



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~



CPAS | NIDC 83-116C

M

3.5(c)

National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

Tuesday
17 May 1983

10

3.5(c)

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NIDC 83-116C

17 May 1983

Copy. 370



Page Denied

~~Top Secret~~



3.5(c)


Contents

NR



Argentina: Civilian-Military Negotiations 4

NR



~~Top Secret~~



3.5(c)

Handle via COMINT Channels



Page Denied

Page Denied

Page Denied

3.5(c)

~~Top Secret~~

ARGENTINA: Civilian-Military Negotiations

//Behind-the-scenes dealing between the armed forces and civilian leaders is likely to ease some political tensions during the coming months.// [redacted]

3.5(c)

3.3(b)(1)

//The military is conducting discussions with the Peronists—who the armed forces believe will win the elections in October—on issues of national security, nuclear matters, and military control of senior command appointments. Recent public statements by Peronists tacitly acknowledged the military's contention that it was a civilian Peronist administration that first authorized military involvement in the fight against subversives. Moreover, [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] the leading Peronist presidential candidate will allow the service chiefs to retain their posts for a year following elections in exchange for financial support of his campaign.// [redacted]

3.5(c)

//In addition, press and US Embassy reporting indicates the military is speeding up plans to return control of the labor movement to civilians.// [redacted]

3.5(c)

//Military intelligence units are concerned that Montonero guerrillas are reinfiltrating the country and that civilian leaders might eliminate the Army's internal security role. These units are planning to underscore the leftist threat with attacks against civilian targets that will be attributed to Montoneros. Security officials apparently believe this would set the stage for another agreement on continued armed forces involvement against domestic subversion.// [redacted]

3.5(c)

Comment: *//Some of these reports—and Peronist promises themselves—probably overstate the lengths to which the party would go to accommodate the military. To the extent that the military accepts them at face value, however, they temporarily ease military misgivings about the transition process. At the same time, tacit military support will improve Peronist chances in the elections.//* [redacted]

3.5(c)

~~Top Secret~~

3.5(c)

Page Denied

Page Denied

Page Denied