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Date. 3 October 1945

F1/1025

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SUBJECT OF REPORT: Special Interrogations of SCHELLENBERG
15 and 21 September 1945

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SPECIAL INTERVIEW OF SCHILLERBERG, 15 and 21 SEPTEMBER

1. KNOWLEDGE OF ATOMIC THEORY AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF USA.

SCHILLERBERG can recall discussing atomic experiments only with WEISSBERG of Amt III (an ex-Catholic theologian who was particularly interested in scientific matters) in a general conversation in the winter of 1943-44. SCHILLERBERG says he understood little of the matter himself. WEISSBERG spoke especially of the work of WEISSBERG of Berlin in this field.

SCHILLERBERG tried to stir up interest in procuring information on foreign work in the field, but got no co-operation from OKW. About August, 1944 ORLITZ of VI W1/T was put in charge of investigation into the matter. An aviation technician (name unknown) was trained in Berlin under Amt VI for two or three months and sent to Switzerland, with the cover of commercial attache or something similar at the Legation in Bern. This man was supposed to study the U. S. armament industry, especially rocket production, and SCHILLERBERG assumes that atomic experiments were included in his assignment. SCHILLERBERG never saw any reports by him, and doubts that he ever prepared any of any importance, since ORLITZ would have passed them to SCHILLERBERG if he had.

Another aviation technician was supposed to collect similar technical information in Spain. He was to go there about the same time as the technician mentioned above was to go to Bern. It is not clear whether this man got to Spain. As far as SCHILLERBERG knows, no reports came from him. SCHILLERBERG states that there was considerable impatience at home because of the lack of results.

SCHILLERBERG recalls a second discussion with ORLITZ on his last visit to Berlin, in March 1945, when he was about to visit Sweden. SCHILLERBERG discussed technical matters (including atomic experiments?) with KLYENBERGER, Oberst WAGNER, and perhaps ORLITZ.

Only the two technicians, in Switzerland and Spain, were assigned to this particular problem.

ORLITZ's section produced nothing of any significance on American technical developments, except studies based on technical developments, except studies based on technical journals, including one on gas, issued at the end of 1944, which SCHILLERBERG passed to the OKW. This was the last such report from VI W1/T that SCHILLERBERG recalls seeing.

SCHLENNBERG added that material captured in the East supplied the Germans with knowledge of Allied technical progress in 1944, when practically nothing could be learned by intelligence methods. He knows nothing of any important hauls of this kind as a result of the Ardennes offensive; in any case, OKW and not Amt VI would have been informed of this.

2. THE CASE OF WILHELM BOHR

This first came to SCHLENNBERG's notice because of HEVERSY's connection with it. First, SCHLENNBERG was visited by HEDERICH, a Gaunstaletter in the Personliche Kanzlei of HITLER; HEDERICH was concerned with the matter because Amt III had been called in to investigate how BOHR had been able to go to America. This, SCHLENNBERG adds, was a touchy subject, which no one dared to approach openly. Second, OHLETZ, of all Amt C wanted to help HEVERSY, who thought that his relatives in Hungary might be spared if he could be instrumental in bringing BOHR back. Amt VI Kult also was interested in getting BOHR back, and SCHLENNBERG tried to prevent duplication of effort.

The matter came up early in 1945. SCHLENNBERG called in SANDBERGER for advice on the matter. Oberst WAGNER in Stockholm dealt with HEVERSY in the matter. HEVERSY thought that BOHR might be persuaded to return, if he could be assured of prestige at home (which SCHLENNBERG understood he had not received in due measure in America). SCHLENNBERG, through SANDBERGER, was able to locate three relatives of HEVERSY, who were liberated and brought safely to the border; but WOLFFER and KALTENBACHER refused to help out, and, so far as SCHLENNBERG knows, the relatives may still be in Hungary.

WAGNER thought that HEVERSY was wholly in earnest in offering to help BOHR's return to Europe. SCHLENNBERG does not know what, if any, contact HEVERSY had with BOHR in America.

Besides the persons mentioned, SCHLENNBERG thinks he may have discussed the possibility of BOHR's return with REYENSTUEBER. REYENSTUEBER, OHLETZ's predecessor, discussed the case once in Stockholm with WAGNER.

The statement of SCHLENNBERG handed in on 18/1/45 is apparently in error in indicating that Amt III arranged for BOHR to leave Europe for America under official auspices. The correct version is that BOHR was able to leave through the carelessness, or with the help, of some one in the Ministry of Education. SCHLENNBERG surmises, without any proof, that the person responsible may have been a Dr. ABAMS, who had charge of matters concerning professors in occupied regions. Amt III got into the matter because it had to investigate this action of the Ministry. So far as SCHLENNBERG knows, Amt III never did conclude its investigations. SPENGLER was, of course, interested in the case.

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SCHLEIBERBERG does not know BOHR's motives for leaving Europe; he guesses that they may have been personal wishes, or a feeling that he was not properly esteemed at home.

3. HUBNER

To a question about HUBNER, SCHLEIBERBERG replied that he knew a HUBNER and a HUMPERT. HUBNER was an oberleutnant in the Abwehr, in the section concerned with the West; HANSEN moved him to the Personnel Section of the new Mil Amt, and eventually he went to Amt I, as personnel liaison man between Mil Amt and Amt I. He is an elderly man, about 55.

HUMPERT was a captain in the Navy, in Abwehr IV. In the Mil Amt, he worked on procuring information about the West.

4. KNOWLEDGE OF ALLIED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

SCHLEIBERBERG insists that his knowledge of our services is very slight. Since the reorganization of Amt VI, he had been unable to keep up with this question. Amt IV, if it knew anything, told him nothing. He denied knowing the names PAFURT, DORFNER, or PIGNATELLI. He said that Amt VI never made a study of the U. S. intelligence services. If any one did, it must have been Amt IV.

5. RELATIONS OF AMT IV AND AMT VI ON CE WORK

IV E 4 handled any cases of CE against the U.S.A. in Germany and occupied territories. Regierungsrat SCHAMBACHER was in charge of this till July, 1941, when SCHLEIBERBERG put him into Amt VI to help on CE matters, in which the OTS was in a sorry state because of poor personnel. SCHAMBACHER had a serious lung difficulty and had to leave in six months. CLEMENS replaced him in IV E 4, and probably remained till the end.

SCHLEIBERBERG repeats that the disorganization of the old III F and the difficulties and complications of his duties prevented him from keeping up on CE matters. He remembers one case connected with German emissaries in Iberia, since Amt VI dealt with it.

In Spain, WINZER of Amt IV dealt with Allied IS, and he used agents without SCHLEIBERBERG's knowledge.

Amt IV sent, he claims, no reports whatever on CE matters to Amt VI. The Venlo incident was a special case, since it was connected with a field (Gegner im Ausland) which was under Amt VI. SCHLEIBERBERG says that he himself took no part in the case, because he was so busy; he recalls being introduced to STEVENS, but since the interrogations took place outside of Berlin he had nothing to do with them. SCHAMBACHER and CLEMENS only were concerned with STEVENS and BOST.

Under KOPKOW, IV A was responsible for CE against the U. S. SCHWELLENBERG says he never discussed the American IS with KOPKOW. SCHWELLENBERG tried in 1943 to do something to bring the work of Amt IV and VI in the CE field together, and induced KOPKOW to hold one lecture, but nothing further came of it. Staf. RAPP, new Gruppenleiter of VI C, tried in the last months of the war to make contact with IV A, but in vain. Nor was there any connection between Amt IV and VI Z. SCHWELLENBERG agrees that this lack of liaison in a field which was divided, arbitrarily and artificially, on geographical lines, was a great weakness.

In October 1944, after the division of CE activity, Oberst ROHMERT went to Amt IV; undoubtedly he maintained his old contacts, and handed on reports to KOP, Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab, etc.

6. VI Z; MUELLER'S ATTITUDE

In discussing the origin of VI Z, SCHWELLENBERG remarked that ROHMERT, as chief of military CE in Abwehr III F, did not care much whether Mil Amt or Amt IV took over the work, so long as it was kept together. MUELLER wanted to control all DAs, while SCHWELLENBERG preferred to have them under Amt VI or Mil Amt, and both HANSEN and SCHWELLENBERG wanted to be left alone by MUELLER in the field of foreign espionage. KALTSCHENKOW discussed the matter in a somewhat heated atmosphere. When HANSEN was imprisoned, MUELLER thought he had won, and SCHWELLENBERG had to take the whole problem to KALTSCHENKOW, who then divided the operations of III F, giving the internal and DA activities to Amt IV, while CE abroad went to Amt VI. The foreign section of Amt IV went to VI Z. ROHMERT and RAPP got into an argument over the question and brought it to SCHWELLENBERG and "at that point the whole service fell apart." SCHWELLENBERG was no longer concerned with VI Z because he could already see the outcome of the war.

The results of VI Z were, in any case, insignificant. Daily reports were sent out on one page -- information from foreign agents, military, political material, seldom any real CE cases; mostly pure secret service work, and restricted to neutral countries. Everything in the Balkans that had formerly been under III F went to Amt IV.

This lack of co-ordination between IV and VI came basically from the different backgrounds and conceptions of the two offices. Moreover, MUELLER forbade closer co-operation with Amt VI. Amt IV, in fact, wanted to make itself completely independent in the field, and to take over all CE work, outside Germany as well as inside. Its setup of agents abroad was unknown to both Amt VI and the Mil Amt.

MUELLER spoke with SCHWELLENBERG of cases of W/T agents, apparently Russian, whom he had turned and sent back, but never gave any specific instances. The failure of MUELLER to follow up this

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subject led SCHULLENBERG to think that MUELLER himself might be a Russian agent. When pressed on this point, SCHULLENBERG very hesitantly said that in 1944 HUMBER had asked him whether he thought MUELLER was a traitor, without giving any definite reason for his question. SCHULLENBERG told HUMBER he could not answer, since he had no specific proof. HUMBER repeated the question later, claiming to have strong suspicions of MUELLER's untrustworthiness. SCHULLENBERG thinks that KERSTEN may have strengthened HUMBER's suspicions; Countess LOLLE, Swedish, said MUELLER was working for the Russians, and she told KERSTEN this. Despite these suspicions, and as a consequence of his inability to make decisions, HUMBER never broke with MUELLER.

7. MONITORING OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CALLS

This began in the fall of 1942, though no real reports came through until the spring of 1943, because of technical complications; for the same reason, there could never be any very extensive monitoring. Perhaps ten calls a day, picked up at random, were monitored, so far as SCHULLENBERG knows, though he adds that it is possible that all traffic was recorded and worked over later.

VERTERLIN, of the Technical Division of the Reichspost, submitted the texts of the calls through his liaison with SCHULLENBERG, and the Gruppenleiter of Amt VI concerned with foreign affairs received the reports; so too did OKW, SPERR, and in general any appropriate offices and ministries. The reports were translated, but with the actual text as the conversation had run, not decoded. DR. THOSE did all he could to decode, but it was beyond him, or any one man. The Reichspost was very proud of its discovery and would have liked to keep all the credit and information to itself.

It was difficult to tell the substance of the conversations because the subject was unlikely to be referred to twice by the same code name - herrings, for instance, might mean propellers today and something quite different tomorrow. Usually the subject was industrial and economic, concerning deliveries, finance, supplies, and of no political importance. SCHULLENBERG thinks that his efforts to rouse interest in these reports among the offices that should have been concerned had little effect.

He recalls very few reports of political interest. One, concerning the Yalta conference, might have offered a chance to make trouble among the Big Three. Another, a conversation in clear between CHURCHILL and ROOSEVELT, a "real airing of their views" gave the Germans a good picture of the situation. Another concerned damage to shipping, and was useful in checking the German reports.

But, largely because of the effectiveness of the code, this monitoring had no real effect on any important matters. SCHULLENBERG thinks it was easily overrated because of being a technical plaything. He adds that the Germans used a similar method of

marking key-words in telephone conversations.

In this connection, he went on to discuss the break and orient one time last year when it was thought that HILDE's telephone was tapped, because things became known that he had discussed with only one or two persons, by telephone. The communications expert thought SCHEIDT was responsible for such matters and came to him every few days in great excitement to ask help because he was in trouble again about the alleged tapping. SCHEIDT doubts that HILDE's telephone was really tapped.

In January, 1945, a new system of scrambling began to be used by the Germans; each word (or syllable) was cut up into approximately 16 pieces, transmitted separately, and reassembled at their destination.

8. AMT VI EXPERTS ON AMERICA

SCHEIDT mentions BAUMANN, SCHEIDT, FRANCK, HARSTUF, FRANCK, and ROSS as being the chief experts on America. Of FRANCK, he says that he dealt only with Belgium and Holland, and had nothing to do with America. FRANCK he does not recall.

Colin ROSS never worked in Amt VI, but with Dr. BAUMANN of the Auswertungs Amt, who dealt with propaganda against ROOSEVELT's re-election. In the Spring of 1942 (1943?) HILDE asked SCHEIDT to get reports from America to show how BAUMANN's propaganda was faring; in fact, to set up a political intelligence post in America.

Retuf WAYWALD worked on the U.S. in Amt VI, and was sent to Spain at the beginning of 1943, with the aim of working with SCHEIDT (or SCHEITZ), an art-dealer, and Mrs. de POPE, in Madrid. The three set up a fashion shop. Their aim was to exploit very good connections, social, political, and military, in Spanish society, to get reports on the U.S. SCHEIDT had run an art gallery in Paris, and had a reputation as an art expert. He had been picked up by the German police in Dueseldorf for swindling, or something of the sort, and after this was taken over by Amt VI. The fashion shop went bankrupt, as a result of SCHEIDT's manipulations, but Amt VI set it up again in business. The reports received from this trio were not good.

WAYWALD had never been in the U.S. He was a former Army officer, had a British wife, and spoke English well.

Retuf had never been, according to SCHEIDT, in Amt VI. In 1942 he was a specialist on the U.S. in VI D, after working in VI C. He was sent in 1943 to Istanbul to cover American information there. There he got mixed up in the NEMO complex, an intelligence organization operating in the Near East, with the German Journalist FRANCK and an Italian FRANCK. SCHEIDT

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was suspicious of the whole complex, which led to a few more results too quickly, but it was belied by others. The agents and agents were supposed to check up on it. They were also supposed to get reports on America, but were unsuccessful. As far as SECRET shows, they are both still in Turkey, and was widely travelled, but SECRET does not know whether he had ever been in America.

SECRET does not recall Gustaf SECRET, SECRET's successor. SECRET, he thinks, only did evaluations. He does not remember SECRET or SECRET, who he says must have worked under SECRET.

Among part-time collaborators of VI E on America, he mentions SECRET of the Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät in Berlin, and the Chairman of the Industrieverband, and some other industrialists (names unknown) who had been in the U.S. The sort of work that was produced included studies on specific problems like the Negro question - a good report, though it had, SECRET remarks, nothing to do with intelligence. In general, Amt VI tried to make use of people who had been in America, but SECRET thinks no outstanding results were achieved.

Robert BEST, American newspaperman, was handled wholly by the foreign section of the Propaganda Ministry, as a radio broadcaster; Amt VI had nothing to do with him.

9. COVERAGE OF INFORMATION ON AMERICA

Nothing came direct from the U.S.; the only sources were second or third hand reports from neutral countries; radio intercepts, reports from South America, and the press. The agents in South America (Argentina) were ordered to set up a network in North America, but had no success. Reports on public opinion in America came from business men. The Mil Amt took over a connection of Abwehr I E1 in the Embassy at Mexico City, but this too had died out before the end of the war. Sources in neutral countries - Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden - were the most important, and Spain supplied the best of these. SECRET was the best of the German agents there on America; he had many good connections with South American diplomatic corps personnel. In Portugal, SECRET was most important. Some political reports from Turkey, including some via journalistic contacts, were useful. Reports were received from French sources before the liberation of France, mostly from industrialists, occasionally from Le Gaullists (?) or Loyalists on political matters, generally from unconscious sources. The Group leader had the entire worry of evaluation; SECRET received only the finished products.

An old lady, presumably an American, employed in the U.S. Consulate at Madrid, was a source for SECRET from 1943 to the end of the war. SECRET thinks she was a secretary of some sort who dealt with

supply the similar pattern, and came into contact with a great many people. SCHEIDT got his information from her orally; it consisted chiefly of tidbits picked up in conversation (no documents), dealing with the coming and going of persons of interest, meetings, etc. The information was of some political interest, though SCHEIDT thinks it may have been coloured considerably by her own views. The individual items received were not very important, and were incorporated into summary reports.

SCHEIDT also was working for him a Brazilian, possibly Legationrat in the Brazilian Embassy, whose name may have been AMARCO or AMARO, and who had produced political information on America. This man had contacts with Americans, whose names SCHEIDT does not know. His reports too were individually of small significance but useful in the mass.

SCHEIDT discussed briefly the PERO and HEARTER contacts in Lisbon, where PERO was the American military attache, and HEARTER his assistant WAPPST. This contact was maintained from early 1943 till the end of the war, with decreasing importance in the latter part. It was purely for political purposes, not for intelligence; PERO and HEARTER discussed a compromise peace with SCHEIDT's men, FRANKY (?) and SPITALE (?), but, as the possibility of such a peace declined, the meetings became fewer and fewer.

American newspapers were received via Lisbon and Stockholm, from three to five weeks or more old. SCHEIDT does not know how extensive the coverage of the American press was (that of the British, he says, was thorough). Reports on technical matters from the press were handled by the technical section, not by VI B.

WAPPST had had the habit of turning out reports on specialized problems (e.g., steel production) which he claimed were supplemented and confirmed by intelligence sources, but which were nothing but summaries of press reports.

A considerable volume of Portuguese diplomatic reports dealing with the U.S. were procured through contacts of RO Leiter (aka von TRCP) with the Portuguese, and this source continued until the end of the war.

10. KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. AND OTHER CODES

SCHEIDT insists that the only American code that he knows was broken was that between Berne and Washington, which was regularly intercepted and decoded from 1942 until the end. He adds that a certain amount of tactical messages were no doubt decoded at the front, but claims to know nothing about them. The breaking of the Berne-Washington traffic; VI B. of SCHEIDT worked closely with SCHEIDT. The Berne-Washington traffic was broken by SCHEIDT and was being in radio messages.

There was indication of the German sources had supplied some of the information, this was passed on to Amt IV for handling; SCHLEIBERBERG thinks that Amt IV never caught any one as a result of this. SCHLEIBERBERG decided whether any of this traffic was to go to Amt IV.

The Forschungsamt deciphering was far less effective than that of OKW. SCHLEIBERBERG is sure that Amt IV could not have carried on deciphering without his knowledge (because of SCHLEIBERBERG's close connection with THIEL).

SCHLEIBERBERG was in charge of deciphering for the Auswaertiges Amt. Again, SCHLEIBERBERG thinks he would have learned of anything important there through THIEL or WITTEBERG.

On the other hand, Turkish traffic between Washington and Ankara was regularly broken from April 1943 and was most interesting, supplying information of some political significance. To specific questions, SCHLEIBERBERG replied that Vatican traffic, Irish, Persian, and Scandinavian were not broken; the only additional important traffic that was decoded was Polish.

The Turkish traffic dealt with Russo-American, American-Turkish and Russo-Turkish relations; the fourth term; Big Three meetings; instructions to delegates in Turkey.

* N.B. This disagrees with WERSING's statement that the W/T intercept submissions included coverage of reports from HARRIMAN in Moscow on Poland; CASSIN in Paris on De GAULLE; and the U.S. representative in Bulgaria.

11. USE OF DOUBLE AGENTS

SCHLEIBERBERG disclaims any real knowledge of DAs, saying that he recalls only one case, that of a technician in a metal factory, run in Hamburg by WICHMANN; he is not sure of the success of the case, since there were only occasional reports that did not concern him directly. The DA had been in America. He says that WICHMANN has remarked to him that there were three DAs cases run ~~by~~ under him.

SCHLEIBERBERG knows nothing of tactical DAs, saying that Amt IV would have handled them under the new organization.

He says he knows of no playbacks by the Americans.

He understood, from general conversation, that German DAs had been very successful in the military sphere against the Russians, but not against the Americans.

Through the use of DAs, in contact with the French underground, the Germans learned of the invasion last June; Amt IV sent a warning direct to the OKW via Berlin, and simultaneously the warning went from Paris to the Army Command in the West, and

to the coast defences. But, as the interior told , some of the defences were not ready despite the warning. SCHLEIBERBERG does not know who was responsible for this failure.

He recalls no political results from the use of IAs.

As for a German penetration program, he says he wanted to set one up as a part of the general reorganisation of Amt VI, but it never got beyond the planning stage. He wanted to make use of the people from the various resistance movements, but Amt IV refused to let him have them. He thought that contacts in high places should be sought, hence his use of JANKE, who worked on the Japanese IS through penetration agents in 1944.

12. PELLOE-HARTUNG

SCHLEIBERBERG denies knowledge of PELLOE-HARTUNG, beyond his name; he thinks he recalls that PELLOE-HARTUNG went to Denmark some time before the war.

13. AMT VI WORK ON PWS

Of a plan, previously mentioned by him, which was intended to help German PWS to escape from Canada to the U.S., SCHLEIBERBERG says that it was intended for Amt VI to ship money and radio parts to Canada in Red Cross packages, under the guise of gifts from a German relief organisation. This scheme was to be started in March 1945 but it was never put into action. Three or four people in the Air Ministry (?) were concerned with it, but there was considerable difficulty in arranging with the Red Cross, and no contacts were ever established.

14. ECKERT; THE AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN

ECKERT, a naturalized American citizen of German origin, who has been reported as an agent sent to New York in 1939 by the Abwehr, and as having returned to New York in 1941 or 1942, is unknown to SCHLEIBERBERG.

SCHLEIBERBERG mentioned a German-American who lived ^{had} in Munich since about 1924 and who had friends in the highest Party circles, including HINZLER. He had a short American name - WILD, WILD, or something of the sort. He was suspected of espionage activities, and the Stapo, the Reichspost, and the telephone people watched him constantly, but nothing was ever done against him, perhaps because of his high Party connections. He knew HESS and various members of the top Munich clique.

15. MME. DECONSELY

SCHLEIBERBERG can recall nothing about this person, unless she is a secretary, of Russian origin, who was involved in a divorce suit when he was in Amt IV. It was a very disagreeable

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affair, the police were shown in; SCHEIDT and SCHEIDT talked with ONE of the American Consulate (this was before America's entry into the war) about her, and SCHEIDT was arrested against her because she was morally unreliable.

16. PARIS's connection with U.S.

SCHEIDT knows of one American connection of PARIS, one of two businessmen who had visited Germany for a long time and had become interested in political problems. SCHEIDT tried to have them used to help in negotiating peace, but the shortsightedness of German policy prevented this, and the connection was lost. SCHEIDT cannot remember the names of these men.

DAUBERT accomplished nothing in sending agents to America. There were two attempts to send men by U-boat since 1943. The first, with four men, was destroyed, supposedly by mines. This was especially irritating for SCHEIDT because the U-boat was of new design and brand new construction; everything was lost, and he was held responsible. In 1943, a second shipment included the two agents who were caught.

Another U-boat attempt was to be launched this summer, with three men who were acquainted with America. It had not yet been decided where they should land. PARIS was in charge, and the Navy was willing to supply a U-boat.

17. CANARIS AND THE 20 JULY

SCHEIDT says he does not know what became of CANARIS, and gives the following account of his own connections with the 20 July. He had been connected closely with some of the officers implicated in the plot (and he says that, if it had succeeded, he was prepared to go with the plotters.) Two of his connections, HANSEN and TRIEBE, were questioned, and he feared that at any time MULLER and TRIEBE might find him out. TRIEBE was particularly close to him; but neither he nor HANSEN gave out SCHEIDT's connection.

MULLER continued to suspect SCHEIDT, and, to test him out, gave him the assignment of arresting CANARIS, to whom he was close. He put off this task, but finally, for the sake of his family and himself, he drove to see CANARIS. CANARIS said at once that he knew why SCHEIDT had come, that he understood, that SCHEIDT should cheer up and not take it so hard. He was afraid, but only asked SCHEIDT to put in a good word for him with MULLER, confident that he would be let off. He asked whether the stupid TRIEBE had said or written anything; he advised SCHEIDT to take care, and all would turn out right. SCHEIDT arrested him on 30 July, or early August.

Shortly afterwards, however, had an indication that all was not well, for of Amt IV sent word that he wanted to talk with about his trip with . 's man was also to be recalled from abroad but said he could not be spared, and so he was saved.

In 's safe certain papers were found which indicated both him, and if the right people know of it, as well.

Moreover, on 20 July, when had returned, had stupidly called , in great excitement, by telephone, and asked what he should do. knew his wire was tapped; in the confusion, with tanks and a general uproar on the street outside, he thought fast, and at once called up and told him of 's call, asking what it meant, and what he should do. He also sent in an unsolicited written report on the conversation, to beat any other one. In the evening, however, himself called on , in a terrible state that required two cognacs to soothe him; said that perhaps was really dead, and just putting out a story. knew the contrary, and tried to quiet .

18. ARTUR HEE

 made complete preparations for a fake suicide after 20 July, hiding his car and uniform and leaving a letter nearby to "prove" his suicide, but after a period of hiding, he resumed his loose way of living, and was betrayed by someone from among his low-grade female friends. He was arrested, tried and condemned by the Volksgerichtshof, and executed, in complete secrecy, at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945.

It should be noted that knows of this only from one of 's adjutants, whose name he cannot recall, and who had been summoned from Amt IV by especially to work on this case.

19. MARIONA-REDWITZ

 knows nothing of his fate, except that he was captured.

20. HIMMLER'S LAST VISIT TO BERLIN

 is certain that was in Berlin for the last time on 20 April. himself was not present; he says, however, that he knows was there on that day because he recalls waiting for him in the evening at Wuestrow (?). He is sure that 's adjutant was with at Berlin, and thinks may have been. never discussed this visit to Berlin with .

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21. REMARKS ON HITLER'S DEATH

HITLER's remark that the Fuehrer was going to die within two or three days was made to SCHMIDTBERG on 28 April at the Swedish Consulate in Quebec. SCHMIDTBERG is convinced that HITLER arranged for his own death, and that the remark did not refer to HITLER's observation of HITLER's condition on his last visit to Berlin, but to knowledge of an attempt to be made on HITLER's life.

SCHMIDTBERG saw HITLER after his vain visit to Stockholm, when SCHMIDTBERG returned on 28 April, and SCHMIDTBERG got the impression that HITLER was somewhat vexed because HITLER was, in a sense, crossing him by still being alive. On 28 April HITLER told SCHMIDTBERG that he, HITLER, would be the successor of HITLER from the following day on.

SCHMIDTBERG then discussed a horoscope made at the beginning of 1944 by WOLFF (or WULF) of Bamberg, regarding HITLER; this horoscope indicated that three danger-points would come for HITLER, one on 20 July 1944, one at the beginning of November, and one 7 May 1945. HITLER discussed this, apparently in full seriousness, with SCHMIDTBERG and with Dr. BERNDT. No one else knew about it.

22. GENE RIT, DR.

BERNDT was only slightly known to SCHMIDTBERG, who saw him on his visits to HITLER, particularly in the Spring of 1945 at Hohenlycken, where HITLER was laid up. SCHMIDTBERG says he disliked BERNDT, who seemed dishonest, intriguing, fond of giving hasty political advice; an "unkomplizierte Natur"; who showed his bumpstousness and naivete by demonstrating several operations in front of some Swedish guests, who probably felt nauseated by the performance.

23. MEETING WITH AMI IN SUMMER 1944

SCHMIDTBERG's present version of this incident (see para. 44 of the SCHMIDTBERG IR dated 12 July 1945) is that HITLER asked AMI what the Japanese could offer in the way of intelligence service in South America, and AMI avoided a definite answer. SCHMIDTBERG thinks he himself may have tried to renew the subject with AMI but he is sure that there was no real offer of collaboration, and hence no rejection of it.

24. RECALIBRATION OF HITLER'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION IN ITALY

SCHMIDTBERG's knowledge came through AMI, who in September or October 1944 reported that some one from Italy was in contact with AMI. AMI tried to make use of the information but he has been carefully kept up to date.

... Hamburg - but ... was also advised to take care to ...
... with full powers to negotiate before he ...
... in touch with him, since ... was swamped with ...
... private offers from German businessmen, etc., and would have ... paid ...
... no more attention to ... if the latter came without full ...
... powers, than to them. So while ... waited for a chance ...
... to persuade ... of the necessity of such full powers, ...
... in Italy got ahead of him - an especially great disappointment for ...
... since ... also had no contact.

In March or April, ... learned of WOLFF's two visits ...
... to ... When ... came to Berlin, he saw ...
... SCHULZ ARNDT, ... and gave them his ...
... explanation. His contacts were through ... head of the ...
... Italian ... Secret Service, and a double agent, and ...
... as WOLFF's mortal foe, wanted to brand WOLFF as a traitor,
... but WOLFF was too close to ... for this to work. Then, on ...
... orders from ... who feared that news of WOLFF's negotiations ...
... might leak out into the press, WOLFF and ... went to ...
... They told him - completely reversing the facts - that ...
... had tried to make contact with them, which prompted ...
... to remark that that was very interesting and might be useful ...
... sometime in the future.

After this, ... was kept out of the negotiations in ...
... that area. ... told him that ... was negotiating with ...
... as a "free Austrian", and ... intended to use this ...
... trick to retain power in Austria and eventually re-establish the ...
... Nazi regime there. In any case, ... felt that the negotia- ...
... tions were too late; by March only ... could have arranged a ...
... surrender. ... used the news of the ...
... attempts to urge ... to capitulate.

... told ... that ... had learned that ...
... was in bad grace in Switzerland, and was likely to come to ...
... brief at the hands of an Allied Intelligence Service.

