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Headquarters
Co. "A", 2677 Regiment
Office of Strategic Services

SCI UNIT A
SALZBURG, AUSTRIA

July 1945
LSX-33

SUBJECT: Detailed Interrogation Report of Johann SANITZER, Gestapo, Vienna,
Section IV 2.

1. Subject was arrested on 7 June 1945 in Salzburg, Austria, and has since been undergoing a very extensive interrogation.

2. SANITZER was recognized by the GIS as one of the leading double agent operators in the Gestapo, and has shown in his interrogation to have a most extensive knowledge both of DA procedure and Allied Intelligence Services.

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3. The Russian, French and British "Funkspielen" that are mentioned in detail in this interrogation are only a few of the many cases which he has handled. They are illustrated, however, as being representative of types of "plays" and are not all in which he was engaged.

4. Subject was not too familiar with the organization and procedure of the GIS monitoring services (See Appendix D), but insists that voluminous intercept reports were correlated and distributed weekly by the OKW Funkbeobachtung Stelle indicating what he thought was almost a complete "break" of all Allied military and agent traffic.

5. SANITZER was entirely familiar with the so-called, "one time pad", and, although he is no code expert, was of the understanding that it either was or could be broken by the GIS. The only actual Allied W/T traffic indicated (other than Russian) is that mentioned in Appendix F, concerning the British Funkspiel "Thomson" Major Faithfull of ISLD (Under Colonel Lockhart) Klagenfurt, came to Salzburg to interrogate the Subject on the British agent Mac Cranford. (See Appendix F). He indicated at that time, that all of the messages revealed in that appendix were sent to "the other agents" on "one time pads". Thus if the original ISLD messages are checked, and knowing that the other that the other agents mentioned were not controlled, one can easily determine the truth of Subject's thoughts on the "pad".

6. This interrogation report will be distributed only to G-2 USAF, London, Washington, Wiesbaden and Rome until further notice from X-2, London.

7. Subject is of no further interest here, but will be held in Salzburg until further notice is received from X-2, London.

E. P. BARRY,
Major, MI,
C.O., SCI/A.

Distr:

G-2 USAFA (1)
G-2 London (1)
Washington (2)
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EXEMPTIONS
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B. Service with the Vienna Police.

11. Subject entered the Vienna Police Service on 1 January 1928. As he knew SCHUBER, the then Police President, he was promised a commission, but it never materialized. In 1930 he was transferred from his apprentice job to the Technische Abteilung, on the basis of his knowledge of chemistry. The mission of this section at that time was to find a chemical weapon for use against disturbances; this they found in Chloracetophenon. When the Subject entered the Police, he took a special police training during the first two years while also serving on the force as a regular policeman. From December 1932 until June 1930 he served as a patrolman in the X Bezirk.

12. The Technical Section at this time was just becoming interested in radio communications. Radio was just being introduced into the Vienna Police then, and since there were no W/T operators available, the Technical Section, under the direction of Ing. DOMASKI, whose secretary Subject had become, was charged with the training of these operators.

13. In 1934 DOMASKI became technical adviser to the Generaldirektion der Oeffentliche Sicherheit, Abt. I, and the Subject succeeded him in his old job. Subject continued in this job until the Anschluss.

C. First Service with the Gestapo Vienna.

14. In 1938 Subject was offered the chance to attend a Police Officers School in Munich, but refused on the grounds that he wanted to become an administrative officer. Consequently, about March 1938 he was transferred, as Oberwachmann, to the Gestapo, Vienna, Referat II C (Legitimism, Reaction, and Opposition). His chief, at that time, was Dr. Hubert KERN. The chief of the Leitstelle was Stabaf. Franz Josef HUBER.

15. In September 1938, Subject became ~~ante~~-assistant (the equivalent of Polizei Inspektor), and attracted the attention of his chiefs by finding a silverfox fur belonging to a woman who knew Mrs. Goering and had made quite a political issue of the theft. The Subject solved the mystery and arrested the thief, an SD Sonderagent. On the grounds of these activities he was told to direct his aspirations into the field of criminology. This the Subject did, but was first subjected to two years of schooling and practice. Subject, was thereafter, placed in the different Referate of the Gestapo and in some sections of the Kripo.

16. Subject reported in August 1940 to the Fuhrerschule der S.D. in Berlin, at the Schlostrasse I, commanded by Obersturmbannfuhrer HELLWIG. This course lasted until April 1941. Courses studied were: Criminology, criminal tactics, criminal technique, Abwehr, police laws, Weltanschauung, criminal psychology, criminal medicine, etc.

17. April 1941, subject returned to the Vienna Leitstelle as a Kriminal Kommissar (supernumerary) and became the aide to the Referent, Regierungsrat Dr. Josef AUENGER whose action was charged with the repressions against rumor-mongers and the indictments against insulters of Gauleiters and higher personalities.

D. Service with the St. Poulten Aussendienststelle.

18. At the beginning of August 1941, subject was transferred to St. Poulten to replace the ailing chief of the Aussendienststelle, Kriminalrat NIKOLL. When the latter did not seem to recover, subject was appointed

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permanent chief of the stelle. The activities of this AUST were mainly concerned with anti-communist work.

E) Service with the Vienna Gestapo, Referate IIg and IVA2.

Further
Further

19. In February 1942, the IIg referat in Vienna lost its chief and subject applied for and received the appointment. Activities of this referat included: sabotage, Schutzdienst (protection of high officials during their travels), false police officials, weapons and ammunitions, false papers and attempts on the lives of officials (Attentate).

The entire staff comprised ten men. Subject's assistant Kriminal Kommissar MOROWITZ, was in charge of the Schutzdienst and a certain Anton BROEDL did the sabotage inquests. All the rest of the activities were directed by subject himself.

20. In May 1942, the entire Leitstelle was rearranged and new numbers were given to the different Referate. Subject's Referat was given the designation IVA2: MOROWITZ and his Schutzdienst became a separate Referat, numbered IVA5.

Subject retained his former activities, but two new ones were then added: Abwehrbeauftragte (industrial CI service) and W/T agents.

There was really not too much to do in the beginning. There were no real sabotage cases. BROEDL still had a lot of work, since all fires had to be investigated for a possible sabotage cause.

As for weapons and ammunitions, the only cases investigated were those brought to his attention by denunciations.

As far as false political documents were concerned, subject emphasizes that this was generally linked with intelligence activities, in which case Referat IVA3 would take over. The only case subject remembers is that of the alleged British agent MESSNER, the general manager of the Semperit Rubber Company who later was shot. Afterwards, when the Gestapo building was partly destroyed by bombs, Subject requisitioned MESSNER's villa in the Hasenauerstrasse, 61, Vienna XVIII, and used it to house his W/T station and his "better agents".

F. First "Funkspiel" with the Russians: "Quartiermacher Eins" (Cover Name).

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21. Around May or June 1942, information was circulated to the effect that Russian agents had been dropped in Eastern Prussia. One of them, the former Communist Reichstag representative, KOENNEN, was arrested. KOENNEN was accompanied by a W/T operator, who was shot during the arrest. A complete signal plan and a W/T set were found on the agents. After his arrest, KOENNEN described a certain number of agents, who were dropped or were to be dropped later on; amongst them he named a certain LANNDORF and a Josef BOERNER. The latter was found and arrested in Vienna by Subject.

22. BOERNER was found in possession of a signal plan, but said that he had hidden his set somewhere in Eastern Prussia. Subject accompanied him there and succeeded in recovering the set. He reported his find to the RSHA and was ordered to report with his prisoner to Berlin.

(Questioned on the reason why he accompanied BOERNER himself to Eastern Prussia, Subject declared that first there were very few people in his referat that he wanted to make the most important arrests himself, and, lastly that he did not want to give the impression to his subordinates of sitting behind his desk and sending them out on dangerous missions).

It appeared that BOERNER's mission was to secure military and political intelligence and to furnish weather reports, according to a previously arranged

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code.

23. Subject and his prisoner reported to Kriminal Direktor Horst KOPKOW, head of the IV2b section of the RSH. (See Appendix A), then located at the Prinz Albertstrasse, Berlin. For both KOPKOW and Subject, the arrest of an enemy W/T agent was a new occurrence and they tried to make use of the man for some sort of a counter-intelligence work. They finally decided to persuade the agent to begin a series of false radio-messages with his Russian chiefs. BOERNER agreed and S. NITZER was ordered back to Vienna and told to begin a "Funkspiel", to which the code-name "Quartiermacher Eins" was given. BOERNER, having explained the signal plan which was found on KOENNEN, KOPKOW decided to begin a similar "play" with the KOENNEN circuit and call it "Quartiermacher Zwei".

24. The aims of the two officials in beginning "Funkspiele" were: 1. to prevent the dropping of new agents in an area, where the Russians thought that the previous agents were safe. 2. to attract the dropping of new Russian agents, whenever the Gestapo wanted it. 3. to be fully informed of all intelligence requirements of the NKVD. 4. to be informed of the troop movements and the locations of Russian radio-stations. (Subject explains that near the end of the war, he knew exactly which route the Russians were taking, as they freely gave their locations to their "agents").

25. Subject, after his return to Vienna with BOERNER, did not want to begin his "play" before he had apprehended FANNLURF, as he feared that the latter might be informed somehow of the "play" and would tip off the Russians, through his own channels of communication. Berlin, on the other hand, began its "play" immediately. (July 1942).

BOERNER had confessed that he had been instructed by the NKVD to contact the 5th, 15th and 25 of the month a cut-out in the woods near Meerane, near Chemnitz. This cut-out, a woman, was arrested by Subject and three previously prepared postal cards were found on her. The Berlin addresses, mentioned on the postal cards were checked, the houses searched and FANNLURF was arrested in one of them.

26. Subject began his radio-play with BOERNER and his set on August 1st, 1942. A room on the fifth floor of the Gestapo-building was used as radio-center. This was the first time, that the Leitstelle ever used radio as a means of communication. Up to this date only the telephone was used and if ever the necessity arose to use some radio-communication, the radio-net of the Vienna Police had to be used.

BOERNER during his transmissions was watched by a man from the Polizei Funkmessstelle Wien, a regular police man, personally known to Subject. III of the 1st Vienna provided Subject with the necessary military information; mostly "cold" information of troop movements. The political intelligence was drawn up by Subject himself after having been submitted for approval to IV2b, Berlin. In the beginning, Subject also sent some weather reports, but was severely reprimanded for this, as this constituted a case of high treason. Contacts were made twice and thrice a week, at night. Because of atmospheric conditions, the transmissions were rather lengthy, sometimes four or five hours for a few hundred groups.

27. Subject was told to report his radio-traffic to the Vienna DF-unit. He informed the OKW Funküberwachungsstelle, Vienna, C.O. Captain HANNES HAUER, situated in a villa at 13 Maxingstrasse in Hitzing and which was charged with the monitoring and DF-ing of radio-traffic outside the Reich. He also notified the Funkmessstelle Wien der Ordnungspolizei, Vienna, C.O. Hauptmann GROTTE, situated at the Steinhausrikassene, Marokanergasse, Vienna

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III, which monitored and DF-ed all radio-traffic inside the Reich. (See Appendix D.).

Later, everytime Subject arrested an Allied radio-agent he would inform the leaders of the two units, who would assist him in the technical interrogation and would make their own inspection of the sets, the codebooks and the signal plans. (See Appendix C).

G. Funkspiel "KRONE" (Cover Name)

28. Soon BOERNER, on Subject's instigation began asking for help, as he had allegedly lost contact with PANNDORF. About the end of October 1942, the Russians informed BOERNER that they would send a man, called Emil KAMMLER.

Further
This KAMMLER had been a professor at the Leningrad Higher Institute of Physical Culture. He was recruited by the NKVD, together with his mistress Viola SANDROOS, a Finnish girl who had returned to her native Latvia from the USA, in company of her father. The couple had already accomplished an intelligence mission for the NKVD, before the German aggression, in Latvia, where they posed as language teachers. A few months before the war, the couple had settled in Reichenberg on another intelligence mission. Contact was to be held with an official of the Russian Embassy in Berlin. At the outbreak of the war, KAMMLER, a German citizen was forced to join the German Army, while his "wife" stayed on in Reichenberg. As soon as he could, the man deserted and reported to the NKVD in Moscow.

KAMMLER was dropped in Eastern Prussia and joined his "wife" in Reichenberg. He left his W/T set to her and proceeded to his rendez-vous in Vienna with BOERNER.

(A comical note: All "BOERNER" had arranged with the Russians was a rendez-vous somewhere in Vienna, at a certain date and hour (1700). The Russians had understood 0700. This caused Subject's employees to miss KAMMLER the first time, but they arrested him the next day at 0700).

Later on, Viola SANDROOS was enticed to come to Vienna and was arrested. As Subject thought that two "plays" were enough in Vienna, the SANDROOS woman was sent to Prague, where she was "persuaded" to begin a "play" of her own.

Who
In December 1942, BOERNER, who up to now, had been given some liberty was incarcerated in the House Prison on the 5th floor of the Gestapo-building. A Hamburg Stelle had also given some liberty to a double agent and the latter had escaped. Consequently, all Stellen had been ordered to deprive the double agents of their liberty.

H. Funkspiel "Burgenland" (Cover Name).

29. In February 1943, a new group of NKVD agents was arrested. It consisted of KOEHLER, alias KONRAD and a woman Emile BORETZKY, who was to operate the W/T set. KOEHLER had been chief organizer of the Communist Party of Austria between 1938 and 1938. He left for France after the Anschluss and from there finally emigrated to Russia.

The two agents of this group had left Russia over London for England and had been, later, dropped from England by a RAF plane. (Subject explains that there were two such cases during all his activities with Russian agents). KOEHLER was caught first. He had stored in one of his jumpclothes a bottle of cognac. The cognac had spilled during the drop and some blood-hounds used by Subject had picked up the trail. Later the parachutes were easily found. Actually the team was caught because of "apartment trouble".

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(See appendix B, para I). The Russians needed alternative current to operate their sets and, as there were very few quarters in Vienna provided with this kind of current, it became relatively easy to supervise these quarters and arrest any suspicious person.

The team also was "persuaded" to cooperate with the Gestapo. The project bore the name of "Burgenland".

I. Funkspiel Alpenrose. (Cover Name)

30. In April 1943 the first "Schutzbund children" were caught. After the Republican Schutzbund insurrection (12 February 1934) a certain number of children of arrested Schutzbund-members were adopted by the Russian Government and transported to Russia. A part of those children were trained as agents by the NKVD.

Zurbin
The first man was Ernst DORFEGGER, @ KERNMEYER. One of the numerous check-ups done by all police organizations for Subject was that all persons who claimed to be deserters who claimed to have escaped from Russian prison were automatically checked by Subject. DORFEGGER, although 21 years old, had shown at the Vienna railway station membership card of the Hitler Jugend, as he appeared much older than 17 years, he was referred to Subject, who recognized a Russian agent and "easily-persuaded" (sic) him to begin a funkspiel for him, which Subject called "Alpenrose".

why
"Quartiermeister Eins" was then transferred to Munich. Subject thought that there were already too many plays in Vienna.

how
"BOERNER" and "BURETZKY" began to have some contacts together in order to let the "ZENTRUM" of the NKVD hear about it.

Name?
31. Immediately afterwards "Quartiermacher Eins", "Quartiermacher Zwei" "Burgenland" and "Krone" were broken. This is how it happened. A woman-agent of the NKVD had been arrested in Frankfurt. In order to persuade her to cooperate with the Gestapo, she was informed of the plays Subject put on. She agreed to play and was given a policeman to make and send her messages. She easily seduced the man and he slipped in a message to the NKVD, telling the real situation. From this moment (June 1943) all plays were stopped, except "Alpenrose".

Zurbin E. 1
32. "Alpenrose" went very well (until the very end). It was so successful that it allowed Subject to discover a Russian agent in OBERREGIERUNGSRAT DR MAJ LEBOUTON, who was on the staff of REICHSSTATTLICHER of Posen (August 1944). Another rather important agent under the name of "FRANZ" was caught through Alpenrose. Subject does not remember too much about him.

J. Komintern Funkspiel Lindwurm. (Cover Name)

33. The 2nd of January 1944 three agents who were sent directly by the Komintern were arrested. The chief was a certain Gregor KERSCHKE and women W/T operators Louise SOUCEK and Hildegard NRAZ.

KERSCHKE was previously Landwirtschafts Referent of the KPOe, who went to Russia in the 30's and was then employed by the Profintern. NRAZ was an employee of Radio Moscow. Subject does not remember what SOUCEK's background was.

They were badly equipped, had no para-clothes, and had to jump without previous para-training. They were not armed, nor had they the abundant equipment, which all real NKVD carried with them (See Appendix B). They

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obscure
did not possess an abundance of documents, like the NKVD agents, but were in possession of large amounts of U.S. dollars, like all Russian agents. They did not have any safe addresses, as the women had quite a number of relatives in the Vienna area.

They were dropped in August 1943 in Poland. The women buried their sets and all three travelled to Vienna. As soon as they arrived in Vienna, the women began assembling a set, the spare parts of which they obtained through friends. They soon began sending and transmitting the Russian recognition signals. This interfered with Subject's plays and he notified the monitoring stations. (The women sent on the same wavelength as Subject's double agents).

34. In the meantime Subject had begun to assemble a file on all the agents, who might possibly be dropped in the Reich. All captured agents were thoroughly questioned on everyone they had seen in the training areas of the NKVD, etc. As quite a number of them were former German or Austrian communists Subject had even their photographs and personal descriptions, from previous police files. He kept it up to date by adding the names and descriptions of other sections received and by destroying those of agents arrested or killed. Subject checked his files and thought that the interference in Vienna must come from NR4Z. He had the family of the woman checked and asked the Censorship people to give him all censorship extracts of their correspondence. This caused NR4Z to move from one apartment to the other; it made her sufficiently suspicious to be arrested January 1944. The others were soon arrested too.

As the set was buried in an area then occupied by Polish guerrillas it was never recuperated, and Subject "persuaded" them to begin a play on a "Jack" set he had in reserve.

This play was really a feather in the cap of Subject. At the time, it was generally supposed that the KOMINTERN had been dissolved. That this proved to be untrue, was shown by the traffic Subject obtained with DMITROV himself and with KUPIENIC, the leader of the Austrian section of the KOMINTERN. In their signed messages they gave direct instructions to KERSCHE about his missions, etc.

Apparently KERSCHE's mission was to observe the political fluctuations and to profit in them by building up some kind of a resistance movement consisting of local Austrian workers, and not of foreign workers. He was supposed to do this through a few selected cut-outs. Those cut-outs which he had managed to assemble were, "of course" (sic) arrested with him.

One of the women began a play in Vienna, under Subject's supervision. Moscow told the other woman to proceed to GR4Z and investigate the possibilities of an underground movement there. Subject began feeding the KOMINTERN some political information and also some specific political material from Graz as if it came from the Graz woman. He also gave them some military information. In order to obtain some real Communist information, Subject had to obtain it from the "Communist Referat" of the Leitstelle.

During all previous plays the NKVD had simply acknowledged the messages and relayed some intelligence requirements. But the KOMINTERN went further and provided Subject with some interesting political tidbits to be used by KERSCHE. They told KERSCHE of the constitution of the Austrian Legion with ITTO's Army, something which was not generally known, anyway not by Subject.

Subject one day informed the KOMINTERN that he had contacted a communistically-inclined group of Wehrmacht officers and what would they like him to do? The KOMINTERN must have been suspicious because they radioed back: "Tell me the name of the grandfather of your wife". KERSCHE, of course was able to answer this question. The "Communist-Referat" was promising

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to provide Subject with a man, who would pose as such a contact, but somehow the scheme never materialised.

Subject began losing interest in the play, first because he says that he was only interested in military intelligence, secondly because he had to check with and rely upon the Kommunisten Referat for all his material and they were not too eager to help.

Notwithstanding this the "Lindwurm" play went on until the very end of hostilities (April 5, 1945) and "KERSCHKE and the two women were liberated by Subject two days before the Russians entered Vienna.

K. Funkspiel Rote MAUER, (Cover Name).

35. This concerned another NKVD group, transported over MOURMANSK to England and finally dropped by a RAF-plane, around February 1944. It consisted of a former Viennese communist called HUTTARY and his W/T operator, ZETTLER, from Bavaria. HUTTARY was a soldier in the German Army who had deserted and was recruited by the NKVD. ZETTLER had fought in the Spanish Civil War and had left for Russia afterwards.

They had been partially equipped in England where they had to wait nine months before being dropped. Their sets were Russian. They had received previously some jump-training (two or three jumps). Curiously enough HUTTARY had, as usual with these agents, a complete set of papers, but instead of using a false name, these were made out in his own real name.

While they waited for their drop in England, HUTTARY had learned how to send and had been equipped with a signal plan.

Their drop was rather unfortunate as they landed about 200m away from a German airfield in Greater Vienna. They got away and managed to hide in town.

HUTTARY was already in Subject's files, which contained at this time several hundred names and descriptions. They were arrested because of "apartment trouble" (having to look for an apartment that was sufficiently high up to enable them to send and that also had A.C., of which there was very little in Vienna).

They were arrested and were "willing" to begin a play for Subject. First Subject tried with ZETTLER, who apparently had lost his signal plan and said that he had memorized it. But that never worked out well. Then Subject began with HUTTARY and his written signal plan and that went all right. The usual military and political information was fed to the NKVD; Subject received it through the same channels. Weather reports at that time were not demanded anymore.

36. By this time Subject began having difficulties in obtaining all the information he needed to feed the Russians. There was no list anymore to give him some (middle of 1944) and only IC of the Wehrkreis XVII gave him some, with reluctance. At times they refused to give him any at all, owing to some news black-outs. Then they told him to go out and get it himself. Subject then fitted one of his own men out in an Oberfeldwebel uniform and sent him out exactly as any Russian agent would have done, and ordered him to look for the information which the Russians were demanding, and which the IC refused to give him. In this manner Subject obtained a lot of information and could see for himself how much an agent could pick up. He then submitted the information to IC, who would transmit it to Berlin for agreement. This caused an enormous delay (sometimes a week) and the information was then too "cold" to be transmitted to the Russians. Generally Berlin would cut the material to about one per cent of what Subject submitted them.

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Later even, when the Russians drew nearer to Vienna, they wanted to increase the contacts from a few a week to daily ones and that embarrassed Subject even more. He had to begin using his imagination. He had his man sick then had him say that he was forced to report to the police for registration, which led eventually to his induction, then to his discharge, owing to some physical defects, etc., etc.

L. Funkspial FELIXDURE, (Cover Name)

37. This group consisted of the agent ANGERMANN, a Viennese and his w/t operator KENNERKNECHT. These men were dropped on W.itsun 1943. They were found out because of bloody stains on a 20 RMK banknote (See Appendix B, para. VI E).

These two agents did not belong apparently to the same section of the NKVD as the previous agents. To begin with, their mission was sabotage and attempts on the lives of higher officials. Then their messages were to be sent to "DIREKTOR" of the NKVD. (The other NKVD agents addressed their messages to "ZENTRUM"). The "Zentrum" man had to repeat their messages time and time again, until they were received perfectly by Moscow. The new agents had a signal plan, but they never had to repeat their messages and messages of over 50 groups were not allowed; nor were they asked to repeat them if they were not letter-perfect.

ANGERMANN was already in Subject's files. They were in German Army uniform. A denunciation came in when a paratrooper had been seen looking for an apartment. A search was made and ANGERMANN had been arrested at his father's house. ZETTLER managed to escape to the Swiss frontier and was arrested there. He tried to shoot one of Subject's men at the time of his capture.

A sum of about 6000 RM was found in ANGERMANN's father's place. A certain amount of German explosives (regular TNT), explosive caps and safety fuse was found in Feldorf in a cache; also a German machine pistol. Contrary to the other agents set which was a "Jack" set, theirs was a DENSUR set.

Their mission, as already stated, was to commit sabotage and to murder a certain number of Nazi personalities, each of which had been designated by a number. Hitler was one, Goering two, Subject does not remember who was number three, but BALDUR VON SCHIRACH was four. They were supposed to execute their mission by recruiting their own agents amongst former Spanish Civil war veterans(?) and former Republican Schutzbund members.

They were also "persuaded" to cooperate with Subject. The latter began his play by saying that he had contacted some members of the Schutzbund and was going to perform some sabotage. At this particular time, the ammunition factory ENZESFELD burned down. Subject knew that it was caused by some negligence, as his section was doing the sabotage investigation. He informed Moscow that this was the work of ANGERMANN, but Moscow answered that they were not particularly interested in sabotage and that number four was to be done away with (Baldur von SCHIRACH). The RSHL thought that this would be a very good propaganda means, but KALLENBERGER feared that his rival SCHIRACH, might gain too much popularity through this stunt and he opposed it violently. Moscow insisted that no radio traffic was to be had with them until SCHIRACH was killed so the play finished there and then.

ANGERMANN committed suicide in January 1944. Subject published a notice in the papers that a Russian agent had been discovered, killed by handling explosives, which he was going to use for terroristic deeds and that a man of

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the description of KENNERKNECHT was seen in his company. Then they transmitted the story to Moscow and Moscow wanted the entire contents of the article transmitted to them; Moscow then ordered KENNERKNECHT to go into hiding for a while. Later Moscow asked whether KENNERKNECHT could possibly do something all by himself. (By this time Subject had already known that Moscow did not send any "help" to agents anymore. Berlin wanted the play stopped and KENNERKNECHT was ordered shot (for his attempted shooting of one of subject's men).

H. Funkspiel "THEISS", (Cover Name)

38. In November 1944 a new type of agents were dropped. They were sent by a FRONTAUFKLAERUNG TRUPP of the Russian Army. The group consisted of a man in Russian Major's uniform named Warner UNBEHAUEN, another called Paul WERNKE and a third whose name Subject does not remember.

39. UNBEHAUEN had been a German Oberfeldwebel, and was divisional W/T man in France. (The best W/T man Subject ever saw). He could receive and transmit 120 groups easily. He had been taken prisoner around Leningrad and then volunteered for work with the NKVD. He had been trained at Camp No. 27 (see Appendix B, Para. V). He had previously done some missions for the Russians. The agents who had seen him in Camp 27 thought he was a bona fide Russian Major. The case of UNBEHAUEN was interesting in this was that UNBEHAUEN said that as soon as he was through with this mission he was to go back and join a Lieutenant Colonel in a mission against the Americans(?).

40. This Frantaufklaerungs-group was dropped in Hungary. The third man of the group had given himself up, and soon the two others were caught.

By this time Subject was considered as the expert of Funkspiele against the Russians, by the RSHA and had been given the supervision of all Funkspiele in the areas of the XVII and XVIII Wehrkreise. He was told to go ahead with the new Funkspiel.

41. Subject began his Funkspiel by saying that he had secured a new signal plan from the Germans. Actually he had gone to IC of the Wehrkreis and they had made a new one and had it drawn up, printed and photographed in Dresden, after many consultations with Berlin. Then Subject asked Moscow to send a man to fetch it. A rendez-vous was made in Vienna. This Russian emissary really arrived but as it was Sylvester evening, Subject's men may have drunk too much and missed him. He never turned up again. Subject at this time was absent from Vienna, and learned about it after his return.

42. This mishap put Subject in rather bad spirits. He tried to contact the Russians again and now came up with a new proposal. He was to present the Russians with a new gasmask filter, with which IC had provided him. The idea was to induce the Russian industry on to some false track. But now the Russians did not want to send a man anymore and told "UNBEHAUEN" to send a man to the Russian lines and even told him where to penetrate them. IC was reluctant to put a man at Subject's disposal for this task but, after a long delay finally offered a young Slovakian, 17 years old, for the job. Subject did not think too much about the advisability of sending a youngster to certain death and the plan did not go through (20 March 1945).

N. Organisation of the IV 2 Section of the Stapo-Stelle Vienna as of March 1945.

42. Direction of the entire IV2 Section:
a: Referent: Kriminalrat Johann S. NITZER.
b: Second-in-command: Kriminalrat Adolf ANDERLE.

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c: Assigned Leading Assistant: Kriminalkommissar zur Probe SCHINDLER.

44. Section IV2a: (Sabotage, weapons and ammunition, political falsehoods attempts on the lives of high officials)

a: Officer-in-charge: Kriminal Inspektor Karl GLUCK
b: Members: Kriminal Sekretar Johann FLEISCHMACKER.
" Karl HERZOG.
" MICKSTEIN.
" Heinrich NIKISCH.
" SEIBT.

45. Section IV2b. (Funkabwehr).

a: Officer-in-charge: Kriminalrat Johann S. NITZER.
b: Search-group: Kriminalsekretaer Anton BRUDEL.
Kriminalsekretaer Josef WIMMER.
Kriminalsekretaer Josef BRUNHOLZL.
Kriminal Ober assistent Johann BOHRER.
Kriminal angestellter Hans OFENBECK.
Kriegsdienstverpflichtiger Walter BIHLO.

c: Interrogation group: Kriminalsekretaer Wilhelm WEISS.
Kriminalsekretaer Johann HEINDL.
Kriminalsekretaer Johann GUTNER.
Kriegsdienstverpflichtiger Anton ENZELBERGER.

d. Funkspiel group (later housed at 61, Hasenauerstrasse):

1. W/T operators: Kriminalobersekretaer Karl LAAS.
Polizeisekretaer MUELLNER.
Revierhauptwachmeister Karl KRONES.
Revierhauptwachmeister STUCKINGER.
2. Encipherings personnel: Ing. Karl LANGER.
Kriminalsekretaer BARZ.
Kriminalsekretaer VOELKHOFER.
Kriminalsekretaer GETTINGER.
Kriegsdienstverpflichtiger Boris TSCAUNOW.
(also the Russian interpreter)
3. Supply of materiel: Kriminalangestellter Hans SMUREK.
4. Sundry personnel: Chauffeur POENTNER.
Waffen-SS FISCHER (guard).
Waffen-SS POSCH (guard).
Cook and housekeeper Franziska PFEIFFER.

0. The last two months of Subject's Activities.

46. In the beginning of March 1945, the offices of the Gestapo became so damaged that Subject had to requisition the villa of a certain MESONER, who had been shot as an alleged British agent. Until then Subject kept in some rooms on the fifth floor of the Gestapo-building the following allied agents: KERSCHE; SOUCEK, NRAZ, of the Funkspiel "Lindwurm" BORETZKY of the Funkspiel "BURGENLAND" KERNEMEYER of the Funkspiel "Jilpenrose" UNBEHAUEN of the Funkspiel "Theiss" a married couple of the Funkspiel "Tiger" Lt Jack TAYLOR (U.S.), Hildegard RIES, and Emil FUCHS.

47. Besides these agents who were lodged and fed in the Villa, Subject

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established there his cipher-personnel and his W/T operators.

48. All police personnel had already received orders since 1944 to allow the enemy to surround Vienna and to fight it out with the Russians. Subject had received the order to try to persuade some Russian double agents to collaborate with some Gestapo people to penetrate the Russian lines and from there send messages to the Frontaufklärungs truppen. Subject finally managed to build the four following groups:

1. Soucek, Kersche and Subject;
2. NRAZ, and Subject's deputy-referant, Kriminalrat AND RLE
3. BORETZKY KERNMAYER and another employee, Anton BROEDL.
4. UNBEHAUEN and another employee, Hans SMIRECK.

Characteristically all W/T operators were to be women.

49. The 3rd of April a certain number of agents, who were also lodged at the villa were transported elsewhere; GINS'EL and SVOBODA (teammates of Lt. TAYLOR OSS), the Ukrainian couple of the Funkspiel TIGOR, Hildegard Ries, FUCHS had already been transferred to Salzburg.

50. Subject had quite a lot of difficulty in obtaining all supplies for the eventual missions and had to resort to personal acquisitions for tobacco, food, etc., and to requisition for a little ammunition, handweapons, and a few trucks.

51. The 3rd of April Vienna was declared a fortified city and the following day was spent evacuating the women of Subject's employees.

52. The previous day Subject had sent a W/T operator with his Funkmeister Karl MAASS to Krems, and from there the Funkmeister was to proceed to Salzburg where he was to establish a communications center. He had already assembled all the W/T sets and had received the necessary cipher systems from the RSHA.

53. The 5th of April Subject was ordered by his chief to transfer his Referat to Florisdorf and to send an employee there immediately as installation personnel. In the evening Subject informed his agents and his employees of the new situation and ordered them to meet in Florisdorf the next day with all the sets and the equipment. As for the agents they were told to proceed in requisitioned cars also to Florisdorf under the guidance of Subject's housekeeper.

The next day Subject didn't find most of his people in Florisdorf. Apparently some shooting had been going on in town, the rumor had been spread that the Russians were there and everybody had scattered. Of the entire group only UNBEHAUEN had remained and the housekeeper.

54. The 8th of April, Subject was again told to move and ordered his few remaining people to proceed to Zwettelin on the Niederdonau. Two days afterwards he brought his people back to Krems. The 12th he contacted the chief of Ic of the Heeresgruppe, Oberstleutnant Count RITBERG and his A.O. N.C. (dead) (Abwehr-offizier) Captain Dr. STECHER, with whom he had had frequent relations during his previous activities. The next day Subject heard that the same RITBERG had been shot for trying to flee the country. Subject decided to transfer his group to Salzburg, as the German army had declared Tyrol as a fortress to be held. Around the 20th one of his most trusted employees, Anton BRÜDL, and two trucks, left for Salzburg. Subject sent his Funkmeister MAASS again to Krems to establish some communications between

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BRODL and himself. He even made a special cipher-system for the occasion. (Nothing ever came out of this communications system). Subject in the meantime remained in ZWETTEL. UNBEHAUEN then volunteered for a mission against the Russians. Subject's chief agreed and Subject left on the 21st of April to Eberswantoer to the Frontaufklaerung I to get the necessary documents and a Russian Major's uniform. He returned and after some discussions moved again with his few remaining people to Gars am Kamp. UNBEHAUEN left for Ried in Surkreis accompanied by SMIRECK, but although he had the uniform and the papers from the Frontaufklaerung he had not received any papers from the I-Frontaufklaerung Kommando as they considered him "politically unreliable". UNBEHAUEN had to return to Gars and insisted that he wanted to penetrate, as quickly as possible, into the Russian lines. This made Subject rather suspicious and he ordered SMIRECK, who was supposed to be UNBEHAUEN's teammate to prevent him from leaving.

55. On May 6, Subject was ordered to report to the IC of the Heersegruppe Sud, quartered at Waidhofen on the Ybbs, and was informed that the entire Eastern Front had collapsed and that all troops had been ordered to surrender to the Germans. The next day Subject, UNBEHAUEN and SMIRECK went to Krems and talked the situation over. UNBEHAUEN then proposed to leave with Subject's housekeeper, Franciska PFEIFFER, with whom he had some relations, and was given a W/T set and a call sign FRA, while Subject would use the call sign ANI. He also received the necessary crystals. In case the word "KOMMIE" (come) was given by UNBEHAUEN they all would meet at Krems. UNBEHAUEN also was given an identification card with a blank in the place of his name, because Subject did not want to know under what alias UNBEHAUEN was going to operate. The next day Subject sent his chauffeur to Krems to inquire where the commander of his Stelle was, but soon the chauffeur returned with the news that everybody had fled. Subject ordered a general exodus and proceeded towards Marbach where he arrived in the evening on the frontier of Upper Austria near Baumkopf. Subject advised his men to surrender in uniform to the Americans, which they refused. Then Subject proceeded with his chauffeur in an attempt to encounter some Americans to whom he wanted to surrender. They waited in Prigarten for two days (10 and 11 May 1945). He finally arrived in Kleinarl where his wife was quartered. As soon as the Americans arrived he fled now with his wife and child. Subject tried to obtain the authorization from some American Unit to report to Salzburg but was refused. He then registered with the local police and was arrested after BRODL, his best man, had been arrested (7 June 1945).

P. Interrogator's comments.

56. Throughout all the interviews with subject, the latter has shown a complete willingness to talk about his former activities. He seemed to display a certain professional pride in the thoroughness of his work. He repeatedly emphasized that all major decisions were entirely of his own and that as far as the activities of the Referat are concerned only he could be made responsible, and that he was ready to suffer the consequences, if any, resulting from them.

57. Subject wants to give the impression that he considered his leadership of the IVa2 Referat as "his front line duty", exactly as any other German Army officer led his combat unit in the field.

58. Subject tried to interpolate in his narrative a certain number of stories, to prove his clemency towards the communists and his "correct" treatment of a certain number of Allied agents. He even went as far as asserting that he did not execute several orders from his superiors in the RSHA to shoot a number of captured agents.

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59. Subject repeatedly expressed his fear of being handed over to the Russians of whom he does not expect any clemency, of course.

Towards the end of the series of interviews, subject became more and more nervous and appeared to be in a highly tense and apprehensive mood.

Q. Note.

60. The "Funkspiele" in this interrogation report are not all the plays subject has conducted during his leadership in the Iva2 Referat. They are mainly typical plays showing either the technique of radio-deception plays of the Gestapo or typical intelligence missions sent by different Russian intelligence organizations. Subject affirms that at one time about 45 (forty-five) plays were conducted throughout the Reich and the occupied territories, either directly by the RSHA or by different Leitstellen. Amongst them were plays with Russian agents (the majority), Polish plays, two French plays, one or two British plays and one U.S. play, and some Czech plays.

How many can be elaborated on.

61. Interrogation by Captain Jules KONIG.

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Detailed Interrogation of Johann SANITZER, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV2b

APPENDIX A. * The IV2a and IV2b sections of the RSHA.

1. These two sections were named IV2, the head of which was then Kriminalrat Horst KOPKOW. It was sub-divided in two sections about the beginning of 1943:

IV2a: whose mission was to prevent: attempts on the lives of officials, sabotage, political falsehoods and the concealing of weapons and ammunition. It was this section which made the technical investigation of the attempt on the life of HITLER in July 1944.

IV2b: which occupied itself with W/T deception plays (Funkspiele) and searches for parachute agents. It was this section with which SANITZER had the most contacts.

2. The tasks of the IV2b section were manifold:

a: Supervision of Funkspiele throughout the Reich and in the Government General. Funkspiele in occupied territories were played by the Wehrmacht and did not fall in this section's competency. A huge list of Funkspiele was prominently displayed in KOPKOW's office, and was his pride and joy. SANITZER suspects that KOPKOW sometimes deliberately inflated this list to exaggerate the importance of his work. Subject received this impression when he saw a Funkspiel that he had only proposed to KOPKOW and which had not yet been begun, being listed as a full-working spiel. KOPKOW reported the activities of this section directly to HITLER. Subject remembers having seen a huge album, adorned with many photographs, typewritten in especially large type, which was submitted to the Fuehrer himself.

b: In general IV2b gave general instructions about the Funkspiele, general lines of conduct concerning searches for parachute-agents and the exploitation of intelligence gathered from the interrogation of Allied agents. Every six or eight weeks a general meeting was held in this section of all the Referente, who were conducting Funkspiele. KOPKOW would give them specific instructions about their Spiele and the different Gestapo-men would exchange technical information about their plays. Subject remembers having given one day a lecture on the "Technique of the Funkspiel" at one of these meetings.

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July 1944*

c: The section had a complete "museum" of captured W/T material, sets, signal plans, crystals, etc. At one time (Christmas 1944) the section was to publish an illustrated manual containing all known information on Allied W/T material, but nothing came of it.

d: The IV2b section in the RSHA played a certain number of Funkspiele itself. The only Stapo-stelle who played their Funkspiele independently were: Vienna, Brunn and Prague. All the other spiele were played by specialists sent specially by the Berlin section at Frankfurt, Hamburg and in Berlin itself. The specialists were absolutely independent from the local Stapo-stellen.

e: The section evaluated all information which was gathered not only from the interrogation of the captured agents, but the intelligence which was obtained during the Funkspiel itself. It maintained a file of all captured W/T agents and of all agents which might be expected to be dropped in the near future. As soon as an Allied agent was arrested a teletyped message was to be sent to IV2b of RSHA.

f: The section was also charged with the dissemination of technical

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intelligence about allied radio-materiel, radio-procedure and general technical developments. It is from this section that subject received technical information about the new cm-frequencies of the Americans, about an American set which apparently transmitted the dots and dashes on different wavelengths, about the special American W/T key ("bug" or horizontal high speed key).

3. The entire staff of the IV2, RSHA section consisted of about 52 men. (1945). Amongst the personnel of the IV2b section, with which subject had the most to do, he remembers:

a: Horst KOPKOW, one of the youngest Kriminal Kommissars in the Gestapo and, according to subject, an extraordinarily able man. Subject received the impression during his last interview with KOPKOW (January 1945) that the latter considered the situation hopeless and that he wanted to give up his present work and fight in the ranks of German army against the Russians. Subject thinks that KOPKOW has realized his wish and that he might now be in Russian captivity. KOPKOW was head of both the IV2a and the IV2b sections.

b: Kriminalrat Thomas AMLETZER, an aide to KOPKOW for the Funkspiele. Subject thinks that this man might have sought a refuge in Switzerland. He was in charge of all the plays in Eastern Germany and took the personal direction of the plays against the "Rote Kappelle". A personal antagonism existed between subject and AMLETZER, whom subject suspects of having spoiled a certain number of plays, which subject considered very promising.

c: Kriminal Kommissar MUELLER (Christian name unknown), who busied himself with technical intelligence about W/T materiel.

d: Kriminal Kommissar Hans MIKA; very young, took over the direction of the Funkspiele in Austria, from AMLETZER, around the end of 1944.

e: Kriminal Kommissar Hans STRUEBING; Executive officer for all Funkspiele and was especially charged with the executive side of the Funkspiele against the "Rote Kappelle" - It was to him that all information about the arrest of allied agents was to be teletyped. All further gathered intelligence had to be forwarded to him.

f: Kriminal Oberinspektor SCHOBER; an administrative officer of minor importance.

g: Kriminal Ober-assistent KLINGER; whom subject only knew because he had received a visit from him in Vienna.

h: Kriminal Sekretar HEISE; worked in AMLETZER's office. Very active. Was in some way busy with Russian agents, but only as an evaluator or intelligence obtained through the Funkspiele.

i. Subject's reticence about the work-methods of the IV2b section RSHA seems to be explained by his relation of the following incident: a special agent from the RSHA IV2b section, then on a mission in Vienna had told a woman acquaintance of his that a number of Funkspiele were played by his office against the Russians. This woman had informed Stalin of the facts, through the Russian Embassy in Sweden. Some minor official had informed subject of the betrayal, during one of his official visits in Berlin. SANITZER had reported this to his own chief, HUBER, who, in turn, related the facts to MUELLER, the chief of the entire IV-section of the RSHA. The latter had severely reprimanded KOPKOW and his men, who from then on were rather reticent about their doings in front of SANITZER.

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Detailed Interrogation of Johann SANITZER, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV2.

APPENDIX B. Technique of the Russian Intelligence Services.

A. Sections of the NKVD who sent Agents into Germany.

1. The main section, with which subject came "in contact" was one which was only interested in political and military intelligence. It signed its messages with "ZENTRUM".

ZENTRUM or The Center

Chief of the section was a woman, who wore the uniform of a major in the Russian Army. About 35 years old, medium height, dark hair, of definite Russian origin. None of the Russian agents remembered her name. This woman was apparently married to a well-known member of the Viennese Schutzbund, a certain DOBRITZBERGER(?) from Floridsdorf, Vienna. DOBRITZBERGER(?) was, at the time, leading a group of partisans.

This section sent the agents of the following Funkspiele in "quartiermacher Eins", "quartiermacher Zwei", "Burgenland", "alpenrose", "Haushammerfeld", "Rote Mauer", "Stalingrad", "Rote Moerder" (cover names given by subject).

2. The second section of the NKVD encountered by subject was only interested in sabotage and attempts on the lives of high Nazi officials. Its messages were signed "DIREKTOR". Leader was unknown.
3. The headquarters of these two sections and their radio-stations were located in Moscow by the German DF-units. Clear texts were in German.

B. Section of the Komintern, which sent Agents in.

4. This section, apparently did not send in many agents. Subject does not remember, anyway, many who were captured. The only Komintern team captured was played back by subject under the cover name of "Lindburn". The Moscow messages were signed KOPLINIG (leader of the Austrian section of the Komintern) and DIHITROV (secretary-general of the Komintern). The Komintern sender was much weaker than the NKVD senders and contacts were generally bad, especially on moonlit nights.

5. According to subject, there was a possibility that about 20 "Schutzbund children" (see below) might have been dropped in Tito-occupied territory. One of them, called S. NIDALNN, was arrested in Klagenfurt (end of 1944). The rest of the group was to go into Styria and from there into Vienna, when conditions were more favorable. Nothing more was heard from this group.

C. Agents sent by the Russian Army (Frontaufklaerungsstruppen).

6. Such agents-groups were either purely German POW's (as in the case of the Funkspiel "Theiss") or a mixed group, consisting of a Russian officer, one or more German POW's or German-speaking nationals (Rumanians, Hungarians, Serbs, etc.) who were to act as courriers and a W/T agent (male or female). Between December 1944 and March 1945, five such mixed groups were captured, according to subject. In one case five personnel-parachutes were discovered but the agents were never found. They were supposedly working in Slovakia.

D. Origin of Agents sent by the Russians.

7. The agents sent in by the NKVD consisted mainly of:

- a: Spanish Civil War veterans, who had emigrated to Russia (BOERNER and PANNDORF of the Funkspiel "quartiermacher Eins", ANG HILANN and

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KENNERKNECHT of the Funkspiel "Felixdorf", ZETTLER of the Funkspiel "Roto Muer").

b: Austrian emigrants: KOEHLER of Funkspiel "Burgenland".

c: Deserters: ANGERMANN of "Felixdorf", HUTLARY of "Roto Muer" and the members of the Funkspiel "Roto Moerder".

d: German POW's, who became members of the National Committee "Freies Deutschland".

e: Persons, who had contracted some obligations toward the Soviet Union: "the Schutzbund children"; these were children of members of the insurgent Republican Schutzbund in Vienna, who were arrested after the February revolt of 1934 and who had been adopted by the USSR and educated in a special home in Moscow. (Agents of Funkspiele "Alpenrose", "Haushammerfeld", and the woman-agent Hildogard RIES. Another example is provided by Emil KAMMLER, whom the Soviet Union helped in his studies at the Higher Institute of Physical Culture and who later received a chair at the same school. Finally there is the case of the woman-agent Emilie BURETZKY, who was permitted to stay in the Soviet Union, after her husband was shot.

8. As for the agents of the Komintern play, they were all members of the Communist Party of Austria. KERSCHKE became a high functionary of the Pro-Intern. SOUCEK was employed at the Lenin school. NRZ worked at the German-speaking transmissions of Radio Moscow.

9. The agents employed by the Russian Army were:

a: Members of the National Committee "Freies Deutschland".
b: Volksdeutsche, former members of a national-socialist organization in their country of origin or whose relatives belonged to a similar organization (for instance, a brother with the SS).

E. Schooling and Training.

10. Training of the NKVD agents was divided in two categories:

a: Radio-communications training: this was generally given in a group of bungalows in a suburb of Moscow or in another group of houses in KUSNARENKO(?). Each bungalow housed about five or six agents. Agents of the same nationality were as a rule not put in the same bungalow. They had to adopt a cover name and were expressly forbidden to reveal their private backgrounds. No student was allowed to travel to Moscow while training at the radio school.

The radio-communication curriculum consisted of: sending and receiving (minimum 16 groups per minute); contacts with an unidentified station; trouble-shooting, construction of receivers and transmitters. The course lasted from six to nine months. A three day cipher course was given by NKVD official, previous to the departure of the agent in the field.

b: Intelligence training - each student received individual instruction by NKVD officials in their own quarters. The principal subject was "agent-lore": how to make caches, how to establish a "letter-box", how to "shake a tail" (get rid of surveillance); selection and execution of rendez-vous, etc. A thorough course in diversionary methods (sabotage) was given where the students were instructed in the handling of

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explosives, safety fuse, primacord, explosive caps and the field-expedients for the use of demolitions (for instance, the use of artificial fertilizer, etc.) - practical demolitions were held at a place which agents could not remember. A thorough course in the firing of handweapons was given. Another course instructed agents minutely about the customs and the political and economical situation of the target-country. This was especially destined to students, who had left their own country, in which they were to be dropped, quite a long time ago (for instance, how to register in a hotel, etc.). There was a continuous instructional program about the world political situation. Another subject described thoroughly the organization and the armament of the target-country' army.

In camp 27, this instructional program was still augmented by general instruction on political economics, dialectical Marxism, German and/or Austrian history, Russian history and the history of the Communist Party.

11. Training of agents of the Russian Army (Frontaufklaerungstruppen) was rather short, (about two months) and was held in mobile schools near the front-lines. The main subject was military organization of the enemy. No radio-communication schools were there, as the W/T agents had already been fully trained before arriving there.

12. The existence of Camp no. 27 became known to subject in May 1943 through the Russian agent LANGERMANN of the Funkspiel "Felixdorf". Apparently it was a concentration or holding area for all POW's, who were to be trained as propagandists, Partisans, or secret agents. There were three areas or "zones": area one hold the candidates, while they were generally examined and screened; area two: training area for propagandists; area three: training area for secret agents. The recruiting of candidates for Camp no. 27 seems to have followed the same pattern: as soon as a German had been captured he was before a German officer who was a member of the National Committee "Freies Deutschland". This officer would undertake his first interrogation and endeavour to recruit the POW for the National Committee with the promise of better treatment and many privileges. If the POW accepted he was screened about his possible use in a special mission. If he was thought capable, he was then sent either to Camp no. 27 or to a Frontschool. According to LANGERMANN, the POW was screened by NKVD officials at the headquarters of the Moscow NKVD (in 1943), then housed temporarily in the NKVD jail before being sent to camp no. 27. Later on, the POW was sent directly to camp no. 27 where he was screened in area one. This generally took the form of personal interrogations, denunciations by fellow-prisoners and the observation of the POW's reaction on certain political provocations. While being in area one, the POWs would be "instructed politically" through meetings, anti-fascists clubs, pamphlets, newspapers, etc. This political indoctrination was apparently only done by Russian experts.

13. Parachute training for the agents of the NKVD was held on an airfield in the neighborhood of Moscow. The program consisted of a theoretical course (explanation of the parachute, etc.) and a practical course, consisting of jumps from a mock-up and two jumps from an airplane, flying at a height of about 500 m. A few weeks sometimes elapsed between the two courses.

F. The Mission; Equipment and Documents.

14. On the eve of their departure, the agents of the NKVD were given a mission order, which they had to read, sign and return to their chiefs. This document described exactly what they were to do and contained a clause whereby the agent engaged himself to suffer any possible punishment if he failed in his mission or would betray any secrets.

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15. In the period between the end of their studies and their dropping in enemy country they were housed in private houses in Moscow, held by trusted people from the NKVD. Most agents lived in the house of the widow of a Russian Air Force colonel, who had fallen in the beginning of the German-Russian war. Agents were again forbidden to leave the houses and the others saw to it that no contact existed between them and the outside world.

16. All agents were excellently equipped with documents: Geburtsschein, Heiratschein, Nachweise ueber Schulbildung, Partei Legitimationen, Arier Nachweise and the documents necessary for the obtention of the latter documents such as death certificates of ascendants, etc., Arbeitsnachweise, blank papers of the firm where they were supposed to work in order to make themselves some travel-orders, Wehrpass, a number of blank police registration forms, a number of rubber stamps to fake police registration forms. Agents in uniform received a Soldbuch, Wehrmachtfahrtscheine, Urk abscheine and a number of rubber stamps for the falsification of military documents.

17. Subject remarks here that the Russians were unaware of one minor point concerning the Soldbuecher: when Soldbuecher were printed at the printers' and before they received their cardboard wrapper, they were counted by the military inspector. This man generally ran an indelible pencil along the binding to facilitate the counting. Later, when the cardboard wrapping was put on and the Soldbuch had been in use for awhile inevitably the indelible pencil mark would show up faintly through the binding. The Berlin RSHA section IVa2 had cautioned subject to keep this fact a secret and to inspect the Soldbuecher himself for the indication of the pencil mark.

18. All personal documents used by the agents bore false family names, but usually the real Christian name of the agent was used, also the real birth-date. The agent HUTTARY of the Komintern play was the only one whose papers contained his real names and personal background. NKVD agents generally had two sets of false papers in two different names. Subject remarked about this - that carrying such a complete set of papers was rather unusual for anyone and became a little too apparent and absolutely unnecessary. The use of the real Christian name was quite a danger, as the confession of a captured agent and his description of other agents could easily be tied up with the agent to be captured.

19. The agents of the NKVD generally carried a pistol of German make, a dagger and some handgrenades for personal protection after the landing. The agents of the Frontaufklarungstruppen carried pistols, machinepistols, carbines (all of them with silencers), handgrenades and daggers.

20. Signal equipment of the NKVD was of two types:

a: The W/T set "Jack", which came in three parts (rectifier, receiver and transmitter). Self-regulating set. It was possible to use crystals on this set, as did the agents of the Funkspiel "Burgenland" Maximum power: 30 watts. The transmitter was excellent, but the receiver was not selective enough. Both worked on alternating current, only. This set apparently was an American invention, licence of which had been obtained by the Russians. The entire set could be put into a suitcase of the following size: 100cm x 40cm x 30cm.

b: The W/T set, type "Tanscr", apparently also in three parts, self-exciting; maximum strength 6 watts. It was an excellent set allowing perfect contact between Vienna and Moscow. This set could be easily hidden in a large size briefcase. Also an American invention.

Both sets could only be activated by alternative current. They necessi

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tated an antenna of about 20m of ordinary copper wire.

21. Agents of the Russian Frontaufklaerungstruppen were equipped with a W/T set of the type "Sever". The set came in one part, had a power of 3 to 4 watts, was self-excited and was powered by dry batteries. It was a good set of particularly robust construction. Its dimensions were such that it could easily be hidden, without its batteries, in an ordinary briefcase.

22. All agents were amply provided with spare tubes and spare parts.

23. Agents of the Funkspiele "Burgenland" and "Rote Mauer" (sent over Mourmansk to England, and dropped by a Ruff-plane) were equipped with British fliers' clothing (without labels), rubber paracholuts, cuffs and gloves. Characteristically these two teams jumped with camouflaged parachutes, while the NKVD agents dropped from Russian planes used parachutes of rather poor quality white silk. The Komintern-team was the worst equipped; they were not even in possession of coveralls and KERSCHKE had to borrow a training suit from his teammate SOUCEK, for the jump.

24. The agents, who jumped in civilian clothes, had cut the Russian or British labels out of their suits and had German or Austrian labels sewn in the lining, (rather clumsily). The trade-mark was scratched off the Russian soap and the Russian labels on the batteries were not cut away but a blank piece of paper had been glued over them, which immediately attracted attention of any alert police official.

25. The signal plan, carried by the agent, was generally in the form of a micro-film of the size of half a postage stamp. It was always sewn somewhere in the agent's clothes. This was a more convenient way of carrying it than the signal plan of the allied agents, which was of the size of a crystal and quite conspicuous. The Russian agent could easily destroy his signal plan, after capture. This was done by the W/T agent of the Funkspiel "Roter Hoerder", who after his capture took the signal plan out of his necktie and throw it in a latrine under the eyes of two gendarmes.

26. NKVD agents carried large amounts of Rmk (up to Rmk 20,000), and always a certain amount of U.S. paper dollars (between 400 and 500). Peculiarly enough, many of the German banknotes bore bloodstains, as they had been taken from German wounded or dead. This gave a clue to the capture of the agent ANGERLANN, who had given a sum of money to his father for safekeeping; this led consequently to his own arrest. The agents of the Komintern team were the worst equipped again as they only carried a few thousand Rmk. and only 200 U.S. Dollars.

27. The NKVD agents had with them a certain amount of concentrated food for eight days, generally of British origin. Quite a number of agents were found in possession of exaggerated quantities of falsified Reise-Lebensmitkarten. For example the agent KAMMLER, was found in possession of 180 Kgrs of meat coupons, butter coupons for 120 Kgrs, and bread coupons for over 200 Kgrs. Later on, the NKVD did not give its agents any coupons any more but gave them more money, to allow them to buy their food on the black market. Apart from this, most agents carried some medicines (stimulants - for example, German-made Pervitin, some anti-pyretics, etc.).

28. Agents of the Russian Frontaufklaerungstruppen were equipped with food for so many weeks as they thought that they would have to live in the country before being joined by their own troops. "Quellbrot" and pork-fat were their staple foods.

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29. NKVD agents carried poison in the form of tablets, surrounded by a rubber wrapper (about five times the lethal dose), which could be easily concealed between the teeth and bitten through at the opportune moment.

30. Further equipment of the agents consisted of: compasses, Russian General staff maps (especially the Frontaufklarungstruppen agents), no cameras, generally no secret inks. Only the Komintern team was found in possession of a secret ink formula on a special kind of microfilm. According to KERSH this ink had been newly discovered by the Russians, it did not contain any silver bromide layer, nor any bromide grain and could thus be made as small as possible; thus a full typewritten page could be reduced to a microfilm, the size of a pinhead. Subject ordered a thorough, scientific investigation be held by Dozent Dr. NYER, head of the legal-medical institute of the University of Vienna. Only in one case was a camouflaged shaving-brush found.

31. On the team of the Funkspiel "Burgenland" a special chemical was found in a glass ampulla, with some self-destructing device attached to it. This ampulla was attached to the parachute and was used to throw off the scent of the bloodhounds.

G. Dropping Points.

32. a: From Russian planes: In Eastern Prussia (agents of the teams "Quartiermacher Eins", KARBELER, "Alpenrose", "Haushammerfeld") -
In Poland (agents of the plays "Polixdorf", "Lindwurm", "Tiger") -
In Hungary (the agents of the groups "Theiss", and "Jaldheim") -
In lower Austria or Burgenland (the agents of the Funkspiele "Stalingrad", "Roter Meider", "Bismberg". rpt "Bismberg", "Leopoldsb-berg", the agent DORI, a group of six men from the Russian Frontaufklarungstruppen).

b: From RAF planes. - In Burgenland (the "Burgenland group"), in greater Vienna (the "Rote Mauer" group).

H. The Apartment Question.

33. The greater part of the Russian missions failed because of the apartment question. Before being dropped the NKVD agents received some safe addresses. Most of them, however, were rather antiquated as they had been collected before 1936 by the Vienna office of the Intourist and the Russian Commercial Attache.

34. Amongst the addresses where agents were to report was the one belonging to a lawyer, Dr. Napoleon BICHARY, of Prinz Eugenstrasse, 2 Vienna IV. Dr. BICHARY had been a rather high official at the Ukrainian Embassy in Prague, when Ukraine was still independent. Later he left Ukraine, traveled through the Soviet Union and finally installed himself in Vienna as a lawyer. He was known to have had close connection with the following persons, who were mainly celebrated for their role in the ill-begotten Kapp-Putsch and their further unusual destinies: Lincoln TREBITSCH and Colonel BAUERY, who was to die in China, after having been a military adviser to the Chinese Government. This circle, which had also close connections with LUDENDORFF, made quite a lot of propaganda for better relations with the Soviet Union. In the 1930's BICHARY became unofficial legal adviser to the Soviet Commercial Mission.

The agents of the Funkspiel "Burgenland" received the order from the NKVD to contact Dr. BICHARY on all legal matters, which they did. It was

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quite apparent that the NKVD considered BICHARY as quite an important person since "ZENTRUM" instructed the agent of the Funkspiel "quartiermacher Eins" to tell Dr. BICHARY to contact a NKVD official in Istanbul. Unfortunately Dr. BICHARY was at that time in jail for collusion with the agents of the group "Burgenland". As far as subject knows, Dr. BICHARY was in the concentration camp of Dachau at the end of the war.

35. The NKVD unsuccessfully tried to couple a Viennese agent with another who had no relatives or connections in Vienna. The Viennese was to provide some safe abode for the team, through his connections, but was forbidden to contact his relatives. (A rule to which no agent held himself). The agent, who had found a safe abode (favorable situation on high level, apartment provided with alternative current, etc.), rapidly became quite a thorny problem to his host, who ran the risk of being executed for harboring a foreign agent (Faidbeguenstigung). For this reason the host generally tried to find another quarters for the agents at some member of a similar communist organization, which sooner or later exposed the Russian agents. If the agent tried to hide with some relatives, he was soon exposed as those relatives sooner or later were put under observation.

I. The Financial Question of the Russian Intelligence Missions.

36. Around the middle of 1943, the further financing of the Russian intelligence missions was solved by the simple procedure of the agent visiting a place, indicated by "Zentrum" where they received a certain amount of money, or the agents were told to take a certain sum from a cache, somewhere in Vorarlberg, in the neighborhood of the Swiss frontier.

37. During the summer of 1943, "Zentrum" instructed the agents of the Funkspiel "Quartiermacher Eins" to visit a certain address, where a woman was to hand them a certain sum. This woman, Margarete SEIDLER, Vienna II, Herminengasse 10, was the sister of a former custodian of the Art-Historical Museum, named BUSCHBECK, who had emigrated to London. The woman who was immediately interrogated could convincingly prove that she had not received any money to transmit to anyone else. (It may be noted here that the address, given by "Zentrum" was wrong as the woman had moved quite a long time ago.) A few weeks afterwards, "Zentrum" instructed the agents of the Funkspiel "Alpenrose" to get some money from the same woman, again without avail.

38. A little later, the monitoring units of the OKW, were able to intercept and decipher a series of messages exchanged between "Zentrum" and a certain station in Swiss territory. This is what they learned: "Zentrum" informed the Swiss group that the "man from Vienna" had contacted the "woman in Vienna", that the woman had moved and that she was not in possession of the sum, which (---) (alias of the Swiss man) was to have handed her. "Zentrum" asked the Swiss man to explain this. Simultaneously, "Zentrum" ordered the Swiss agent to have a Russian agent (woman? man?) apparently belonging to the Austrian aristocracy, contact the inner circle around the Prince of Liechtenstein, in order to accomplish some intelligence mission. The Swiss man answered that the woman was lying and that contact would be made with the Liechtenstein group. -- A new message from "Zentrum" then informed the Swiss man that a new man had contacted the Vienna woman and was now convinced that the woman had never received any money from the Swiss man. "Zentrum" practically accused the Swissman of having withheld the money.

39. The Swiss police was informed of this traffic and apparently had taken some precautions against him. The RSHA then demanded that the Swiss police

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*Alexander
Rado*

look for a Hungarian, called RADO, whom the RSHA suspected of being the leader of the Russian agents group in Switzerland. RADO was known to have tried to leave for Hungary. A little later the RSHA was informed that RADO was again operating in Switzerland.

40. Subject tried to get a complete picture of these money transfers and after a certain time was able to piece the following picture together: The "Swiss man" was identified as a certain Manfred von GRIMM, who was living with his mother in Davos, in rather strained financial conditions. He was the son of the late Consul General of Austria in the Netherlands, the retired General GRIMM, and a nephew of Mrs. SEIDLER, from whom the Russian agents were to receive the money in Vienna. The RSHA possessed quite a voluminous dossier on GRIMM, as the latter had tried to organize an Austrian Intelligence Service before 1938 without having received any official permission. After 11 March 1938, GRIMM had fled to Switzerland and had apparently joined the British Intelligence Service. He played some leading role amongst the Austrian aristocracy in Switzerland and was known to agitate in favor of the legitimistic cause. He claimed to be an intimate friend of Otto von HABSBURG.

41. Further identification between "the Swiss man" and GRIMM was made by an agent of the RSHA, who noted that as soon as the "man from Switzerland" was asked to contact the circle around the Prince of Liechtenstein, GRIMM began to renew his acquaintance with a friend of the widow of the late Prince of Liechtenstein, a woman called Maria GLASER, in Vaduz. GRIMM had tried hard to come and see her frequently in Zurich as his sojourn in Vaduz might cause his arrest. GRIMM's acquaintance certainly served only the purpose to allow the Russian agent from the Austrian aristocracy to continue his or her intelligence work. It appeared later that GRIMM worked for both the British and the Russians, under the cover of the legitimistic movement.

42. Another time, the agent of the Funkspiel "Quartiermacher Eins" was instructed to take a certain amount of money out of a cache in the Vorarlberg. The man, who had established the cache then denounced an Alsatian named BLUN, who was arrested. This BLUN had been working for the Intelligence Services of the Entente during the first world war and had still close connections with the British Consulate in Zurich. From this inquest it was learned that GRIMM was a British agent and simultaneously a Russian agent. It could not be established whether there were any arrangements between BLUN and GRIMM concerning the cache in the Vorarlberg and the financial arrangements in Vienna. Neither was it established who was the Russian agent belonging to the Austrian aristocracy.

43. The Russian agents were to account strictly for the money they had received. Every agent received a monthly pay of 400 to 600 Rmk., but was allowed to reimburse his travel expenses. All other moneys were to be used as pay for sub-agents or were to be held at the disposal of the NKVD.

J. Radio-Communication with Moscow.

44. Contacts were made generally on a frequency band of 30 to 70 meters. Originally fixed call-signs were used, but later these call-signs were changed daily, established according to a certain scheme, involving a pre-arranged phrase. The signal plan foresaw that either Moscow or the agent would call for five minutes on the main frequency. If no contact was established, then the calls were repeated on the secondary frequency for another half hour. But there always existed a possibility of calling each other outside the foreseen hours, by simply QRX. The QRX or QRY were not encoded.

*Radio-Communication
with Moscow
by means of
a special
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45. The procedures used included: the regular Q-signals, the international amateur code and the international amateur conventional phrases.

46. The heading of the message contained: the call sign, an urgency signal and a number group. The classification of urgency follows:

- OK : ordinary message.
- RDO: urgent.
- GR : number of groups followed by the digits.

K. The Russian Cipher System.

47. The cipher system used by the Russians was double transposition. The ground phrase was generally an ordinary key-phrase, whose characters digits or certain parts of phrases were changed into numbers. Nulls were used to fill in the 5-groups. The enciphering was done with the aid of a previously arranged book. The final enciphering was obtained through so-called "false additions" between the ground key phrase and the transposed text (omitting of the other parts of the groups and retaining of only the last digits). The final results were transcribed in five letter groups. Only in one case was an arbitrary grouping of the final results demanded. The groups which indicated which page and which line were used in the book for enciphering purposes were generally repeated in the beginning and the end of the message (see example below)

The clear text was generally German except in the case of the Komintern group where Russian was used, although all concerned knew Russian rather badly, they were Austrians and knew German perfectly.

L. Example of a Russian Cipher.

48.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
12	16	31	36	61	65	81	85	13	17	32	37	62	67	82	86	14	18
S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	.	!	:	+	Parenthesis		equal			
34	38	63	68	83	87	15	19	35	39	64	68	89		69			

+ sign to be used in front of digits

EXAMPLE:

B I N G U T G E L A N D E T .
16 13 67 81 63 38 81 61 37 12 67 36 61 38 35.

Formation of a further key-phrase : using a pre-arranged group, for instance 27385

2	7	3	8	5	2	7	3	8	5	2	7	3	8	5
B	I	N	G	U	T	G	E	L	A	N	D	E	T	.
16	13	67	81	63	38	81	61	37	12	67	36	61	38	35
-2	-7	-3	-8	-5	-2	-7	-3	-8	-5	-2	-7	-3	-8	-5
14	6	64	73	58	36	74	58	25	7	65	29	58	30	30

49. Construction of the transposition with the aid of a certain book and a key-number: book: Kurt Lasswitz's "Auf zwei Planeten". Used text: Page 129. Fourth line, beginning with the following words "Da man den Apparat auf ein und dieselbe Stelle eingestellt hielt ... " Key-number 2457.

- 50. Construction of the transposition: a. construction of a new alphabet.
- b. construction of the numbers-basis of the transposition text until numbers

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of four digits are obtained and connecting it with the proper letters. (circled numbers in the annex). Counting up to the following digit or until the next space marked with the digit nine. The intervals are being filled, beginning with the figure 21 (digits surrounded by a square) by the decade numbers of the key-number. C. construction of three transposition columns, number one columns constructed out of the key-number, column number two out of column number one and column number three out of column number two:

1 plus equals 3 35 3 plus 5 equals 8 83 8 plus 3 equals 3 14, etc, etc.
3 plus 2 equals 5 8 plus 5 equals 13 1 plus 3 equals 4

Construction of the transposed cipher through use of the transposition text: "Da man den apparat":

1. D from column I is 95
2. A from column II is 83
3. M from Column III is 40
4. A again from column I is 35
5. N from column II is 13
6. D from column III is 32, etc, etc.

51. c. final result of the enciphering:

Clear text : B I N G U T G E L A N D E T
 Key number : 16 13 67 81 63 38 81 61 37 12 76 36 61 38 35
 Plus the
 new number : +95 +83 +40 +35 +13 +32 +07 +13 +14 +40 +48 +14 +64 +83 +85
 "false addition" tens are not put down.

Final text put in five letter groups:

01960 71676 60887 44150 03402 51110

52. Annex to the Explanation of the Russian Cipher:

	COLUMN ONE	COLUMN TWO	COLUMN THREE
a.	12	35	83
b.	13	47	18
c.	14	59	43
d.	15	95	49
e.	16	07	74
f.	17	19	09
g.	18	21	34
h.	19	34	71
i.	20	46	06
j.	21	58	31
k.	22	60	62
l.	23	72	91
m.	24	80	86
n.	25	92	13
o.	26	04	48
p.	27	40	48
q.	28	52	79
r.	29	64	04
s.	30	76	39
t.	31	56	17
u.	32	68	42
v.	33	70	74
w.	34	82	02
x.	35	94	37
y.	36	06	62
z.	37	18	92

15	D	A	M	A	N
98	35	12	62	
71					
89	D	E	N		
62
45	A	P	P	A	R
80		86			

Numbers obtained:
 (2) (4) 5 7

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53. In order to inform the other correspondent which word of the cipher book one was going to use for the transposition, one had to mention the page, the line and the position of the first word, in our case page 129, 4th line, first word. Generally it was agreed upon that the first 100 pages were used only by Moscow, the next hundred pages by the agent; for this reason the hundred-digits were not indicated in the group. Thus the group obtained is 29041. - This recognition group is generally obtained through the addition of the transposition - key with the first group and the last group of the enciphered text and then placed at a previously arranged place, for example at the beginning and at the end and reversed.

first recognition group:	original recognition group	29041
	plus first cipher group	01960
		<u>20901</u>

second recognition group:	original recognition group	29041
	plus last cipher group	51110
		<u>70151</u>

This is thus the form of the absolutely final cipher text:

01960 71676 20901 60887 44152 70151 05402 51110

M. Measures taken by the Russians to recognize double agents.

54. Originally no such measures were foreseen. The ones taken later were rather primitive according to Subject. Here are a few which he remembers:

- a: the correspondent, when asking for a certain frequency had to add 10 to it, for instance when asking for a frequency of 45, one had to demand 55.
- b: Putting the recognition group at false places.
- c: The most elaborate counter-measure consisted of the following "trick": the "other side" sometimes asked for the repeat of a certain previous message, allegedly because they could not decipher it. (Actually the message had been checked by subject and found to be deciphered perfectly). "Zentrum" supposed that if the police and not the agent was sending the message, the entire message would have been transmitted again. But Subject knew that "Zentrum" had instructed its agents to destroy and enciphered message after it had been sent. That subject then did was to paraphrase the old message and encipher it again or inform Moscow that the message in question had been destroyed and that he could not remember its text anymore. This procedure has been used many times by "Zentrum".

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Detailed interrogation of Johann SANITZER, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV2.

APPENDIX C. Gestapo Counter-Measures against Russian W/T Agents.

1. Material Necessary for the Search.

- a. Subject first stressed the necessity of adequate file system: 1. an agent file with the names and descriptions of all persons, who, according to the confessions of arrested agents, were being or had been trained by the Russians and who were ready for a mission. 2. a photographic file. 3. a file of deserters. This file consisted of the names of all German deserters, who were supposed to be good Russian agent material because of their political background. 4. a file of relatives or political friends of persons who might be expected to be sent into the Reich by the Russians.
- b. Secondly, it was necessary to equip the units charged with the eventual searches (Aussondierstellen der Staatspolizei, Hotelkriminalbeamten, Heeres- und Zugstreifen, etc), with the necessary material: i.e. suitable point files of photo graphs, personal descriptions, etc.
- c. Thirdly, the proper training of the Police, Army and border Patrol units who were constantly conducting searches, by means of lectures and the distribution of pamphlets concerning information on the proper methods of search.
- d. Lastly, it was absolutely necessary to have a thorough knowledge of the enemy's intelligence services and techniques. This was accomplished mainly by interrogations, constant liaison with other Dienststellen and by the interception of enemy W/T traffic and their subsequent exploitation.

2. The General Search.

- a. Subject was constantly in direct communication with the intercept room of the Luftwaffe and was thus automatically informed as soon as an airplane was observed.
- b. As soon as an airplane was seen circling around a certain area, a general alarm was sounded as it became likely that it dropped agents. A thorough search was made with the help of the Gendarmerie, the Landwacht, school-children, police dogs, etc., for objects left behind by the agent.
- c. All railroad stations between the dropping place and the next important town were immediately occupied for checking purposes.
- d. Information about the dropping of agents was then sent to all police stations to be passed along to the Hotelkriminalbeamten.
- e. The same information was passed to all hospitals, in case the dropped agent was wounded and had sought medical help.
- f. Finally a particular thorough observation was instituted of the known communist groups.
3. The individual search.
 - a. As soon as a dropping point had been discovered a thorough criminological

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search was made of the area. If, for instance, a crash-helmet was found, it was thoroughly checked for hairs which might give additional detail to the personal description of the pursued agent. At the same time all eye-witnesses were assembled and questioned.

- b. A discreet surveillance was made of all friends and relatives of persons suspected of being dropped. This was done by employees of subject, disguised as gas- or electrical power company employees, which allowed them at the same time to make a search of the suspected house. If the house looked suspicious, the employees arrested the occupants.
- c. A technical W/T search was then made by the OKW Funküberwachungsstelle and by the Funkmessstelle of the Ordnungspolizei, who would comb the suspected area with DF-cars. These units would at the same time establish fixed DF-stations, in areas where previously agents had found it easy to transmit. These fixed DF-stations were equipped with registration material for the automatic recording of W/T traffic.
- d. If the agents had been located, they would be arrested by employees disguised as railroadmen, cable-layers, air-raid precaution men, etc. so as to avoid loss of life on both sides.
- e. As soon as the agent had been arrested, he would be given a complete change of linen and clothes, so as to avoid a possible suicide attempt or the destruction of valuable microfilms.

4. The Funkspiel.

- a. The aim of the Funkspiel was fourfold: 1. to avoid that the Russians would send an agent where they thought that the previous one was safe. 2. to arrest other agents. (when new drops were demanded from the Russians). 3. The obtaining of valuable intelligence by knowing the Russian intelligence requirements. 4. the funkspiel permitted the Germans to send disturbing news to the Russians.
- b. The technique of the Funkspiel was tailor-made to the circumstances. In the beginning the Russians would dictate the sequence of the Funkspiel by repeating their intelligence requirements and subject would then adapt his plan accordingly. Later on subject would try to dictate his wishes to the Russians (at a certain time subject wanted to transfer a Funkspiel from Graz to Vienna and he suggested the transfer to the Russians until they ordered him to do so).
- c. Careful camouflage of the Funkspiel was observed through: 1. for instance when Subject informed the Russians that a certain agent had moved from one place to another, one of his employees actually registered with the police at that address under the captured agents name; when a safe address was given, subject never gave the address of V-Leute, but had an employee of his actually contacted unsuspecting people, who really thought that they were going to harbor agents.
- d. Information sent to the Russians during the Funkspiel was always authentic if "cold". The only exception was the specifically disturbing information, which Subject had to transmit on orders of the RSHA. The military information was given to subject, first by IIIF East Vienna, later by Ic of the Wehrkreiskommando XVII, after proper authorization by RSHA. When the thus given information was not enough to be transmitted to the Russians, subject was obliged to send out

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of his own employees to gather the information. Subject then submitted the obtained information to the RSHA through IC. It would come back sometimes after one week, and about 99% of it would be blue-pencilled. Single, generally known intelligence items were given more frequently by the RSHA.

- e. The writing of the message was entrusted to the double agent, in order to conserve the "personal touch" and at most times the agent was allowed to send himself in order to have Moscow note his personal rhythm of sending ("fist"). This was judged highly dangerous by the RSHA, but desirable by subject for camouflage purposes.
 - f. A certain number of office aids were used in the playing of the Funkspiele: 1. a list of addresses provided to the Russians, in order to avoid repeating an address already given, 2. a "Funkspielbuch" in which a complete record was kept, in story form, of each play. This book has never been completed and was destroyed by subject before his flight. 3. a radio log, containing day, hour, length of transmission, call-signs (in the case of changing call-signs) frequencies used, etc. This log was also destroyed by subject.
5. Generalities about the Funkspiele.

In the beginning of 1945, the RSHA directed or played itself about forty-five Funkspiele. As far as subject can remember, Funkspiele were played in the following places: Vienna, Brunn, Prague, Berlin, Koenigsberg, Dantzig, Verona, etc. He thinks that some more were played in Posen or Thorn in Hamburg and a French one in Southern Germany. All the others were either Russian, Polish or British.

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Detailed Interrogation Report of Johann S. NITZER, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV 2.

Appendix C. Interception of Allied W/T Traffic in South-Eastern Germany.

A. Organization of the Monitoring Services.

1. The task of monitoring Allied W/T agent traffic was divided amongst the Ordnungspolizei, charged with the monitoring of stations within the Reich and the Government General of Poland, and the monitoring units of the German Army, charged with the same task, but for traffic outside the Reich.

2. The Ordnungspolizei had a central unit in Berlin and many sub-units all over the Reich.

3. The monitoring Units of the German Gen. Hqrs. (OKW Funkbeobachtungsstelle) has also its central unit in Berlin and many sub-units. The regimental commander in Berlin was Major von BAEI. The South-East was monitored by the Funkbeobachtungsstelle Sued-Ost, (commander Hauptmann HANNES BAUER). Vienna, which had many sub-stations in Athens, Sofia, Budapest and towards the end of the war also in Graz, Klagenfurt and Prossburg.

4. Later on, the different monitoring units began specialising and the Ordnungspolizei began only monitoring Russian agent-traffic while the OKW Funkbeobachtungsstellen supervised only the British and the American traffic.

5. The Russian circuits were called WNA-lines (after the call-sign of the first intercepted Russian agent-circuit), the British lines bore the number 51, while the American lines were designated as 58-lin.s. Individual circuits were then further numbered: "51-23" would thus designate the 23rd intercepted circuit of a British agent.

6. According to the DF-units, the central British receiver was located in Bari, while the central American receiver was in Adriana, somewhat south of Bari.

7. Since it is relatively easy to distinguish between individual circuits owing to their idiosyncrasies (the "fist" of the sender, the rhythm of the transmission, etc.) and since the DF-units could easily locate the different places of the transmitting agents, it became relatively easy to draw a general picture of the Allied agent-traffic. A map showing these locations was added to the monthly activities report, issued by the OKW Funkbeobachtung.

B. Monitored Circuits.

8. The following radio-nets were monitored, intercepted and broken by the Funkbeobachtung:

- a. A certain number of 51 and 58 circuits, originating from Tito-occupied territory.
- b. A very interesting and politically extremely well-informed Polish circuit with a central station in Istanbul.
- c. A Czech circuit with a central station in Istanbul.

9. The ciphers of these circuits were apparently broken by the Research section of the Ministry of Aeronautics (Forschungsamt des Luftfahrtministeriums). The interested sections of the Gestapo regularly received the clear texts of the intercepts, through the intermediary of the RSHA (Amt III.). Subject asserts that he received these intercepts until March 1945, that is, as long

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as there was direct communication between Vienna and Berlin.

C. Examples of Intercepted Messages.

10. A series of intercepts from Tito-country contained the traffic between some Allied missions with Tito and their Headquarters in Italy. Subject only remembers the name of a Major LINDSEY, who was later relieved by a Major C. HUSAC. The latter's headquarters were apparently in Rosental, in Carinthia, towards the end of the war. The intercepted messages contained mainly complaints from the Allied missions about handicaps put in their way by the Tito-men and more specifically by the political commissars.

11. Some messages concerned infiltration of agents. Subject remembers the case of a group of British agents operating in the Vienna area who operated only on "letter-boxes" and who were assured by their headquarters that they would receive a W/T set. Later intercepts showed that these headquarters were never able to keep their promise.

12. In another case, a "safe address" was mentioned, namely the farm of a widow in Southern Styria. This farm was then observed by the IV3a section of the Stelle Salzburg.

13. Another message mentioned that "Mac and Harry had been dropped blind in the Kor-lpe". Subject was later informed that this message concerned the British captain Cranford Mac and his teammate Rudolf STUHLHOFER. Subject was to use the Mac-set for his Funkspiel "Thamse" (see appendix E).

14. When the German Paul POEMERL, a British agent, was dropped and arrested in the Laibach area, the intercepts of a "51" circuit contained a message to all other British agents, whom POEMERL had known, ordering them to cease all activities and disappear, as the prisoner had confessed and had thus endangered the missions of his comrades. Subject adds that to his knowledge, POEMERL was still in prison in Vienna when he left the town.

15. In February 1945, a message was intercepted announcing the constitution of a Yugo-Slav committee of Liberation in Graz with the exact names and professions of the leading committee-members.

16. Other messages mentioned courier-communications between Southern Styria and Graz. One courier who was frequently mentioned was a certain KOREFLICHTER(?).

17. Still another message contained the news of the arrest of a certain number of Stapo employees of the Stelle Graz, which the latter nailed as a fantasy.

D. Generalities.

18. The entire collection of intercepts was rather voluminous and finally constituted a large book. Many names were mentioned.

19. Subject does not remember more details about these intercepts, as the area covered was not included in Wehrkreise XVII and XVIII, his professional territory. But as he foresaw the possibility of many of these agents moving north into his territory as the war proceeded, he appointed a special employee to collate them and evaluate them for possible use. All these were destroyed before leaving Vienna.

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Detailed Interrogation Report of Johann S. NITZER, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV2.

Appendix E. The Funkspiel "Fata Morgana" (French Agents).

1. In the evening of April 4, 1945, Subject received from the Luftgaukommando XVII a parachute and a bundle, dropped the same afternoon on the territory of the village of Neusiedl, in the neighborhood of the Neusiedlersee. The contents of the package were immediately examined and the following objects were found: a. military letter (Feldpost brief) from a girl addressed to "Josef SASSO, Feldpostnummer". b. Some erotic pictures, signed BREZINA. Although Subject thought it very unlikely that agents would leave their "visiting cards" in parachute bundles, he still ordered his employees to send a circular wire to all Dienststellen, whether they knew of two men of these names.
2. Two hours afterwards, the Aussendienststelle Wiener Neustadt announced that a certain Josef SASSO from Winzendorf, Kreis Wiener Neustadt had been arrested and condemned to a term in prison for participation in a communist youth movement in 1940. After his imprisonment, SASSO had been inducted in the German Army, assigned to a disciplinary company, sent to North Africa, where he had deserted and run over to the Allies.
3. Subject immediately proceeded to Winzendorf in company of two of his best men, Anton BROEDL and Hans POTZINGER. He actually found SASSO in his parent's home. During the inevitable fight SASSO shot POTZINGER through the heart, but was arrested after a rather eventful chase. On SASSO's indications, subject proceeded the same day to the home of the carpenter BREZINA in the Rotzergasse, Vienna XVII, where he arrested SASSO's teammate Karl BREZINA.
4. The following picture could be assembled from the joint declarations of the arrested agents: Both had deserted in the area of Monte Cassino and were transported to a POW camp in the neighborhood of the Suez Canal. There a fellow-prisoner named Justus GUTTERMAN, a veteran of the Foreign Legion, had recruited them for the French Intelligence Service.
5. The two men were transported to Algiers, where they were to receive their agent-instruction. SASSO was trained as a W/T operator, while BREZINA received some superficial intelligence training. BREZINA mostly was instructed in the recognition of German airplanes, as the team's mission was the reporting of airplane production in the Wiener Neustadt area. Jump-training was held on an airfield in the neighborhood of Algiers. It consisted of jumping from a mock-up, from a high platform and two jumps from an airplane, flying at 500m. Cipher training was given by the code-instructor. The cipher was a double transposition. The signalplan was similar to the British and American one (already well-known to the Funkueberwachungsabteilung der OKW). It consisted of three call-signs, which could be used either horizontally, vertically or diagonally, an enciphered QRX, a pre-arranged QRY and a special signal for frequency-change.
6. The code-instructor transported them to Tunis, whence they flew to Bari, with a halt in Naples. As the weather conditions were rather unfavorable, they had to wait until the next moon-period. They were finally dropped from a Luftwaffe plane, piloted by a Polish pilot, stationed in Brindisi. (20 March 1944). Their W/T set (apparently a British Mark VII) was dropped in the Neusiedlersee and subject's searches were not successful in finding it.
7. The agents had been instructed, that in case they lost their W/T set, they were to write two POW-cards to themselves at an interval of two or three weeks. The text used by SASSO, on subject's instigation, ran as follows: "Marie, a common friend, was unfortunately drowned during a boat-ride in the Neusiedlersee". At the same time, the writer of the message, who was supposed to be a very good friend of SASSO's, informed him that he was about to be

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inducted into the German Army and asked him to write to a certain address, until the "friend" would be able to give him his APO-number. It had been previously arranged that the French chiefs were to inform this "address" how they were going to drop a new set or when a cut-out was to bring a new set to the address mentioned.

8. As SASSO had killed an agent during his arrest, the Reichsfuehrer SS had ordered Subject to execute both agents and their families. Subject wanted to impress interrogator with his feelings of sympathy for BREZINA and his family and relatives that BREZINA made such a good impression on him that he decided to spare him. Instead of accomplishing the execution, Subject informed the RSHA that he was about to begin a Funkspiel under the cover name "Turis". The RSHA did not insist on the execution as in the meantime news had arrived of the arrest of the Uffz. Justus GUTTERMANN, who had recruited SASSO and BREZINA.

9. On June 1, 1944, the Frontier post of Bruck a. d. Murtha delivered a German noncommissioned officer, suffering from a severe legwound at the office of Subject. This prisoner had given himself up to the Gorka Marie in Frauenkirchen, explaining that he had been dropped during the preceding night from a R.F.-plane in the neighborhood of Frauenkirchen. The following objects were found on his person: an authentic and only partly falsified Soldbuch in his real name, about Rmk 60,000, a W/T set (of the type "Polonais", invented by a Polish engineer) and a number of miscellaneous things: coffee, tea, silk stockings, etc.

10. When GUTTERMANN was confronted with SASSO and BREZINA by one of Subject's employees, he was immediately recognized by them as their recruiter. But, as no previous interrogation was taken from GUTTERMANN, the latter was on his guard when he saw the two others arrested and tried to tell his story accordingly. In general, his story corresponded with the ones told by his comrades. Subject was rather surprised when GUTTERMANN related his mission: apparently there existed an extensive intelligence net throughout South-Eastern Germany, mainly directed against the British, Americans and Russians, which was only to be activated after the end of the hostilities. Until then he was to send from time to time some report on his activities and only send actual reports, when they concerned objects of the highest importance, for instance, new weapons, etc. Subject thinks that the entire story given to him by GUTTERMANN, which could not be proved, might have been a fake and that his only real mission was to contact SASSO and BREZINA. GUTTERMANN would never have given himself up had he not suffered his serious legwound. He was sufficiently intelligent to try to tell a story which could not be broken by anyone. Only one fact spoke in GUTTERMANN's favor: while he was in the POW-camp at the Suez-canal, he had confided to a German medical officer that he was going to volunteer for the French Intelligence Service so that he might go back to Germany. This medical doctor had later been exchanged and confirmed GUTTERMANN's story when he was interrogated by Subject.

11. As the interrogations of all three did not allow Subject to have a complete picture of the French intelligence requirements, he decided to start a Funkspiel, to which the covername "Fata Morgana" was given.

12. Subject hoped that the French would instruct GUTTERMANN to contact SASSO and BREZINA and thus confirm Subject's suspicions about GUTTERMANN's real mission. Subject's expectations were not realized. The Funkspiel began quite normally, but the French made no mention of the SASSO-BREZINA team. They were very interested in the news of a possible new intelligence net. In the beginning 1945, they changed their previous attitude of reticence and suddenly ordered GUTTERMANN to transmit urgently all information about the

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Russian advances in Burgenland and the German defensive measures. As a reward and a control (whether the French thought that the play was real), Subject began asking for a supply-drop, which was granted by the French. The latter asked for the indication of two areas, where no flak was present in a radius of about 50 Km. A light-signal was arranged to announce the drop the same night and the BBC-signal "Anatole" was arranged. All these arrangements actually went through, but unfortunately Subject's men came too late to the dropping point. A second drop was arranged for the next moon-period but by that time the area was occupied by the Russians.

13. April 5, 1945, the day that the Dienststelle was to be moved to Florisdorf, Subject's employee, who was specially appointed to guard GUTTERMANN reported to his chief that the prisoner had approached him with the demand to transmit a real message to the French, "since everything was lost anyway". Subject states that he had asked the RSH. to release GUTTERMANN around Christmas 1944, but that now he had him put in jail (he had been on parole until now). GUTTERMANN was later transported to Florisdorf by subject's employees and was lost in the general chaos.

14. Now Subject wanted to expose the Funkspiel, but the signal plans were in Salzburg as was all other material. A courier who was sent there to get the signal plan never reached Subject.

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Detailed interrogation of Johann SANITZER, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV2.

APPENDIX F. Funkspiel "Thamse" (With British Agents).

1. Subject was informed in the late summer of 1944 by the Landwacht of Weitz that they had arrested an English captain in possession of papers, designating him as Cranford M.C. He had admitted being a British W/T agent. His destroyed set was actually found somewhere in the neighborhood of his dropping point.
2. Subject immediately sent his only English-speaking employee to the Stapo Stelle Graz, where Cranford M.C. was held. His intention was to induce M.C. to begin a Funkspiel, under the supervision of the Graz Funkueberwachungs-kompanie, and then to see whether it would be interesting enough to transport the "play" to Vienna, etc. The employee, on his return to Vienna advised Subject to transport M.C. to Vienna, not because Vienna offered more chances of success for the Funkspiel, but because the Graz people were not capable enough to execute it satisfactorily.
3. Subject then teletyped a demand to the RSHA to allow him to begin a Funkspiel with M.C., which was immediately granted, and the order was given to Graz. Unfortunately Graz replied that M.C. had committed suicide the same morning, and had swallowed some cyanide hidden in a button of his uniform. His clothes were searched, after his death, and the following objects were found: two steel-saws, 3 or 4 full-size compasses, several compasses camouflaged in buttons, three gold coins and a staff-map of Styria. No motive could be found for the suicide. The British officer was to be given some neutral clothes that same morning and it was supposed that he had profited from the last occasion to escape from a certain destiny. M.C. had only been interrogated hastily and no interrogation report had been made available. The only thing which was known was that the cipher system was a double transposition, the basis of which was a well-known English school-song. But the method of building the recognition-groups and their place in the enciphered message was unknown.
4. The Funkueberwachungs-Abteilung der OKW possessed some excellent cipher-experts, who had specialised in English double-transpositions. Subject then decided to begin a Funkspiel with the aid of those experts, after having received the approval of the commanding officer of the Funkueberwachungs-Abteilung. The aim of this Funkspiel was to be purely preventive: Subject wanted to move the play later on to Vienna in order to avoid the further dropping of British agents in his own area.
5. There were a few difficulties to this project: first, subject knew nothing about M.C.'s mission; secondly it was not known whether M.C. had had a teammate. During the preceding weeks a certain number of personnel and cargo-parachutes had been found in the neighborhood of Hartberg. The contents of the dropped bundles indicated that they were destined to British agents, who, Subject supposed, were the installation personnel of M.C.'s team.
6. In order to visualize what the British Intelligence Service required, Subject began digging in the material given to him by the intercepts of the "51" and the "58"-lines. (See Appendix D). He arrived at the conclusion that what was demanded principally was information of political nature, especially liaison with resistance groups. He thus began transmitting political intelligence. This was quite easy for Subject as he practically received no military information from the Wehrmacht.
7. The first message contained practically no information. As Subject

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did not master the English language, he had the message, made by himself in German, translated in English by two soldiers of the Funkuebrwachungstelle, Vienna, both of them experts in the English language, one of them being a Studienrat and the other a businessman who had been in England for many years. The Bari-transmitter answered immediately, but the message could not be deciphered in the beginning. Finally after many trials and tribulations, the following clear text was obtained (Subject cites from memory):

"God damn! is this message really from you; it is absolutely illegible! If it really originates from you, then you have placed the recognition groups at the wrong places and built them erroneously. This is the way you should have built them etc., etc."

8. The British themselves thus helped Subject over the first cliff. He had his interpreters provide him with a hearty cuss-word and, as far as he can remember sent the following message:

"To hell with this damned cipher. You know quite well that I am weak in this sort of thing! Thanks for the lesson and will try to do everything correctly from now on. Have arrived well. Have made good connections with a priest and some French POW's, from whom I expect many advantages in my future work..."

9. Bari answered as follows:

"We are very glad that you have well arrived and that you have made such good contacts. But be careful, as you know quite well that you and Harry are momentarily the only group working for us in Austria!"

10. This message was of course invaluable to Subject because it showed that Mac had a teammate named Harry and that it was the only British team in Austria. But on the other hand he suspected that his subterfuge had been seen through and that the last part of the message had only been inserted to induce him in error.

11. In order to see whether he had been induced in error by the British about "Harry", Subject then proceeded to Graz where he managed in a rather complicated way to arrive at the conclusion who Harry really was. It was the workman Rudolf STUHLROFER, from St. Peter near Graz, who had been taken prisoner by the English, on the Italian front. He had been previously condemned quite a few times for vagrancy, theft and similar actions.

12. Subject then sent the following message to Bari:

"I am now in Harry's company. Have been separated from him but met him at the pre-arranged meeting-place. The addresses given by him are not to be used, as Harry possesses a very bad reputation and nobody wants anything to do with him."

This satisfied the office in Bari. It should be said here that a little later, Subject received an intercept saying that "Mac and Harry have been dropped blind in the Kor-alpe".

13. The Referat IV3 (General Counter-Intelligence) had a Vertrauensmann (informant) who was known under the alias "Pilot". This informant had been condemned to a certain term in prison because he had tried to contact the Allies (Verbindungs-aufnahme mit dem Feinde). While in prison he had met

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the Yugo-Slav count ORSICH-SLAVETISCH, who had been imprisoned for high treason (he had had some connections with a logistimistic organisation). "Pilot" had presented himself to ORSICH as an Allied W/T agent. ORSICH thereupon informed "Pilot" that he was a member of an Austrian Resistance Government which sought recognition from the British, and asked "Pilot" whether he could establish the necessary contact with the British. "Pilot" answered affirmatively. Subject was contacted and decided to include this in his Funkspiel. There was one difficulty in that ORSICH demanded that "Pilot" include in his message to the British a special phrase, namely "The Rose will bloom again", which was to be transmitted through the Austrian transmission of the BBC.

14. Subject hesitated to transmit the ORSICH message as his new Funkspiel was too young yet and tried to find some other circuit which would transmit the "Pilot" message. He was informed of a Funkspiel in Verona, but this Stelle refused for some reason. Subject was thus forced to inform Bari of the facts about ORSICH and asked for the re-transmission of the BBC-phrase, which was granted. Bari emphasized that subject would not contact too many civilian circles but to try to meet some socialists. "Pilot" had also contacted some communist group through the indications of ORSICH. This group was headed by a cobbler named STROHMERSTAND. There were apparently some frictions between the ORSICH group and the STROHMERSTAND group. The latter called the former "a white-collar government" and wanted to have "Pilot" ask British recognition for themselves. Only for this they asked "Pilot" to have Bari demand the Austrian transmission of the phrase "Bombs fall from the sky", if recognition was granted. Subject informed Bari of the new developments and Bari actually had the sentence "Bombs, etc." transmitted over the BBC.

15. The consequences of the transmission of the "Bombs, etc." phrase were that "Pilot" became the center of a group of persons or small resistance movements, amongst them a group which operated an illegal printer's shop. Even the Swedish consul, who apparently had tried to contact a Russian W/T agent in communication with Moscow, suddenly discovered that he really was Anglo-ophile and tried to contact "Pilot"....

16. The competency of this work was not Subject's but belonged to the Referat VIIa. This Referat thought that it was time to intervene against the two groups as the members of the ORSICH-group were known to intend shooting the Commander of the Sipo-S.D., SS Brigadefuehrer FUBER, while another member of the same group, Oberstleutnant DRACON, commander of the Security forces of Vienna-Semmering, was suspected of wanting to shoot eleven of his officers in case of a British airlanding in order to join his troops with the British. Subject stated that he was violently opposed against any measures against the resistance groups, as it would have endangered his Funkspiel.

17. In the meantime, Bari had ordered its "agent" to transfer his activities from Styria to Vienna, and informed its "agent" that it wanted this transfer because the "Vienna group" did not exist anymore, but that certain connections still existed, which could be utilized by the "agent".

18. Since Subject's Funkspiele-plan had been thwarted through the activities of the Referat VIIa, he was obliged to raise some difficulties after having moved to Vienna, hoping to get quicker in touch with the Vienna connections. Subject immediately received the information that this group was situated in Zielarzdorf, the petroleum country in the neighborhood of Vienna. The search for this group would unfortunately not be made as the Russians were already before Vienna.

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19. Subject used this Funkspiel to enquire from Bari about a certain British officer, a former Viennese Jewish lawyer, named Kurt GLAUBER, who was arrested in Vienna in February 1945. This GLAUBER asserted that he was a British agent and that he had been dropped in September 1944, in the Tistyan area. According to his declarations, the W/T agent who was supposed to be his teammate had not dared jump at the last moment. The airplane had also missed its target considerably as the original plan was to be Gussersdorf in Lower Austria. Subject asserts that the declaration of GLAUBER could not be verified, and since he wanted to treat him as an officer, he asked for verification from Bari. The latter informed him that the enquiry had been transmitted to London. GLAUBER had been transferred to the concentration camp of Mauthausen at the end of March 1945, with many other prisoners of the Gestapo.

20. The interruption in Vienna of the Russians did not enable Subject to continue to lead this Funkspiel personally. He transmitted its direction to the commander of the Funküberwachungsstelle in Vienna, enticed him to send some general information about the progress of the Russians. It is thus possible that some messages were transmitted on this line, without the knowledge of Subject.

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Detailed Interrogation Report of Johann SÄNITZER, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV 2.

APPENDIX G: Arrests in Vienna of some Personalities Implicated in the Plot of July 1944.

1. Subject was able to re-construct the actions and inquests against some personalities who were implicated in the plot of July 1944 against Hitler and as far as he can remember, this is the sequence of events:

2. Am und 1900 on the 20th of July 1944 an urgent teletype message arrived on the desk of the Chief of Staff of Wehrkreiss XVII, staff-colonel ODRE. It originated from the office of the Commander of the Home Army, Generaloberst FRÖMME, situated Bendlerstrasse, Berlin, and contained approximately the following message:

"A clique of party-leaders, who have forgotten their duty and their honor have thought that time had arrived to stab the fighting front in the back, and to grab the reins of power. In order to prevent this criminal plot all power is hereby concentrated in the hands of the Wehrmacht....." Some general instructions followed, for instance about the regulations in occupied territories, etc. The center of this action informed everyone of the constitution of a Heimatführungsstab, situated in the Bendlerstrasse, Berlin.

The message was apparently signed FRÖMME.

3. Colonel ODRE immediately contacted his chief the General of Armored Troops, General von ESEBECK, who was in charge of Wehrkreis XVII, while the actual chief, General SCHUBERT, was on an inspection tour. He also informed the Town Commandant of Vienna, General SINZINGER, and the members of his staff.

4. In the meantime a new message had arrived, in which the following orders were given:

a: The arrest of all Reichs and State ministers of the Reichstatthalter, the Regierungspräsident, the Gauleiter, the Kreisleiter, the Hoehere SS and Polizeiführer, the chief of the Stapo-stellen, the Polizeipräsident, Kriminal and Schutzpolizei were left in liberty.

b: The liberation of all political prisoners from the concentration camps.

c: Occupation of all public buildings, post-offices, railroad stations, etc.

d: The conclusions of the message stated emphatically that all acts of revenge and unjustified acts were to be avoided. The acts of the new government were to differ favorably from the terroristic measures of the old regime.

The telegram was signed by different people, amongst whom Subject can remember von WITZLEBEN and STAUFFENBERG.

5. General von ESEBECK only read these messages rather fleetingly as he thought that this action originated from Hitler himself and that it was another purge in the style of the 30 July 1934. It is possible that he did not get to read or misunderstood the orders about the different arrest of

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of Reichsministers and the liberation of political prisoners from concentration camps. This was quite in keeping with his character, as he made the impression of being a distraught person (his officers called him derisively a "bureau-general").

6. Colonel CODRE, after his staff-officers had appeared, summoned the Town Commandant, General SINZINGER, read the text of the telegrams and ordered him to arrest the Police-president of Vienna, SS-Brigade-fuehrer GUTZMANN and the Kreisleiter of Vienna, SINZINGER, after the return to his office, (situated at the Universitaetsstrasse II, Vienna IX) summoned GUTZMANN under some pretext, had him disarmed and arrested. He did not succeed in arresting the Kreisleiter, as the revolt had failed already.

7. After SINZINGER left CODRE's office, the latter summoned the following persons, under the pretext of a conference concerning the measures to be taken in connection with the now revolt:

- a: the aide to the Gauleiter of Vienna, Dr. SCHLITZER (SCHILLACH was absent from Vienna.
- b: the Regierungspräsident GRUBER, who replaced the absent Dr. JURY.
- c: the Koeharce SS and Polizeifuehrer, SS-Gruppenfuehrer QUERNER.
- d: the senior officer of the SS, a Standarten-fuehrer (name forgotten).
- e: the chief of staff of the Schutzpolizei, Oberstleutnant FRIDIN.
- f: the Chief of the Stapo-Leitstelle Vienna, SS-Standartenfuehrer Dr. MILDNER.
- g: the latter's second-in-command, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer, Oberregierungsrat Dr. EBNER.
- h: the Propaganda-chief, who was not invited but appeared anyway, out of pure curiosity.

8. Colonel CODRE informed the gentlemen about the now situation. Since the Schutzpolizei and the Waffen-SS were now subordinated to the Commandant of the Wehrkreis, CODRE ordered the police-chief to return to his office and to take all measures to maintain peace and order. He demanded all information which QUERNER could give him about the concentration camps in Vienna area, (QUERNER was later sent to Central Germany, as punitive measure for having given the information). Then the different dignitaries were kept under rather loose guard by some Wehrmacht-men.

9. In the meantime a third message had arrived from the Heimatsfuehrungsstab. It was announced that the news that HITLER had not been killed during the attempt on his life was entirely false and that he was actually dead.

10. A fourth message appointed the former chief of the Abwehrstelle XVII, Count MARON, as the liaison officer of the Heimatsfuehrungsstab to the Wehrkreis XVII, and that the former social-democrat Mayor of Vienna, Karl SEITZ and the former Landeshauptmann for Lower Austria and former Minister of Agriculture, REITHER, were appointed political delegates.

11. General von ESEBCK was having some suspicion now about the legality of those actions and ordered CODRE to contact the Bendlerstrasse in Berlin. CODRE contacted STAUFFENBERG by telephone. The latter confirmed the legality of the orders and ordered them executed as soon as possible. The general-alarm was given by CODRE, under the phrase "Wolkueere" and all public buildings were immediately occupied. The execution of the "Wolkueere"-alarm was not possible in the other parts of the Wehrkreis as the cipher officer who had to make the message was not to be found at his post, a situation which was typical of Vienna.

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12. Von ESEBECK was still not convinced of the legality of the different orders, notwithstanding STAUFFENBERG's assurances and he decided to telephone Berlin again. There he contacted HOEPFNER, who was rather nervous at the telephone which aroused ESEBECK suspicions more and more, (it was generally known that HOEPFNER had been discharged from the Wehrmacht, for cowardice). ESEBECK decided then to contact the Fuehrer-Hauptquartier and was able to speak to General Feldmarschall KETTEL, who finally gave him the right information. Immediately after the conversation with KETTEL, ESEBECK released all the prisoners after having informed them of the real situation and having apologized for their detention.

13. A little later a fifth message arrived signed FROMME, where he said that he had assumed again the command of the Home Army, after having been prevented by a few revolutionary officers to exercise his functions during a few hours.

14. The conclusion of this revolt was made by HITLER who had FROMME arrested and proclaimed himself chief of the Home Army. FROMME, according to subject, had a somewhat dual role in these events. Immediately after his "release" he ordered a certain number of officers shot who apparently knew too much about his real role. Later, it seems FROMME was arrested and executed.

15. As Subject was also referent for "attempts on the lives of higher officials", he remained in his office as soon as the radio-message was broadcast about the attempt on the life of HITLER. He ordered that all messages concerning a repressive action against the plotters be submitted to him immediately as he knew from previous experiences that it was usual that the frontiers would be closed and that general searches would be ordered. About 2300, when Subject decided to go home, as nothing had happened, he met at the office of the duty commissar, the Oberregierungsrat Dr. EBER, who had just been released from his "prison". The latter informed Subject of the real situation and ordered Subject to arrest immediately SEITZ and REITHER. This took quite a while, as REITHER lived in Langenrohr near Tulln.

16. In the early morning of July 21st, after his return from the arrest of REITHER, Subject was ordered by his Section-chief, Dr. Otmar TREMKER, to ascertain whether Count MAROGNA-REDWITZ, who had been transferred to Berlin, was in Vienna and to have him arrested. Subject met MAROGNA in his villa of the Boocklinstrasse, Vienna II, and brought him back to the Stapo-stelle. Apparently all indications were against him. He had been relieved of his command (AST XVII) and had been transferred to Berlin, where he became the subordinate of STAUFFENBERG. He had left Berlin on the eve of the 20th of July and as soon as he had arrived in Vienna had looked up GUDRE and ESEBECK, without a special reason for his appearance there. It is Subject's suspicion that he appeared there only to announce his presence in Vienna, in case the revolutionary officers would need him when the message naming him liaison officer to the Wehrkreis XVII would reach Vienna. A secretary of his successor in Vienna, Oberstleutnant ARMSTER, had reported that MAROGNA had used the direct Berlin line in ARMSTER's office to call Oberst BERNARDIS, a trusted man of STAUFFENBERG, and had asked him how long he was to stay in Vienna, whereupon BERNARDIS told him to wait another day. In any case, MAROGNA denied any participation in the plot.

17. On 21 July a message arrived from Berlin ordering the arrest of MAROGNA, SEITZ and REITHER. There was apparently a reason or reasons for the arrest of MAROGNA, but as Subject thought that none existed for the arrest of the two others, he suggested to Berlin that they be liberated, which was refused.

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18. The NSHA had, in the meantime, created a "Sonderkommando 20th July" for the persecution of all the plotters. This new organization, under the leadership of SS Oberführer PANZINGER, ordered Subject to arrest General von ESEBECK, SINZINGER and CODRE. Another message even ordered the arrest of Oberst ARMSTER, the successor of MAROGNA. Reasons for the arrests were not given. (Sometime later Subject was informed that amongst the papers found on STAUFFENBERG, was found the nomination of ARMSTER as liaison officer to the Wehrkreis XVIII).

19. Berlin further ordered the arrest of Count BERCHEM, of a Oberstleutnant whose name Subject does not remember, and of captain ERHARDT, leader of the famous Erhardt-Brigade which had participated in the Kapp-Putsch. The arrest of the two last officers was explained because they were special friends of MAROGNA's and that they might have known about the plot, although Berlin had nothing to substantiate these suspicions. No reason was given for the arrest of ERHARDT.

20. It was not possible to incriminate MAROGNA without having specific proof of his conversation with BERNARDIS. Subject demanded Berlin to arrest and question BERNARDIS, without any materialise. Since there was no other incriminating material against ARMSTER and ERHARDT, Subject decided to travel to Berlin and take up the matter there. There he met the officials who were in charge of the different cases: the SS Stabsführer WOLF who made the request on MAROGNA, the SS Obersturmbannführer and Ober Regierungsrat Dr. Alfred TREMKER (of Munich - no connection with the Vienna man). As Subject did not receive any incriminating material from them and, as he refused to further prosecute the case without it, he was told to bring MAROGNA and ARMSTER to Berlin. Subject asserts that he also tried to obtain some decision on the other prisoners (SKITZ, REITHER, ESEBECK, SINZINGER, CODRE) but to no avail as the Gestapo, SS Gruppenführer MUELLER, had reserved for himself the right to decide about the liberations.

21. Subject emphasizes the special situation of ERHARDT. The official in charge of his case was a Kriminalrat SADER, who was rather embarrassed, when Subject asked him point blank why ERHARDT had been arrested. He said that immediately after the 20th of July some high official, whom he did not remember, had put a note in his hand ordering him to have ERHARDT arrested, without stating any reason. When Subject explained that he could not hold ERHARDT on such flimsy grounds, SADER forbade him expressly to talk about it as the higher official might still appear somewhere. SADER finally compromised by ordering Subject to bring ERHARDT to Berlin and to clear the matter himself.

22. As far as the request against Count BERCHEM was concerned, Subject was advised by the Sonderkommando to inspect a voluminous dossier concerning the prisoner, which was kept at the SD-Hauptamt at Bernau. Subject states that he actually read that dossier but did not find anything which could possibly incriminate Count BERCHEM. Subject knew BERCHEM as a brilliant conversationalist, who had his connections with the Pope and the British Royal House, and who kept an open eye on everything. Subject knew that BERCHEM had at different times talked rather freely about some errors in the prosecution of the German foreign policies and about the German conduct of the war. An intimate friend of the prisoner regularly informed (the Gestapo) about it. As soon as Subject came back to Vienna, he had all the prisoners transferred to Berlin, except Count BERCHEM.

23. Subject stated that the following facts came to his knowledge after he had been transferred to Berlin:

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24. In September or October of 1944, Subject was informed by the RSHA that MAROGNA had confessed to having been previously informed of the plot and to have traveled to Vienna because he knew he was going to be named the liaison officer to the Wehrkreis XVII. Any such knowledge was denied by BERCHEM, but steps taken by Subject to have BERCHEM released were vain.

25. In the beginning of 1945, Subject received the visit of the Countess MAROGNA, who asked Subject to allow her to take her belongings from her villa as she intended moving to Bavaria. Subject answered that he could not allow her this, until a court had examined her husband's case, whereupon the Countess informed him that MAROGNA had been executed on the 11th of October. Subject immediately contacted Berlin, who confirmed the news.

26. As far as ARMSTER is concerned, Subject can only relate that he met one day in Berlin RSHA officers-mess, the official who was in charge of ARMSTER's case, Oberregierungsrat Dr. Alfred TREMKER. The latter told him that ARMSTER had confessed that he had once received an envoy of STUUFFENBERG. TREMKER concluded that he had undoubtedly received some news of the plot from this envoy.

27. The most tragic destiny was given to CODERE. The latter was a Ritter-Kreuztraeger and made an impression through his cutting attitude and his sarcastic remarks on his prosecutor, Dr. TREMKER. The latter was so antagonized by CODERE, that he managed to have CODERE sent to Mauthausen as a Prisoner of class III (the worst kind).

28. ESEBECK and SINZINGER were discharged from the Wehrmacht, freed, again arrested and again freed. SEITZ and REITHER were freed after a few months and had to reside forcibly in some town in Central Germany. As for BERCHEM, he was freed by Subject after a series of fruitless demands for liberation, around Christmas 1944.

29. Subject adds that there were a number of rumors in Berlin about the real background of the revolt. One rumor was more fantastic than the other. Subject just remembers that somebody explained that the real instigator of the entire plot was Admiral GEMARIS, the leader of all the USTEN, and that GEMARIS had prepared his revolt since 1934(1). Another rumor affirmed that the plotters had their connections and ramifications over a certain number of USTs to some Russian quarters. Another affirmed that there was a direct connection between the Bondierstrasse and the already mentioned "Rote DREI".

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Detailed Interrogation Report of Johann SAMITZER, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV2.

APPENDIX H. Description of Personalities.

1. Frans Joseph HUBER:
SS-Brigade Fuehrer und General Major der Polizei.
About 45 years old; 178 cm high, slender, brown brushed back hair, dark eyes, hooked nose, short-clipped moustache; well-rounded features; suffers from agina pectoris.
2. Oberfuehrer HELLMIG:
About 50 years old; 170 cm high; stocky; dark blond brushed back hair, beardless, domineering.
3. Dr. Josef AUENGER:
Regierungsrat.
Around 45 years old, 170 cm high, slender; drooping, rather careless attitude; dark, rather sparse hair; short-clipped moustache. Mongolian-looking.
4. Dr. Hubert KERN:
Around 40 years old; 168 cm high; slender; dark, brushed back hair; wears glasses; fleshy nose. Left the Police in Vienna since 1939 and became Landrat somewhere in the West.
5. Kriminalrat Adolf ANDELE:
41 years old; around 175 cm high; stocky; became slimmer in the last years; stooping attitude; drags his feet slightly; broad face; brushed back hair - blonde and wavy; rather protruding eyes; deep wrinkles.
6. Kriminalrat Franz MORAWETZ:
58 years old; around 180 cm high; stooped attitude; thin, narrow face; dark, sparse hair, parted in the middle - mixed with grey; bushy eyebrows; short-clipped moustache.
7. Kriminalkommissar zur Probe SCHINDLER:
Around 35 years old; 180 cm high; thin, rather loose frame; blonde hair parted in the middle; somewhat protruding upper-lip; beardless.
8. Kriminalsekretar Anton BROEDL:
39 years old; 178 cm high; slender, stiff posture; brown hair (artificially waved); light brown eyes; slightly curved, sharp nose; sharp, marked features, beardless.
9. Kriminaldirektor Horst KOPKOW:
around 38 years old; looks 33 years; boyish face; about 185 cm high; brown, brushed back hair; wears glasses; very vivid in his gestures, beardless.
10. Kriminalrat Thomas FLETZER:
around 38 years old; around 170 cm high; slender; dark blond, brushed back hair, with strong and deep bald spots above the temples; slightly curved nose in narrow face; beardless.
11. Kriminalkommissar MUELLER I (KOPKOW'S aide):
around 35 years old; 182 cm high; slender, sportive figure; blonde brushed back hair; blue eyes; high-pitched voice; beardless.
12. Kriminal Kommissar MIKA:
around 35 years old. Around 175 cm high; rather fleshy face; dark,

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sparse, brushed back hair; wears glasses; wide, red face.

13. Kriminal Oberschreiber HEISE:
around 50 years old; about 175 cm high; slender; blonde, brushed-back hair; narrow face; healthy complexion; beardless.
14. Kriminal Oberassistent KLINGER:
around 30 years old; 190 cm high; wide shoulders and relatively small head; dark, brushed back hair; somewhat curved nose.
15. Hauptmann Hannos BAUER:
around 40 years old; 178 cm high; big, sportive figure; dark blonde, brushed-back hair; wide face with healthy complexion; the filmstar type; ingratiating attitude.
16. Hauptmann GROTHE:
around 35 years old; 175 cm high; big, slender; narrow face; dark blonde, brushed-back hair; sharply etched nose; protruding, large ears; big mole on left temple.

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