

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS  
ARE ATTACHED:  
(Please do not remove)

SSC 1 2637A 88

OCA 2520 88

DOO 1728 88

SUBJECT:

~~SECRET~~

DD/088-1738

3 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] Recollections of Canadian Requests in (b)(1)  
1979 (b)(3)

[redacted] who has been out of town for the last month, (b)(1)  
phoned early morning 3 August and the undersigned asked him if (b)(3)  
he recollected the meeting in 1979, with a ranking Canadian  
security official in then DDCI Carlucci's office. The Canadian  
made the dramatic announcement at this meeting that six  
American Embassy officials had taken refuge in the Canadian  
Embassy in Tehran. [redacted] did not recall any mention by the (b)(1)  
Canadian that the U.S. Congress should not be briefed. He did (b)(3)  
recall how frightened the participants were for the lives of  
the Americans and the 15 Canadians, who were now also at risk.  
He also recalled the phrase, "this should not be discussed  
outside these four walls." When I asked if he remembered  
Carlucci saying he would have to brief the President, [redacted] (b)(1)  
said he thought that was right. He added that the Canadian was (b)(3)  
very up-tight and that as the weeks following this meeting  
progressed, the Canadian Government was taking a lot of  
political heat to pull all of their people out of Tehran. The  
Canadian did take their embassy down to the absolute minimum  
required to support our six people. Several times [redacted] had (b)(1)  
to plead with the Canadians for a few more days before we could (b)(3)  
organize the rescue. The Canadians did pull out the remainder  
of their people immediately after ours left.

[redacted] (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Thomas A. Twetten  
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

- Distribution:  
Orig - ADDO Chrono  
1 - D/OCA  
1 - DDCI  
1 - C/NE  
1 - EA/DCI  
1 - DDO  
1 - DOREG



✓B-405-IR

C-303D-IR

~~SECRET~~

29 July 1988  
OCA 2520-88

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Acting Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT:

Response to Boren/Cohen Letter on a Canadian Request to Limit Congressional Notification

1. Attached for your signature is a response to Chairman Boren's and Vice Chairman Cohen's request that we provide documentation regarding Canada's request that Congress not be informed of the operation to rescue Americans in the Canadian Mission in Tehran. As you are aware, the Committee believes the Administration has exaggerated the facts concerning the story to defeat the Intelligence Oversight legislation.

2. I have also attached for your information a summary prepared by the Directorate of Operations that documents additional details regarding the Canadian assistance in the exfiltration of the Americans. The summary mentions a meeting that occurred on 19 November 1979 at which time a Canadian official may have made the request that Congress not be notified of the operation. Secretary Carlucci, who was the DDCI at the time, was present at the meeting. You should be aware that Secretary Carlucci today has no recollection of the meeting.

*15/*  
[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Attachments:  
As stated

ALL PORTIONS  
CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
DCI  
EXEC  
REG

~~SECRET~~

*1B-405-1r*

*CR: C-303D-1r*

SUBJECT: Response to Boren/Cohen Letter on a Canadian  
Request to Limit Congressional Notification

A/D/OCA/ [ ] (26126) 29 July 1988

(b)(3)

Distribution:

Orig - addressee

- 1 - DDCI (w/att.)
- 1 - EXDIR (w/att.)
- 1 - ER (w/att.)
- 1 - D/OCA (w/att.)
- 1 - OCA Registry (w/att.)
- 1 - [ ] Chrono (w/o att.)
- 1 - [ ] Chrono (w/o att.)

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

27 July 1988

SUBJECT: Additional Background Information on Canadian Assistance in the Exfiltration of U.S. Embassy Employees from Tehran

N.B. Given the extreme sensitivity over Canadian support to our exfiltration efforts, several aspects of the operation were not committed to paper. The information contained below is primarily based on the recollections of Agency officers involved in the initial planning of the exfiltration operation.

1. Although the Iranians seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, we were unable to reconcile the numbers of U.S. employees being held captive. The Iranians claimed to be holding 54 hostages: 51 at the Embassy and three at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If this figure were correct, a small number of employees were "missing". [redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[redacted] visited Headquarters on 16 November 1979. During the visit, which had been arranged before the U.S. Embassy was seized, [redacted] advised six Embassy employees had made their way to the Canadian mission where they sought safehaven. It was stunning and welcome news.

2. Upon learning this information, [redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[redacted] Additional officers representing Near East and European Divisions joined Mr. Carlucci to discuss exfiltration planning with [redacted]. The group adjourned to the Director's Dining Room where adequate table space was available to spread out maps of Tehran and Iran. During the ensuing discussion, [redacted] made it plain the Canadians would help in the exfiltration of the Americans but knowledgeability of the presence of the Americans at the Canadian mission and the Canadian assistance must be extremely limited. Two DO participants independently recalled [redacted] stating "the information must not go beyond this room" or "beyond these four walls." Carlucci said the Agency would respect this, but he asked for [redacted] approval to brief one other individual -- the President.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] agreed and reemphasized no one other than the President should be aware of our joint planning. One participant recalled [redacted] specifically said the information should not be passed to [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

[redacted] The participant believed this unusual request added additional weight to [redacted] request for utmost secrecy. While two of the DO officers recalled that [redacted] stipulated Congress not be informed, two other DO officers did not recall a specific statement to this effect. Rather, in subsequent discussions, the Agency officers agreed that the "gentlemen's agreement" with [redacted] contained the implication that Congress not be notified.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

3. Lives were at stake and the information was extremely tightly held within the Agency. In addition, we were concerned with violent retaliation the Canadians would experience at the hands of the Iranian revolutionaries should they become aware of Canadian assistance, extremely tight compartmentation was instituted. The uncertainty of events in Iran and the Middle East was underscored when, during the same time frame as the Embassy seizure in Tehran, militant Muslims destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, killing an Army Warrant Officer in the process, dependents were evacuated from Kabul because of the instability of the Afghan regime, and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli was sacked.

4. In sum, [redacted] offered us a means of saving six Americans. He requested absolute secrecy and we agreed. Former DDCI Carlucci took this caveat seriously and specifically requested [redacted] permission to brief the President. Within this context it was clear to the officers involved that Congress must not be briefed on the exfiltration planning. The point is not whether a specific document memorialized a Canadian request not to brief Congress, but rather how experienced Agency officers interpreted [redacted] request. The recollections of those officers involved in the meeting indicated they believed [redacted] statements revealed a clear and consistent need to keep this information on a "close-hold" basis, which was interpreted as precluding Congressional notification.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~



Washington D C 20505

29 JUL 1988

OCA 2522-88

The Honorable David Boren  
Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of 12 July requesting the Agency provide contemporaneous documentation that the Canadian Government conditioned its cooperation in the 1980 exfiltration of six Americans from the Canadian Mission in Tehran on Congress not being notified in advance of the operation.

A search of our records has revealed no contemporaneous documentation that Canada requested Congress not be informed of the operation. This is not surprising. Given the extreme sensitivity of the Canadian support to our exfiltration effort, several aspects of the operation were not committed to paper.

We have discussed Canada's support to this operation with Agency officers, some of whom are now retired, who recounted the events surrounding the exfiltration of the six Americans. These officers recall that a Canadian official informed senior Agency officials on 16 November 1979 that six Embassy employees had made their way to the Canadian Mission. This was critical intelligence as the Agency was desperately seeking information on the location of the hostages during the preceding two weeks. The Canadian official stated that Canada would help in the exfiltration of the Americans. The official insisted, however, that the knowledge of the Americans presence in the Mission and Canada's assistance in their exfiltration had to be extremely limited. Two officers from the Directorate of Operations recall that the Canadians requested "that information must not go beyond this room." Given the almost certain violent retaliation that would occur against Canadian

ALL PORTIONS  
CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~



(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

officials in Tehran if the Iranians became aware of the Canadian assistance, the Agency agreed to honor this request. The Canadian official did agree to the necessity of briefing the President, but re-emphasized his country's requirement that no one beyond the President should be briefed.

Precise recollections vary, eight years after the fact, on whether the Canadian specifically requested that Congress not be informed about the operation. Two Directorate of Operations officers recall that the Canadian official stipulated that Congress not be informed; two other officers present at the same meeting do not recall a specific statement to this effect. Based upon subsequent discussions, these Agency officers believed that there was an implied agreement with Canada that Congress not be informed of the operation.

While I can understand your interest in having an accurate historical record on this matter, I believe that the crucial point to keep in mind is the distinct possibility that in the future a country will condition its cooperation with the Agency on Congress not being notified until the extraordinary sensitive part of the covert action operation is completed. Without the flexibility to delay Congressional notice in such situations, the Agency may not be able to carry out a covert action designed to save innocent American lives. This possibility must be seriously considered in determining the wisdom of mandating Congressional notice within 48 hours. A copy of this letter is being provided to Vice Chairman Cohen and Chairman Stokes and Ranking Minority Member Hyde of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ William H. Webster

William H. Webster  
Director of Central Intelligence



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

29 JUL 1988

OCA 2523-88

The Honorable William Cohen  
 Vice Chairman  
 Select Committee on Intelligence  
 United States Senate  
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of 12 July requesting the Agency provide contemporaneous documentation that the Canadian Government conditioned its cooperation in the 1980 exfiltration of six Americans from the Canadian Mission in Tehran on Congress not being notified in advance of the operation.

A search of our records has revealed no contemporaneous documentation that Canada requested Congress not be informed of the operation. This is not surprising. Given the extreme sensitivity of the Canadian support to our exfiltration effort, several aspects of the operation were not committed to paper.

We have discussed Canada's support to this operation with Agency officers, some of whom are now retired, who recounted the events surrounding the exfiltration of the six Americans. These officers recall that a Canadian official informed senior Agency officials on 16 November 1979 that six Embassy employees had made their way to the Canadian Mission. This was critical intelligence as the Agency was desperately seeking information on the location of the hostages during the preceding two weeks. The Canadian official stated that Canada would help in the exfiltration of the Americans. The official insisted, however, that the knowledge of the Americans presence in the Mission and Canada's assistance in their exfiltration had to be extremely limited. Two officers from the Directorate of Operations recall that the Canadians requested "that information must not go beyond this room." Given the almost certain violent retaliation that would occur against Canadian

ALL PORTIONS  
 CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~



(b)(3)

SECRET

officials in Tehran if the Iranians became aware of the Canadian assistance, the Agency agreed to honor this request. The Canadian official did agree to the necessity of briefing the President, but re-emphasized his country's requirement that no one beyond the President should be briefed.

Precise recollections vary, eight years after the fact, on whether the Canadian specifically requested that Congress not be informed about the operation. Two Directorate of Operations officers recall that the Canadian official stipulated that Congress not be informed; two other officers present at the same meeting do not recall a specific statement to this effect. Based upon subsequent discussions, these Agency officers believed that there was an implied agreement with Canada that Congress not be informed of the operation.

While I can understand your interest in having an accurate historical record on this matter, I believe that the crucial point to keep in mind is the distinct possibility that in the future a country will condition its cooperation with the Agency on Congress not being notified until the extraordinary sensitive part of the covert action operation is completed. Without the flexibility to delay Congressional notice in such situations, the Agency may not be able to carry out a covert action designed to save innocent American lives. This possibility must be seriously considered in determining the wisdom of mandating Congressional notice within 48 hours. A copy of this letter is being provided to Chairman Boren and Chairman Stokes and Ranking Minority Member Hyde of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Sincerely yours,


*W. H. Webster*

William H. Webster  
Director of Central Intelligence


~~SECRET~~

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

|          |            | ACTION    | INFO | DATE | INITIAL   |
|----------|------------|-----------|------|------|---|
| 1        | DCI        |           | X    |      |  |
| 2        | DDCI       |           | X    |      |   |
| 3        | EXDIR      |           | X    |      |   |
| 4        | D/ICS      |           |      |      |   |
| 5        | DDI        |           | X    |      |   |
| 6        | DDA        |           |      |      |   |
| 7        | DDO        |           | X    |      |   |
| 8        | DDS&T      |           |      |      |   |
| 9        | Chm/NIC    |           |      |      |   |
| 10       | GC         |           |      |      |   |
| 11       | IG         |           |      |      |   |
| 12       | Compt      |           |      |      |   |
| 13       | D/OCA      | X         |      |      |   |
| 14       | D/PAO      |           |      |      |   |
| 15       | D/PERS     |           |      |      |   |
| 16       | D/Ex Staff |           |      |      |   |
| 17       | C/NE/DC    |           | X    |      |   |
| 18       | D/NESA/DI  |           | X    |      |   |
| 19       |            |           |      |      |   |
| 20       |            |           |      |      |   |
| 21       |            |           |      |      |   |
| 22       |            |           |      |      |   |
| SUSPENSE |            | 25 Jul 88 |      |      |   |
|          |            | Date      |      |      |   |

Remarks D/OCA to respond over his signature.



(b)(3)

Executive Secretary

12 Jul 88

Date

To: Approved for Release: 2020/02/27 C05849185

12 JUL 1988

From: John L. Helgerson

\_\_\_\_\_ We plan to prepare an  
answer for your signature.

✓  
\_\_\_\_\_ We plan to prepare an  
answer for my signature.

\_\_\_\_\_ No answer expected or required

\_\_\_\_\_ John, I prefer to \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

|                                    |  |
|------------------------------------|--|
| DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMAN | WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN |
| LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS               | WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE         |
| SAM NUNN, GEORGIA                  | ORRIN HATCH, UTAH                      |
| ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA | FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA                |
| BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY           | ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA            |
| ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA          | CHIC HECHT, NEVADA                     |
| DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA          | JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA                  |
| HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO         |  |

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8475

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO  
ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

SVEN E. HOLMES, STAFF DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL  
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

#88-2637A

July 12, 1988

The Honorable William H. Webster  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:


As you know, in the course of our deliberations on the intelligence oversight bills, there have been repeated references to the CIA operation to extricate U.S. hostages from the Canadian embassy in Tehran in 1980. We have heard repeatedly that the Canadian government explicitly conditioned its cooperation in this matter upon the U.S. Congress not being notified of the operation.


In reviewing their records, however, including two subsequent hearings before the SSCI and one before the HPSCI where this matter was discussed at length, neither Committee has found any mention of this aspect of the operation.

Inasmuch as it is important to both Committees to have the historical record accurate on this point, we request that you provide both Committees with any contemporaneous documentary evidence in CIA's possession which documents the assertion that the Canadian government specifically conditioned its cooperation in the operation upon the U.S. Congress not being notified of the operation.

We ask that the Committees be advised of such evidence by July 25, 1988.

Sincerely,

  
David L. Boren  
Chairman

  
William S. Cohen  
Vice Chairman

cc: The Honorable Louis Stokes  
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

  
U.S.S.

The Honorable William H. Webster  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

80-6307/1

ER

OLC 80-0004/2

February 6, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : Legislative Counsel  
SUBJECT : Testimony on Iran Findings Before HPSCI Subcommittee on Oversight, 7 February 1980

1. You are scheduled to appear before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, 7 February 1980, to testify on the 27 December 1979 and 23 January 1980 Findings relating to Iran. The Subcommittee was unable to accommodate our request for an earlier time to avoid a conflict with your travel plans. The Subcommittee Chairman, Les Aspin (D., WI), is aware that you may have to depart before the Subcommittee has exhausted its questions and expects that [redacted] will remain until the session ends.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

2. You will recall that you appeared before this Subcommittee on 23 January to present the Findings of 27 and 28 December 1979 relating to Iran, Afghanistan, Oman and Sudan. Because of a conflict in your scheduling that day (a later appearance before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on the Reserve reprogramming), the Subcommittee decided to take up only the Findings on Afghanistan and Iran, in that order. Not only did you never get to the Finding on Iran, but [redacted] had to complete the testimony on Afghanistan after your departure for HAC.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

3. On 29 January, [redacted] again appeared before the Subcommittee to satisfy its request for briefings on all outstanding Findings, now including those of 22 January on the Arabian Peninsula as well. Unaware of the 23 January special Finding, Aspin agreed in advance to defer the 27 December Finding on Iran since neither you nor Hal Saunders were available. Unfortunately, the story about the exfiltration of the six Americans broke on CBS that morning and I rushed over to brief Committee Chairman Edward Boland (D., MA) before Hodding Carter's noon press conference. In an attempt to soften the blow further, I arranged to have [redacted] accompany [redacted] to the 3:00 p.m. briefing, where we were prepared to brief the Congressmen in Executive session on this matter. Aspin refused to have the 23 January Finding read into the record unless we were prepared to "open the whole Iranian bag", kicked [redacted] out of the briefing, and proceeded with testimony on the other Findings.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT CLASSIFIED SECRET/SENSITIVE

C-109

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Last Thursday, at the request of Chairman Boland, [redacted] provided Tom Latimer, HPSCI Staff Director, a briefing on the exfiltration. Earlier this week, Les Aspin called me for details on our normal notification process in compliance with Hughes-Ryan.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

5. The reactions of Les Aspin, Charlie Rose (D., NC) and Chairman Boland to the events of the 29th may overshadow the Subcommittee's major concerns about the earlier Finding, which can be condensed into the following:

[Large redacted box]

(b)(1)  
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6. The questions relating to the 23 January Finding are likely to be tough and emotional. Aspin is convinced that the performance of the Executive failed to meet the "timely" notification requirement of Hughes-Ryan, and that our actions were therefore illegal. He will not attempt to define "timely" in terms of hours or days but will argue that the intent of Hughes-Ryan is certainly clear, i.e., there must be notification before the act. He probably will not quibble about preparatory acts--although his basic position encompasses these as well--since it is clear that in this case all acts were completed before notification.

7. Attached are a list of Subcommittee Members, a witness list and information sheets on Subcommittee Members.

/s/

Frederick P. Hitz  
Legislative Counsel

Attachments:  
As stated

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee w/atts
- 1 - ER w/o info sheets
- 1 - [redacted] w/atts
- 1 - OLC subject w/o info sheets
- 1 - OLC Chrono w/o atts

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

OLC [redacted] (6 February 1980)

(b)(3)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT  
7 February 1980

WITNESS LIST

Witness:

Frank C. Carlucci

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Accompanied by:

Frederick P. Hitz

Legislative Counsel, Office of the  
Director of Central Intelligence



Directorate

of Operations

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Briefing of  
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
Subcommittee on Oversight  
Thursday - 7 February 1980  
2:00 p.m.  
H-405, The Capitol  
(27 December 1979 & 23 January 1980 Findings)

Les Aspin (D., WI), Chairman

Charles Rose (D., NC)  
Romano L. Mazzoli (D., KY)

John M. Ashbrook (R., OH)  
C. W. Bill Young (R., FL)

Staff Members

Tom Latimer, Staff Director  
Leon Fuerth  
Mike O'Neil

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

80-6307

1 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT: Breakfast with Congressman Les Aspin on 5 February 1980  
at 9:00 on the Hill

1. I have invited Les Aspin to meet with you three to discuss his reservations about the procedure surrounding the Canadian Six Finding. This seemed indicated following an hour's conversation I had with Mr. Aspin on 30 January. We had received reports that Mr. Aspin considered the Canadian Six Finding to be outrageous, unlawful and totally without precedent. I met with him alone in an attempt to hear him out. I first showed him the language of the Finding and the Presidential memorandum in order to prove to him that it was at least a debatable question whether timely notification had been complied with. Although he did not agree with my interpretation, he recognized that it was not an open and shut case.

2. The thrust of Mr. Aspin's concerns is the following. He began with a specific comment on the Agency. He stated that over a period of time he has come to recognize that Richard Helms' homily that "we too are honorable men" has some justification. In that spirit, he stated that the relationship evolving between his Oversight Committee and the Agency on the covert action Findings was becoming constructive and fruitful from the Committee's point of view. He was, therefore, dismayed and disappointed at the manner in which the Canadian Six Finding had been handled because in the end it means that the Executive does not trust the Legislative Branch. In effect, he said the Executive Branch does not believe that in the Congress there are also honorable men. I replied quite the contrary. The Administration did not view this operation as an Executive Branch - Legislative Branch matter. It was a question of keeping the number of those witting to the absolute minimum necessary in order to safeguard the lives at stake. I stated that this was not just a question of U.S. lives but Canadian as well, and that the President did not wish to take any chances respecting their involvement. After an intense but amicable discussion in which Mr. Aspin stated he recognized that the

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EYES ONLY

(b)(3)

**EYES ONLY**~~SECRET~~

trend was in favor of the Agency but because he felt betrayed by this obvious lack of trust, he would look for an occasion to ambush us. I stated that I regretted this fact and wished he would meet with the DCI, DDCI and the DDO to lay on the table the concerns he had expressed to me. I told him that under the best of circumstances, the President would probably only have consented to allow us to brief the Committee Chairmen on this matter. Again I stressed it was not a matter of trust, but a matter of operational security where human lives were at stake. I stated that this was a question where hard cases make bad law in the context of the "timely notification" provision and wished that it had not been necessary. With regard to his own behavior, I stated that many of us were concerned by his actions on some occasions in releasing from his office intelligence material which, though not classified, cut pretty close to the bone. We are concerned by the fact that it is he, the Chairman of the HPSCI Oversight Subcommittee, who made these releases. We concluded that a hearing of views on both sides was desirable.

3. Comment - We will not talk Mr. Aspin out of his opposition to the manner in which the Canadian Six Finding was handled nor out of his opposition to covert action operations generally. However, we cannot really afford for this issue to become a festering sore in our relations with him. He can counter with a tight band of liberals in the House and Senate and harass us unmercifully if he puts his mind to it. I have limited goals for a meeting between him and the DCI but believe it important to get our case upon the record.

4. I have since learned that the HPSCI met as a Committee on Hughes-Ryan on 31 January 1980. The meeting was to discuss restructuring the Amendment in the light of the recent spate of Findings and, more particularly, the Canadian Six Finding. The issue is not whether to change Hughes-Ryan, but in what way. According to Tom Latimer, the principal questions are how many Committees of the Congress should be notified and when. Mr. Latimer described the meeting as unemotional and exploratory of the issues involved. Although Mr. Aspin wants prior notification of covert action operations, Mr. Latimer confides that Chairman Boland realizes the President will never consent to this. There is clear majority on the HPSCI, according to Mr. Latimer, in favor of Hughes-Ryan change.

 FREDERICK T. MITCHELL

(b)(3)

cc: DDCI  
DDO  
GC

~~SECRET~~**EYES ONLY**

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

15 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Hughes-Ryan Finding on Proposed Iran Rescue Operation

1. On 15 November at 9:20 a.m. the DCI and I met with Dr. Brzezinski. Noting that contingency planning was moving forward on a possible Iran rescue operation, the DCI said we should begin to discuss legal constraints. -Specifically, it appeared to us that if our people became involved in providing support in the form of documentation to Delta force people being introduced into Iran this could fall under Hughes-Ryan. We were not sure, however, and thought it best to consult the Attorney General. (S)

2. Dr. Brzezinski emphatically stated that the President did not wish to have anybody else knowledgeable of this planning. He wondered why a finding was needed just for the purpose of providing documentation. I said the documentation was being provided for people who would be used for purposes other than the collection of intelligence. Dr. Brzezinski said this would not be the case since the early military people going in would be those providing intelligence and other support. In any event it would not be appropriate to consult the Attorney General at this time. (S)

3. Two hours later in a separate meeting the DCI raised the question of legal authority with Secretary of Defense Brown, asking if Defense planned to operate under the War Powers Act. Brown had obviously not given it a lot of thought, but said he believed that would be the case. We indicated that if the President did operate under the War Powers Act, this eliminated our legal problem with regard to Hughes-Ryan. (S)

[Redacted signature box]

Frank C. Carlucci  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

(b)(3)

cc: DCI (handcarried in sealed envelope)  
General Counsel "


~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

[Redacted box]

(b)(3)



Washington, D.C. 20505



October 22, 1979

Commodore John Rodocanachi  
Director General  
Intelligence and Security  
Department of National Defence  
Ottawa, Canada

Dear John:

I very much appreciated your taking time to meet with me during my recent visit to Ottawa. I found the session with you and your staff highly productive and am delighted with our ongoing relationship.

Thanks also for the delightful lunch. I hope you will allow me to reciprocate on your next visit to Washington, which I hope will not be too long in coming.

Sincerely,

Frank C. Carlucci

DDCI:skm (22 Oct 79)  
Distribution:  
Orig - Addressee (via DDO)  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3)

NOTE FOR THE FILE

[redacted] visited Hqs on 16 Nov 79  
 at the request of the DDCI. He met with  
 the DDCI, Chief, NE [redacted] of  
 NE, [redacted]  
 Purpose of visit: to discuss the Iranian crisis  
 and possible Canadian support. The DDCI made  
 an Agency plane available for [redacted] return  
 flight to Ottawa on 16 Nov.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

*Luncheon 12:15*

[redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)