

SECRET

*Triplite*

12 July 1945.

1. SUBJECT: Character Sketch of SCHULLENBERG; chief of Germany's  
Espionage Service.

SOURCE: SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Wilhelm HOETEL, chief referent Group  
VI E, RSHL.

1. SCHULLENBERG's meteoric rise to power, despite the initial handicap of youth and a high party number, has been considered a remarkable feat by his admirers as well as by his detractors. To a very large degree it can be attributed to sheer ability and remarkable industry, the hallmarks of success in all these countries, but not necessarily in Nazi Germany where the accidents of race and political background weigh heavily.
2. SCHULLENBERG had his start in politics in his hometown Saarbrücken, where he taught "Weltanschauung" in the local unit of the Allgemeine SS. In 1934 he was taken on by the Sicherheitsdienst and posted to the personnel department of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Amt I). At that time the SD was still in its formative stage and consequently Amt I was of pivotal importance. Beyond the narrow confines of a second-string position, SCHULLENBERG held at first, he soon began to exert considerable influence. His conspicuous talent for organization did not escape the attention of the all-powerful chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, HEYDRICH, who soon took him under his wings. In the course of time the relationship SCHULLENBERG - HEYDRICH deepened and besides being counted among HEYDRICH's most trusted co-workers, he enjoyed the rare privilege of invitations to his private home. He stood high in the favor of Frau LINN. (HEYDRICH's wife) whose charm sufficed to make the Hanguan shake in his boots, and so that it was generally expected he would marry the widow. SCHULLENBERG did not do this, with her husband's timely demise Frau LINN. fulfilled her usefulness for SCHULLENBERG.
3. SCHULLENBERG's career took a decisive turn in the direction of where his real talents lay when he was transferred to Amt IV (Geheime Staatspolizei) and appointed head of Amt IV B, IV E (later IV A 5 was the counter-intelligence branch of the SD), the ideal proving ground for new and untried methods of espionage work developed on the enemy side. SCHULLENBERG never busied himself with routine Gustavo matters and his most conspicuous attainment in that branch, the abduction of two prominent British agents STEWART and LEE (code names), was an Amt VI undertaking, with SCHULLENBERG as the main force even taking a decisive part in the planning. At the time he moved to Amt VI, his reputation as a "Nachricht-erwartung" was established and, besides, he had worked himself up to a position of the, next to the Gruppenführer BRELLER (Chief Amt IV), most powerful man in Amt IV.
4. It goes without saying that the circumstances surrounding SCHULLENBERG's accession to power in Amt VI at some length, because they bring out some of his most salient characteristics, among them the conspicuous absence of moral scruples in pursuing his ends.

Already in 1940 HEYDRICH had made up his mind to oust the then chief of Amt VI - SS-Brigadeführer JOST - of whose abilities he had a low estimate. At that time the main stumbling block was SS-Brigadeführer Dr. STAHLCKER, the most serious candidate a vacancy left by JOST. HEYDRICH who feared that STAHLCKER's net was not even wider, decided for the lesser evil and on to JOST who was waiting for more propitious circumstances in which to effect the change-over.

5. In Autumn 1941 the time appeared ripe. SS-Sturmbannführer SCHULLENBERG was appointed deputy chief Amt VI (he signed all official documents as Chief VI/V) and given the specific mission by HEYDRICH to build up a damaging case against JOST. SCHULLENBERG went about this task with his customary circumspection. Registrar KRAUSELIN was the main contact.

HLEUCH (chief investigator of the RSHA); had been t. 1 to concoct the frameup and put it on a legally sound basis, was attached to SCHELLENBERG. The three let no grass grow under their feet and in due time managed to 'uncover' certain misdemeanors on the part of JOST. JOST, as it turned out, has been wanting to build a little house for himself in Berlin. He lacked ready cash and accepted the offer of SS Obersturmbannführer VOLLHEIM, group chief VI.C, to arrange for a cheap credit with a banking house in Prague. This rather innocuous transaction emerged, after the trio had given matters the proper slant, as a full-fledged case of bribery, implicating besides JOST, SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. FLEMMER and SS-Sturmbannführer LEPFER. Pending investigation they were to drag on for years, JOST was relieved of his post and, in October 1943, SCHELLENBERG appointed deputy chief of VI.

6. SCHELLENBERG's appointment was to be a milestone in the history of the German espionage service. He has set his sights high: his aim was no less than the creation of an all-inclusive Espionage service in Germany, doing away with the notorious quality of political and military espionage, the latter the exclusive domain of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht through its staff officer. His endeavours towards that aim were at first none too successful. SCHELLENBERG himself was to blame for that. In his eagerness to clear the Russian stables of Lt VI his innate distrust of men and men's motives drove him too far. He purged most of the experienced group chiefs from his staffs and replaced them by young inexperienced men whose talents lagged considerably behind the enthusiasm they brought to the job.

In 1943 the personal animus had been finally overcome and the ascendancy of SCHELLENBERG over the staff was to make itself felt. It coincided with the appointment of Lt. VOLLHEIM, SS-Obersturmbannführer der Sicherheitspolizei. In contrast with Lt. VOLLHEIM, KALTENBUNGER evinced a lively interest in the foreign espionage branch of the RSHA, putting the full weight of his position behind the proposition of Lt. VI and the improvement of its services. As a result of course, the preferential treatment accorded Lt. VI and Lt. VOLLHEIM, and the former had to be handed a sizable part of the staff of Lt. VOLLHEIM III. Still, in spring 1944, after the matter with the staff officer had been consummated, SCHELLENBERG had taken to a position of untested power in the RSHA, a position he was to reinforce in the aftermath of the 20th July.

To form a correct estimate of SCHELLENBERG's character, one must have known him over a considerable period of time. This might sound like a truism, if it were not for the fact that his character is of inordinate complexity, masterfully disguised. Snap judgments are bound to be either superficial or erroneous. E.g. to cast SCHELLENBERG in the common mould of a Nazi gangster carried up through a vagary of fate, would be missing the main point. Neither he nor KALTENBUNGER conform to type, they are both sui generis.

SCHELLENBERG is a consummate actor. He can turn on the charm and when he does, the impression of being face to face with a nice, harmless and quite ingenuitous man is all but irresistible. SCHELLENBERG has a habit of leading the person he talks to deep into the eyes as if he were trying to convey: "look, what I am telling you here really springs from the depth of my heart; since you caught me in a weak moment I might as well confess to it". In real life SCHELLENBERG is an ice-cold, ever calculating realist, who leaves nothing to chance and who even in his 'weak moments' knows how to regulate the impression he sees fit to give. SCHELLENBERG knows what he wants, he knows how to get there if need be over corpses. For SCHELLENBERG the words 'friendship' and 'loyalty' bear no meaning, nor does he expect them from others.

10. The dream in SCHELLENBERG's life was the creation of one single espionage system omnipotent in the field of political decision and comparable to what he conceives the British Secret Service to be. To make this dream come true, he was willing to sacrifice everything, not excluding his health and the happiness of his family life. For years he had never, not even for a matter of hours, taken time off to relax and enjoy life.

He knowingly drove himself to a physical collapse and his gall bladder ailment is primarily due to overstrain.

11. SCHELLEBERG's private life, if there is such a thing, is impeccable. He neither smokes, nor drinks, nor craves female companionship. He lives an ascetic's life and the emoluments of his position have never tempted him. He lived within the limits proscribed by his ration coupons and if his private secretary had not taken care of him, symptoms of malnutrition might have taken in serious proportions. His asceticism, however, did not stem from any higher ethical motives. He merely felt that continence would be his most powerful weapon in holding off his detractors who would gladly have seized upon just any circumstance liable to reflect upon his integrity.
12. SCHELLEBERG was inconsiderate not only to himself but also to his family. He loved his sick wife when her death appeared likely but she would be unable to bear any more children. By all means he had to please his great protector Hitler, who liked to see his subordinate's own in a certain way. To that end he bore three children in blank disregard of his wife's poor state of health. After the last child had been born the delivery appeared to be particularly difficult; SCHELLEBERG had to give a doctor's order to bring Hitler to his wife's bedside.
13. His survival, potential and actual, SCHELLEBERG fought with incredible pertinacity, single-mindedness and collaboration. In order to gain control over the military cryptographic system (Abwehr) SCHELLEBERG procured the necessary information and evidence against Admiral Zumbach, his chosen successor. At the same time he went out of his way to prove to Hitler that despite the prevailing spirit of competition, his feelings were those of friendly feeling with friends. He must have realized that it was his credit in the wake of the VERBODEN incident (concerning the German mission in Turkey to the British), that Hitler would have to take notice of him and cancel the Abwehr. After the attack on Hitler the Abwehr was completely broken up and the evidence against Zumbach was used to show that the Abwehr was the enemy powers had been beyond his jurisdiction.
14. Hitler was never satisfied with the new chief of staff (the successor of the Abwehr, General W. W. W. W.). He either must have known or at Hitler's indirect request he must have suspected their collusion. His conduct, under the plot of the 20 July blow up, was certainly not prompted by disloyalty. In one of the few few leading men in Germany Hitler had any personal contact with Hitler's military fortunes were on the wane and he would not have wanted to act on that conviction and break Hitler again with his own hands. Therefore his dominant emotion upon the 20 July was one of petulance rather than of downright indignation. What trick his most was Hitler's double-cross had to have been awarded a high place on the liquidation roster of the new government.
15. SCHELLEBERG's relations with Kaltenbrunner, were short of cordial. He is a type he did not appeal to Kaltenbrunner, but that did not deter him. By every manner of means he tried to ingratiate himself with Kaltenbrunner. In his personal contacts with the Cdc he frequently displayed a rather disgusting servility. In that respect he was typical product of the Mendrich era: Never talk back to a superior and avoid telling him all the bad news. Needless to emphasize, SCHELLEBERG did not feel bound by any obligations of loyalty towards his chief.
16. Hitler entertained great personal esteem for SCHELLEBERG. He even nicknamed him: Benjamin. Whenever a suitable opportunity offered, SCHELLEBERG reported to Hitler direct. Kaltenbrunner did nothing to stop that practice. He was much too phlegmatic to make an issue of 'trifle' and, besides, he did not consider SCHELLEBERG a serious opponent, although he suspected him of hatching out a plot in conspiracy with SS Obergruppenfuhrer Berger, Kaltenbrunner's replaceable enemy.

17. To what extent SHELLENBERG was actually able to influence HILLER's decisions is difficult to gauge. Although he was intellectually far superior to HILLER, his natural inclination not to come out into the open with his true convictions tended to minimize his influence. At the same time he developed a remarkable skill in instilling certain beliefs or opinions into HILLER, making him think that it was actually his own original idea which SHELLENBERG had merely put into words.
18. As an established fact SHELLENBERG fanned HILLER's strong dislike for KALTENBUNNER. His weapons: the easy insinuation in preference to blunt accusations. An aside comment on KALTENBUNNER's increasing powers and independence, a passing remark upon his strong Austrian proclivities worked wonders with HILLER; and SHELLENBERG loved it.
19. SHELLENBERG had nobody in the world he could call his friend. When Reichsrat Sebastian, one of his oldest friends, was subjected to criminal investigation, SHELLENBERG dropped his like a hot potato. All chiefs of the Amt were SHELLENBERG's sworn enemies, especially HILLER of Amt IV who could not forget that SHELLENBERG at one time had been his subordinate. SHELLENBERG's colleagues were of course keenly aware of his intellectual superiority. Moreover, they began to feel preponderance of SHELLENBERG's two Ams (VI and VII Amt) in the NSDA. In the daily meetings of the Amt chiefs, SHELLENBERG was the butt of their most merciless attacks and frequently he came back to his office like a broken man. Even in his own Amt nobody fully trusted him; with one exception; his faithful secretary Fraulein SCHLENKE.
20. SHELLENBERG's enemies in Amt VI were SS-Sturzbannfuhrer SKORZENY and WANECK (VI E), SS-Sturmartensfuhrer Dr. KROCKEN and RAUFF. SKORZENY and WANECK were admittedly in the good graces of their fellow Austrian KALTENBUNNER and SHELLENBERG felt this very keenly. At the same time SHELLENBERG never hesitated to ask for their help whenever he wanted something from KALTENBUNNER which he dared not ask himself. Then again he played KROCKEN, WANECK and SKORZENY out against each other with so much skill that he actually got close to bringing about SKORZENY's downfall. Quite likely SHELLENBERG will claim now that he was a prisoner in his Amt, and that it was in the hand of KALTENBUNNER's henchmen WANECK and SKORZENY. That is not true, however. Both believed in direct action, disregarding channels and banking on SHELLENBERG's notorious disinclination to face issues squarely. If he had been less of a coward, he could have forced both WANECK and SKORZENY into line by the sheer weight of his superior intellect and undoubtedly he would have found the backing of KALTENBUNNER.
21. Despite his manifold talents and his unabated/self-esteem, SHELLENBERG suffers from a bad case of inferiority/complex. This is important to bear in mind. In a great many respects SHELLENBERG is unfit to stand on his own legs. What the casual observer may possibly take for feigned modesty, is in many instances due to lack of self-assuredness. SHELLENBERG is unable to cope with many of the demands the routine of daily life raises and certain of his mannerisms typical for the 'Weltfremde Wissenschaftler' are not just of but genuine.
22. From the point of view of professional accomplishment, SHELLENBERG must be rated as belonging to the top layer of Germany's leading intelligence men, in fact, he probably heads the list. As a matter of fact his forte is not intelligence work as such, for which he lacks the practical foundation, but his outstanding knack for organization and imparting constructive ideas. SHELLENBERG has made an exact science out of intelligence work. He would be the man to teach this science in a university. In spite of the above-mentioned limitations SHELLENBERG has been most successful in organizing and maintaining his own information net, notably in Switzerland and in Sweden. His lack in practical experience, it seems has been amply compensated for by his acumen in judging people and by his judiciousness in dealing with them.
23. To strike the balance on the various elements that make up SHELLENBERG's character:

Professionally highly gifted, though not devoid of imperfections.  
By all counts, a low character without standards of loyalty and common  
decency.  
A man who under no circumstances can be trusted.

MEMO 3

END

12 Jul 45

13 July 1945

XY-8438

1. SUBJECT: A Character Sketch of SOHELLENBERG, chief of Germany's Espionage Service.

SOURCE: SS-Sturmabführer Dr. Wilhelm HÜTTL, chief informant Group VI B, HSPA.

1. SOHELLENBERG's meteoric rise to power, despite the initial handicap of youth and a high party number, has been considered a remarkable feat by his admirers as well as by his detractors. To a very large degree it can be attributed to sheer ability and indefatigable industry, the hallmarks of success in all free countries, but not necessarily in Nazi Germany where the accidents of race and political background weigh heavily.

2. SOHELLENBERG had his start in politics in his hometown Saarbrücken, where he taught "Weltanschauung" in the local unit of the Allgemeine SS. In 1934 he was taken on by the Sicherheitsdienst and posted to the personnel department of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Amt I). At that time the SD was still in its formative stage and consequently Amt I was of pivotal importance. Beyond the narrow confines of a second-string position, SOHELLENBERG held at first he soon began to exert considerable influence. His conspicuous talent for organization did not escape the attention of the all-powerful chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, HEYDRICH, who soon took him under his wings. In the course of time the relationship SOHELLENBERG-HEYDRICH deepened and besides being counted among HEYDRICH's most trusted co-workers, he enjoyed the rare privilege of invitations to his chief's home. He stood high in the favor of Frau LINA, (HEYDRICH's wife) whose crown sufficed to make the Bangan shake in his boots.



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after HEYDRICH's death. Alas, with her husband's timely demise  
Frau LISA had outlived her usefulness for SCHNELLENBERG.

3. SCHNELLENBERG's career took a decisive turn in the direction  
of where his real talents lay when he was transferred to Amt IV  
(Sachamt Staatspolizei) and appointed group chief IV 2. IV 2  
(later IV 3) was the counter-intelligence branch of the RSHA, the  
ideal proving ground for new and untried methods of espionage  
work developed on the enemy side. SCHNELLENBERG never busied  
himself with routine Gestapo matters. His most outstanding  
attainment in that period, the abduction of two prominent British  
agents STEVENS and BOST (Venlo-Unternehmen), was an Amt VI under-  
taking, with SCHNELLENBERG as the only Amt IV man taking a decisive  
part in the planning. At the time he moved to Amt VI, his  
reputation as a "Nachrichtemann" was established and, besides,  
he had worked himself up to a position of the, next to SS-Gruppen-  
enfuhrer MÜLLER (Chief Amt IV), most powerful man in Amt IV.

4. It seems worth while describing the circumstances surrounding  
SCHNELLENBERG's accession to power in Amt VI at some length,  
because they bring out some of his most salient characteristics,  
among them the conspicuous absence of moral scruples in pursuing  
his ends.

Already in 1940 HEYDRICH had made up his mind to oust the then  
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SS-Brigadefuhrer Dr. STÄHLCKER, the most serious candidate for  
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on to JOST while waiting for more propitious circumstances in which to effect the change-over.

5. In Autumn 1941 the time appeared ripe. SS-Sturbannfuhrer SHELLENBERG was appointed deputy chief Amt VI (he signed all official documents as 'Chef VI/V) and given the specific mission by HEYDRICH to build up a damaging case against JOST. SHELLENBERG went about this task with his customary circumspection. Rehier-  
ungerat SEBASTIAN who, together with Dr. HAEGGH (chief investi-  
gator of the RSHA), had been told to concoct the frameup and  
put in on a legally sound basis, was attached to SHELLENBERG.  
The three let no grass grow under their feet and in due time  
managed to 'uncover' certain misdemeanors on the part of JOST.  
JOST, as it turned out, has been wanting to build a little  
house for himself in Berlin. He lacked ready cash and accepted  
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implicating besides JOST, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr. FILBERT  
and SS-STURMBANNFUHRER HAPPER. Pending investigations they  
were to drag on for years, JOST was relieved of his post and, in  
October 1941, SHELLENBERG appointed deputy chief Amt VI.
6. SHELLENBERG's appointment was to be a milestone in the history  
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his aim was no less than the creation of an all-inclusive  
espionage service in Germany, going away with the notorious  
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exclusive domain of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht through its  
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too successful. SOHN ~~himself~~ <sup>was</sup> to blame for that. In his eagerness to clean the Augean stables of Amt VI his innate distrust of man and man's motives drove him too far. He purged most of the experienced group chiefs from his staffs and replaced them by young inexperienced men whose talents lagged considerably behind the enthusiasm they brought to the job.

7. In 1943 the personnel crisis had been finally overcome and the ascendancy of Amt VI within the RSHA began to make itself felt. It coincided with the appointment of Dr. KALTENBRUNNER to Commandeur der Sicherheitspolizei. In contradistinction to HEINRICH, KALTENBRUNNER evinced a lively interest in the foreign espionage branch of the RSHA, putting the full weight of his position behind the expansion of Amt VI and the improvement of its services. As a matter of course, the preferential treatment accorded Amt VI came into the open, and the former had to be handed a sizable sop in form of a slice of Abwehr III. Still, in spring 1944, after the merger with the military Abwehr had been consummated, SCHULLENBERG had risen to a position of uncontested power in the RSHA, a position he managed to reinforce in the aftermath of the 20th July.
8. To form a correct estimate of SCHULLENBERG's character, one must have known him over a considerable period of time. This might sound like a truism, if it were not for the fact that his character is of inordinate complexity, masterfully disguised. Snap judgements are bound to be either superficial or erroneous. E.g. to cast SCHULLENBERG in the common mould of a Nazi youngster carried up through a vagary of fate, would be missing the main point. Neither he nor KALTENBRUNNER conform to Typus sui generis.

9. SCHELLENEBERG is a consummate actor. He can turn on the charm and when he does, the impression of being face to face with a nice, harmless and quite ingenuous young man is all but irresistible. SCHELLENEBERG has a habit of looking the person he talks to deep into the eyes as if he were trying to convey: "look, what I am telling you here really springs from the depth of my heart: since you caught me in a weak moment I might as well confess to it". In real life SCHELLENEBERG is an ice-cold, ever calculating realist, who leaves nothing to chance and who even in his 'weak moments' knows how to regulate the impression he sees fit to give. SCHELLENEBERG knows what he wants, he knows how to get there if need be over corpses. For SCHELLENEBERG the words 'friendship' and 'loyalty' bear no meaning, nor does he expect them from others.
10. The dream in SCHELLENEBERG's life was the creation of one single espionage system omnipotent in the field of political decision and comparable to what he conceives the British Secret Service to be. To make this dream come true, he was willing to sacrifice everything, not excluding his health and the happiness of his family life. For years he had never, not even for a matter of hours, taken time off to relax and enjoy life. He knowingly drove himself to a physical collapse and his gall bladder ailment is primarily due to overstrain.
11. SCHELLENEBERG's private life, is there is such a thing, is impeccable. He neither smokes, nor drinks, nor craves female companionship. He lives an ascetic's life and the emoluments of his position have never tempted him. He lived within the limits prescribed by his ration coupons and if his private life was not taken care of by the Government of Denmark, he was in serious danger of starvation.
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from any higher ethical motives. He merely felt that continence would be his most powerful weapon in holding off his detractors who would gladly have seized upon just any circumstance liable to reflect upon his integrity.

12. SCHULLENBERG was inconsiderate not only to himself but also to his family. He divorced his first wife when her age made it appear likely that she would be unable to bear any more children. By all means he had to please his great protector HIMMLER, who liked to see his subordinate spawn in a big way. In short order he begat three children in bland disregard of his wife's poor state of health. After the last child had been born - the delivery happened to be particularly difficult - KALTENBRUNNER had to give a direct order to bring SCHULLENBERG to his wife's bedside.

13. His rivals, potential and actual, SCHULLENBERG fought with incredible pertinacity, single-mindedness and deliberation. In order to gain control over the military espionage system (Abwehr) SCHULLENBERG patiently went about gathering incrimination evidence against Admiral CANARIS and his closest collaborators. At the same time he went out of his way to prove to CANARIS that despite the prevailing spirit of competition, his feelings were those of a friend dealing with friends. No doubt SCHULLENBERG can claim major credit if, in the wake of the VERMEREN incident (desertion of Abwehr personnel in Turkey to the British), KALTENBRUNNER was able to dethrone CANARIS and annex the Abwehr. After all it was SCHULLENBERG who had systematically gathered evidence to prove that close connections between the Abwehr and the sneaky powers had grown beyond the experimental stage.

14. SCHULLENBERG never confided in the new chief of Amt III (the successor of the Abwehr), Oberst i. B. HANKE. He either said

suspected their existence. His conduct at the plot of the 20 July blew up, was certainly not prompted by disapprobation. As one of the very few leading men in Germany SCHULLENBERG clearly perceived that Germany's military fortunes were on the wane and he would not have hesitated to act on that conviction and strike a bargain with his opposite numbers. Therefore his dominant reaction upon the 20 July was one of petulance rather than of downright indignation. What irked him most was LAUSEN's double-cross and to have been accorded pride of place on the liquidation roster of the new government.

15. SCHULLENBERG's relations with KALTENBRUNNER were short of cordial. As a type he did not appeal to KALTENBRUNNER, but that did not deter him. By every manner of means he tried to ingratiate himself with KALTENBRUNNER. In his personal contacts with the CCG he frequently displayed a rather disgusting servility. In that respect he was typical product of the HEYDRICH era: Never talk back to a superior and avoid telling him all the bad news. Needless to emphasize, SCHULLENBERG did not feel bound by any obligations of loyalty towards his chief.
16. HIMMLER entertained great personal esteem for SCHULLENBERG. He even nicknamed him Benjamin. Whenever a suitable opportunity offered, SCHULLENBERG reported to HIMMLER direct. KALTENBRUNNER did nothing to stop that practice. He was much too phlegmatic to make an issue of a 'trifle' and, besides, he did not consider SCHULLENBERG a serious opponent, although he suspected him of hatching out a plot in conspiracy with SS Obergruppenfuhrer BEYER, KALTENBRUNNER's implacable enemy.

17. To what extent SCHELLENBERG was actually able to influence HIMMLER's decisions is difficult to gauge. Although he was intellectually far superior to HIMMLER, his natural inclination not to come out into the open with his true convictions tended to minimize his influence. At the same time he developed a remarkable skill in instilling certain beliefs or opinions into HIMMLER, making him think that it was actually his own original idea which SCHELLENBERG had merely put into words.
18. As an established fact SCHELLENBERG fanned HIMMLER's strong dislike for MAJ. SCHUBERT. His weapons: the sly insinuation, the reference to blunt accusations. An aside comment on MAJ. SCHUBERT's increasing powers and independence, a passing remark upon his strong Austrian proclivities worked wonders with HIMMLER, and SCHELLENBERG knew it.
19. SCHELLENBERG had nobody in the world he could call his friend. When Regierungsrat Sebastian, one of his oldest friends, was subjected to criminal investigation, SCHELLENBERG dropped him like a hot potato. All circles of the Amt were SCHELLENBERG's sworn enemies, especially HIMMLER of Amt IV who could not forget that SCHELLENBERG at one time had been his subordinate. SCHELLENBERG's colleagues were of course keenly aware of his intellectual superiority. Moreover, they began to feel the preponderance of SCHELLENBERG's two Amts (VI and XII Amt) in the RSEA. In the daily meetings of the Amt chiefs, SCHELLENBERG was the butt of their most merciless attacks and frequently he came back to his office like a broken man. Even in his own Amt nobody fully trusted him; with one exception: his faithful secretary Fraulein SCHLENKE.

20. SCHLEIBERBERG's ekonomies in Amt VI were SS-Sturmbannführer SKORZENY and WANECK (VI E), SS-Standartenführer Dr.-KNOCKEN and RAUFF. SKORZENY and WANECK were undoubtedly in the good graces of their fellow Austrian KALTENBRUNNER and SCHLEIBERBERG felt this very keenly. At the same time SCHLEIBERBERG never hesitated to ask for help whenever he wanted something from KALTENBRUNNER and he never got to ask himself. Then again he played SKORZENY and SKORZENY out against each other with so much skill that he actually got close to bringing about KALTENBRUNNER's downfall. Quite likely SCHLEIBERBERG will claim that he was a prisoner in his own Amt, a mere puppet in the hand of KALTENBRUNNER's henchmen WANECK and SKORZENY. That is not true, however, both believed in direct action, disregarding channels and banking on SCHLEIBERBERG's notorious disinclination to face an issue squarely. If he had been less of a coward, he could have forced both WANECK and SKORZENY onto line by the sheer weight of his superior intellect and undoubtedly he would have found the backing of KALTENBRUNNER.

21. Despite his manifold talents and his unabashed self-esteem, SCHLEIBERBERG suffers from a bad case of inferiority complex. This is important to bear in mind. In a great many respects SCHLEIBERBERG is unfit to stand on his own legs. What the casual observer may possibly take for feigned modesty, is in many instances due to lack of self-assuredness. SCHLEIBERBERG is unable to cope with many of the demands the routine of daily life raises and certain of his mannerisms typical for the 'weltfremde Wissenschaftler' are not put on but genuine.

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SCHULLENBERG has made an exact science out of Intelligence work.

He would be the man to teach this science in a university.

In spite of the above-mentioned limitations SCHULLENBERG has been most successful in organizing and maintaining his own information net, notably in Switzerland and in Sweden. His lack in practical experience, it seems, has been amply compensated for by his acumen in judging people and by his judiciousness in dealing with them.

23. To strike the balance on the various elements that make up

SCHULLENBERG's character:

Professionally highly gifted, though not devoid of imperfections.

By all counts, a low character without standards of loyalty and common decency.

A man who under no circumstances can be trusted.

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