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HEADQUARTERS
COMPANY A, 2677 REGT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512 U. S. ARMY

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30 June 1945

INTERROGATION OF JOHAN SANITZER

ARREST OF LT. JACK TAYLOR OF OSS

c At the beginning of November 1944, the Aussendienststelle Wiener Neustadt was informed by the wife of a railroad worker that an unknown man (who was later identified as the father of the agent ULSNER) had visited her house. This man brought greetings from the agent GUSCHLBAUER, who had previously been friendly with the railroad worker's daughter. The man had said that GUSCHLBAUER had been dropped by parachute in the neighborhood (Neu-siedler Sec, 13 October 1944). The man said that they had no w/t set and that they tried in vain to contact another group. The unknown man had asked whether the railroad worker could be able to smuggle the group on a freight train and enable them to leave for Yugoslavia. GUSCHLBAUER would come within a few days to get the answer.

At that time SANITZER knew that a group had been dropped in the vicinity but did not know that they were sent by the United States Government. He thought they might have been French and been sent by a North African group.

and
ced The man who visited the railroad worker indicated that he was an active Army officer, although he wore civilian clothes, and this made him conspicuous. GUSCHLBAUER was very easily arrested because he had said, some time before, that he was the son of a director of a glass factory located in Sudetenland and also that he had been stationed at an airbase near Aschberg. This enabled SANITZER to get his name and a complete description of his person.

and Armed with the information given by the railroad worker's wife, SANITZER's men occupied the worker's home to await the eventual return of GUSCHLBAUER. He arrived there in the company of B. SCHER.

ced SANITZER received the news of the arrest of the two men while he was at a conference; he rushed back to Wiener Neustadt. From the preliminary interrogation he heard that two other men of the same group were hiding with a stone mason, named KAUFMAN, in the latter's house at Stieg Neusiedl in the Burgenland; that they were hiding in the hay loft and that every night they walked around and washed themselves in a little annex. SANITZER proceeded there in company of a number of men from the Aussendienststelle Wiener Neustadt. To prevent loss of life on both sides, he posed with his men as wood engineers of the Organization Todt, told the mayor that he has come to engage all possible masons and carpenters, and ordered all these tradesmen to appear before him. When KAUFMAN arrived, SANITZER dropped his cover and ordered him to deliver the two Americans to him without bloodshed. KAUFMAN first denied everything, then had to admit the truth. In the evening, SANITZER and his men hid in the annex, and soon TAYLOR arrived. TAYLOR was later found to be wearing his uniform under a light summer-civilian suit. Then SANITZER and his men rushed them, there was

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a fight and everybody got bruised. ULSNER was not allowed to use his weapons.

TYLOR was taken to Wiener Neustadt by S.NITZER himself; the others were brought there the next day. S.NITZER discovered with astonishment that he had arrested an American officer. S.NITZER, according to the working method of his section, wanted to take away TYLOR's uniform in order to prevent him from using poison, if he had some, or from destroying any documents which he might have hidden. TYLOR hesitated, then finally allowed the uniform to be taken away from him. .. "neutral" suit was given him.

After the arrest, the team's signal plan, about fifteen crystals and two one-time cipher pads were found in the hay loft. B.SCHER later admitted that he had given other cipher-books to his father. S.NITZER immediately noticed that at least one message had already been transmitted as some pages were missing from the code-books.

The same night TYLOR and S.NITZER arrived in Vienna. The other agents arrived there the next day. S.NITZER had already sent a flash message to RSH in Berlin, reporting the group's capture.

The OKW Funkabwehrwachsstelle Wien and the Polizei Funkabwehrstelle Wien had been informed of the arrival of the agents, and their respective commanders Flieger-Hauptmann H. WESBERGER and Polizei-Hauptmann BROTTJE arrived to look over the w/t material.

TYLOR refused to answer the simplest questions before his uniform was returned to him. In the morning, S.NITZER sent TYLOR's uniform to Dozent MEYER, head of the medico-legal Institute of Vienna University, where TYLOR's uniform was scientifically examined and then immediately returned to him.

As soon as his uniform was returned, TYLOR had his first interview. S.NITZER admitted that TYLOR never "talked," nor did WESBERGER. But GUSCIBAUER and B.SCHER were described by one of S.NITZER's men as having talked "like a book."

PASCHER

TYLOR spoke a little about himself, said he was a dentist from Los Angeles and a radio amateur. H. WESBERGER even remembered having corresponded with him by radio before the war. TYLOR said he had volunteered to fight against Japan and had been in the Coast Guard. Later he had been transferred to Egypt and then to Greece, where he commanded some transports on a little island. Later he had been ordered to jump into Austria with his men.

S.NITZER confessed he never received a clear picture from TYLOR about his actual mission, but that he was not too concerned about it, because GUSCIBAUER and B.SCHER had "revealed" that they were to look for and prepare landing-places for the planes of American missions, who would contact the Russians during their advance. TYLOR denied any knowledge of all this and stood by his oath of allegiance as an officer not to reveal ~~not to reveal~~ any military secrets. For the same reason, not many questions were asked TYLOR about the w/t part of the mission; the two experts examined the material without the aid of TYLOR and his men.

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The other men were not questioned personally by S.NITZER. A complete report was written down, signed by the arrested men and forwarded to RSH., Berlin. S.NITZER claims he did not question T.YLOR, as his employees did interrogate the other members of the team, but that he simply reported the capture of T.YLOR to Berlin without having T.YLOR sign the "protocol." RSH. immediately complained that T.YLOR had not talked enough. They also asserted that he must be identical with a certain English Captain T.YLOR, who was a sabotage instructor with Tito's Partisans. S.NITZER thought that was erroneous and so informed RSH..

GUSCHLBER, BLSCHER, ULSNER, and also ULSNER's father were handed over around January 1945 to the Wehrmacht (Kriegsgericht - XVII Luftgau) for high treason and S.NITZER asserted that he never heard about them again.

As for T.YLOR, he was placed under house arrest on the fifth floor of the Gestapo building. As soon as he complained that he was supposed to do menial work, such as cleaning latrines, etc., S.NITZER said he gave orders that he had to be treated as an officer and that he be given food from the officer's mess. During air raid alarms, house prisoners had their hands and feet tied to prevent escape, but that was not done to T.YLOR, whom S.NITZER took to an air raid shelter instead.

Soon T.YLOR asked S.NITZER whether he could transmit a message to Bari, saying that he was well treated and that only military targets should be bombed in the Vienna area. For this service T.YLOR demanded that his men be treated as he was. S.NITZER asserted that T.YLOR was under the delusion that he was being treated as a regular POW. According to International Law, S.NITZER said, T.YLOR was a spy, whether he was in uniform or not, and his men were deserters and guilty of high treason. What S.NITZER had in mind was to keep T.YLOR and perhaps exchange him against a captured German spy. S.NITZER refused T.YLOR's request but said that he would transmit it to his commanding officer. The commanding officer, who gave S.NITZER considerable latitude, told him to discuss it with Berlin.

A few days before Christmas 1944, S.NITZER reported to Berlin, and among other things talked over T.YLOR's case with KOPKOW, the IVa2 referent of the RSH.. KOPKOW informed S.NITZER that a new edict from HITLER had ordered that all officers belonging to "foreign missions" were to be shot. S.NITZER later learned that the officers of the "Czech Mission" were shot. S.NITZER did not take this seriously and proposed to wait. He emphasized that he never proposed that T.YLOR begin a Funkspiel (controlled broadcast).

BLSCHER and GUSCHLBER had previously admitted that a second American group (i.e., the DILLON team of OSS, HEDTO) was to be dropped around the Katschberg, in Carinthia. They had revealed that one of the agents was named STEINWENGER and that another was only known under the name of GEMME, but they gave a complete personal description of the latter.

S.NITZER decided to begin a funkspiel anyway. He informed the two DE stations of the Vienna area of the situation and asked them to listen in on a

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certain number of frequencies. Soon the DF stations informed him that Bari had called but that it was too weak to be deciphered.

In January 1945 Berlin asked what was happening with the project "Mississippi" (code name given by S.NITZER to the T.YLOR funkspieler.) S.NITZER informed that that Bari still had not called, but that he was going to take the STEINWENDNER group in hand personally, try take them prisoner and try to work out a funkspieler with them. If this succeeded, S.NITZER planned to contact Bari under T.YLOR's call-sign, tell them that he ("T.YLOR") had contacted the second group, that he had no w/t set, and ask Bari to drop another set.

Sanitzer?

S.NITZER was unable to go to Carinthia himself, but he sent one of his men to see whether any trace of STEINWENDNER or of his family could be found in the vicinity of the Katschberg. The employeed found no trace of them. S.NITZER was quite friendly with BERGER, the hold of the Klagenfurt Stelle, as they had worked together in Vienna, where BERGER had been "Kommunisten-referent." S.NITZER then sent all the material he had on T.YLOR and his group on to BERGER and instructed him to keep his eyes open. (S.NITZER had been appointed chief and advisor of all the Funkspiele in the Ostmark, and had the right to order Berger in this case.)

and

During the month of February S.NITZER received a routine report of the arrest of the American Carinthia group. A little later, H.NESLUEK, the chief of the GSW Funkabwehrwachungsstelle Wien, informed him that his Klagenfurt subordinate, Luftwaffe Oberloutnant PLEHNITZ, had reported that a Funkspiel was going on in Klagenfurt that that it was badly played, without imagination, and that Bari was practically certain to be suspicious. S.NITZER immediately asked BERGER to transmit all the texts of the Funkspiele. Around 3 or 4 April 1945, BERGER, during an official visit in Vienna, submitted the texts, but the situation was such that S.NITZER found no time to look them over; and when a general destruction of official papers was ordered on 5 April, S.NITZER also destroyed the Klagenfurt papers.

At the beginning of March 1945, a greater part of the Morzin-Platz building of the Gestapo was damaged and S.NITZER moved his radio-station, his ciphering personnel and the "better agents" (who were conducting Funkspiele) to the Bossner villa. T.YLOR was also transferred there, as he had promised not to try to escape.

and

In the middle of March, UMBRAUER, a Russian agent, informed S.NITZER that T.YLOR had approached him with a proposal to escape together. That, and the fact that T.YLOR was assiduously studying German, made S.NITZER suspicious and he had him transferred back to the house-prison of the Gestapo at the Morzin-Platz.

and

Around the end of March the leader of the house-prison, Ober-Inspektor LUCKI informed Sanitzer that all house-prisoners were to be transferred to Mauthausen, as their detention in the Morzin-Platz prison had become difficult, owing to repeated air raid alarms. S.NITZER asserted that before he allowed his

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special prisoners to leave, he wrote a special note on their transfer sheet, ordering the Mauthausen people to allow them to have the privileges of smoking, letter-writing and studying. LUGEL returned from Mauthausen with a message that the Mauthausen people did not want TAYLOR because he was in uniform, and that possibly he should be transferred to a regular POW camp. From then on, S.NITZER asserts that he did not know any more whether TAYLOR was in a POW camp or in the civilian section of Mauthausen.

Around 6 May 1945, S.NITZER tried to go to Mauthausen to see where TAYLOR was; but he could only go as far as Anstetten, and was told that the Americans had overrun Linz and Mauthausen.

WHAT S.NITZER THINKS OF THE SIGNAL PLAN, CODEBOOKS, SETS.

S.NITZER asserted that he had already seen a signal plan similar to TAYLOR's in the possession of an English agent and that it was very easy for him to read it. H.N. WESBLUER was an expert on English communications and found no difficulty at all in understanding it. S.NITZER thinks that the signal plan was better than the Russian ones, as it contained a QSI, QSY, and a guard channel.

S.NITZER does not think too highly of the one-time pad such as TAYLOR had. He immediately saw that TAYLOR had already written one message and the imprint of the clear text had left a mark on the virgin pages. S.NITZER had these pages photographed and quickly thereby learned both the clear text and the enciphering method. S.NITZER thinks that a memorized key (something like a little poem, as the British had) is much better.

(Quite a lot of intelligence was found on TAYLOR when he was arrested, which awaited transmission to Bari. This intelligence had been gathered by WESBLUER's father; this explains why the latter had been arrested.)

About the w/t sets: GUSCHLAUER and H. SCHEIDT had given S.NITZER a fairly good description of the set. It was everybody's opinion that THIEDT's set had been stuck in the bomb-bay of the plane. Later on, in April 1945, a set which was recognized as American was found in the Greater-Vienna area and thoroughly examined by H. WESBLUER and GLOTTE, although it was rather badly smashed.

WHAT S.NITZER KNEW ABOUT ALLIED TEAMS IN SLOVAKIA

S.NITZER knows of only two teams sent into Slovakia, but does not know whether they were OSS teams.

1. Found the end of December 1944 a combined British-American team, consisting of a British officer, a U. S. officer and some Slovaks were caught near Banska-Bistrica, and S.NITZER heard about them. S.NITZER had to go to Pressburg frequently in order to supervise the training, as w/t agents, of about nine Ukrainians, who were to be sent behind the Russian lines. There he frequently met Ober-Inspektor LUDWIG, the Pressburg subordinate of HANNESBLUER. The Allied agents were caught by a E.T.-group who had posed as Partisans. LUDWIG was to interrogate them about their sets and signal plans, etc., but before he could complete their interrogation, the Allied agents were sent to Mauthausen.

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2. Around January-February 1945 a U. S. noncom named KRISHAN (?) was arrested in the company of five airplane crew-members somewhere in Slovakia. They were all dressed in civilian clothes, which they explained by saying that they had been in Partisan territory and that the Partisans had stolen their uniforms. A signal plan had been found on one of them and they had all been sent to the OAV Funkbeobachtungsstelle for interrogation by HANFESB.UEI. It was not known then who had been in possession of the signal plan and the arrival was expected for some time of the man of the Thirlenayer division (a punitive SS division), who had made the arrest. He identified KRISHAN as the owner of the signal plan. The other men were sent to a POW camp. KRISHAN was then interrogated for quite a while, and finally "liberated" in April.

DF-ing AND INTERCEPTION OF OSS MESS.GES

The DF stations in Germany had for quite a long time located the OSS radio station at Adriane (?). The RSHA regularly circulated all messages it had deciphered and which were exchanged between OSS headquarters and missions attached to Partisan Headquarters. S.MITZER regularly learned about the "frictions" encountered by the OSS officers at the Partisan Headquarters, etc. He remembers the names of two officers, a Major LINDSAY and a certain KHRUSAK (?).

During his regular visits at the RSHA, S.MITZER says he saw a table of organization of OSS. He knew that agents were dropped by the Italian Section (Bari) into Austrian and Southern Germany, and that London dropped agents in the rest of Germany. Agents from Italy left from the Brindisi airfield.

S.MITZER especially remembers the name of a "Captain" CHAPIN, who was the Chief of the section which sent agents into Austria.

JULES KONIG,
Captain, SC

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