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CSDIC/CMF/SD 33

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EIGHTH DETAILED INTERROGATION REPORT ON

SS STURMBANNFUEHRER HUEGEL Dr. KLAUS

This report contains a general outline of the work of Amt VI RSHA since its inception, and on its internal development. It should be read in conjunction with CSDIC/CMF/SD 23 and 25.

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DATE 2001 2006

H. T. SHERGOLD Major

CSDIC,
CMF
26 Jun 45

(H. T. SHERGOLD),
Major I.O.,
O.C. Army Section,
CSDIC, CMF.

1. SOURCE

(a) Personal Details

Name : HUEGEL Dr. Klaus
 Alias : None
 Rank : SS Sturmbannfuehrer
 Unit : Abt VI Bds ITALIEN
 Id. No. : Not known
 F.P. No. : 13563
 SS No. : 111.815
 Party No. : 3,407,815
 Home Address : BREGENZ, Schloss Wolfurt
 Captured : 28 Apr 45, COMO
 Secret No. : M/45/546
 Interrogated : CSDIC, CMF, 22-23 Jun 45

(b) History and Career

(cf: CSDIC/CMF/SD 2, para 1.b.)

(c) Assessment

(cf: CSDIC/CMF/SD 2, para 1.c.)

Reliability : Good.

(Interrogated by F.G.A.)

2. DEVELOPMENT AND WORK OF AMT VI RSHA

(a) Period Summer 39 till End 41

As stated briefly in CSDIC/CMF/SD 25 para 2.A.; when Amt VI was formed shortly before the outbreak of war, it took over from Amt III (of the SD Hauptamt) the information obtained on the political, economic and cultural structure of foreign countries. The first Amtschef VI was SS Brigadefuehrer JOST, formerly Amtschef III of the SD Hauptamt. Work of the Hauptamt on foreign countries had been carried out by Abteilung III/1 (and III/3), (not Gruppe as stated in a/m report), of which the latter, since 1938, had toyed with the idea of concentrating on the obtaining of Intelligence proper, which was to become the function of Amt VI RSHA. However, neither the personnel of Abt III/1 nor of Abt III/3 had any special qualifications for Intelligence work, and Amt VI RSHA had to be built up from scratch.

On the outbreak of war JOST attempted close liaison with the Government departments which it was the task of Amt VI to supply with Intelligence material. Right from the beginning the Foreign Office showed itself disinclined to co-operate, as RIBBENTROP did not want a separate intelligence organisation to supply him with material, and attempted to obtain his own intelligence by indirect means. He lost no opportunity of spying and ridiculing wherever possible the work of Amt VI, and for certain periods HIMMLER ordered that no member of Amt VI might enter the Foreign Office. Co-operation was never entirely broken, however, as Foreign Office contacts were necessary to the SD for building up its intelligence service abroad. To counteract the attitude of the Foreign Office JOST tried to work more closely with Government Ministries which were themselves opposed to it, such as the Ministry of Propoganda and the Ministry of Economics, and use their contacts, travellers, Germans living abroad, etc. Here again co-operation was not entirely satisfactory; for instance the difficulties which Amt VI personnel had over the matter of foreign exchange were not settled satisfactorily by the Ministry of Economics.

Inside the RSHA itself there were also numerous personal quarrels and petty jealousies which hampered the attempts of Amt VI to build up an efficient service. Amt IV and, to a lesser extent, Amt VII considered that they had a part to play in the collection of intelligence abroad, and undertook

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independent work in this field through their own agents; Amt VII, however, soon gave this up. The greatest competitor of Amt VI was always the Abwehr, and remained so until its fusion in 44.

VI representatives in GERMANY came under the SD Abschnitte, and in neutral countries were normally attached to the diplomatic missions, so far as the Foreign Office allowed, or were representatives of German firms. In occupied countries they came under various Dienststellen of the Sipo. Neither the Abschnittsfuehrer nor the Befehlshaber or Fuehrer of the Sipo Dienststellen abroad were VI men, and had little understanding for VI work, which greatly hampered the work of VI representatives at home and abroad.

Despite the internal quarrels and jealousies described above, Amt VI succeeded in this initial period in establishing a number of representatives in neutral countries, notably in HOLLAND and BELGIUM, NORWAY, SPAIN, PORTUGAL and TURKEY. No success was achieved with SWEDEN. After the military successes of 40 and 41, work in the conquered territories naturally became much easier, but suffered under the disadvantage that VI representatives tended to concentrate for their information on elements that were friendly to GERMANY, i.e. the Quislings, who were not in anything like so good a position to provide intelligence as quarters favourable to the Allies. In ITALY, although HITLER had forbidden any SD activity there, some small attempts were made to obtain intelligence, and SS Obersturmfuehrer ZHAEER and SS Obersturmfuehrer GROEBL were sent to ROBE, but were soon recalled.

With the establishment of Rds in the occupied countries, Amt VI was divided into geographical Gruppen. An LO was set up to the Ministry of Economics, and the Technical Group, Gruppe VI/F, including the HAVEL Institute was created. Another Group was formed during the period, but again dissolved in autumn 41. This was Gruppe VI/H, later VI/E, which was known as "Gegner im Ausland", and was concerned with counter-espionage abroad, against the "enemies of National Socialism", especially against Freemasons and Jews, and movements like STRASSER's "Schwarze Front". Because the Group's work overlapped with that of the Gruppe dealing with geographical divisions, and with the counter-intelligence branch of Amt IV which was gradually developing, it was finally disbanded.

Source is unable to give many concrete examples of work undertaken by Amt VI during the period under review. The VENLO incident at which STEVENS and BEST were captured was considered the greatest triumph of the period. Following this success, Amt VI made plans for the capture of Lord VANSITTART, who was said to be intending to visit SWITZERLAND either at end 39 or beg 40. (This story was overlooked by Source in his interrogation on work on SWITZERLAND - CSDIC/CAF/SD 25). The information on the impending visit had been obtained from a contact maintained by Amt VI with Austrian Legitimists inside SWITZERLAND. They believed themselves to be in touch with a similar group in the TYROL, which was in fact a fiction of Amt VI agents. A Swiss courier in the service of Amt VI travelled between SWITZERLAND and the SD Aussonstello at BREGENZ, where despatches from the Legitimists in SWITZERLAND were opened and examined. They made use of secret ink of a peculiar kind, obtained by the drinking of large quantities of red wine; this ink produced writing which became visible when exposed to heat. It was hoped through these contacts to persuade Lord VANSITTART to confer on the frontier with ostensible members of a German resistance group, and then kidnap him as was done with BEST and STEVENS. The plan came to nothing because Lord VANSITTART's journey was cancelled.

Work in FRANCE was concentrated on obtaining all possible information on the intentions of the VICHY government. Work in YUGOSLAVIA concentrated on discovering the attitude of the Yugoslavs in case of a German invasion. In this connection there was a considerable tension between Amt VI and the Foreign Office, as HEYDRICH maintained, on the basis of information obtained by Amt VI, that a revolution was likely, and that the people would resist, while RIBBENTROP pooch-pooched the idea.

Although, by end 41, a fairly wide VI net had been built up abroad, the actual successes which Amt VI had to show were small, and the question was raised whether the continued existence of the Amt was justified in view of the increasing extent of the country commitments. The Amt was often referred to even by its own personnel as "Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH's personal information service". HEYDRICH set out to improve matters, and began by appointing

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SCHELLENBERG as Stellvertretender Amtschef. SCHELLENBERG actually ran the Amt from now on, and though JOST was not officially removed till a little later, his authority was nil. He frequently stopped his car in a sidestreet near the Amt VI offices and sent his driver to get some papers he happened to need, as his relations with SCHELLENBERG prevented him from entering the offices himself.

(b) Period End 41 till Bog 43

SCHELLENBERG was only 32 when he undertook the reorganisation of Amt VI. He had up till then been Gruppenleiter IV/2, concerned with counter-intelligence. He had received the E.K. 1 for his part in the VENLO incident. It was not believed by most senior members of the RSHA that he would succeed in his task of making Amt VI a worthwhile concern, but Source believes HIMMLER was prepared to give him a year's trial. SCHELLENBERG started off by making considerable changes of personnel, and as he came from Amt IV attempted to have transferred to Amt VI a number of Gestapo men of whose efficiency he knew from his own experience. This led to long drawn out squabbles between Amt IV and Amt VI, but eventually SCHELLENBERG succeeded in replacing almost all the key personnel of Amt VI, and, as stated in CSDIC/CAF/SD 25 para 2.C.1., those who were too efficient to be spared were sent to outside Dienststellen so as to allow a fresh start to be made at the main office.

Through SCHELLENBERG's personal efforts peace was at any rate outwardly made between the Foreign Office and Amt VI. SCHELLENBERG himself became the LO for Amt VI to the Foreign Office, and RIBBENTROP appointed his own representative as LO to Amt VI. An immediate result of the reconciliation was that the VI positions in neutral countries could be improved. This happened at a timely moment, as the decrease in German trade with the neutrals had been making it more and more difficult to establish further camouflaged VI representatives in neutral countries. (In SPAIN and PORTUGAL VI representatives were attached to the Police Attaches, themselves IV men, but no other neutral had agreed to the establishment of such attaches, so that the chances of Amt VI in this respect were very limited). Nevertheless, in comparison with Abwehr representation in diplomatic missions abroad, Amt VI representation was very small even after this increased co-operation with the Foreign Office, the proportion being somewhere in the region of 10:1 in favour of the Abwehr.

SPAIN (with TANGIERS), PORTUGAL and TURKEY were the most favourable countries for the building up of VI representatives after the agreement with the Foreign Office, and Source states that unquestionably the greatest successes of Amt VI were scored in these countries, whereas SWITZERLAND and SWEDEN remained the problem children, as before. The political upheavals in IRAN and IRAQ offered a splendid opportunity for VI infiltration, which was not overlooked, and every effort was made to stir up trouble against BRITAIN. VI positions in SOUTH AMERICA, particularly in THE ARGENTINE, were strengthened. So far as Source knows Amt VI did not succeed in placing any agents in USA after the declaration of war on that country, and at no time, he believes, was there ever an SD agent operating in GREAT BRITAIN.

The Referat VI/C/ZEPPELIN, concerned with sabotage and subversion against RUSSIA, frequently pressed at this time for the establishment of some form of independent government to be set up in various conquered territories of the U.S.S.R., particularly in the UKRAINE, which was considered an especially favourable field for such an experiment. However, opposition by the Foreign Office and other Government Departments prevented anything being done to achieve this.

In FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES there was continual friction between Amt VI and Amt III representatives on the relative responsibilities in SD work in obtaining information on the political tendencies and morale of the respective countries. In a less acute form this friction existed throughout the work of the SD. In FRANCE, where VI was more strongly represented than III, the task of obtaining such information on the country, and also of bringing political pressure to bear, was largely carried out by the former, but in HOLLAND and BELGIUM, where VI was far less strongly represented, both these tasks fell to the latter. A responsibility of Amt VI in all three countries at this time was the building up of P/O nets which would operate after the withdrawal of the

Germans once the war had been won.

Inside GERMANY SCHELLENBERG considerably reduced the number of VI Referenter in the SD Abschnitte, as in many cases their work had been unsuccessful. On the other hand he induced HEYDRICH to issue an order that all Sipo und SD Inspektoren were to do all they could to keep the requirements of Amt VI in mind and to provide all possible assistance. Both HEYDRICH and SCHELLENBERG had the intention of setting up independent Abteilungen of Amt VI in GERMANY. Because of lack of the necessary personnel this ambitious plan could not be fulfilled, but to make up for this SCHELLENBERG had the right to make specific demands on every SD or Stapo Dienststelle in the Reich to co-operate in the fulfillment of Amt VI operations. Also, to compensate for the numbers of VI Referate which were withdrawn from SD Abschnitte, VI representation in the RSHA was further strengthened by the creation of the Sonderreferate VI/Wirtschaft and VI/Kultur, and of an LO to the Ministry of Propaganda.

SCHELLENBERG also made great efforts to improve the relations of Amt VI with the various Government Ministries, and to limit as far as possible the confusion prevailing because of the overlap of interests in the obtaining of intelligence e.g. in the intelligence admissions given to business men, and in personal jealousies within the RSHA. HEYDRICH's murder in 42, though SCHELLENBERG lost thereby an enthusiastic supporter, brought him closer to HIMMLER, as for seven months there was no Chef der Sipo und SD, and SCHELLENBERG himself performed this function. During this period he succeeded in persuading HIMMLER of the necessity of Amt VI, of which in its earlier days he was by no means convinced.

The open competition between the Abwehr and Amt VI was also shelved, at least openly, for the time being, following a conference held in PRAGUE in May 42 between HEYDRICH and CANARIS. SCHELLENBERG and CANARIS held frequent discussions together, and their relations were outwardly extremely affable, though SCHELLENBERG, as stated in CSDIC/CAF/SD 23, para 3, made no secret of his real feelings about "the old fox".

(c) Period Beg 43 till Beg 44

At the end of his year of probation SCHELLENBERG had already overcome his chief difficulties, and no-one questioned any more the justification of Amt VI's existence. The former personnel of the Amt had been changed up to 80 or 90%, and of the former Gruppenleiter only one had remained unchanged (VI/C). Nevertheless the quality of the Referenter was in many cases not as high as SCHELLENBERG would have liked. In Spring 43 the Gruppen VI/S and VI/G were formed. The personnel of Amt VI had now grown to such an extent, also with the increase of technicians in VI/F and VI/S, that it exceeded that of Amt III by almost 1,000, totalling about 2,000 altogether. A number of men from Amt VII, whose activities had been severely restricted in the course of the war, now passed over to Amt VI.

SCHELLENBERG had in fact shown himself to be a man to be reckoned with. The fall of LUTHER, the special confidant of RIBBENTROP and Secretary of State to the Foreign Office, was correctly attributed to him, for details see CSDIC/CAF/SD 20, para 8). This incident brought a further breach between Amt VI and the Foreign Office, relations having deteriorated since the rapprochement at beg 42, but as by this time VI representatives had been firmly established in all neutral countries, with the exception of SWITZERLAND and SWEDEN, the necessity for co-operation was not so marked, and neither HIMMLER nor SCHELLENBERG were concerned with the worsened relations. Amt VI reports were not passed to the Foreign Office before they had been pronounced "suitable" by HIMMLER.

With all the advantages for a successful year's work available to Amt VI at the opening of 43, notably the closer relations with the Ministries of Propaganda and Economics, work was further complicated by the appearance of a new problem. The war situation had greatly deteriorated against GERMANY, and Amt VI was now faced with the task of setting up a P/O network in all countries which were thought to be threatened with an Allied invasion. In Apr 43 orders to this effect were issued to the VI men in NORWAY, HOLLAND and BELGIUM, DENMARK, FRANCE and ITALY. In ITALY very little could be done because of the still existing Ruckhorbefehl that no SD work was to be undertaken. VI/C/ZEPPELIN undertook this work for RUSSIA. It was found very difficult to establish nets in the West because of the growing power of the resistance

movements.

In neutral countries also, the effect of German reverses increased the difficulties of Amt VI, as opposition to GERMANY became more and more apparent. In neutral countries whose internal political situation was of little interest, such as SWEDEN, it was found increasingly difficult to obtain information on the Allies instead of working against the country itself.

Another disadvantage made itself felt during 43 when because of air raids on the capital most of the Amt VI documents and part of the admin personnel were removed from BERLIN to less threatened areas (see CS/DIC/CMF/SD 23, para 2.c.). This, coupled with ever-growing transport difficulties, seriously delayed the work of the main office.

Work on individual countries was as follows apart from the creation of P/O nets:

HOLLAND and BELGIUM: both these countries were comparatively unexploited by Amt VI. Amt VI in THE HAGUE and BRUSSELS were not seriously considered until autumn 43, and produced very little results of interest. The most important intelligence work in these countries was considered to be the counteracting of Allied agents, and in this Amt IV had considerable success (no details known) especially against W/T agents. The results of their work were of great use in W/T counterespionage in other countries.

FRANCE: VI was chiefly concerned with the internal political situation, including changes of ministers in the VICHY Government. For instance, the proposed appointment of BOUSQUET as Chief of Police was rigorously opposed by the SD. SS Obersturmfuehrer Dr. REICHE was the special VI Beauftragter at VICHY (cf: CS/DIC/CMF/SD 25 para 4.a.). Very little intelligence on the Allies was obtained. It was intended to set up an organisation in FRANCE for work against SWITZERLAND, NORTH AFRICA and GREAT BRITAIN, but this never came to anything.

SPAIN: the best VI positions of all were in this country. SS Oberfuehrer BERNHARD, the head of the German-Spanish firm of SOFINUS und ROWAK, was the perfect example of a VI representative camouflaged within a large industrial concern. He was very close to SUNER, and was able to provide information on internal Spanish politics, and the attitude of the Spanish Government to GERMANY. He also attempted to sound Allied circles on views of a compromise peace. An espionage network in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA was controlled from TANGIERS, and operations of the sabotage and subversion Referat VI/B/4/PARSEVAL were also directed from here.

PORTUGAL: Work was mainly directed against the country itself to prevent rapprochement with the Allies. Neutral business men were sounded on their views of Allied morale.

TURKEY: the account of the photographing of documents in Sir Hugh KNATCHBULL-HUGHESSEN's private safe has already been given in CS/DIC/CMF/SD 20, para 7.c.

THE FAR EAST: attempts were to be made in 43 to increase the weak position of Amt VI in the FAR EAST by sending representatives by air or submarine, and SCHELLENBERG was planning a trip to JAPAN himself, but could not be spared because a substitute could not be found for him in BERLIN. The project was accordingly abandoned.

SOUTH AMERICA: with the breaking off of diplomatic relations by the SOUTH AMERICAN states, Amt VI work in those countries ceased almost entirely. The previously existing network had made itself too obvious. Work had been concentrated on obtaining information on USA through business men. The revolution in THE ARGENTINE caused the dissolution of an important network, and there followed endless bickerings between the SD, Abwehr and Foreign Office on who had been responsible for its detection.

ITALY: even before the fall of MUSSOLINI the SD had set up a wireless set in ROME, despite the special Fuehrerbefehl against activity in ITALY. HASS had been wont as VI representative with the Police Attache, and was responsible for this. Though information from various sources had indicated the possibility of the overthrow of the Fascist Government, the actual event, coming when it did, was a surprise to the Amt. The building up of an SD organisation in ITALY after the Armistice is well-known.

BALKANS: work was chiefly directed against the political situation of the countries themselves, except in GREECE, whose geographical position was favourable for intelligence work against the Allies. A P/O network was

also prepared, in conjunction with the activities of VI/S. In JUGOSLAVIA efforts were concentrated on exploiting the differences between the various groups, and especially to winning over the Cetnik forces wholeheartedly on the side of the Germans.

SCANDINAVIA: In NORWAY and DENMARK increased VI personnel attempted to build up lines to BERGAND and to exploit her close relations with SWEDEN, by means of commissions given to travelling Swedish business men, etc. In this VI/Wirtschaft was closely concerned. Source knows no details. In SWEDEN Amt VI concentrated mainly on the nature of air traffic between that country and ENGLAND, passengers carried and the purpose of their visits, etc. In FINLAND VI work was directed entirely against the internal political situation.

In 43 SCHELLEBERG introduced the principle of "personal representation" for himself and his Gruppenleiter. His view was that he and his senior officers should have personal VI representatives in all important countries, so that they would have a means of checking on the activities of their subordinates and the reliability of the information reported. SCHELLEBERG's own man was SS Hauptsturmfuehrer EGGER (see CSDIC/CMF/SD 25, para 2.C.3.), who was said to have obtained very useful information in SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, SPAIN and HUNGARY.

During 43 the activities of Amt VI developed more and more on the political as opposed to the intelligence plane. The reports submitted to the Reichsfuehrer often took the form of a diplomatic dossier. This change to active political work was necessitated by the comparative inactivity of the Foreign Office. The preparation made by SCHELLEBERG in SWITZERLAND for opening up lines of contact to the Allies are an example of the political work undertaken. Both in the political and intelligence field Amt VI received an increasing number of requests for information from Government Departments, though it still remained its own master in supplying questionnaires to the agents employed. Source states that these were perhaps one of the weakest sides of the Amt's work, as despite the wide-read net which SCHELLEBERG had succeeded in building up since he took over, no clear line of policy was ever laid down on the type of intelligence material required. Unless a VI officer was able to polish up and expand for himself the questionnaires submitted by the main office, he was likely to incur the sympathetic laughter of the agents he employed.

In summer 43 SCHELLEBERG planned the forming of a training school in the Amt VI building for SS and Police personnel detained as VI representatives abroad. As a beginning about a dozen SS and Police officers were to be trained and then placed in the Passport and Visa branches of various Embassies, Legations and Consulates. The project was delayed, however, and no more was heard about the school until just before the cessation of hostilities.

By this time Amt VI had achieved a fairly favourable position in regard to foreign exchange, as the funds available were the equivalent of RM 200,000, apart from a number of special funds.

Reorganisation of the Amt right at the end of the period brought about the following changes: SCANDINAVIA passed from VI/E to VI/D, and VI/E, concerning itself entirely with S.E. EUROPE, moved to VI/IIA. ITALY also passed from VI/E, and came to VI/D. A Central Evaluation Dept for the whole Amt was also begun, under VI/D. VI/WI and VI/KULT, which had been independent, were placed under VI/A (General).

(d) Period Reg 44 till Apr 45

The fusion of the Abwehr with Amt VI has already been described in CSDIC/CMF/SD 23, para 5.

Apart from this major reorganisation, SCHELLEBERG attempted during 44 to strengthen the position of the Amt inside the Reich in other ways. His and HEYDRICH's original intention of having independent VI Abteilungen instead of Referate under the SD Abschnitte was in part fulfilled, and several of such Abteilungen were set up under ICS or RGS in the Reich. For the same reason VI/WI and VI/KULT had been placed under the Gruppenleiter VI/A who would have more time to control their activities than SCHELLEBERG, when they were independent organisations under him.

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Activities of the various Amt VI Referate in 44/45 may be briefly summarised. In FRANCE, during the last months of German occupation, all efforts were concentrated on the increasing partisan problem, and the preservation of civilian morale despite the air attacks. Work on the inner political scene, which had been the chief function of VI in FRANCE, became almost non-existent. As Amt VI Bds PARIS and other VI Dienststellen withdrew to GERMANY increasing importance was laid on the despatch of agents through the lines, and on P/O networks. In autumn 44 it was said that some 15% of agents, both W/T and espionage, had returned with reports. The chief object of Leitstelle WALTER, the former Amt VI Bds PARIS (see CSDIC/CIF/SD 29, para 3) was to work in conjunction with French emigres from FRANCE, especially the DORIOT group, and from GERMANY and ITALY, and through SWITZERLAND, to maintain contact with pro-German French groups that had remained behind, and with P/O agents. A similar role was played by Amt VI of Bds BRUSSEL, which set up as Leitstelle NORD-WEST at MAREBURG after the withdrawal and likewise attempted to maintain contact with elements in BELGIUM.

In SPAIN, because of increasing Allied pressure on the FRANCO Government, Amt VI attempted to increase the number of VI representatives already in the country, in case any of those already there should have to be withdrawn because they were too well-known to the Allies. They were to be set up in diplomatic missions or in industrial circles. So far as Source knows it was found impossible to send more representatives to the country because of the attitude of the Spanish Government. Despite Allied pressure, Amt VI succeeded, because largely of the influence of BERNHARD, in maintaining the attitude of SPAIN towards GERMANY where it was wanted. The position with PORTUGAL was largely similar.

VI/D tried to despatch several agents to USA by submarine, but Source knows no details. In THE ARGENTINE some agents were still operating. The VI representatives in TURKEY continued to provide useful information on political trends in the country right up to the end.

KALTENBRUNNER was largely responsible for the revolution in HUNGARY in Mar 44, and the VI Beauftragter in that country played an important part. VI/S was also thrown in. In the last weeks of the war a number of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs were despatched from ITALY (COMO) into SWITZERLAND with missions for the SD Dienststellen in YUGOSLAVIA, but Source knows no details. It is thought that Ambassador RAHM has some knowledge of their intentions. Similarly a number of Czechs were to be despatched into SWITZERLAND from SOUTH TIROL under the auspices of Dr. NEUBACHER, the special representative in the South-EAST, in the last days of Apr 45. They had been trained under SS Obersturmbannführer HÄSSLER, VI Leiter of Bds PRAGUE, who had been Gruppenleiter VI/E till autumn 43. He began his attempts to set up a Czech espionage group in the first months of 44. It was the intention that they should pose as anti-Germans and establish contact with Allied circles in neutral countries. During 44 it was also planned to use Slovaks for a similar purpose. Till the end of 43 work in SLOVAKIA had been undertaken by Amt III, but from 44 on it became the province of Amt VI, which concentrated on the inner political condition inside the country, apart from the recruiting of the Slovak agents.

It is some indication of the muddled conditions prevailing during the last months of the war that while SCHELLENBERG was attempting to get in touch with the Allies to sound their views on an end of hostilities, he brought about two changes in the organisation of Amt VI; the school for VI personnel was finally set up, and the establishment of the Central Evaluation Department, begun at end 44, was finally concluded.

Corrigenda : In CSDIC/CIF/SD 29, App "A", under Aussonstellung of SD Leitabschnitt STUTTGART, for "EVENSTADT" read "FREUDENSTADT".

In CSDIC/CIF/SD 32 para 3.a. line 1, for "British or French Major" read "British or Irish Major".

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