

Oct 44 - Mar 45

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[REDACTED]

THE EARLIER PART OF HIS LIFE

Prisoner denies any contact with this group. He claims to have met for the first time after his arrest in OBERURSEL. He further denies that he was ever approached by this or any other org to carry out industrial, technical, economic or political work. He denies that he was not aware that SCHELLENBERG had in mind an organization of this kind which would have made use of the IG FARBEN Int Service.

FROM OCTOBER 1944 UNTIL MARCH 1945

From Oct 44 until Mar 45, NSDAP VI published its own analyses of world affairs which were circulated only at highest levels. These reports, which appeared at irregular intervals - about every two or three weeks - were called "EGMONT" Reports and classified "Top Secret". For some time SCHELLENBERG, the ambitious head of NSDAP VI, had been an opponent of HITLER's and RIBBENTROP's foreign policy, and considered that HITLER was badly advised by the Ausw. Amt. Through his "EGMONT" Reports, which reached HITLER through HIMMLER, SCHELLENBERG, by giving what Prisoner calls "unbiased reports" of political trends, aimed to counteract RIBBENTROP's influence and, if possible, to oust RIBBENTROP from his position.

At the time, SCHELLENBERG's main preoccupation was the necessity of concluding an immediate peace with the Western Allies, in order to salvage as much as he could from a GERMANY which, he considered, had plainly lost the war; he based his hopes for a German renaissance on the pattern of events which followed the 1914 - 18 war. To have said so openly in a report which was read by HITLER, would have been considered high treason, but SCHELLENBERG, by presenting "objective" reports - GERMANY's position in world affairs being, on any showing, depressing enough - counted on persuading HITLER to listen to the "moderates", and failing this, to convince HIMMLER of the urgent need of betraying his "God" and removing the man who stood in the way of the long-term salvation of GERMANY. Although HIMMLER seems to have accepted the general argument behind the "EGMONT" Reports, he could not bring himself, until it was too late, to take the drastic step of overthrowing HITLER; HIMMLER's final peace talks with Count BERNHARDT are historical facts too well known to need recapitulation here. SCHELLENBERG saw in HIMMLER the only man in GERMANY capable of taking over control from HITLER, and possessing sufficient authority to conclude an immediate peace. Prisoner now claims that he himself never saw in HIMMLER

Source
see to
WIPSONG
inside
the
center
of
H. Hill
and
17 May
1966

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more than the hope of an interim government for a strictly limited period and mentioned BRUNING as a possible successor; but these were only nebulous formulations doubtfully accepted by SCHULLENBERG; the main point of agreement between SCHULLENBERG and Prisoner was that HITLER must be removed. HITLER hesitated until it was too late, and the real aim of the "EGMONT" Reports came to nothing.

2. WIRSING was the man chosen by SCHULLENBERG to produce the "EGMONT" Reports. His relations with SCHULLENBERG in this connection have been admirably summed up in Liquidation Report No 6, Counter-Intelligence Section, dated 9 Oct 45:-

"The important connection of SCHULLENBERG's intention of the preparation by Amt VI of a properly coordinated summary of political information from all available sources; and SCHULLENBERG to achieve that end did not hesitate to go beyond the recognised organization of Amt VI.... A striking example is his use of Dr WIRSING in the preparation of the "EGMONT" Reports. Dr WIRSING was a journalist and author of notes whose views on political affairs SCHULLENBERG often admired. He was, however, in no sense an Amt VI officer. But SCHULLENBERG, recognising his ability (and also a kindred mentality in political ambition) decided that WIRSING, with his wide knowledge of political affairs and his standing as a political writer, was better fitted for the task he had in mind than any Amt VI officer, and did not hesitate to invite WIRSING to prepare reports on political matters for Amt VI. The remarkable feature is that WIRSING was given access to all Amt VI material likely to be of assistance to him. With this material at his disposal WIRSING prepared reports on various aspects of political importance which were in turn passed to the Central Büro (of Amt VI) for further distribution as the "EGMONT Berichte". SCHULLENBERG had calculated in this way to have these reports, which attempted to be a true assessment of a deteriorating situation, passed through HITLER to HITLER with the hope that the foreign policy of the Reich would be framed to meet realities which HITLER would not face."

3. Origin of Name

In 1942, Prisoner, while a war-correspondent in RUSSIA, produced a memorandum for AOK IV severely criticising the German administration in occupied RUSSIA. This memo reached HITLER, or, at any rate, his immediate entourage, and Prisoner was considered a carping critic for his remarks. Prisoner, furthermore, had a long-standing disagreement with GOEBBELS and the Propaganda Ministry and had also personally offended RIBBENTROP by refusing to take over the Infm Sec of the Ausw Amt in 1941 (see Appendix B). In order, therefore, not to prejudice the value of the Amt VI reports, it was agreed by SCHULLENBERG that they should appear anonymously as "EGMONT" Reports. EGMONT refers to a quotation from GOETHE's "EGMONT": "It is not meet to oppose the king, yet one must stand in the way of the king who takes the first unfortunate steps along the wrong path". "King" obviously is not AVON

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subtle allusion to HITLER, while it speaks against Prisoer's opinion that he should consider that HITLER made the first mistakes in autumn 44.

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4. It was a condition of Prisoer's verbal agreement with SCHEIDENBERG that HITLER, GOMBERG, TRICHTER and BOCHNER should in no circumstances be named in his activities as "AGENT". In case of inquiry, SCHEIDENBERG would claim authorship himself, but no query of this nature ever arose. The following persons were named as Prisoer's author of "TRICHTER": HITLER, KUMMER, the two German agents of Amt III, the staff of the Zentralfura of Amt III, TRICHTER (by special permission of SCHEIDENBERG), TRICHTER and SOLZ and Alexander BORN (both of the Kul Pol of Amt III).

5. Prisoer's relationship with SCHEIDENBERG

In early 44 Prisoer's friends, TRICHTER and SOLZ, mentioned in the course of political discussions, that SCHEIDENBERG was, from 30 Oct, a "re-scriber" and, one might say, the author of his work. TRICHTER and SOLZ would arrange meetings between Prisoer and SCHEIDENBERG. TRICHTER was responsible for his part in the 30 July plot but he had already arranged for meeting with SCHEIDENBERG. SCHEIDENBERG's assistant, GOMBERG, Prisoer's contact for a while at the end of 44, told Prisoer that SCHEIDENBERG told him various things in the past, including that SCHEIDENBERG had been in the hospital for a while, which contained some of the activities of HITLER. Prisoer was plunged into Hitler's political situation, the gist of which was that the army was lost, that in order to get out of the East, the army must be destroyed, and with this the army would be destroyed. Prisoer was told that SCHEIDENBERG was a political agitator and that he was a political agitator. Prisoer was told that SCHEIDENBERG was a political agitator and that he was a political agitator.

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specific points which could only be briefly touched on in the reports, on which he considered SCHELLENBERG should take action (see para 11).

8. Prisoner's knowledge of GIS

Prisoner claims that his knowledge of GIS org and personalities was slight, and that although he had access to GIS material, he considered himself an outsider and abstained from closer inquiry. Prisoner denies having any knowledge of GIS methods of obtaining int from abroad. He claims to have been aware of the existence of the Kps, but denies knowledge of details. There is no reason to disbelieve Prisoner on this point, since extensive knowledge of the GIS org was not necessary for the production of TROTT Reports.

At the beginning of Prisoner's collaboration with Amt VI, SCHELLENBERG gave Prisoner a general outline of the GIS, and specifically of the Amt VI org, without disclosing int methods. Prisoner states that as a journalist, he had hitherto had a low opinion of the efficiency of the GIS, and was surprised by the quality of int available. SCHELLENBERG introduced Prisoner to the heads of the Gruppen, and Prisoner recalls meeting Standf SANDERGER, Standf THIE, Ostuf FUNGER, Ostuf CLASSEN, Maj CHLETZ (Maj Oberfeldrichter SCHON). SANDERGER later explained to Prisoner the internal org of Amt VI. When Amt VI was reorganized

"There remains a slight chance for GERMANY to make contact with these circles, especially as Amt VI has contacts with BRUNING through SWITZERLAND."

(NOTE: Prisoner had met BRUNING in 1932, but claims that he had not kept contact with him. When TROTT and Prisoner were looking for a suitable figurehead for a new Government, BRUNING's name was mentioned. TROTT then said that he was in contact with BRUNING through, Prisoner believes, an American who was working at the International Bank in BASLE, and Anton BOHM, of the Ausw Amt, was also in correspondence through another source. SCHELLENBERG himself had another personal contact to BRUNING through SWITZERLAND, but nothing further is known to Prisoner. Prisoner cannot say how far BRUNING was aware of developments inside GERMANY, but thinks

"that, up to 20 July, he was kept informed by TROTT.)

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"(Note 1: The main point, i.e. HITLER's resignation or removal could naturally not be included by SCHELLENBERG expressis verbis in the report. It was made evident by the above-mentioned preliminary conditions, which HITLER would never have been able to fulfil, and HITLER naturally only as a transitional solution for quite different forces. Therefore, in the last EGMONT report, the proposal was made to ask EISENHOWER to form the new government)"

"(Note 2: Neither HITLER nor HEIDLER understood the above-mentioned reasoning. The only result was that SCHELLENBERG began negotiations with a member of the Swiss Council (Ex-president MURY) - for the purpose of freeing Jews who were still in German hands; this was later stopped by HITLER. The second consequence was the granting of a few small concessions to DENMARK and NORWAY and to some of the French who had been arrested; these concessions were, however, nullified by the Gestapo.)"

End of the Bulge Interrupts Reports

With the beginning of the LUZBURG offensive the reports were interrupted for a while in order to await the results. When Prisoner heard of this plan a short while before, he told SCHELLENBERG that all chances which still existed would be ruined if the offensive was not a huge success, something which could hardly be expected. SCHELLENBERG said that no-one could dissuade HITLER from this plan. He gave Prisoner to understand that HEIDLER was too unskilled to act openly against HITLER. Although SCHELLENBERG, etc., clearly saw that that meant Germany's irrevocably the last chance,

Nov 44: Prisoner introduced RAHN to SCHELLENBERG. Prisoner hoped that RAHN might be induced to put out peace feelers for SCHELLENBERG through DULLES in SWITZERLAND, and also act as Amt VI informant. Prisoner denies that RAHN agreed to collaborate with SCHELLENBERG.

(11) Amt VI Daily Reports (Tagesbericht)

(NOTE: Prisoner has been questioned on SCHELLENBERG's statement that the Daily Reports also went under the cover-name of "EGMONT" Reports. Prisoner states this must be a misunderstanding, he claims that only his reports were known by this name.)

LEAD:

SCHELLENBERG's private source in LISBON. Through this source SCHELLENBERG obtained an American contact (through BOULES) and received info about internal American political personalities.

V-2 of JAKOL:

Apparently in close contact with the Swiss IS, and also some contact with BOULES in BERNE. Prisoner believes that JAKOL may have been an agent run directly by SCHELLENBERG.

French Source from SWITZERLAND

A private source of SCHELLENBERG's reporting about the internal political difficulties of DE GAULLE and his relations with BIDAULT. This source reported at great length on the significance of DE GAULLE's visit to MOSCOW, winter 45. Prisoner believes this info may have come from someone close to BONNET, then living in SWITZERLAND.

Chinese Source in SWITZERLAND

A private source of SCHELLENBERG's, from which he obtained at the time the sensational disclosure about the YALTA Conference, that the Russians had acted as intermediaries in introducing Japanese representatives to STETTINIUS. Prisoner still thinks this info is of doubtful reliability.

SCHELLENBERG's private Chinese source, reporting on the... This source was treated with reserve, as Prisoner awaited confirmation.

Distribution

Draft Reports handed in by Prisoner to SCHELLENBERG after final discussions were headed "EISMONT Berichte", and were passed out on the authority of KALTENBRUNNER. Prisoner is unable to say whether KALTENBRUNNER made any corrections before they left the NSDAP. The reports were then retyped in special "Führer-type" (an especially large typewriter) on RSHA VI paper and headed "ausserpolitische Lageberichte". (Prisoner claims he only glanced at one such final copy and is not certain of the exact phraseology.) With each copy went a note from KALTENBRUNNER, saying: "Herewith the latest report from Amt VI".

Internal NSHA Distribution of "EGMONT" Reports was:

One copy to KALTENBRUNNER.

Several copies kept by SCHELLENBERG, who may have given them to various persons at his discretion. For instance, Ogruf LORENZ read many of the reports and Prisoner believes that SCHELLENBERG circulated them among his Gruppenleiters. One copy kept by Prisoner.

References to "EGMONT" Reports

As a rule, each "EGMONT" report contained a short addendum, in the form of a private memo-remise for SCHELLENBERG. In it, Prisoner raised specific points at greater length than was possible in a political survey; these points were the result of the several hours' discussion Prisoner had with SCHELLENBERG before the publication of each "EGMONT" report. During these discussions, especially in the later stages, SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner openly discussed what could be done to end the war in the light of the existing situation, and concrete measures which might contribute to that end and was touched on during the discussions, of the BUSY negotiations to release the Jews from the concentration camps (aim: favourably influencing world opinion towards Germany); negotiations for the release of Danish, Polish and Danish Jews from concentration camps; release of five Swedes sentenced to death in the WISSEW trials (aim: to win the goodwill of SWEDEN as a prerequisite for STADEN's services as intermediary in peace negotiations); reversal of Gauleiter's HOPPER's radical anti-Catholic policy in AUSTRIA (aim: to maintain world goodwill of Vatican circles, through whom peace feelers were also attempted); These were all relatively small points which SCHELLENBERG could bring up in the course of his interviews with REIDER, who in turn might either give the desired instructions on his own responsibility or try and obtain Hitler's sanction at convenient opportunity. The memo-remises were essentially briefs for SCHELLENBERG, stating the problem and

proposing a line of action to be taken. Although the SCHELLENBERG memo-remises were the authentic work of Prisoner, and Prisoner was guided by the influence he could exercise without assuming public responsibility, REIDER was not aware of their political significance as such. Although, for his part, Prisoner had not taken any steps to conceal his intentions, REIDER knew of, and commented on, Prisoner's and SCHELLENBERG's attempt to establish contact with Western Allies. By 1943, REIDER was able to discuss REIDER's overtures openly with SCHELLENBERG when he went to report to Hitler, and REIDER kept SCHELLENBERG informed directly of the political situation.

PRISONER's work in the framework of SCHELLENBERG's and
Prisoner's work in interest in SWEDEN as the only remaining
German asset. Prisoner and SCHELLENBERG were both agreed that the
FROEDEN-RIEGER policy of resistance and scorched earth in NORWAY and
DENMARK was mistaken. Meanwhile, PRISONER had become friendly with
FRISCH, head of the Consular Dept in the German Legation at
STOCKHOLM, who also desired to see better relations between SWEDEN
and GERMANY, the more so, since the Swedish Govt would be unlikely to
act on GERMANY's behalf in any peace negotiations unless their most
pressing demands were sympathetically considered.

On the 15th of April 45, whilst PRISONER happened to be in
BERLIN, he met the Prisoner at PRISONER's suggestion and
discussed the political situation question very openly. The
Prisoner's political views were very clear. He stated in a
letter to PRISONER on the 15th of April 1945 that he had
been in the German Legation in Stockholm from 1940-1945 and
had been in contact with PRISONER and SCHELLENBERG. He stated
that he had been in contact with PRISONER and SCHELLENBERG and
that he had been in contact with PRISONER and SCHELLENBERG. This
information was obtained from PRISONER's files. PRISONER
was invited to visit PRISONER in Stockholm through PRISONER's
invitation by mail.

At the first conference in Oct 40 PRISONER offered Prisoner
the post of head of the Inf. Sec, with the rank of Gesandter 1st Class.
The position had become vacant through SCHELLENBERG's appointment as
Chairman of the Romanian-Hungarian Frontier Settlement Commission
and PRISONER's transfer as envoy to PARIS. Prisoner asked for 24 hours
to think it over. He decided, however, that by becoming a state
official he stood to lose his political reputation, without being
able to influence German foreign policy. Prisoner's avowed ambition
for some time had been that of king-maker, in his self-chosen role of
the man-behind-the-scenes: he was prepared to bide his time until
he could serve under another more malleable man whose political star
was on the rise. He therefore declined PRISONER's offer, a
refusal which led to a period of almost complete political impotence until
in Prisoner's "Egmont" period he once more became a power among the
Nazi satellites, and but for GERMANY's defeat, might have become the
guiding brain behind the Foreign Minister-to-be, SCHELLENBERG.

In spring 41, the MNN paid VIERECK a lump sum of \$ 10,000,
ie eighteen months' salary in advance. Shortly after the outbreak
of war, VIERECK was arrested by the FBI and the connection ceased.
Prisoner has since been informed at OBERURSEL that copies of all
reports went were found in VIERECK's flat in NEW YORK. Prisoner is
positive that VIERECK was only working as personal V-man for DIECKHOFF,
and not for the GTS. He asked SCHELLENBERG in 1944 whether he knew
of VIERECK, but the latter replied in the negative.

This was again of a few days' duration, officially undertaken
for "Signal". By then Prisoner was already working for SCHELLENBERG,
and was given great freedom by "Signal", who were aware of his
highly-placed connections.

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The war was drawing to a close and SCHELLENBERG was trying
to send out peace feelers. On the other hand HITLER, KEITEL and
TERBOVEN were in favour of a last-ditch defence of NORWAY and DENMARK.
With SCHELLENBERG's knowledge and approval, Prisoner contacted BEST.

Nothing appeared in print about Prisoner's visit to DENMARK,
he merely reported verbally to SCHELLENBERG the results of his talks.

PFLEIDERER fits into the framework of SCHELLERBERG's and Prisoner's overriding interest in SCANDINAVIA as the only remaining German asset. Prisoner and SCHELLERBERG were both agreed that the TERBOVEN-HITLER policy of resistance and scorched earth in NORWAY and DENMARK was mistaken. Meanwhile, KRUEGER had become friendly with PFLEIDERER, head of the Consular Dept in the German Legation at STOCKHOLM, who also desired to see better relations between SWEDEN and GERMANY, the more so, since the Swedish Govt would be unlikely to act on GERMANY's behalf in any peace negotiations unless their most pressing demands were sympathetically considered.

Importance of this conversation has been fully reported in CAGIG (S) dated Oct 21 on PFLEIDERER, appendix B, paras 6-10 and has been confirmed by Prisoner. Prisoner asked PFLEIDERER to let him have a memorandum on SCANDINAVIA. PFLEIDERER wrote this on his return to STOCKHOLM, and sent it to Prisoner through KRUEGER. The memorandum was incorporated in another "addendum" to an "internal report" wherein SCHELLERBERG could bring the matter to the attention of the Reich.

At the last conference in Oct 40 RIBBENTROP offered Prisoner the post of head of the Inf. Sec. with the rank of Gesandter 1st Class. The position had become vacant through STERNBERG's appointment as Chairman of the Roumanian-Hungarian Frontier Settlement Commission and RAHN's transfer as envoy to PARIS. Prisoner asked for 24 hours to think it over. He decided, however, that by becoming a state official he stood to lose his political reputation, without being able to influence German foreign policy. Prisoner's avowed ambition for some time had been that of king-maker, in his self-chosen role of the man-behind-the-scenes: he was prepared to bide his time until he could serve under another more malleable man whose political star was on the rise. He therefore declined RIBBENTROP's offer, a refusal which led to a period of almost complete political impotence until the Prisoner's return to Germany once more became a power among the Nazi leadership. SCHELLERBERG's offer might have become the decisive factor in the Prisoner's decision to accept SCHELLERBERG's offer.

On 12/10/40, SCHELLERBERG visited VIHERECK in New York City. SCHELLERBERG was arrested by the FBI and the connection ceased. Prisoner has since been informed at OBERURSEL that copies of all reports sent were found in VIHERECK's flat in NEW YORK. It is positive that VIHERECK was only a contact person and not a member of the German staff.

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