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SUBJECT			DATE	
Camp O20 Report on the case of Alfred HOUJOCKS @ BONSEN			17 June 1955	

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM

Page 9.
 When SCHELLENBERG gained control of the Hauptamt later on, however, the whole system of espionage was altered and placed on a much more efficient footing.

Page 25.
 After giving NAUJOCKS these facts, KALTENBRUNNER sent him to SCHELLENBERG (an official already well known to him) who, he said, would discuss the matter further with him.

NAUJOCKS accordingly went to SCHELLENBERG'S office in the Berk-aerstrasse, where he was introduced by the latter to the well-known SKORZENY (head of Amt VI S) who, he was told, would collaborate with him.

In all, NAUJOCKS had only two interviews with SKORZENY, the first in SCHELLENBERG'S office, and the second in SKORZENY's own office, which was located in the same building in the BERKAERSTRASSE.

Page 27.
 Claire BONSEN, who was still on friendly terms with LAUWERS, urged NAUJOCKS to intervene on his behalf, and NAUJOCKS accordingly used what influence he had with SCHELLENBERG.

Appendix II

Page V. February 1944

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 In this connection introduced to SKORZENY by SCHELLENBERG.

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51. SCHELLENBERG, Walter

Appendix V

The Venlo Incident
 THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
 TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2001 2006
 (continued)

CROSS REFERENCE FORM

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NAUJOCKS knew nothing of the proposed kidnapping until early on the morning of 21st November, when GOETTSCH rang him at his quarters in Berlin to inform him that he was to go to Disseldorf immediately as he was required to help undertake an important task.

However, after the incident, NAUJOCKS learned the following details of the early plans of preparation for the kidnapping.

SCHNEIDERMAN and KROCHEN, who were members of Aust III at this time, had contacted BAST and STEVENS either in Poland or Holland some six or nine months previously; with KROCHEN's consent, they kept in touch with these British agents and finally conceived a plan to kidnap them and bring them to Germany. They remained in contact with BAST and STEVENS when they informed that there was a strong group of men in Germany antagonistic towards HITLER because of his actions in Poland, and anxious to help the Jews escape any persecution at the hands of the Nazis. BAST and STEVENS expressed interest in this "group", SCHNEIDERMAN and KROCHEN informed them that this was a German general who was a bitter enemy of HITLER and the British agents then suggested a meeting with this general, as a preliminary step towards the kidnapping, and the latter promised to arrange a rendezvous on the German side of the border.

On the 23rd of November the interview remained undecided, and a decision was finally reached in favour of the proposed attack on HITLER in the Munich Beer-hall on the occasion of the Nazi Party celebrations on 8th November 1938. It was decided that something should be done post-poned until the 23rd of November, and SCHNEIDERMAN and KROCHEN decided to contact the German general, who was definitely known to be in Berlin at that time, and to have him contact BAST and STEVENS.

On the 23rd of November SCHNEIDERMAN sent a message to BAST and STEVENS, informing them that the German general would be awaiting them at the rendezvous on the German side of the border, and advised on GOETTSCH to take charge of the kidnapping. BAST and STEVENS then got in touch with NAUJOCKS and informed him of the proposed kidnapping.

On the 24th of November NAUJOCKS was informed by GOETTSCH that the kidnapping would be carried out by two men who would be arriving at the border on the 25th of November, and would have to cross to the German side of the border, and then proceed to Disseldorf. GOETTSCH was not feeling well, he appointed SCHNEIDERMAN second-in-command and instructed him to take charge of the actual kidnapping.

A conference was then held in the Central Police Station, at which SCHNEIDERMAN, GOETTSCH, NAUJOCKS, CHRISTIAN, the Chief of the Sipo - *ed-38*
HOLGERSEN (also since deceased), the deputy chief of Police, and a high-ranking official of the Allgemeine S.S. were present. NAUJOCKS thinks that KROCHEN may also have been present but is not certain; in any case, KROCHEN was not in Venlo during the actual kidnapping. *ed-38*

NAUJOCKS was informed that he would have some nine or ten men at his command, all armed with revolvers, and that two sub-machine guns would also be available. All who took part wore civilian clothes.

Of the men, he recalls the following names:-

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Untersturmführer SCHILLERMEIER

CD-8.B

BSST

VOIGT

LEWISCH

Geoscharführer STEVENS

CD-8.B

BEHROVSKI (S.S. driver)

CD-8.B

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There were also two members of the Düsseldorf Police in the party.

At the conference, NAUJOKS briefed his men and the party set out for Venlo. NAUJOKS himself drove a Ford V8 with some of the men; BEHROVSKI and Untersturmführer KRISTIANSEN travelled in an Adler driven by BEHROVSKI and the rest of the party travelled in a cabriolet.

SCHILLERMEIER and KRISTIANSEN arrived in Venlo ahead of the rest of the party, and they went immediately to the frontier hotel (see sketch). NAUJOKS cannot remember the name of this hotel, but states that it was more of a restaurant than a hotel, and had a glass veranda.

On reaching Venlo, NAUJOKS instructed his men to take up the assigned positions as follows:-

Two men went to accompany NAUJOKS himself and took up positions in the German customs shed. The man was to guard the transport, which was parked in front of the German customs shed; these men were instructed to prevent any attempt at escape by BSST and STEVENS in their car. The remainder of the men were to cover the Dutch customs shed, to prevent any possible last-minute action, and also to guard the street.

As soon as SCHILLERMEIER heard BSST and STEVENS' car approaching, he went to the door of the hotel and gave the prearranged signal by raising his hat. (KRISTIANSEN remained in the hotel).

The car with BSST and STEVENS drove in front of the hotel, and with a slight turn, backed into the passage-way on the west side of the hotel. At this moment, NAUJOKS and his two men ran forward, keeping out of sight of the car, until the German car had followed the agents' car and blocked their way of escape.

NAUJOKS states that the car containing BSST and STEVENS was a two-door Lincoln. The two British agents sat in the rear, while the Dutch chauffeur and Dutch officer sat in the front. It was at first thought that this fourth man was an English Captain, but it was later discovered that he was a Lieut.-Colonel on the Dutch General Staff in civilian clothes.

The Dutch officer was the first to realize the situation, and forthwith jumped out of the right side of the car, and fired four shots into the windscreen of the German car. Orders had been issued that there was to be no shooting, but circumstances alter cases and the Germans returned the Dutchman's fire. He was gravely wounded by fire from the sub-machine guns of the street guards. BSST and STEVENS were so cramped in the rear of the car, that they were unable to get their revolvers out before NAUJOKS and his two men pounced on them, disarmed them, and hustled them into the waiting Adler, which was driven at high speed across the frontier into Germany.

The Dutch chauffeur took no part in the skirmish, and NAUJOKS states that he could not have been in the plot, otherwise he (NAUJOKS) would have been notified to that effect. The Dutch chauffeur was also taken prisoner.

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As soon as HAUJOCKS was wounded, he instructed TCHIBOVSKY to drive him in the Lincoln as quickly as possible to Dusseldorf, where the Dutchman died during an operation, without regaining consciousness. HAUJOCKS does not know the man's name.

BEST and STEVENS, under escort, were then driven in the Adler to Dusseldorf, accompanied by SCHILLERBERG. The rest of the party then rejoined the waiting cars and returned to Dusseldorf where they reported to Police Headquarters. SCHILLERBERG immediately rang HEIDRICH to inform him of their success. BEST and STEVENS were housed in the police station overnight, whence they were driven on the following day to Berlin, accompanied by SCHILLERBERG. On arrival in Berlin, they were imprisoned at Albrechtstrasse 9.

BEST and STEVENS made no comment at the time of their arrest, but during conversation with him, BEST remarked that their capture was a piece of bad luck and part of the war. HAUJOCKS then told STEVENS a "very pleasant sort of" story.

GOETTSCH and HAUJOCKS, together with the men who had organized the kidnapping party, were summoned before HITLER shortly afterwards. HAUJOCKS was thanked by him. The leaders of the party received the Iron Cross, 1st Class, and the others received the Iron Cross, 2nd Class. All received promotion, except HAUJOCKS, who was told by HEIDRICH that he did not merit promotion in view of his past conduct.

HAUJOCKS later learned that BEST and STEVENS were interrogated by Gruppenführer MULLER, head of Art IV, SCHILLERBERG and KUCHEK and that they were questioned particularly regarding the British Secret Service and its activities inside Germany. As far as HAUJOCKS knew, they were comfortably housed and well-treated, as befitting their rank as British officers, and there was never any question of their being executed. In fact, HAUJOCKS believed them to be still alive, although he has no idea of their present whereabouts. The Dutch chauffeur, however, was later released, and returned to Holland.

He also learned some time afterwards that a Professor of Medicine, whose name he cannot recall, played no small part in the affair, but he is unable to say whether it was he who arranged the rendez-vous. In any case, he received the Iron Cross for his participation.

Camp 020
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