Count Bernadotte to him and asked him, above all at least to use the channel of Count Bernadotte and put an end to the war. The discussion lasted comparatively long, because he again had doubts about the meeting with Masur. He did finally decide, however, to drive with me to Hartzwalde and, from there in the same night to Hohenlychen to have breakfast with

Count Bernadotte at 0600 hours. Himmler then outlined to me what he wished to say to Masur. It was essentially a chronological summary of events with an attempt at a skillful justification. I asked him not to speak of the "Karma" between the two peoples, nor of Weltanschauung, etc. which Herr Masur would not be able properly to understand. It would be much better not to speak of the past, but instead to determine shortly and precisely what had to be done to save those, who still could be saved, and what he himself had to do, as the man responsible for these things. This was also what Herr Masur wanted to hear and in this way it would be a good thing, if he showed that, by the measures he was taking, he was putting himself in open contradiction and disobedience to Hitler and his entourage, this being what he must now, at last, take upon himself to make amends for his personal conduct. Himmler wished to think over my advice.

21st April, 1945

We left Mustrów for Hartzwalde about 1:15, with only a driver and Dr. Brandt with us. We had to stop in a patch of wood on the way, as there was much low flying activity in the area. We were, however, able to proceed after quarter of an hour without further hitch. We arrived at Hartzwalde about 2.30. After a short greeting the conference between Herr Masur and Himmler, and Herr Kersten and myself began. Himmler really led the conversation. What he said amounted to his showing that he had wanted to solve the Jewish question by banishment, but this could not be successfully implemented, on the one hand because of opposition from the world, but on the other hand because of opposition among ourselves. I had the feeling that the conversation was correctly appreciated by Herr Masur in its individual parts. Viewed as a whole, however, it was only an attempt to justify what I like to call the cosmic outcome of the event". Herr Masur did not go into the individual points in detail, but merely said after about three quarters of an hour, that these explanations had been very interesting, but that they did nothing to alter the actual situation. He was principally there in order to obtain the following assurances:-

- 1) That no more Jews would be allowed to be put to death, which he had heard had already been ordered by Himmler.
- 2) The present number of Jews, which was certainly not accurately known and disputable, should, whatever happened, be kept in the camps and no longer evacuated.
- 3) That all camps in which there were still Jews should be catalogued and made known.

These points were agreed upon, Himmler always saying that he had already ordered this and that everything would be done to bring these problems to an end in this definite manner. He pointed out the difficulties he had with Hitler here. The above-mentioned points were to be confirmed in writing. This was discussed between Herr Kersten, Dr. Brandt and Himmler. I knew that Himmler was also ready to release Jewish women from Ravensbrueck to Herr Masur, as he had permission from Hitler to remove all the Polish women from Ravensbrueck. He had said to me previously, that one could very well let the Jewish women go from there, as he would be in a position to say, if the matter ever came up afterwards, that these had been Poles.

I had gone into another room with Herr Masur in order to discuss with him there all the points he wished to ask Himmler at the end of the talk. After the start of the joint conference, when I saw how gradually colourless it was becoming and concerned only with unimportant incidental points, I tried to put an end to the talk, so as still to be able to be with Himmler in Hohenlychen punctually at 0600 hours. After a short leave taking we drove off about 4.30 from Hartzwalde. On taking leave I

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assured Herr Masur again that I would do everything that lay in my power to make his departure on the next day possible. We arrived at Hohenlychen punctually at 0600 hours, that is on the 21st, and were able to have breakfast with Count Bernadotte straight away. I had hoped that the frank talk between Himmler and the Count that I had so long desired, would at last take place. Again Himmler avoided this. It remained a general conversation, in which, as a new effort, Himmler gave the Count permission to transport the Polish women from Ravensbrueck to Sweden. Regarding this point Himmler had already told me, that Hitler had only agreed to this proposal, because he had made it clear to him that the reception of these Polish women by Sweden was not only a humanitarian act, but, under the circumstances, a political gesture against Russia. The reason for this action of Himmler's was as follows: I had connections with the Polish Prince Radziwil in Geneva through Herr Musy junior. The Prince had already in January sent me a list of Polish women in Ravensbrueck camp and these I had promised to free whatever happened, as they were just children and young girls. I had laid the unworthiness of this state of things strongly before Himmler and was even able to prevail upon him to allow a release, partly by pointing to the racial qualities of the Polish people, in which connection I referred to my own wife. This had impressed him very much and I had felt that, as he had repeatedly brought up the question of his own accord, he had occupied himself with it a great deal. More I had not been able to achieve at that time. In order to gain his point with Hitler without giving away his real motives, he apparently had tried to solve the question by giving it the above-mentioned political background.

Apart from this Prince Radziwil urgently requested the release of General Bor. I also discussed this with Himmler, who did not want to make a decision on the question without Hitler. I succeeded in seeing General Bor at, so to speak, the last moment, in that I was able to give the operative order in the name of Himmler to the Prisoners Camp in Klatnow in Czechoslovakia. He was then taken in the general direction of Munich and Himmler likewise gave me permission to send General Bor over into Switzerland. This was on 24.4.45. I gave the order, but was not able to verify its execution.

Count Bernadotte expressed thanks for this offer and asked whether it would not be possible to transport the Danish and Norwegian prisoners to Sweden. Himmler declared that he was not in a position to authorize this, but agreed that, if Neuengamme were overrun, no evacuation of the Danish and Norwegian prisoners would ensue (sic).

The Count expressed thanks for meeting him half way in this matter and for the confidence he had been shown in the earlier conversations. The talk ended in a general conversation and an official leave taking.

Himmler knew that I would accompany the Count for part of the way and secretly hoped that I would then again request him to fly to General Eisenhower on his own initiative, in order to make a negotiation or a discussion between Himmler and General Eisenhower possible. The resulting conversation we had on the road near Waren, in Mecklenburg, where we parted, revealed the situation to be approximately as follows: "The Reichsfuehrer does not see the real situation any more. I cannot help him any more, for, for that, he would have had to have taken things in the Reich entirely into his own hands after my first visit. I can hardly allow him any more chances and you, my dear Schellenberg, would be more sensible to think of yourself". There was nothing I could say to him in reply and we took leave, as though we were not to see each other again within a measurable space of time. I was extremely sad.

I drove back to Hohenlychen, about 2 hours and was then called to Himmler, who was still in bed, about 12.30 hours. He told me that his health was not good and, indeed, he was the picture of a torn soul and of unrest and dissatisfaction. I could only say that I could do nothing more for him now, and it lay finally with him to act, and that in any way he liked, as I simply did not see a way out for Germany any more. We then had lunch together. Our conversation brought out nothing new. The ever-worsening military situation of Berlin was discussed.

We left for Wustrow about 1600 hours after I had convinced Himmler, that it would not be good for him to drive to Berlin. We got into great traffic difficulties in Loewenberg, as numberless troop movements had become mixed up with endless columns of refugees, closing all the arterial roads from and to Berlin and Neukolnburg. I asked Himmler to detach a company from his escort to give assistance, if only to enable the troops to move on. It was then that, for the first time, Himmler said, as we drove on: "Schellenberg, I dread all that's still to come". I replied, that this ought at last to give him the courage to act. He didn't reply. Shortly before Wustrow we met a low flying enemy aircraft, but these apparently intended rather to attack the refugee columns and troop movements lying behind us.

Obergruppenfuhrer Berger and von Harff had been ordered to report to Himmler in Wustrow, Berger so as to learn his latest intentions before he flew off for the South in Himmler's aircraft. I sat alone with Himmler. The subject of conversation was my impression of our conversations with Masur. I again referred to the great guilt of Kaltenbrunner in continually nullifying the orders issued since the Nuremberg business and this evening at last made a strong impression on Himmler. "Yes, yes, Schellenberg, if only I had listened to you earlier". After the meal we were left alone and talked about general problems: feeding, danger of epidemics, works concerning clearing up, Prisoners of War, etc. and then again and again over the senseless attitude of Hitler's, which was so greatly influenced by Kaltenbrunner, and of the continual evacuation of the camps. When I described the above as criminal Himmler became very restless, almost uncontrolled, and said "Schellenberg, now don't you start too, Hitler has been furious for days that Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen were not evacuated a hundred per cent". To that I said, for the first time to Himmler: "But in that case his Parkinson's disease must have developed very far". Himmler accepted this without comment, but our conversation became more official and he immediately asked Berger to join in. At the same moment Feglein telephoned with the information that Hitler and Goebbels were furious that Berger had not stayed in Berlin. The letter was required on account of the sentence against Gruppenfuhrer Professor Dr. Brandt, Hitler's previous physician-in-ordinary, who had been condemned to death in the last few days because he had knowingly let his wife fall into American hands in Thuringia. I was able to gather from the conversation between Berger and Himmler, that this must concern a huge game of intrigue going on among those closest to Hitler, in which Hitler's mistress, Eva Braun and Feglein's wife had a part. Himmler did everything to postpone and hinder the execution of the sentence. I could see that from his attitude and from the instructions which he gave over the telephone to Gruppenfuhrer Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo, in my presence. Professor Dr. Brandt was taken to Schwerin to protect him from airraids and Feglein was told that Berger was already on the way South with the aircraft. In view of this the execution could not take place at the moment, unless Reichsleiter Bormann and Goebbels took off trusted Party members for the task. As I found all these things about Berger and the current conversation uninteresting, I took my leave.

After an hour, however, I was called for again. Himmler sat down

again with me at a table and told me what he would do, if he once had the power in Germany in his hands. He asked me that very evening to consider a possible name for him to give the new Party, which I had suggested to him. I gave him the name "Nationale Sammlungspartei" (National Coalition or Rallying party). He, then began to speak again of removing Hitler, but only in vague hints. He dismissed me about 04.30 hours and went to bed.

22nd April, 1945

At 10,00 hours (it was Sunday morning) Himmler had breakfast with Dr. Brandt and me. According to Himmler the military situation had so deteriorated over night that 4 Waffen-SS Divisions of Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner had had to be put in on Hitler's orders in a last do-or-die attack. I cannot say accurately now, what the strategic situation was. There was to be a flank attack against the Russians somewhere. Himmler was still completely convinced of the necessity for this order of the Fuehrer's, while I was in agreement with his military Adjutant Grothmann that this too was an unnecessary spilling of blood. My protests on those lines were disregarded, as I was supposed to understand nothing of military matters.

After breakfast Berger and Lorenz appeared. They were to drive with us to Hohenlychen as well, as Zietzen Castle, Mustraw, was being threatened by the enemy and had to be given up.

I then went on to discuss the Vanaman case with Berger. Vanaman was an American Air Force general, a German prisoner of war and previously American military attache in Berlin, who was to leave Germany illegally with another American Air Force Colonel on Berger's and my suggestion. Vanaman was to fly to Roosevelt via Switzerland, first of all to obtain better aid for the American prisoners of war and secondly to explain to him that Himmler wanted peace with the Western powers.

I had conceived this plan some months before, when I had wanted to release English prisoners of War, the name of a name in England, for example Mr. Dodge and many others, with the object of making propaganda for an understanding. Hitler and Himmler, however, had given a very firm refusal to both.

I had spent a long time with Vanaman and we had agreed everything together. It could not, however, be carried out, as, in spite of all my requests, Himmler would not give me permission. On my own responsibility I arranged his illegal crossing of the frontier with Swiss friends and the American military attache General Logg, in Bern, Switzerland, and sent Vanaman and the American Air Force Colonel, who was to accompany him, in a car despite the great petrol shortage, to Constance for the frontier crossing. As I had no news of either, I asked Berger in Himmler's presence to take a special interest in the case. Himmler was now agreeable to the plan.

There was a very hasty departure from Mustraw about 1200 hours, as Russian tank spearheads were reported in the general direction of Loewenberg - Krauen. We drove in a northerly direction from Mustraw to Mecklenburg and then struck off eastwards in order to reach Hohenlychen. Wehrmacht columns, guns and tanks that were being brought up and continued activity by low flying aircraft so delayed us, that the drive took over an hour and a half.

We had a very late lunch together in Hohenlychen. The conversation at table was mostly concerned with Obergruppenfuehrer Berger and Lorenz's affairs. I took absolutely no part in the conversation.

Himmler asked me to stay behind alone after the meal and said to me: "I almost think Schellenberg that you are right, I must act in some way or other. What do you suggest?". I explained to him that it was naturally too late for everything. The Lubeck affair unfortunately could no longer be carried out. There was, however, still one possibility and that was now at last to discuss the situation absolutely openly with Count Bernadotte, whom I had on my own responsibility put into the picture to a much greater and more comprehensive extent than he knew. I stated, however, that I was not accurately informed as to whether I could still reach Count Bernadotte in Germany or Denmark. I supposed that, since as far as I could remember he had wanted to remain in Lubeck up to Monday, if circumstances allowed, he might still be there. Himmler thereupon decided straight away that I should drive to Lubeck immediately in order to talk openly with the Count. He, Himmler, was now prepared to request the Count officially in his name to carry the declaration of capitulation to the Western powers.

I prepared for my departure immediately and drove off about 1630 hours for Lubeck. Owing to great enemy aircraft activity, road blocks, etc. I did not arrive in Lubeck till night and ascertained after a short time that the Count was neither in Brickenbrun, nor Lubeck, nor Flensburg but in Aarhuus in Denmark. After a comparatively short time I succeeded, despite all difficulties, in speaking to the Count on the telephone and requesting him to receive me next day in Flensburg. We arranged to meet on 25.4. at 1500 hours in Flensburg at the Swedish Consulate.

23 April 1945

In the meantime it was morning again and after 3 hours rest and telephoning to Himmler to inform him of my telephone conversation with Count Bernadotte, I drove to Flensburg. At 1300 hours I met Attache Chiron at the Swedish Consulate in Flensburg, who conducted me to the Swedish Consul - Honorary Consul - Petersen, with whom I had lunch.

At 1500 hours Count Bernadotte arrived. I discussed with him the entire situation and Himmler's intentions. The Count considered that it was probably no longer necessary to go to Luebeck, as Himmler could put his intentions down in a letter to Eisenhower, that if the Declaration of unconditional surrender to the Western Powers. That would certainly be the best solution. I replied that such a course did not seem to me possible should Hitler still be alive, and asked him still to come with me to Luebeck for a short discussion with Himmler. After an hour's talk the Count declared himself prepared to do so. I telephoned from Flensburg with 'Sonderzug Steiermark' to fix a meeting with Himmler in Luebeck. Dr. Brandt answered, but as he was unable to reach Himmler for the moment he promised to telephone me later. That the telephone functioned under the circumstances was luck, as the lines were so overloaded with 'Wehrmacht' traffic, that it was not possible to get through on the normal post office communications. At 1800 hours Dr. Brandt rang up. He said that Himmler would be glad to see the Count in my presence at Luebeck at 2200 hours.

After a quick snack we drove from Flensburg to Luebeck at about 1900 hours. We arrived at the Swedish Consulate there at 2100 hours. In the meantime I waited in the Hotel Danziger Hof in the rooms which had been arranged as offices and got into touch with General vonnenberg's Dienststelle - Ordnungspolizei - where Himmler intended to stay. At 2200 hours I was ordered to present myself and I gave Himmler a short report on the main points of my conversation with the Count and strengthened him in his intention to forward the decision to capitulate through the Count to the Western Powers. Himmler vacillated for awhile and then agreed to my arguments which I repeatedly put before him and said, "good, we will go to the Count at 2300 hours - arrange the meeting".

I drove with Himmler at 2300 hours to the Swedish Consulate, where we arrived at 2310 hours. As the electric light was out at that time in Luebeck, the discussions were conducted by candlelight. The alarm went as soon as formal greetings were over, and there was a heavy attack on an aerodrome nearby, so that we had to sit in the cellar. An hour later fortunately the discussions commenced. Himmler delivered a long discourse on the military and political situation of the Reich and then gave a more or less honest and accurate account of the whole situation: "We Germans must declare ourselves as beaten by the Western Allies. That is what I request you, through the Swedish Government, to convey to General Eisenhower, so that any further senseless fighting and unnecessary bloodshed might be spared. To the Russians it is impossible for us Germans, and above all for me, to capitulate. We will continue to fight there until the Western Allied front has, so to speak, relieved the fighting German front, (i.e. taken over from us)". Himmler also declared that he had the authority to disclose this to the Count for onward transmission, as at this stage it could only now be a question of one or two, or at the most three days before Hitler gave up his great life in this dramatic struggle. It was a consolation that he should fall fighting against Bolshevism, the 'Idea' to the fulfilment of which he had dedicated his life.

Count Bernadotte declared that he on his part was prepared to pass Himmler's proposal on, indicating that it was for him, and probably also for the Swedish Government, a matter of first importance that the

entire Northern Sector be saved from a senseless destruction through the continuance of this war. This consideration was for him also as Swede the deciding factor for carrying out Himmler's request at all. Himmler, in answer to a question from the Count, declared himself prepared to agree to the transfer of Danish and Norwegian internees to Sweden.

The discussion on the form in which the declaration of capitulation should be handed to the Western Powers took a long time. We reverted to the original plan that Count Bernadotte should, without using official diplomatic channels, fly straight to General Eisenhower and give him Himmler's declaration direct. We agreed on the idea that Himmler should write a letter to his Excellency Guenther, in which he should request him to give his sympathetic support to the affairs of which he had informed Count Bernadotte, and which the latter would place before him. Himmler discussed briefly with me the form of this letter should take, which Himmler then wrote out himself by candlelight on notepaper which had been hurriedly obtained. The Count said he was prepared to fly to Stockholm with this letter on the following day, i.e. on the 24th April, to make the necessary arrangements. We agreed that I should go with the Count as far as Flensburg or Apenrade, and then remain there as a connecting link in case of questions or adjustments, and also to organise a fast communication line with Himmler in case of any news. Himmler and I left the Swedish Consulate after very hearty farewells, at 0130 hours.

24 April 1945.

I went with Himmler once more into General Wuennenberg's Dienststelle where we sat for another half an hour. This half hour served to lighten his anxiety over the step which he had taken and to imbue him with strength, so that he need not feel, that what he had done was in any way disloyal to the "Deutsche Volk". He then drove off to his Kommandostelle at about 0230 hours. I went back to the Dansiger Hof where I still had a few things to discuss with my people, then to fetch the Count punctually at 0500 hours from the Swedish Consulate and drive with him to Flensburg.

It is perhaps of interest to note here that on the way to the Swedish Consulate Himmler drove his large car himself. I had one of my men with me as pilot, and he was bathed in perspiration because of Himmler's appallingly bad driving - curbs, passing heavy traffic. He was at best a bad driver, but quite obviously his agitation was very great. He started off too fast from the Swedish Consulate so that he landed with his left fore-wheel off the edge of the drive and it took us, together with the Count, about $\frac{1}{2}$ hour's work before we were able to go on.

We left at 0500 hours and arrived punctually at the German-Danish frontier. I took leave of the Count. He hoped soon to be able to send some provisional news by telephone through Count Lewenhaupt or Attache Chiron. I then went back to Flensburg with Attache Chiron, where I stayed for the time being with Consul Petersen. At 1000 hours I lay down for a little rest and was awakened again at noon by an unpleasant air raid there and at a nearby aerodrome. Only half-dressed I went to the cellar and there in this undignified get-up I met the lady of the house for the first time.

I then organised the necessary telephone communications and went to Froeslev in the evening, where I lived. This place was convenient as it was possible for me to be reached by telephone from Padborg-Apenrade, in other words for Count Lewenhaupt to send me any message from Count Bernadotte and thence through by Wearmont line to Flensburg.

25 April 1945.

For the 25th April I had ordered Standartenführer Dovensiepen to meet me in Flensburg in order to inform him of the authority and Special Powers which Himmler had given me in writing: - in roughly the following words: "acting on my express wish, has full powers to issue orders which are to be obeyed without question" - that all Danish and Norwegian internees were to be transferred to Sweden without question. I told him to be in Copenhagen within the next few days in order to discuss the political situation of Denmark with Dr. Best, and told him to prepare the ground for this meeting by seeing that in the next few days no more death sentences would be pronounced or carried out. Dovensiepen was impressed with this and promised to make contact with Dr. Best forthwith. Of Dr. Best I had the impression that he was not a genuine follower of Hitler. This also came out in the course of my conversation with him in Copenhagen on the 30th April, when I was able to tell him that he had a bitter enemy in Kaltenbrunner, who had told me with pride that on receipt of a telegram from Best, Hitler had once said to him that it would be better if Best wrote his name with "ie", then he would be called "Biest" - actually for Best a compliment.

26 April 1945.

On the 26th April I received a provisional reply from Count Lewenhaupt indicating that the negotiations were not going well, mainly because Himmler was not acceptable as a person. This provisional message I did not pass on to Himmler.

In the late afternoon my colleague Oberstleutnant von Dewitz came to see me with a report of a wireless message received from the Frontaufklärungschef, Oberst Buntrock, stating that a Frontaufklärungskommando had made contact with an American recon party. Permission was requested to enter into an arrangement for us to work together. I discussed this with von Dewitz. We were both agreed that the report was certainly of the greatest interest and that an exact account was urgently required. No W/T reply reached me. The W/T was conversation between Hamburg and, presumably, Obing in Oberbayern.

In the night of 26/27 April I received a message to expect the Count at the Odense airport where he was to arrive from Copenhagen, on the 27th April.

27 April 1945.

I drove with Count Lewenhaupt to Odense at about 1100 hours. On account of bad weather the departure of the Count's plane was delayed, and we spent the time with the Fliegerhorstkommandant, Oberstleutnant von Cubeuge who helped us and looked after us very well. We were anxious about the Count's plane and so all observation posts and Flak zones were warned and told to keep us informed. We ourselves let off fire signals until the plane landed safely at about 2000 hours. A delegation of magistrates had expected from Odense.

I drove with the Count to Apenrade. There we discussed in peace, over a quick breakfast, the negative result, above all the difficulty Himmler presented as a political figure vis-à-vis the Allies and those arising out of this, and what advice which he, Count Bernadotte as private representative of Norway and Denmark could give. He formulated his last point saying he had good grounds in believing that the Swedish Government was interested that the whole of the Northern Sector, including Denmark and Norway, should be spared the complete destruction that the continued fighting of the Wehrmacht would bring.

The Count offered to go with me to Himmler and discuss those things with him, as we had to accept the fact that my discussions had not only resulted negatively, but that the Allied press had taken the matter up, and so my position with Himmler was by no means simple. I was therefore relieved that the Count wanted to go with me for another discussion with Himmler. We arranged to leave for Luebeck at 0400 on the night of 28th April.

I returned to Flensburg, tried to ring up Himmler but was only able to speak to Dr. Brandt who very anxiously enquired what the result was. I told him negative, but perhaps it was still possible to do something about the Northern Sector. I said the Count wanted to come to Luebeck too to discuss the matter with Himmler. This was flatly refused. I was to report to Himmler alone.

28 April 1945.

As I did not wish to disturb the Count - my telephone conversation had been at 0100 hours - I drove from Flensburg to Apenrade at 0300 hours - where I asked the Count at 0400 hours not to accompany me, as I had - and this Dr. Brandt had told me - to go further south than Luebeck to see Himmler. As it was so near the front I asked the Count not to come.

Shortly after 0400 hours I left Apenrade for Luebeck. As I know that my position vis a vis Himmler was very difficult, and that under certain circumstances I must reckon on my liquidation, I hit on the idea of sending for an Astrologer from Hamburg, personally known to Himmler, whom I took with me, in order that an astrological session might absorb some of the bitterness of disappointment, for I knew Himmler had a great opinion of this particular gentleman.

I waited till 2000 hours at the Danziger Hof in Luebeck, until I was called to General Wuennenberg's Dienststelle to report. I gave an account of my long discussion with the Count and the unofficial advice of the Swedish Government which he had transmitted with regard to the Northern Sector. The first part of my conversation with Himmler need not here be gone into. The discussion was for me not a simple one and now that it is over the whole affair passed off for me with quite unbelievable luck. After a few hours I was able to demonstrate the political significance of the Northern Sector, the futility of continuing the fight to the end in Denmark and Norway and the great harm the meaningless destruction of these countries would do to what remained of Germany's reputation. After a lengthy discussion of the form of the Allies' refusal, his bitter disappointment, the disclosure in the world press, his fear that his letter to Foreign Minister Guenther might also be put at the disposal of the world press, the consequences his step would have with Hitler, my responsibility as the moving spirit in this, for him now seemingly so fatal step, was a difficult basis on which to carry through the plan for saving the Northern Sector. All the same I managed, with the help of the above-mentioned gentleman, to put forward the proposals for such a solution, so convincingly, that he withdrew for an hour to think it over. Then at about 0300 hours he gave me authority to continue the discussions with the Count, first of all on the suspension of the military occupation of Norway and the consequent internment of the German troops in Sweden for the duration of the war. He declared himself prepared to accept a similar solution for Denmark, but wanted to reserve this for a later date. He authorised me to brief Reichsbevollmaechtigtger Dr. Best on these lines. He was finally prepared to nominate me as "Sonderbevollmaechtigtger" to negotiate a peaceful solution of the North with the Swedish Government. In this respect he had no doubt in his own mind that within the next day or two he would be in a position, as Hitler's successor, to make these decisions.

I immediately set off for Flensburg for a discussion with the Count within the limits of this authority.

29 April 1945.

I arrived in Apenrade between 1100 and 1200 hours on the 29th April and lunched with the Count at the house of Arntmann Thomsen, and we then discussed the Northern Sector. The Count then arranged for a meeting, in his presence, between representatives of the Swedish Government and myself, for the next day, i.e. 30th April.

We left Apenrade about 1700 hours - Arntmann Thomsen handed me a number of requests, suspension of sentences, release of Danish policemen, all of which I dealt with in Copenhagen on the next day. The Count drove himself. We arrived in Copenhagen at about 2330 hours and went to the Hotel D'Angleterre.

30 April 1945.

We met at 0900 hours on the 30th April. I went first to see Dr. Best to inform him of my authorisation, the decision to give up the military occupation of the Northern Sector without fighting, Himmler's succession to Hitler, etc. Dr. Best was, as I expected, on my side. *End of*
At 1200 hours I met Herr von Post of the Swedish Government and Count Bernadotte. Herr Ostroem and Major von Horn, who belonged to the Swedish Commission, did not take part in the discussion. The discussion with Herr von Post was on positive lines, that is, the Swedish Government expected the German Government to make, through me, clear and definite proposals for the execution of this plan in the first place for Norway and possibly also Denmark. After the conference the Swedish delegate in Copenhagen, von Dardel gave a luncheon to which Reichsbevollmaechtigteter Dr. Best was also invited.

Immediately after lunch I left for Korsør in order to take the ferry to Niburg, which had already been held up two hours for me. I arrived in Flensburg in the night, and after a short telephone conversation with Himmler, I went on to Luebeck, where I arrived at 0400 hours on the 1st May and where an adjutant of Himmler's met me to escort me to Himmler's new quarters - Kalkhorst by Travemuende.

1 May 1945.

In Flensburg I met a member of my staff, Stuba Dr. Wirsing, who had flown in a night fighter from Muenchen to Flensburg, as representing my closest associates, to inform me that Kaltenbrunner had relieved me of all my appointments and had replaced me in the political section by O'Stuba Waneck, and in the military section by O'Stuba Skorzeny. I took Dr. Wirsing immediately with me to introduce him to Himmler, so that he could return to the Southern Sector (Suedraum) armed with the necessary orders from Himmler.

On the stretch from Luebeck to Kalkhorst we ran into the most difficult traffic congestions, as retreating troops from the entire Mecklenburg district and more particularly from Schwerin were blocking the way and it took us $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours to do 40 km. During this time we were only once attacked by divebombers, otherwise it would have been impossible for us to have reached my destination. I walked many long stretches of this journey as I could walk faster than our car could go.

I arrived in Kalkhorst at 0800 hours. Himmler had not gone to bed till 0300 hours. I contacted Dr. Brandt who immediately informed me that Hitler's successor was not Himmler but Grossadmiral Doenitz, and that during this very night the first meeting between Doenitz and Himmler

had taken place in Flöen, that Himmler on the strength of my original suggestion had managed to get Doenitz, as his first order, to depose Ribbentrop and put in Graf Schwerin von Krosigk as Foreign Minister. Himmler was obviously in a bad mood, as in the Grossadmiral's purely military circles Himmler's political story with the Western Powers was not understood. Himmler was toying with the idea of having to resign, of committing suicide. He wanted to discuss all these points with me once more.

After half an hour's rest I received a message from Himmler telling me to have breakfast with him at 0900 hours to tell him of my conversation with Herr von Post, Raab and the Count. Himmler was very nervous and distraught and told me that he was no longer up to dealing with these matters. He had only accomplished one thing more, and that was to suggest Schwerin von Krosigk to Grossadmiral Doenitz as Foreign Minister, which after dismissing Ribbentrop he had done. Himmler wanted to take me straight away to Doenitz so that I should, so to speak, be installed as von Krosigk's immediate assistant on foreign policy. It would be a good thing if I expounded my ideas on the question of Norway and Denmark to the Government immediately. Himmler considered that I should remain permanently with von Krosigk and Doenitz and get someone else sent to Sweden, should it be possible for me to persuade the Reichs Government to abandon the Northern Sector without fighting.

After a longish discussion on the general situation we left Kalkhorst at 1100 hours for Flöen through Luebeck to meet Doenitz. After a difficult drive through refugees, military columns, dive-bomber attacks we reached Flöen at 1400 hours, where I contacted von Krosigk immediately. I also greeted Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl who were all taken up with the immediate daily military problems. One could feel the intense excitement among the staff.

In the afternoon alone with Himmler it was again possible for me to convince him of the importance of the political problem, that is, of the surrender of the Northern Sector without fighting. We agreed that von Krosigk was of the same opinion, whereas Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl were under no circumstances at this time prepared to surrender Norway without fighting. On the other hand I had promised von Post to return to Copenhagen with a decision. A lengthy delay in Flöen would mean so much loss of time that my, so to speak, option to negotiate with the Swedish Government would lapse. I was able to persuade Himmler to get in touch with von Krosigk over the solution of the Northern Sector on the lines presented by me, and first of all to send me to Copenhagen to explain the changed general situation to von Post and, despite this, to explain our agreement in principle. Generaloberst Boehme, Reichskommissar Torboven, Generaloberst Lindemann and Reichsbevollmächtigter Dr. Best were, in the meantime, ordered to meet the Grossadmiral on the 2nd May in view of my proposal for the Northern Sector which Himmler had put before him. Himmler and I were agreed that I would in any case not receive any definite decision from the Grossadmiral before this conference had taken place, and I therefore wanted to use this day, the 2nd May, to inform Herr von Post in Copenhagen of the new situation. *C. J. ...*

I left Flöen at 1500 hours and arrived in Flensburg at 1900 hours, where I spent 3 hours with Dr. Wirsing and worked out a draft I wanted to present to von Krosigk as my, so to speak, first task as his Mitarbeiter. The primary intention was to show that any pretence at political bargaining would depend on the internal political measures adopted by the new Government. I suggested for this reason to von Krosigk, that Doenitz should first dissolve the Party, secondly the Gestapo and the SD, and to announce this on the radio. Dr. Wirsing worked these things out in the night and left them for me, as I wanted to rest

for a few hours before my drive to Copenhagen, as I was quite unable to fight against the desire to sleep.

Dr. Wirsing wanted to fly back to the Southern Sector, on the next night as Himmler did not consider Kaltenbrunner's dismissal order very important, perhaps because of the general situation, and that he should outwardly bow to higher authority, but inwardly he should remain true and loyal to me as my closest Mitarbeiter. I drove during the night to Froeslev from where I telephoned to Dr. Best, who wanted to meet me on his way to the Grossadmiral at about 7 o'clock on the 2nd May, for me to tell him about the latest situation.

2nd May 1945.

I left Froeslev at 0430 hours for Niburg - I want at this stage to mention that Count Bernadotte put his personal Red-Cross car at my disposal whilst I was in Denmark - from Padborg on - which was of the greatest help to me at all military control posts, etc. and excellent cover. I felt uneasy only when I was at times too much feted as a Swede and, without being able to speak a word, was even giving autographs to school-children and grown-ups.

The proposed meeting with Dr. Best did not take place as we had both mistaken the times of the ferry, I did not take the ferry from Korsør on which Dr. Best was crossing but took one which left Niborg at the same time, so that we passed each other on the water. I arrived in Copenhagen at 1300 hours, and telephoned to Herr Minister von Dardel, to be told that I could meet Herr von Post and Herr Ostroen, whom he included, at 1600 hours. I described once more the general situation, the altered Government situation and mentioned that for the present Grossadmiral had taken over the military and civil command of Denmark and Norway, but that I had good grounds in believing that the execution of my plan had the support of the Foreign Minister, Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, and Himmler and was still possible. Herr von Post was still interested in the whole problem and stressed that Sweden naturally was greatly interested in a bloodless settlement in the Northern Sector, but he did not think that he could any longer undertake anything binding as the general situation had altered so much, owing to both the change of Government and the passage of time, that one had to reckon with a total capitulation within the next few days. In which case any partial solution in Denmark and Norway was no longer of interest for Sweden. Nonetheless he suggested pursuing the old plan and as soon as time and circumstances allowed, to hand him a definite proposal. We were agreed that it was all a matter of time, that I should return as quickly as possible, or, if possible, give a provisional report by telephone. We arranged the following telephonic code words:

"I should be glad to see the gentlemen again"

meaning:- German Government's definite proposal for Norway.

And if the above sentence included:-

"and please tell them this"

it meant:- the offer is extended to Denmark.

Herr von Post and Herr Ostroen stressed the fact that they were not able to remain in Denmark any longer for reasons of secrecy. I can at this point stress that the discussions in Copenhagen were conducted in the strictest secrecy.

3 May 1945.

That night I experienced by first dive-bomber attack in Denmark and

only arrived at Padburg at 04.00 hours. After two hours delay I continued my journey to Flensburg, collected Dr. Wirsing's draft and drove on to Floen to talk about the whole affair to the Reichs Government.

The journey to Floen turned out to be one of the most difficult and dangerous, that I have experienced. There were, over a comparatively short stretch of 90 km, over a dozen dive-bomb attacks on roads jammed with retreating columns of troops hung-up partly on account of petrol shortage and through damage. Burnt out lorries, streets strewn with corpses, exploding tanks and munition trucks, we fought our way through with difficulty to Floen, having ourselves lain prone by the roadside and in fields during machine-gun fire.

In Floen we were told by the Staff-guard that the Government had removed itself to the Marineschule Muerwick. As this affair did not permit even an hour's delay, I had to make the same journey back again and met with the same difficulties. I may be permitted to state here, without exaggeration, that thinking back on it, it was a wonder that I managed to get through with my car on the same day, arriving at Muerwick at 1700 hours to present myself to the Reichs Foreign Minister and Himmler. The frontier police at Kupfermuehle by Flensburg had been informed of the removal of the Government, but I was not told of it, when I crossed, and there were three Search Parties looking for me on the Floen road. One feared the worst.

In my report I once again stressed the basic political importance of the whole Northern Sector, and we were agreed within a comparatively short time, that, in spite of the unfavourable course of events, it was important under all circumstances, and if possible by bringing Sweden into it, to give up Denmark and Norway without a fight.

I then had a long discussion with von Krosigk alone. He was very glad to have someone for consultation and told me that he would be glad if I could remain with him and he make me his first "Mitarbeiter". On the other hand he considered it important that I should go to Sweden to clear up the question of the Northern Sector, as discussed, with the Swedish Government. We both agreed that this action was only a thing of the moment and would not delay the pending total capitulation.

The idea of a declaration of total capitulation came to nothing at that time because of this situation on the Boemisch-Maehriscchen Sector, where the Heeresgruppen of Generalfeldmarschall Schroener and of Generaloberst Rendulic - about a million men, equipped with munition and provisions for another 7 weeks, were still intact and on the whole more than holding their own on this part of the Eastern front.

Apart from my mission for the Northern Sector, which was primarily concerned with Norway, but also embodied proposals for Denmark, I had to endeavour under all circumstances to arrange a meeting with General Eisenhower for myself or a representative of the Government, whether through the Swedish Government or through the Swedish Red Cross. Von Krosigk and the Government were of the opinion that I should be allowed to do all I could to alleviate the difficult position of the Reich and the distress still to come, through open negotiations with the Swedish Government, while still continuing to try to prise open General Eisenhower's firmly shut door. Then I discussed with von Krosigk and Staatsminister Frank from Prag the Czech problem. I was not able to hear Dönitz's decision on this, so I do not know how it developed.

With regard to Denmark, von Krosigk thought it would be wiser to include Denmark immediately in the negotiations being carried on by Admiral Friedeburg with Montgomery over North-Western Germany. He asked me to include this problem in my discussion with Grossadmiral

Doenitz, as the military were absolutely without understanding of the political aspect of the Northern Sector within the sphere of the whole German situation.

At 2000 hours I began my report to Grossadmiral Doenitz, who at first would not hear of abandoning Norway and interning German troops in Sweden for the duration of the war. Obviously his military advisors had pointed out not only the in itself good strategic position of the army, particularly that of Generaloberst Boehme, but also of the Navy. After I had managed to prove the political significance of a surrender without combat, that in fact the enlistment of Sweden would be a political gain, the Grossadmiral enquired just what sort of an immediate gain this would be for Germany. With many explanations I had to point out to him that under the present circumstances I could naturally not prove any immediate gain, but by taking a long view, this gain would be in saving the "biological substance" of the German people and of what remained of the reputation of the Reich. Added to that when it came to the political game of the Powers in the near future, Sweden was the only neutral for whom even a broken Germany was of no little importance. Finally I said that after what I had witnessed of the collapse in the Reich, the continuation of the war in Denmark and Norway had no moral or traditional justification, since it would be devoid of any political or other value.

The meeting was then adjourned. Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl and I went off for supper together at which these questions were, of course, further discussed. Keitel and Jodl were both against my going to Stockholm and wanted me, as the best experienced in Foreign affairs (sic!), to remain beside von Krosigk and so within their reach. I again pointed out the importance of the Northern question and, I think, succeeded in getting Jodl to understand this.

I discussed once more with von Krosigk, Dr. Wirsing's draft and advised him to get the Grossadmiral to carry out the suggestion contained therein, of dissolving the Party, the Staatspolizei and the SD. Further the question was discussed in what capacity I should be sent to Stockholm. Von Krosigk left it to me to advise him as to whether he should appoint me 'Botschafter' (envoy), 'Sonderbevollmaechtigter' (Plenipotentiary Extraordinary), 'Beauftraeger' (Representative) or anything else. I asked him to name me 'Gesandter', the one word which, in view of my mission, would suit me best. State Secretaries von Steengracht and Henke were called to the Foreign Minister in the night to prepare the plenary powers and form of appointment as 'Gesandter'. Then we both talked to the Grossadmiral again. He again procrastinated and delayed a final decision until the next morning, saying he must sleep on it once again.

I reported to Himmler once more and had a short but significant talk with him, the essence of which was: "If only I had listened to you sooner" and "perhaps you are the first German to be permitted to do something positive for his poor 'Vaterland' again".

4 May 1945.

The next morning at 1000 hours I reported to von Krosigk. My appointment as 'Gesandter' and the plenary powers to negotiate with the Swedish Government were signed by Doenitz at 0930 hours. I took leave of von Krosigk and left for Copenhagen at noon.

On the stretch to Hadersleben in Denmark, I ran into a heavy dive-bomb attack, which entailed a delay of three hours in the "Great Belt", and arrived in Copenhagen at 1800 hours. I endeavoured to contact Dr. Best to inform him of my mission and corresponding instructions regarding

Denmark, which concerned him. Whilst I was still waiting for him in Dagmarhaus in order to go with him to the Swedish Minister von Dardel, an enormous crowd gathered on the Rathausplatz in expectation of the imminent capitulation of Germany. Shots were fired, armoured cars, ambulances, and the crowds grew to tens of thousands. Owing to this upheaval in the whole town, Dr. Post was unable to make it, but I could not afford to lose any time either and had to reach the Swedish Legation at all costs, as the pre-arranged telephone communication had evidently not reached Stockholm through Herr von Dardel. I had driven through the night specially from Mürwik to Padburg to request Dr. Post to communicate this code message to Herr von Dardel. After a lot of argument with the SSGuard at the Dagmarhaus, I was whisked away in Count Bernadotte's car through a clearing made in the wire entanglement on the Rathaus side. The driver was ordered to go round and avoid the crowded streets, but apparently he did not know his way too well, and in a second we found ourselves in the thick of the crowd, who recognised Count Bernadotte's car and it was only a matter of minutes before the car surrounded, pushed and half carried by the enthusiastic crowd, could get no further. With great presence of mind I managed to lock the doors and shut the windows, so that the people were unable to drag us out. I ordered the driver to step on it, and metre by metre we managed to push our way through the crowd. Those who were nearest yelled because they were being hurt and those further away were pushing towards the car gesticulating wildly. Finally the car was swamped by about 30 people, on the running board, on the roof and on the radiator, and it was only thanks to the driver's persistence that after 1½ hours we arrived at the Swedish Legation, looking as though we had come out of a Turkish bath. With much nodding, friendly gesticulations, doffing my hat and saying 'tak-tak', we had managed to get rid of the wild demonstrators.

I was immediately received by Herr von Dardel, after I had met the lady of the house, and whilst we were still in the preliminary stages of the conference, the crowds had evidently moved to the Swedish Legation and there began to sing the Danish and Swedish national anthems. The noise of singing and shouting and shooting was such that one could hardly hear oneself speak. But in the quiet rooms of the Legation one felt safe. Herr Bertholtz had kindly undertaken to arrange all details for my journey, I went to the Hotel d'Angleterre to rest for two hours. The crowd had in the meantime dispersed and only here and there shots could be heard. Before the hotel I was held up by a wild 'Soldateska' of partisans but on recognising the Swedish car and a word from the driver that I was a Swede, I was allowed to pass unmolested.

5 May 1945.

On the morning of the 5th May at 07.00 hours having got through all the controls put on by the Partisans, and the last German airport control, I left Copenhagen in Count Bernadotte's Danish Red Cross 'plane'. At 07.15 hours we arrived safely in Halmoe, where I was courteously received by the airport Commandant. 10 minutes later the Commandant informed me that a Swedish military 'plane' was there to take me to Stockholm. After a brief introduction to the pilot, I was given oxygen apparatus and strapped into a parachute, and after a two-hour flight we arrived safely in Brona. Here I was fetched by Hans Ostroem from the Foreign Office and who escorted me to Count Bernadotte's home, where immediately upon my arrival discussions commenced with von Post and Staatssekretär Bohmann.

Having presented my credentials and the written authority to negotiate with the Swedish Government, I described my special mission to von Post and Bohmann, and the request, embodying the view of the German Government. After exhaustive discussion the two gentlemen decided first of all to discuss the whole affair with the representatives

of the Western Powers, present in Stockholm, as events in Germany had gone so far.

As a provisional reply the Swedish Government received the information that in certain circumstances a special commission, set up by General Eisenhower, could be sent to Stockholm to discuss the existing problems.

6 May 1945.

Sunday 6th May brought no change in the Swedish attitude. The question of demonstrating my plenary powers by obtaining from Generaloberst Boehme an undertaking to implement the results of my negotiations with the Swedish Government, seemed of importance to us all.

In order not to lose any time, I decided to send Gesandter Thomsen - after I had explained my mission to him and General Utmann, the Military Attaché - to the Norwegian frontier, to discuss with Generaloberst Boehme or Heister the surrender in Norway and the internment of German troops in Sweden. Gesandter Thomsen flew in a Swedish bomber to..... on the morning of the 6th May and met the First General Staff Officer of Generaloberst Boehme on the frontier.

At lunch time Thomsen telephoned a preliminary report to Stockholm and explained to me that only the First Officer of the General Staff had come, in himself an intelligent man, but whose attitude was different from what we expected. Thomsen pointed out that he could not discuss the matter in detail over the telephone and said he intended to be in Stockholm between 1700 and 1800 hours, to continue the discussion with me personally.

Gesandter Rieckert, Herr von Post, Count Bernadotte and I conferred over these further developments. Gesandter Rieckert suggested that we should under all circumstances get in touch with Grossadmiral Doenitz and inform him that Generaloberst Boehme had not yet been notified of my plenary powers. My suggestion of sending Doenitz a long telegraphic message was turned down after a general discussion. It had to be as Gesandter Rieckert suggested: through General Utmann's kind offices, telephone communication with the Grossadmiral was in fact established via Oslo, but owing to technical difficulties was hardly understandable. A second contact was made and I was able to talk to Graf Schwerin von Krosigk myself. He told me that things had moved very rapidly over night and that Germany had declared total capitulation. Negotiations, however, were still under way and I should therefore take care not to annoy the other side - Anglo-American - as the Norwegian question had been included. He added that should the Swedish Government on their part still have an interest in the matter, they should contact the Western Allies immediately.

The Swedish Gentlemen declared that under the circumstances there was no longer any possibility of doing anything - quite evidently the Norwegian problem as well as the Danish one had become part of the total capitulation negotiations. One could only wait and see if the Western Allies intended to approach the Swedish Government at all, say over the question of internment of the German fighting forces. All the same I did at the request of British Military Attaché, Sutton Bratt, transmit through Herr von Post and General Utmann, a notification from the Western Allies to Generaloberst Boehme that he could get into direct touch with England on short-wave. This showed then that the Western Powers, especially England, did not wish to use the medium of the Swedish Government in this matter, but instead to carry out capitulation negotiations regarding Norway direct with the German Government. In that way the further plan of requesting the Swedish Government officially to arrange a meeting for me or Schwerin von Krosigk with General Eisenhower fell through.

During my last telephone conversation with Flensburg on the 9th May, it transpired that the active participation of the Swedish Red Cross over the possible internment of German troops in Norway, was exclusively a question for the Swedish Red Cross and the British military authorities to settle. In so far as I was concerned the German Government had nothing further to say.