


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Director of
Central
Intelligence

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CPAS/CIG

National Intelligence Daily

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Monday
20 September 1982

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CPAS NID 82-220JX
TCS 2920/82
20 September 1982

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


Contents

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

/ Israel-Lebanon: *Israelis Evacuate Some Positions* 1



Special Analyses

NR Record

// Israel-Lebanon: *Israeli Intentions* 11



NR Record

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


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TCS 2920/82

20 September 1982

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① ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israelis Evacuate Some Positions

Israeli troops in West Beirut have eliminated organized resistance by the leftist Lebanese militias, and some Israeli units have departed their positions in the city.

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The Lebanese Army is entering the Palestinian refugee camps, the banking district, and the government buildings near the port, according to press reports.

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Israeli troops had entered the Saudi and French banks. they were there to protect the area but that they had occupied only the Arab Bank, which has reportedly been used by the PLO for financial transactions.

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Elsewhere in Lebanon, heavy fighting occurred between the Lebanese Army and Palestinian units in Tripoli yesterday morning. The Lebanese Army apparently was routed in a four-hour fight that resulted in its losing a barracks there. An Army unit also reportedly clashed with remnants of several leftist Lebanese militias near the Bain Militaire in West Beirut but was able to obtain a cease-fire.

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
1-10

Comment: Israeli forces are evacuating some of their new positions in the heart of West Beirut, but they will probably remain at key positions within the city and at checkpoints leading into it. The Lebanese Army is expected to take over eventually from the Israelis. The Army is ill prepared to fulfill its designated role quickly and effectively, however, and there is a danger that the Phalange will move in to fill the vacuum, which could precipitate serious violence.

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Shatila Massacre



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--continued



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TCS 2920/82

20 September 1982

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[Redacted]

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Comment: Tel Aviv almost certainly knew in advance that Phalange militiamen intended to enter the camps.

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[Redacted]

the Israeli

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Defense Forces permitted the Phalange to enter the camps, but only to battle guerrillas. The Israelis were clearly in a position to control access to the camps if they wished to do so.

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[Redacted]

PLO Reaction

The PLO Executive Committee met last night in Damascus and called for the return of the Multinational Force to Beirut to protect the remaining Palestinians.

[Redacted]

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Comment: The massacre will make it difficult for PLO moderates to voice their interest in the US peace plan and will stiffen PLO resolve to retain their remaining forces in northern Lebanon.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Soviet Reaction

The TASS news agency yesterday accused Israeli troops of the massacre of Palestinian civilians in West Beirut and claimed that the US shares responsibility for the crime. The Soviets called for the insertion of UN troops into Beirut and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions against Tel Aviv and questioned whether Israel should be allowed to remain a member of the UN.

--continued

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~~Top Secret~~

TCS 2920/82

20 September 1982

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[Redacted]

The Palestinian news agency reported that President Brezhnev replied yesterday to Arafat's appeal for assistance in ending the killing. The news agency also cited a note from Brezhnev to Syrian President Assad. Soviet media have not taken note of any of these messages. [Redacted]

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Comment: This is the third time since Israel invaded Lebanon that the USSR has condemned Israeli actions in a TASS statement, which is one notch below a government statement in authority. The suggestion that Israel's right to UN membership is in question is some of the strongest language the Soviets have ever used against Tel Aviv. [Redacted]

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~~Top Secret~~
TCS 2920/82
20 September 1982

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SPECIAL ANALYSES

①

ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israeli Intentions

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The massacre of Palestinians has embarrassed the Begin government badly and will cost it substantial political support, although it will probably not affect its hold on power. The massacre does not appear to have harmed the candidacy of Phalange leader Amin Jumayyil, who in fact seems closer to winning the election scheduled for tomorrow.

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The government will have difficulty countering Labor Party charges that the incident, following so soon after Bashir Jumayyil's assassination, proves that Prime Minister Begin has no understanding of the complexities of Lebanese politics and has allowed Israel to be dragged into a no-win situation. Labor will also argue that the recent events make it all but impossible for Israel to secure a peace treaty or the withdrawal of the remaining Palestinian and Syrian forces and that Tel Aviv should now pull its forces back to the 25-mile zone.

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Labor's ability to capitalize on the government's embarrassment, however, will be hindered by the party's image as indecisive and faction-ridden. Labor will probably not be able to oust Begin on this issue.

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Opponents of Defense Minister Sharon within the cabinet will use the massacre to try and undercut him and perhaps force his removal. While Begin will be reluctant to support moves against Sharon, the incident has clearly dealt a major blow to the Defense Minister's political ambitions. Many Israelis will feel that, as architect of Israel's Lebanon policy, Sharon bears some responsibility for the massacre.

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Under pressure from Labor and some of his coalition partners, Begin will be forced to take some action to distance his government from the criticism. He has already called for an inquiry into the incident.

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TCS 2920/82

20 September 1982

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The Israelis will probably also seek to shift some of the blame onto the Lebanese Army and, indirectly, the US. Chief of Staff Eytan reportedly told journalists that "foreign elements" had prevented Israel from allowing the Lebanese Army to police the camps. [redacted]

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But the criticism is not likely to deter Begin from continuing to push for the achievement of his goals. Begin will now feel compelled to demonstrate the wisdom of his policies and justify the high costs of the invasion and will be reluctant to order any more than token pullbacks of Israeli forces. [redacted]

(b)(3)

The Lebanese Presidency

Former President Camille Shamun appears to be losing the support of some who had urged him to run and is reportedly wavering in his decision to oppose Amin Jumayyil. [redacted]

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[redacted] there has been a sudden shift of Muslim support away from Shamun. Shia Muslim deputies who had earlier pledged to back him appear to be responding to instructions from the two most prominent Shia leaders, who have thrown their support to Amin. [redacted]

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Many Shias are adamantly opposed to the Palestinians and probably are not moved by events of the last several days. Israeli intimidation of deputies in areas under Israeli control probably also has contributed to this shift. [redacted]

(b)(3)

Eight other deputies--seven of them Muslims--who had boycotted last month's election in an effort to block Bashir Jumayyil's presidential ambitions have now come out in support of his brother, Amin. Most significant of these is elder statesman Saib Salam, a leader of the Sunni Muslim community. [redacted]

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Salam probably believes he will be able to influence Amin. Moreover, his public statements blaming the forces of southern Christian leader Haddad and ignoring the Phalange role in the massacre probably was designed to make his support for Amin more palatable to Sunni Muslims. [redacted]

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TCS 2920/82

20 September 1982

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Next Steps

The Israelis apparently believe that the Lebanese Army is not capable of asserting control, and that it will be necessary to rely on Phalange military forces. Negotiations for an Israeli withdrawal from West Beirut will be the first order of business for the new Lebanese Government. Statements by Sharon and other Israeli leaders suggest that they will not leave West Beirut until they are satisfied that all PLO forces are out of the area. [Redacted]

1-7

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If Israel persists in its demands for a peace treaty-- still the most important objective for Begin--the emerging domestic political consensus for Amin is likely to shatter. Sunnis and other factions have always opposed signing a treaty, and the massacre of Palestinian civilians has made the issue even more sensitive. Efforts to push ahead with treaty negotiations once again could move Lebanon down the road toward partition. [Redacted]

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President Sarkis believes that the new president must immediately enter into a special relationship with the US and conclude a treaty or pact placing Lebanon under US protection. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]