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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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XARZ-27743

426

20 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAINT, Washington
FROM: SAINT, London (German Section) *LP*
SUBJECT: c Stubaf. Karl RADL

1. Attached is a copy of a preliminary interrogation report on Stubaf. Karl RADL, RSHA, Amt VI-S/2, adjutant of O/Stubaf. Otto SKORZENY.

2. This report dated 4 June 1945, is the second of two preliminary reports on the subject.

Enclosure: 1 copy of report (SECRET)

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S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 655

INTERMEDIATE INTERROGATION REPORT (IIR)

PRISONER: Stubaf RADL, Karl

DATE: 4 June 1945

1. REFERENCES: None.
2. REASON FOR REPORT: Report contains information believed to be of immediate interest. Final report will be issued later.
3. REPORT:

Introduction

This is an intermediate report on Stubaf RADL, Karl, RSHA Amt VI-S/2, adjutant of O/Stubaf Otto SKORZENY. He and SKORZENY surrendered to US troops at ANNABERG on 16 May 45 and arrived at 12th A Gp Interrogation Center on 19 May.

RADL is a lawyer by profession. He joined the Austrian Nazi Party in 1931 and the SS in 1934. Before coming to Amt VI-S in Apr 1943, he had worked for the Gestapo and Grenz Polizei in minor functions.

As SKORZENY's aide he coordinated his chief's different activities loyally and efficiently. He now emphasizes his cooperative attitude, but it is believed that he is still withholding certain facts.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
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S E C R E T

a. Organizations under O/Stubař SKORZENY

(1) Amt VI-S

Amt VI-S consisted of the Fuehrungs Stab (Headquarters Staff), six Abteilungen, and four Referate.

a. Fuehrungs Stab:

Abtn Chief O/Stubař Otto SKORZENY

Only alias known to RADL is Dr. WOLF which SKORZENY used during the abduction of Admiral HORTBY

Erst Grete KOPPELISE

SKORZENY's secretary, decorated with Kriegs Verdienst Kreuz No II

H/Staf Karl RADL

SKORZENY's adjutant

H/Staf von FOELKERSAM

Chief of Staff, dead

I-a

H/Staf Werner HUNKE

Arrested by CIC

I-b

H/Staf Reinhard (Reinhold ?) GERHARD

Supply Officer formerly Abwehr II

I-c

O/Staf GRAAF

II-a

O/Staf Wilhelm CALLENT

Officers' records. Re-assigned to 6 SS Pz Army

II-b

H/Staf WEISS

Sent to Jagdverband Sued Ost

II-b

O/Staf STEINBEIN

EM records. One leg amputated. Discharged.

III

Stubař Dr PENDER

Judge Advocate. Arrived mid Jan 1945. Transferred to 6 SS Pz Army in Feb or Mar 1945, has been arrested by CIC

[REDACTED]

S E C R E T

IV-a	H/Stuf Herbert (?)URBANER	Quartermaster. Transferred to 6 SS Pz Army
	U/Stuf SCHENKEL	Under URBANER. One foot ampu- tated. Dis- charged
IV-b	H/Stuf Dr WETZ	Medical officer. Went home to OBERDONAU
	H/Stuf Dr Helmuth SLAMA	Went home to OBERDONAU
V	H/Stuf MAHLOW	Transport officer. Be- lieved by RADL to have been captured at TEISENDORF. O/Stuf Alois WEBER was MAH- LOW's prede- cessor until dismissed
	U/Stuf KOBSTER	Remained at TEISENDORF
VI	Staf Otto BAYER	Special services officer. Came from SS Fueh- rungs Hauptamt in mid Dec 1944. Transferred to 6 SS Pz Army
	U/Stuf KUTSCHKE	
	H/Stuf KILLWEIT	In charge of W/T operations. Discharged at HOF
	U/Stuf HEIN	W/T operations Discharged at HOF
	H/Schrf BITTERWOLF	Mail clerk

S E C R E T

b. Amt VI-S/1, Administration

H/Stuf Erwin SCHMIEL	Went to HOF and then joined SCHUTZKORPS ALPENLAND (SKA) (for details see B, (2), below).
H/Stuf Hugo PODLECH	Went to HOF. Discharged there but went to TEISENDORF without orders
O/Stuf BREITENFELD	Stayed in HOF
U/Stuf WINDHOEFFEL	Disappeared from HOF
Frl WOLF	Secretary. Discharged at HOF
Frl BEIRICH	Secretary. Discharged at HOF

c. Amt VI-S/2

H/Stuf Karl RADL	SKORZENY's adjutant
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d. Amt VI-S/3, Supervision of training schools at SEEHOF, KURHOF, and HEINRICHSBURG

H/Stuf Herbert BRAMFELDT	Joined SKA
H/Schrf PAHLOW	Joined SKA
Frl KAULPACH	Secretary

e. Amt VI-S/4, Direction of Agent Operations

H/Stuf Arno BLSEKOW	Joined SKA
O/Stuf Werner MEYER	Joined SKA
O/Stuf Franz NEBENFUEHR	Formerly in Greece. Wanted to join his relatives in Austria
H/Schaf HEINECKE	Joined SKA
H/Schaf STOECK	Stayed in HOF with his family

S E C R E T

Frl Annemarie KRUEGLER)
Frl Lieselotte KRUEGLER)
Frl Gisela BOLLING)

These three women were secretaries, released either at HOF or at PUCH. The KRUEGLER sisters came from the factory, HAMBURG and BERLIN, and had worked for no other dept of the SD except Amt VI-S/4

f. Locations:

Besides its headquarters at FRIEDENTHAL, Amt VI-S had one room and an ante-room (No. 113) at the RSHA offices at 32 Berkauerstrasse, BERLIN. The secretary was Frau Gerda KOWALSKY, formerly with Amt VI-A. She had not been decorated and was released in Feb 1945. Amt VI-S had no Tarn Buero (cover address) in BERLIN, but agents were seen in the Jagdverband Karten Stelle in Kalckreuthstrasse.

g. Movements:

With the exception of RADL and GERHARD, the Fuehrungsstab went to the area HOF during the period Feb to Mar 1945. From HOF they moved to TEISENDORF where the members left for either the SKA or 6 SS Pz Army. Radio communication between FRIEDENTHAL and the Fuehrungsstab at HOF and TEISENDORF was maintained until 15 or 20 Apr 45.

On 1 Feb 45 SKORZNY, GALLEN, SLAMA, PINDER, HUNKE FUECKER, all of Jagdverband MITTE, and Fallschirm Jaeger Bn 600, and most of Jagdverband NORTHWEST, went to fight the Russians at SCHWEDT/Oder. About the middle of March, SKORZNY, SLAMA, and GALLEN returned to FRIEDENTHAL and continued to TEISENDORF and LINZ, where they established a Streifendienst (patrol service, in this case to prevent straggling) at the request of Gauleiter EIGRUBER.

RADL left FRIEDENTHAL to meet SKORZNY in LINZ in the middle of Apr 1945. They left LINZ on 1 or 2 May and went to a headquarters train at PUCH, which left the same night for PONGAU, where they remained for two days. They then travelled to KLAMMSTEIN, remaining there two or three days, then to RADSTADT for two or three days, and finally to ANNABERG, location of the SKA HQ. They stayed there one week and then surrendered to US troops.

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h. Reports.

According to R.DL, whose function was to supervise office routine and maintain a semblance of order, no regular reports were issued by Amt VI-S to higher authorities. When a successful operation had been concluded, SKORZENY sent a written report to SCHELLENBERG. These reports were frequently prepared by R.DL as SKORZENY did not like paper work. R.DL remembers having prepared reports for SCHELLENBERG on the following matters.

- (a) Unternehmen THEODOR. See TITO operation, III 4 below.
- (b) Discussions between SKORZENY and Gen STEINMANN, of the Reichs Luftfahrt Ministerium who was a specialist on electricity generating stations. The discussions concerned power installations in Russia and the possibility of attacking them with one-man suicide weapons; the discussions took place in the latter half of 1944.
- (c) Kdk organization and activities. Discussions between the Kriegsmarine and HELLMERS in Mar 1944.
- (d) Operation against Marshall TITO's HQ. According to R.DL, Amt VI-S took no part in this operation, and the report to SCHELLENBERG embodied strong objections to the suggestion that this was one of Amt VI-S failures. The date was June 1944.
- (e) Official trip to return MUSSOLINI's diary to him in Jun and Jul 1944.
- (f) Conference with Abwehr II at INNSBRUCK in Aug 1944.
- (g) Resistance movements in the Baltic in Aug 1944.
- (h) Combat reports from SCHWABT/Oder issued every two or three days from Feb to Mar 1945.
- (i) Release of O/Stuf RUCKER from the Oder Korps. This was a complicated exchange of correspondence between KUTTLBRUNNER, SCHELLENBERG, and SKORZENY, beginning in April 1945.
- (j) The PETTEN episode. Discussed in III, 4 below.
- (k) Plan of Amt VI-S/4's work. Prepared by BESEKOW. Included a map giving the locations of agents; R.DL believes it was burned. Date: Jan 1944.
- (l) Bi-monthly reports. These were to be sent to SCHELLENBERG but only one was issued in 1944.

S E C R E T

(2) SS Jagdverbaende:

When SKORZENY came to VI-S in Apr 1943 there was a company of Waffen SS at ORANIENBURG. This company participated in the liberation of MUSSOLINI on 12 Sep 43. It returned to FRIEDENTHAL in Oct 1943 and became Jaegerbattalion 502. The unit strength was increased to 200 men, all of German nationality. The commanding officer was H/Stuf JAECKERT. In the summer of 1944 JAECKERT was transferred to the front and was succeeded for a few weeks by H/Stuf HOYER. HOYER was followed by O/Stuf FUCKER. At this time various Streifkorps, which had been part of the BRANDENBURG Div before its reorganization, came to FRIEDENTHAL and formed the SS Jagdverbaende. There were five Jagdverbaende: MITTE (formerly Jaeger Battalion 502), NORD WEST, SUED WEST, OST, and SUED OST.

a. Jagdverband MITTE. Formed out of Jaeger Battalion 502.

CO	O/Stuf Karl FUCKER	Came in Nov 1944. Went with 150 men to HOCH-KOENIG area in mid Apr 1945
I-a	H/Stuf Werner HUNKE	Arrested by CIC
I-b	H/Stuf GERHARD	
I-c	O/Stuf GRALF	

Since Jagdverband MITTE was stationed at FRIEDENTHAL it utilized the staff of the Fuehrungs Stab (See a, (1), a above) for administrative purposes, in order to economize on personnel.

Sonder Einsatz Abteilung: For administrative purposes the Sonder Einsatz Abteilung, headed by O/Stuf KLINCKERT, was formed within Jagdverband MITTE. As every German soldier had to belong to a replacement unit, the Sonder Einsatz Abteilung served that purpose for SS men assigned to KdK, KG 200, and Kampfschwimmer schools at Diana Bad, VIENNA and B.D TOELZ. It carried the soldiers' records and was responsible for administrative matters arising out of injury or death.

b. Jagdverband NORD WEST:

Strength was about 120 men, although battalion strength had been envisaged. H/Stuf HOYER was CO. He was wounded on the Oder front in Feb 1945 and was succeeded by H/Stuf DETHIER. This Jagdverband remained at NEUSTRELITZ until April when it was evacuated to the area of HOF. Eighty to ninety members of the Jagdverband went to the Oder front.

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U/Stuf STRAUB	Adjutant. Wounded on Oder front in Feb 1945
U/Stuf Karl EGNER	Supply and Courts Martial officer. Went to HOF.
H/Stuf Dr GOERMS	Medical officer Joined Jv NORD WEST in Nov 1944 and trans- ferred to Jv MITTE in mid Apr 1945 when it went to Austria
U/Stuf H. CKL	Platoon leader. Killed
O/Stuf MLNS	Killed on Oder front. May have belonged to Jv MITTE

A platoon of 20 to 25 Flemings under U/Stuf BACHOT was part of Jv NORD WEST. This platoon was at GIESSEN between Jan and Mar 1945.

Kampfschule NEUSTRELITZ: According to RDL this was the name of the sabotage training school at NEUSTRELITZ.

CO	H/Stuf WINTER	Came from Brand- enburg Div. CO and sabotage instructor. Went to Austria
	O/Stuf STEINMETZ	Ordnance, trans- port, and sup- plies. Be- lieved to have gone to HOF with H/Stuf DETHIER
	Frl KOTTSCHEG	WINTER's secre- tary. Released in Apr 1945

S E C R E T

Early in Feb 1945, Stubaf AUCH succeeded von FOLLGERSAM as CO of Jagdverband OST. He was formerly with the Brandenburg Div and had come to FRIEDENTHAL in Jan 1945. Jv OST was re-organized under him, this time to a strength of 60 to 100 men. In Apr 1945 Jv OST left FRIEDENTHAL in the direction of TROPPAU. The following staff went with AUCH:

I-a	U/Stuf RINNE
I-b	U/Stuf zur MUEHLEN
I-c	U/Stuf TITJEN

Jagd Einsatz BALTICUM was a part of Jagdverband OST and was headed by Stubaf Dr PECHAU. PECHAU first made contact with BESEKOW in 1941-42 when both were with BdS RIGA. He went to the SEEHOF Sabotage School and was transferred to Amt VI-S/4 to supervise a group of Baltic agents. In Sep 1944 he and his group, believed to number about 30 agents, were assigned to Jagdverband OST to operate in the Baltic. Jagd Einsatz Balticum was discontinued in Feb 1945, and a number of its agents went to Sweden. RADL heard that these agents established contact with the British Intelligence Service in Sweden which, he believes, was operating against the Russians in the Baltic States. After the dissolution of Jagd Einsatz Balticum, PECHAU and about 20 members went to the Eastern front; a few of the Estonian agents went to COPENHAGEN, purpose unknown.

e. Jagdverband SUEB OST

The strength was appr 500 men. It was located at KREMS/DONAU near NIEDERDONAU. When VIENNA fell to the Russians they moved to the Lower ENNS area.

CO	O/Stubaf BENESCH	Formerly leader of Streifkorps Croatia, Brandenburg Div
I-a	H/Stuf Emil STEINER	
	H/Stuf WEISS	Formerly in the Fuehrungs Stab as II-b; before that in Brandenburg Div
	O/Stuf KIRSCHNER	Formerly Brandenburg Div
	O/Stuf MUELLER	Responsible for activities in Roumania

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U/Stuf ROWOHL

Responsible for activities in Hungary Area. Formerly Brandenburg Div

O/Stuf SCHLAU

Responsible for activities in Croatia. Formerly in Streifkorps CROATIA

(3) Mil Amt D:

a. HQ

In Aug 1944 Abwehr II was incorporated into Amt VI as Mil Amt D. Mil Amt D was under SKORZENY. The CO was Major i G NAUMANN, succeeded in Mar 1945 by Major Roland LOOS. Until mid Mar the HQ was at BERKENWERDER, about 15 km S of FRIEDENTHAL. It was moved to BLD ELSTER and later to Upper Bavaria, possibly to the TRAUNSTEIN area. There were about 20 officers in Mil Amt D. RDL remembers the following:

Hptm EISENBERG

HQ Commandant
Formerly Abwehr II

Hptm LORWIS

Responsible for Spain, Portugal, Italy, and North Africa

Hptm SCHOLNAICH

Responsible for France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway (?)

O/Lt GAMBE

Responsible for Baltic States, Russia, Ukraine, and Finland

O/Lt FERRID

Responsible for Balkans

Maj MENGLER

Administration

Hptm ZIERJAKS

Officers' records

O/Lt BITTNER

EM's records

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Lt PAULUS	Luftwaff liaison
Maj. EHRMANN	Leiter II-T. The technical HQ was at BRAND- ENBURG. EHRMANN was not a tech- nical man
Lt SCHULTZE	Technical expert under EHRMANN

b. Liaison

When the RSHL took over the Abwehr early in 1944, the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab relinquished control of the Mil Amt, and the FAKs were directly subordinated to Amt VI-mil. The Fuehrungs Stab insisted, however, that trained military personnel be included in the organization to make purely military information immediately available to the armies in the field. As a liaison agency Mil Amt F was formed, headed by Obst BUNTROCK, former I-c of Army Group WILSSNER in the Crimea and Balkans.

c. II-T

MARGUERRE, MAURITIUS, and Maj POSER, all of II-T, were dismissed in Jul 1944 or earlier.

d. Leitstelle II-WEST fuer Frontaufklaerung

HQ was at BAD ORB at one time but changed frequently. The CO was Hptm Fred HELLMERS. Other officers in Leitstelle II WEST were:

Hptm URAMANN	Transferred to Leitstelle II WEST from Amt Mil D HQ
Lt FRANK	Maintained liaison between DARREND and DORIOU on the side and HELLI- MERS and Amt VI-B on the other

e. Leitstelle II-OST fuer Frontaufklaerung.

The CO was Obst/Lt Ernst zur EICKERN, a close friend of Freytag von LORINGHOVEN. RADL has never heard of Sonderlager LUCKENWALDE and has no further information about Leitstell II-OST other than that Obst/Lt zur EICKERN went to BIRKENWERDER after FRIEDENTHAL was evacuated.

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f. Leitstelle II SUEB OST fuer Frontaufklaerung.

The HQ was in the old Austrian Heeres Ministerium (War Ministry) in VIENNA. When the Russians approached the Leitstelle was planning to evacuate to Upper Bavaria. Personnel:

Obst/Lt FLECHNER	Commanding officer
Maj KOCH	Recently retired
Lt PIFF	Radio instructor
Korv/Kapt Alfons WEISS	

WEISS was in charge of DONAU SCHUTZ, a cover name for an intelligence gathering agency aiding in II-missions (sabotage). He was suspected of collaboration with an Allied agent, known as CAZDA, and was later transferred back to the Navy.

b. Sources of Resistance

(1) Dienststelle PRUELTZMANN

RADL's acquaintance with Gruf PRUELTZMANN and Dienststelle PRUELTZMANN is based on the following contacts:

a. In Jun or Jul 1944, he met PRUELTZMANN for the first time in Italy, when the latter was deputy of O/Gruf WOLF, the ESSPF of Lake Garda.

b. In Nov 1944, he met PRUELTZMANN in the office of O/Stubaf MALZ, adjutant of KALTENBRUNNER, at 102 Wilhelmstrasse, BERLIN.

c. In Dec 1944, following a chance meeting in KALTENBRUNNER's outer office, PRUELTZMANN and SKORZENY had an impromptu conference, subject unknown. Sometime in Dec, SKORZENY drove to see PRUELTZMANN, who had his HQ in a train in KOENIGSWUSTERHAUSEN.

d. In the winter of 1944-45, SKORZENY and PRUELTZMANN went to a demonstration of Nipolit (see d, (1), b, below) held on the POTSDAM training grounds. RADL thought the demonstration had been arranged by H/Stuf GERHARD? I-b of Fuehrungs Stab Amt VI-5. GERHARD, who went with a combat team to the Oder on 15 Apr 45, may have information about the supply of sabotage material that he sent to PRUELTZMANN.

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e. In Dec 1944, PRUETZMANN had lent SKORZENY four or five SS guards for FRIEDENTHAL. A member of PRUETZMANN's staff, Stubaf MUELLER-?, telephoned RADL about their return.

RADL knew (superficially) the following members of PRUETZMANN's staff:

Standf TSCHERSKY
SA Brigf SIEBEL
Stubaf MUELLER -? (second part of double name unknown)

TSCHERSKY succeeded O/Stubaf GRAEFE of Amt VI-c, who was killed in a motor accident. TSCHERSKY was transferred to Dienststelle PRUETZMANN in autumn 1944. He attended the second meeting in KALTENBRUNNER's office, mentioned above. Suggestions had been made to transfer TSCHERSKY from VI-c to VI-5, but SKORZENY refused considering him an intriguer.

RADL said that PRUETZMANN, after he became HSSPf, dealt directly with HIMMLER instead of KALTENBRUNNER. This fact, and possibly the personal character of PRUETZMANN, described as "ice cold", caused difficulties between KALTENBRUNNER and PRUETZMANN in Mar 1945.

(2) Schutzkorps ALPENLAND (SKA)

After the Allies crossed the Rhine, SKORZENY conceived a plan to take five or six groups of people into the Austrian Alps. Each group was to number 400 to 500 men and was to re-inforce the Wehrmacht at important passes. The groups were consequently organized as the SKA and supplied with weapons, ammunition, plastic and ordinary Wehrmacht high explosives, and food. At the end of Apr 1945, however, SKORZENY gave written orders to each of the groups that the SKA was to be dissolved.

The text of the order (as far as RADL remembers it) was as follows:

- a. All fighting against the Western Allies will cease immediately.
- b. Orders of the Anglo-American occupation forces will be obeyed.
- c. Members of the SKA are to remain quietly with the local population and will render all possible help, including agricultural work.
- d. They will maintain order among the inhabitants, protect them from marauders, and prevent the formation of Bolshevik groups.
- e. They will rid the area of non-Austrian elements (foreign workers and diplomats) to ease the food situation.
- f. Personnel is to remain at SKORZENY's disposal for further orders.

[REDACTED]

S E C R E T

There were six groups in the SKA. One was under FUECKER in the HOCHKOEENIG area; one under GIRG in the LOFER (STEINBERGE) area; one under SCHURMANN in the LOFER area; one under BENESCH in the LNNSTAL area; one, including BESEKOW, WINTER and MEYER, in the REDSTAETTER TAUERN area between SALZBURG and KENTEN; and one additional group, leader unknown.

In compliance with SKORZENY's orders, the weapons and ammunition which were stored at the SKA HQ at ANNABERG, were handed over to the local mayor.

c. Operations in Foreign Countries

(1) Dienststelle 2000:

This organization originally belonged to Amt VI-E, but was transferred to VI-S when Amt VI-E failed to furnish necessary supplies (Spring 1944). The CO was Dr BEGUS who later went to Italy to train VI-S agents in VERONA; from there BEGUS maintained liaison with Amt VI-S through the BdS VERONA teletype. O/Stuf Franz NEBENFUEHR of Amt VI-S/4 succeeded him as CO. He later joined the SKA but wanted to go to NIEDERDONAU.

(2) SS Fallschirm Jaeger Bn 600:

This unit under the SS Fuehrungshauptamt was commanded by H/Stuf RYBKA in Croatia, and later by H/Stuf MYLIUS in Poland. In Sep 44 it took part in the operation HORTHY after which it joined the SS Jagdverbaende. Its designation was changed from Fsch Jg Bn 500 to 600 and it was reorganized in NEUSTRELITZ. On 1 Feb 45 the unit was committed at SCHMIDT/Oder and early in Apr it was transferred to an SS Pz Korps under O/Gruf STEINER. H/Stuf MYLIUS was decorated with the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold and was promoted to Stubaf. With this transfer all connection between this unit, and VI-S and the Jagdverbaende ceased.

(3) Agents:

RADL said he knew no agents other than NEBEL. He gave the following men as sources of information on that subject:

H/Stuf BESEKOW
H/Stuf BRAMFELDT

O/Stuf MEYER

Dr BEGUS for Balkans
Hptm SCHOENLICH for
South America

According to RADL, NEBEL @ NEUMANN, had been the only VI-S agent who had passed through the Allied lines and had returned. In the winter of 1943-44, NEBEL had come from VI-B to VI-5, having worked previously for the SD in STRASBOURG. VI-5 sent him to SEEHOF school in THE HAGUE to pass on the reliability of trainees. Amt IV requested him in the summer of 1944 and sent him on a counter-sabotage mission to MONTBELLARD. He went to PARIS for VI-S/4 in Sep 1944 to organize a group of "French nationalists" into a resistance movement. He was not heard of again until early 1945 when he returned to FRIEDENTHAL and reported that he had failed.

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Upon his return he was promoted to O/Stuf and given the EK I, according to RADL, because he had been in the service for a long time and had risked his life twice crossing the Allied lines.

NEBEL returned to France in Feb 1945 on orders of BLESKOW. At that time the I-c of an SS Korps reported that NEBEL was a traitor but BLESKOW made an investigation and found this to be untrue. RADL thought that NEBEL had originally been a refugee from Switzerland and he does not know what happened to him.

RADL knows of only two agents sent to the United States, both of whom were caught immediately. They were William COLE-PAUGH, an American citizen, and GIMPEL who had worked for SD in Spain. Amt VI-D trained them in sabotage and W/T operation at A-Schule West, THE HAGUE, and sent them out in the spring of 1944.

Amt VI-D asked SKORZENY to take Jacob COLLINS into VI-S. He was sent to the school in THE HAGUE to assist in the training of COLLEPAUGH. COLLINS, a British subject, had been a PW and had previously worked for the Abwehr. His conduct at the school was unsatisfactory, however, and he was returned to VI-D.

RADL stated that India was too large a territory to be handled by Amt VI-S. He mentioned that Franz MAYR was an Amt VI-C agent in Persia. Two agents from Sonderlehrgang ORANIENBURG, who had been to an Amt VI-F W/T school, O/Gefr HARBERS and PIWONKA, joined MAYR in Persia.

(4) Plots

a. Projected TITO Kidnaping

The code name for this operation was Unternehmen THEODOR. It started in Jan 1944, led by H/Stuf MANDL who belonged to VI-E. He was an Austrian and an expert on the Balkans. He had under him four to five Germans, including U/Stuf STUEWE, and was in contact with two groups of Croat gangs comprising 300 men, led by DURECIC and DJUKIC.

The undertaking was supervised by Amt VI-S/4. The plan was that TITO should first be captured by a small unit of Croat signal troops and then to be passed on to a larger unit. MANDL was supplied with arms, money, and W/T sets by VI-F and VI-S. The TITO operation was a failure because of communication difficulties, Partisan activity, and internal strife among the Croats. It was abandoned in the winter of 1944, but MANDL continued working as a political informant for Amt VI-E in the Balkans.

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S E C R E T

There is no connection between this operation and the one directed against TITO's HQ in Jun 1944, in which Maj BENESCH, at that time in Streifkorps CROATIA of the BRANDENBURG Div, and H/Stuf RYBKA of Fsch Jg Bn 500, took part.

b. Projected PETAIN Kidnaping

At the end of 1943 RIBBENTROP decided that he wanted PETAIN's HQ to be in PARIS. As PETAIN refused to leave VICHY, SKORZENY was instructed by HIMMLER and KALTENBRUNNER to move the Marshal. He took 50 men from the SS Fuehrungs Hauptamt and 25 to 30 men from Jaegerbattalion 502 to VICHY, planning to move PETAIN to PARIS in a private car, by force if necessary. After eight or ten days, however, RIBBENTROP announced that the matter had been settled through diplomatic channels and SKORZENY returned from VICHY.

There are discrepancies in the accounts of this projected operation by RADL and SKORZENY, and both failed to remember that NEBEL, see c, (3), above, was a member of the party.

c. Projected Assassination of Gen EISENHOWER

RADL said that the report of an assassination plot against Gen EISENHOWER was unfounded. He knows that many rumors were circulating among German troops during the Ardennes offensive. This rumor, he maintains, is evidence of the general tendency to exaggerate the importance of SKORZENY and his functions.

d. Technical Developments

(1) Sabotage

RADL's knowledge of the technical aspects of sabotage is superficial. He suggested that technical details be obtained from SKORZENY, who is an engineer, and GERHARD, who was the supply officer on the Fuehrungs Stab.

a. Hell- und Dunkel Zuender

RADL described this as a fuse which functions when light is removed. It was designed by Dr WIDMANN of the Kriminal Technisches Institut (KTI), BERLIN, and turned down by GERHARD although SKORZENY was interested in it. His account, however, does not agree with that of SKORZENY who claimed to have designed it personally and who said that the fuse functioned when the electric battery inside had run down.

S E C R E T

b. Nipolit

This is an invention developed at the explosives factory WASAG, WITTENBERG, Elbe. RADL states that Nipolit was never used by the Wehrmacht because H.G. FARBEH had a complete monopoly on Wehrmacht supplies and allowed no innovations other than their own. H/ Stuf GERHARD maintained contact with WASAG who produced Nipolit in long strips, 10 cm thick. They were delivered to:

Mil Amt D-T BRANDENBURG
KTI BERLIN, Dr WIDMANN
SS Police Academy Research Station, believed to
be in BERLIN (the CO was Maj d Schupo HENSEL)

Mil Amt D-T had a small workshop in BRANDENBURG, where the strips were turned into the finished product. RADL is familiar with the two sorts of Nipolit hand grenades (Nipodiscs and Nipocylinders) and belts and shoe-soles made of Nipolit. Models of these were in GERHARD's museum in FRIEDENTHAL.

c. Amt VI-F

VI-F was responsible for the production of false papers, passports, secret inks, and sabotage material. They did not work with Nipolit, however, and handled only normal Wehrmacht stores which they supplied to Amt VI-S. Stubaf LSSIG, CO, was alleged to be an expert on bomb fuses and said to be working on a radio-controlled fuse. He was described as incompetent. VI-F compiled a textbook on sabotage of which only one copy existed and which was sent to the school at THE HAGUE. Amt VI-F was considered inefficient and unproductive, and when GERHARD came to the Fuehrungs Stab, relations between VI-S and VI-F practically were severed.

S E C R E T

(2) Special Weapons

a. Suicide Weapons

In the summer of 1943, when a German victory could no longer be regarded as likely, SKORZELNY began to develop suicide weapons, backed by the Luftwaffe and the SPLER ministry. This was against the will of HITLER who did not drop his objections until the spring of 1944. Together with engineer CEMISCH, SKORZELNY worked on a V-1 steered by a man. The project had the cover name REICHEL.BACH (or REICHELBERG?) but was discontinued because of lack of fuel.

b. Liaison with the Japanese

Maj NAUMANN of Mil D had one meeting with Japanese officials in BERLIN in Nov 1944, at which sabotage was discussed. This had been done without SKORZELNY's permission who immediately forbade any further meetings. RADL stated that they had unsuccessfully tried to obtain reports of results of suicide tactics from the Japanese, but that in the field of sabotage they had nothing to learn from the Japanese.

c. Bacterial Warfare

RADL emphasized that this subject had never been discussed, and that Dr WETZ could never have had anything to do with it. (This does not agree with SKORZELNY's statements.)

4. CONCLUSIONS: None

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The recipients of this report are requested to submit special briefs of any subject upon which this prisoner should be interrogated and to indicate the desirable distribution of the resultant report.

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