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OF

INTERROGATION REPORT ON KOPKOW, HORST (030/8/64/2)

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FIELD INTERROGATION REPORT

ON

HORST K O P K O W

(2 PARTS)

PART I

030/8/64/2.

PREFACE TO HORST KOPKOW'S STATEMENTS.

These statements were dictated directly into the type-writer by KOPKOW himself. By a piece of luck his own secretary Miss ROSE, Bertha (030/8/63) was at the same time in the same jail, so she was used to do the typing. As he has a very methodical brain, the structure of these statements was left to him, and is his responsibility apart from the end of Part 1, where some things were added, which had been overlooked. He was allowed more or less complete freedom, and was seldom interrupted. Only if a point seemed to need explanation, he was asked to go further into the matter; he then dictated the supplement direct into the type-writer. But several times he had to be checked as he was getting too lengthy.

Through this method it was not necessary to clarify his statements at the end in special paragraphs, some additional information was added as short notes, and at the end short comments were made in form of special points.

As far as possible KOPKOW'S personal story was excluded, as it had been made subject of a separate preliminary report (030/8/64/1).

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Neumunster 7th June 1945.

My activity at Allenstein Staatspolizeistelle until my call up in 1937 for a Candidates' Course for Criminal Police Commissioners held at Berlin-Charlottenburg.

My entry into the Staatspolizeistelle resulted from an invitation by the Abschnittsfuehrer at that time SS-Oberfuehrer K.U.L., who became later SS, Gruppenfuehrer und Hoeherer SS-und Polizeifuehrer in Stuttgart.

I was not especially inclined to enter the Staatspolizei Service as my monthly salary was only 80 RM and there was no possible chance of an increase. In my own business I was earning since 1934 200 RM per month and it was always my intention to continue with my commercial profession. However later on I accepted.

Field of Activity.

The work of the Staatspolizei in Allenstein was mainly defensive (Abwehrpolizeilich) The cause of that was the complete lack of industry, political groups and religious societies. Masuren was almost completely protestant. The few industries had hardly any masses of workers. The danger of Communism was only small.

On the other hand the activity of the Polish Intelligence Service in East Prussia was very strong on account of the long land frontier. On entering the Stapo I was posted to Abteilung III (Spionage-Abwehr) Here I was employed in the beginning as a general clerk, filling in the Card Index, keeping the files and diary etc. One year later I was working in the Identification office, whose job it was to fingerprint and photograph arrested persons. Furthermore reproductions of documents were made.

The principle carrier of information for the Polish Intelligence Service was at that time the Polish Minority in South-East Prussia. That minority were citizens of the German Reich but of Polish origin. They used every opportunity to get the information from East-Prussia, which at that time was already well organized by the Wehrmacht, into Poland.

The main objective of the Polish Intelligence Service was at that time the Defence Line (Dunkersperrlinie), recently under construction in South-East Prussia, the Fortification area round the BOYEN (Lotzen) lakes, Heilsberger-Dreieck and all East Prussian Garrisons. Several Polish Agents, including recruited German citizens were rounded up while trying to get information about these areas.

The following cases are in my memory:

- (a) A town-inspector (German) was arrested in Lotzen, because he was in possession of a complete photographic and enlargement apparatus, with which he photocopied instructions and orders to the Landrat and Burgermeister from higher authority. These were sent to Poland by means of messengers. This man's motive was to improve his financial position, owing to his low wage as town-inspector.

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- (b) A man of Polish origin, 23 years of age living in Kreis Allenstein and in possession of a frontier pass was under suspicion owing to frequent journeys to Poland, as messenger for the Polish Frontier Control. A recent report confirmed this suspicion and also that he was to photograph on a certain day a newly constructed concrete bunker in the wood at Ortelsburg. Allenstein Stapo Officials posted themselves at the expected time with cameras inside the bunker and took a photograph of the photographing Pole. He was arrested crossing the frontier and made a complete confession.
- (c) The chief target attacked by the Polish Intelligence Service was Kreis and the town of Neidenburg. This activity was the result of good work by the Polish Frontier Control Post at Soldau, which as far as I can recall belonged to the Military Establishment in Bromberg. In Bromberg was one of the most outstanding and active Polish Intelligence Officers, called Capt. Czycon (phonetical) Capt. C. worked extremely actively against the former Free-State Danzig, where he achieved good results in espionage about military and political matters. I received this information from the eastern Stapo stations which were in contact with each other, even in loose contact already at that time with the Danziger politischen Polizei.
- (d) Bromberg was to the Polish Intelligence Service in the West as Dyalystock was in the East. As already mentioned the target attacked from Dyalystock was the Fortification Area of Loetzen. A few cases of espionage occurred in my time in the Kreis of Johannisburg and Lyek which I can no longer outline.

In Abteilung III in Allenstein I was attached as Assistant to an expert. Later on I had to deal with the examination of enquiries made by the militia Abwehrstellen in Wehrkreis I at Koenigsberg regarding persons desiring employment as civilians in the Wehrmacht. The vetting was done by means of the existing Abwehr Card Index and by filling in of Forms sent to the local Burgermeister and Chief of Gendarmerie. The head of personnel was so great at that time that only few enquiries were made. In practice only the Communists were excluded. Members of the Social Democratic Party and its Affiliations were permitted employment in the Wehrmacht.

The vetting became less strict in 1937 when even members of minorities of foreign origin and during the war foreigners themselves were accepted owing to the lack of suitable personnel for these jobs. Political opponents of National-Socialism had only to sign a Declaration of Loyalty.

Abteilung III at Stapo Allenstein dealt also with Soviet Intelligence Espionage activity. The cases which occurred in the whole Province were very few, as there was no common frontier with the Soviet Union, and had their origin through the still existing Soviet Consulate in Koenigsberg. Only when the Soviet Union suddenly closed all German Consulates in U.S.S.R. was the Reich forced to close the Soviet Consulate in Koenigsberg.

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Personnel concerned with Counter Espionage at Stapo Allenstein.

1. The leading executive official in 1936 approx. was Kriminalkommissar Wagner. The latter left the Stapo at the beginning of the war owing to some charge made against him.
2. Expert Krim. Sekretar Synowski.
3. Expert Krim. Assistent Skepp.
4. Expert Krim. Oberassistent Czernetzke.

(2) Activity in the Gestapo Office 1938 - 1945

After a six months Kripo course in Koenigsberg (Kripoleitstelle) and nine months visit to the Sipo Officers' school I came in September 1938 to the Gestapo Office as a Criminal Commissioner Candidate and was attached to the then Sachgebiet II A 3. (Department).

Field of Activity of the Department (Sachgebiet).

Control of Slaw refugees in the Reich

Co-operation with their representatives and observation and utilisation of persons returning to Russia.

The problem of the persons returning to Russia (office side only) was handed over to me after several months instruction on that subject. It is only about this subject that I can give the following details:

Since 1928 the Soviet Union started a campaign in Germany to get hold of experts and skilled labour for industry. About 10,000 German experts followed the Soviet offer and up to 1932 had gone to the Soviet Union having mostly good contracts. Only in the years 1936 and 1937 most of these experts returned to Germany in consequence of the improvement in the economical situation due to the growth of the home armament industry. The Soviet Union was also under the impression that the majority of these people were German agents. Moreover the German Embassy in Moscow was instructed to encourage the return of these German nationals.

- (i) Since 1936 approximately 6,000 German experts had returned all having been detained before being allowed to leave the Soviet Union and been put into detention camps. The impression they gave on crossing the frontier was one of complete demoralisation. They stated that in the first years of employment they were treated more favourably than Russian citizens, receiving special food and allowances to their wives in Germany. Shortly after 1933 these extra benefits ceased completely.

The interrogation of the returning persons followed the lines of a Decree issued by the Gestapa (Gestapo Office) and provided the first authentic inside information on the methods of the NKWD (OGPU). Moreover a complete picture regarding conditions in the Russian Concentration Camps was obtained.

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More substantial however was the knowledge gained regarding:-

- (a) Economic conditions.
- (b) The technical side of the Armament Industry and the Military sphere.

The interrogations were done exclusively by the Stapo on the Eastern Frontier and reports had to be sent in duplicate to the Gestapo Office. One copy was sent to the Military Abwehr at the OKW (German High Command) where extracts were taken out and sent to the Departments concerned e.g. to the operations department of the Army High Command.

I recall very distinctly that statements of leading Engineers who had worked many years in the Industrial Districts in and behind the Urals caused great surprise to the Military Authorities when describing the extent and working methods in the Armament Industry. I would like to mention in this connection that my Superior - Gruppenfuhrer Mueller - in 1941 was completely taken aback that in spite of this authentic knowledge Germany should declare war on the Soviet Union. Mueller once told me himself that he could not understand in the least why this unique knowledge had not been given more attention by the OKW.

(3) NKWD methods as regards to returning German personnel.

Every Expert and Engineer entering the Soviet Union was submitted to a thorough investigation. He was threatened with being sent back to Germany immediately or put in a camp if he would not give away the trade secrets and methods used in German Industry. For fear of again becoming unemployed the above methods resulted in giving away many German industrial secrets which Staffs of Russian Experts used to the fullest extent.

I remember that the Russians greatest interest lay in the Saxon Instrument Industry, the U-Boat, Shipbuilding and Chemical Industries in Germany.

Every German leaving the Soviet Union was submitted to a strict control by the NKWD. Before they returned to Germany they had to pass through a Detention Camp where they were told that they had to continue working for Soviet interest in Germany. This method typifies the Soviet Intelligence Service, because as I will explain later, it aims chiefly at the masses and calculates thereby that the majority of these acquired agents will report themselves on return to Germany.

About 45 - 50% of all returning persons stated at the frontier Stapo post that they had signed a written declaration for NKWD which compelled them to unconditional co-operation. This fact led to a conference between Gestapo and the Reich Ministry of Justice. Both parties decided that they would not take legal action as the majority of cases proved that the declaration was signed under pressure for

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the Soviet Intelligence. Those who refused to co-operate were made to understand that pressure would be brought to bear on their relations in Germany and pointed out that they (NKWD) were capable of doing this.

No legal procedure was taken against those persons having signed this declaration on entry into Germany. The only steps taken was to send them for three months to a Transit Camp in Tegel near Berlin, from where they were released to return home.

Nevertheless I know of two cases where people returning from Russia carried out their agreed instructions received from the NKWD. The first case took place about 1939 in Stuttgart, where a returned German Engineer carried out diversionary activities inside the Wehrmacht and tried to obtain military information. He attempted to influence soldiers of Stuttgart Garrison with Communistic ideas and by theft of Weapons from the Wehrmacht to support the AM-Apparat (Anti-Military Organisation). He also tried to get Military information from a Corporal. The second case took place in North-West German - I can not say exactly if it was Munster or Hamburg, where another homecomer from Russia who was known before as a Communist attempted diversionary tactics on Police and Wehrmacht members and to recruit them into the district special organisation of the Communistic Party.

Note.

NKWD = Russian Home Political Affairs Department.

The NKWD is the successor organisation of the OGPU. In 1923 the change of name took place. This seems to have been necessary because by the foundation of the NKWD the police activities of the GPU ceased and their function covered almost all walks of life in the Soviet Union.

(4) Germans in the Soviet Union.

The interrogations of the homecomers from Russia gave a very comprehensive view of the groups of racial Germans living in the Soviet Union and having Soviet nationality. It concerned those Germans living in the Ukraine and in the so-called Volga Republic. The main points of the problem as follows:

(a) Being more experienced and hard working agriculturists they had up to 1933 a more favourable position. Their standard of living was higher than that of the Soviet Citizen. This however was changed from 1933 when the first great mass deportations began.

(b) The German Intelligence Service was terrified to hear that the Soviets had largely succeeded in turning a large proportion of Racial Germans into Communists so that their loyalty to the German Race had ceased. An 'Informer' System planned on a large scale later throttled all individual initiative.

Office. One copy was sent to the Military Abwehr at the OKW (German High Command) where extracts were taken out and sent to the Departments concerned e.g. to the operations department of the Army High Command.

I recall very distinctly that statements of leading Engineers who had worked many years in the Industrial Districts in and behind the

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It was proved during the war between 1942 and 1944 by the German Intelligence that Germans from the Volga Republic had willingly accepted to work for the Russian Intelligence and serve the political aims of the Soviet Union. Soviet Agents were captured in charge of groups of German soldiers who had become completely bolshevised and who did not want to recognise their German descent although they still spoke the German language.

(5) How the Germans Returned from Russia were directed and instructed by the Soviet Intelligence Service.

The Soviet Intelligence envisaged the use of two methods.

(1) Soviet messengers entering Germany from neutral countries especially via Sweden and Czechoslovakia called on the homecomers, whose password, identity marks and personal description were known to them.

(2) Through Soviet Consulates and Commercial Representatives in Germany, Germans returned from Russia could address themselves directly to them, or drop messages containing a password into their letter boxes, unobserved.

Personnel in Sachgebiet II A 3 (Department).

Head of the Department: Krim. Rat Schroeder.
Assistants: Krim. Sekretar Scharf.
Krim. Sekretar Schulz.
Polizei- Obersekretar Krueger.
Krim. Assistent Hartog.

(6) Activity of Sachgebiet II A 1 (Dept.)

About Autumn 1939 to the middle of 1942.

Owing to continual dropping out of leading officials from the department, II A 1 of the Gestapo, I was transferred from II A 3. to Dept II A 1.

This Department dealt with the following subjects:-

Sabotage on Land
Sabotage on Ships.
Combatting Sabotage and Terror Organisations.
Supervision of Communist Areas.

Sabotage on land before the war (1939) in Germany was very small. No single act of sabotage at that time can be mentioned. There were only a few cases of damage to defence installations, without any political motive.

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On the other hand the department II A 1, had already done considerable work, for about two years before my arrival (from 1937) on the organization for sabotage on ships centralized in Moscow, whose aim it was to destroy German, Italian and Japanese ships. From a series of cases the Central Office II A 1, where all the information regarding sabotage was collected, obtained a comprehensive view of the intentions of the Russian General Staff. The latter was making great efforts to instigate these acts of sabotage, especially by means of the ISH (International Sea and Dockworkers Federation) in all European ports.

A total of approx 20- 25 merchant ships of the former Axis Powers were lost as a result of these activities. A few were sunk or burnt out at sea, the majority going down in ports as a result of explosions. A large proportion were later raised to the surface.

The methods of sabotage employed were in no way like those used by the Allied powers during the war who worked with factory produced materials. On the contrary home made incendiaries and explosives were used which were made from stolen explosives and Potassium Chlorate obtained from Chemist and Drug Stores. The knowledge acquired by the saboteurs at special schools in Moscow, which I will go into further later on, were of great value. The main principle was to avoid anything suspicious in Germany as well as other European countries, such as transport of packages containing explosives. In consequence the means used although primitive were very effective. The main source of supply were the Kiruna Ore Mines in Sweden from where the explosives were taken by intermediaries from Lulea to Stockholm by boat.

(7) Sabotage Objects.

As already mentioned, the ships affected by sabotage were exclusively ships of the Axis Powers. The various explosions to my knowledge took place in the ports of Reval, Riga, Koenigsberg, Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Le Havre and in a few Italian ports. To my knowledge two cases of ship-sabotage took place in Copenhagen. This widespread Communistic activity caused the German Sicherheitspolizei to contact the Swedish, Danish, Dutch, Belgian and French Police Forces and invite them to separate and collective discussions. Through an exchange of the materials employed a complete picture was obtained showing the common source of the attempts and in particular the suspicion had already existed for a long time that all this was inspired by the Soviet Union. About 1942 I went on a mission to Sweden and saw the Chief of the Political Police, Herr Lundquist, to whom I gave all the facts I had collected. There was absolutely no doubt that the paper wrappings round the detonators proved that these came from the Swedish Ore Mines.

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A few names of the sunken and danged ships as far as I can remember are:-

Germany: S.S. KARPFANGER
S.S. KLAUS BOEGE
S.S. PHILA
S.S. RELIANCE etc

Italy: S.S. DOGGAGIO

Japan: S.S. TAJIMA MARU

(8) The Sabotage of Organisation itself.

Long and tedious studies in which the exchange of information between the various Police Forces played a great part, gave eventually a clear picture of the extent of the Sabotage Organisation directed against Germany. At the head of the Organisation was WOLLWEBER a former Communist member of the Reichstag who went to the SOVIET UNION after 1933. WOLLWEBER acted on orders of the Russian General Staff and was active in SWEDEN and DENMARK as well as other places. At times he visited HOLLAND and BELGIUM and also stayed in OSLO. He had a representative in each country and financed the enterprise. WOLLWEBER ran a Courier service from COPENHAGEN via GERMANY to HOLLAND and BELGIUM, informing and instructing his agents who were also contacted by seamen visiting the various European ports.

He was largely responsible for the supplying of explosives and the production of igniters.

at Belgium
His Belgian representative was the communist ISH official FICHTELS and his brother who both came from ANTWERP. These two brothers, together with two or three other Communist officials were arrested when the German Army entered Belgium. They made a detailed confession and clues as to the activity of WOLLWEBER and SCHAAP the Dutch Organisation leader, who consequently was also arrested. Through SCHAAP the part played by WOLLWEBER became quite clear. SCHAAP himself had taken part in several attacks against shipping and had been previously trained for several months at a special school in MOSCOW. At that time it was impossible to get hold of a number of persons suspected of sabotage as they had either fled, or in the case of seamen, gone overseas. On the suggestion of the Gestapa the German Foreign Office asked SWEDEN to hand over WOLLWEBER to Germany as he still had German nationality. The Swedish Government did not comply with this request, and as far as I know, condemned WOLLWEBER to three years imprisonment. In the meantime WOLLWEBER had taken Soviet nationality and according to newspaper reports went back to the Soviet Union at the end of 1944.

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Special groups of Communist Ship-saboteurs had also been formed in NORWAY. In spite of the occupation of these territories we scarcely succeeded in routing them out. In this connection I would like to mention the role played by ANUEFFKEN of the I.T.F. (Internation Transport Workers' Federation), a Trade Union Organisation of the Social Democrats, who together with WOLLWEBER tried to carry out Ship-sabotage against German ships from BELGIUM and HOLLAND. Later on he went to SWEDEN after a dispute with WOLLWEBER where he was interned on request of the German Government.

Sabotage Agents of the Rote Kapelle Network

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(9) Sabotage on SS DEUTSCHLAND and fire on SS BREMEN.

These two cases were dealt with by my department II A 1 and caused some excitement. SS DEUTSCHLAND caught fire shortly before the war on her journey to AMERICA and sent out SOS signals. The fire was put out by the crew. On returning to HAMBURG and enquiry was made, lasting for six months with the following results: Not a case of sabotage but one of Insurance Fraud. A Swiss subject had sent goods which were despatched to the ship by the firm of JACKY MAEDER, in which a time - incendiary bomb had been placed. He had hoped to collect 30,000 Swiss Gold Francs Insurance.

The second biggest GERMAN Liner "BREMEN" was completely burnt out in dock at BREMERHAVEN-WESERMUNDE, and had to be totally scrapped. This was not due to any organisation but was done by a 16 to 17 year old HITLER YOUTH, after he had been dismissed from his job as Cabin boy. He set fire to a stack of mattresses in the Smoke Room. His only motive was sheer lack of discipline. Only the day before the fire took place a leading Seaman had warned him that if his behaviour did not improve, he would whip him with the towrope.

With reference to the Liner "DEUTSCHLAND" the German and Swiss Police Forces worked in conjunction with each other but as regards the "BREMEN" incident, investigation was kept secret. Everything in connection with the enquiry and the acts of ship sabotage organised by MOSCOW was kept strictly secret until Germany's declaration of war against the Soviet Union.

(10) Special Communistic Activities dealt with by SACHGEBIET (Dept) II A 1

As regards the anti Communist activities of the Gestapa Dept II A 4 dealt with communism in general, leaflets, formation of cells, "Red Help" (Rote Hilfe), Trade Unions etc. whilst II A 1 concerned itself with special organisations, especially the "Am - and BB-Apparat" Betriebs-Berichterstattung (Observation of Industry. Both organisations were unknown to the Politische Polizei Ia at the respective Police Headquarters until Summer 1933. The peak of these special activities was reached before I entered Dept. II A 1. Nevertheless a number of cases of the BB kind occurred which threw considerable light on economic and armament espionage in German Industry. I recall distinctly a case which occurred at Siemens-schuckert in BERLIN in 1939 where an Engineer having idealist communistic principles gave up-to-date information to the Soviet Trade Commission.

As regards to the am-Apparat of the former Reichstagsmember KIPPENBERGERS, the only information I can give is that he directed later activities from PRAGUE instead of from German territory. The original activity of the am-Apparat (dealing in subversive activity and forgery of passports) gradually changed in 1938/1939 into the formation of Sabotage and Terrorist Groups. The "Deutsche Sabotage- und Terrororganisation Officialname) at its height in 1939 and the "Danziger Sabotage - und Terrororganisation".

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in 1939 were cleaned up by the Gestapo.

(11) "Deutsche Sabotage- und Terrororganisation".

Germany
The Centre of this organisation was in BERLIN. The leader was a certain PIETZUCH, another leading member was called MOSKAL (Correct names) PIETZUCH had transformed the kitchen of a flat in BERLIN into a laboratory where an explosion occurred when chemicals were being mixed.

member of the rote kapelle network
This occurrence caused the intervention of the Gestapo. The head man in BERLIN employed a number of special Agents in GERMAN towns i.e. HANNOVER, HALLE, FRANKFURT/M (?) and two other large towns which I cannot bring to mind at the moment. There was also a connection with the LEUNA-WERKE near MEISEBURG.

The saboteurs' job was as follows:- Preparation of a network of Sabotage and Terror agents to serve when required but on no account before MOSCOW gave the order. The first requirement for a successful action was to obtain explosives and arms either by theft or force. In this connection a German subject called GOTSCHKE who as far as I can remember was a Communist Party Member of a LANDTAG, was specially appointed by MOSCOW and given a leading role to this end. This man succeeded in spite of a wide-spread hue and cry, in returning to the Soviet Union. These people were not engaged in direct action in the sense of the word but persons who had prepared the way. The object of these preparations was the mining and blowing of railway lines and bridges leading from Central Germany to the East.

Inside this Sabotage - organisation was a group of assassins who had in their possession amongst many other weapons ten Airpistols with which they continually practised in the woods round BERLIN. Here too, assassinations of leading personalities should only be carried out after the Soviet Union had given the orders.

(12) "Danziger Sabotage- und Terrororganisation".

A still bigger organisation than the previously described S) und T-Gruppe was the one operating in DANZIG. A citizen from the DANZIG STATE who was engaged on the Autobahn in HANNOVER as an OT-Worker reported one day that he had been ordered by one of the leading men in DANZIG-CHRA to take explosives in his luggage to HANNOVER and hand it over to an agent, also in the OT, working at STENDAL. On clearing up this organisation centred at HANNOVER and DANZIG the following facts were obtained:-

The Group of approximately 200 people had already been entrusted with the task of preparing acts of sabotage since 1934. It had received current financial support from an agent in the Soviet Consulate at DANZIG who also paid allowances to the wives of the various members from time to time. Even at that time MOSCOW had forbidden the import of explosives and incendiaries from the Soviet Union. The members had to get this material themselves inside the country and amongst other acts carried out a large theft of explosives in ELBING or MARIENBURG about 1934/35, which could not be explained at that time.

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All members concerned had considerable skill in the preparation of primitive but at the same time very effective products. They had gained their knowledge almost exclusively at special schools in MOSCOW where they had been for several months and which I will describe later

What has this Group done until now?

They succeeded in the course of years in mining the whole Danzig Free State Railway System.

When this was completed they started the same work in the POLISH CORRIDOR which resulted in all east-west communications across the Corridor being mined. Scores of explosives and detonators were kept in embankments whence they were allotted to the required points of the line. The storage was expertly done and the material protected against the elements. The stores also contained arms, especially small arms for use in case of self defence if necessary whilst mine-laying. I remember that a number of ampoules of irritant gas were confiscated which were thought to be intended for use whilst carrying out this kind of work.

The third phase of this organisation developed in Germany itself in 1939. As already mentioned, the DANZIG OT-Workers travelling into the Reich were recruited, and employed for transport of material and arms, and for execution of jobs. The main line from COLOGNE to BERLIN was already mined near STENDAL. A large dump of weapons and explosives had been built near to the embankment. The same was done on the line from the South-West to BERLIN via HALLE. In the course of this act of sabotage approximately 60-70 people were arrested but unfortunately I no longer remember their names. A large number of these saboteurs however were able to escape by ship via DANZIG and ports of neighbouring states to the Soviet Union.

- (13) In this connection the schooling of foreigners by Russians in their Special Sabotage School in MOSCOW is worth mentioning.

The following Special Schools in MOSCOW were known to the Staatspolizei in the years 1936 to 1939:-

- (1) LENIN SCHOOL.
- (2) THE KUMS.
- (3) UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WEST
- (4) UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST.

In all four institutions besides ideological communistic education Special Courses of the "An-Theory were given e.g. Training for Sabotage and Diversion. Whilst the third mentioned school taught western Europeans the fourth was visited by Chinese and Japanese; the Chinese was the most important Continent.

The various courses of about six months duration were followed by 60 to 100 students. The German section of the "University for the Peoples of the West" was the largest having approximately 150 students per course.

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As far as I can remember other sections were formed by Austrians, Bulgarians, Finns and Hungarians and smaller groups of West Europeans. No English or Americans took these Courses.

The majority, or in any case all the leading personalities of those saboteurs rounded up in Germany had been to these schools. They had travelled to Russia via Czechoslovakia and Poland. They were entirely unknown to the illegal Communist Party in Germany and covered themselves in most cases by joining one of the Nazi Party affiliations or by sending their children to the Hitler Youth. It was very difficult therefore to discover these forces at large in Germany who were acting on the Trojan Horse principle.

Officials in Dept II A 1 (as far as I can remember)

Dept. Chief

KRIM. RAT GEISSLER

G. was posted to the Eastern Front but after being proved guilty of an offence against a Russian woman in REVAL was discharged from the Civil Service and thrown out of the SS. In 1944 he was sent to a "redemption" unit and I believe was later killed at the front.

Assistants.

Krim. Sekretær RAMLOW.

Krim. Obersekretær BERG.

Krim. Sekretær HEISE.

Krim. Sekretær LANGE.

Krim. Obersekretær SCHULZ.

Krim. Assistent WEBER.

(14) Reorganisation of the Geheime Staatspolizei into Groups IV A and IV B

When the Gestapa was being reorganised in about 1942 I took over from Krim. Rat GEISSLER the sub-department IV A 2 in Group IV A. In the following years as previously the Department continued to deal with War-sabotage. With the signing of the German-Russian Non-Agression Pact it was distinctly noticed that the Soviet Union had ordered all acts of violence to cease in Germany but this order was completely annulled at the outbreak of war in 1941. I will talk about this development later on. It was caused by the mass use of parachute agents which the Soviet Union put into operation in Germany and the Eastern occupied territories.

The following were the tasks allotted to Dept. II A 1 and the successor of Sub-office IV A 2.

- (1) Formation of a Central Instructional museum and records from the outbreak of war.
- (2) Training of Gestapo executive-experts.
- (3) Publication of policy.
- (4) Active combat itself.
- (5) Cases of all thefts of explosives and crimes.

The Co-operation with the military Intelligence was not very fruitful as regards my field of activity dealing with sabotage-counter-intelligence. Owing to the large scale mobilisation during the war a large number of criminal elements found their way into the Army, and committed damage to War Department property. The Gestapo was interested in these crimes, but had difficulties in obtaining the information from the Wehrmacht. It was the time when the GFP (Geheime Feld Polizei) was getting further away from the Sicherheitspolizei although at the beginning of the war it was composed of executive officials of the Kriminalpolizei and a few from the Staatspolizei.

See 1 on Page 12.

One of the main tasks of the specialist departments was the formation of a Central Instructional Sabotage museum, which only succeeded by the help of all Home-stations and those in occupied territory. The collection contained almost everything used by the Soviet Union and the Western Allies for sabotage. It produced exhibits in such a quantity, that the collection was best suited for instructional purposes.

In 1944 when the Gestapo was bombed out for the first time in BERLIN, PRINZ ALBRECHT STR. 8. they were forced to move this precious collection elsewhere. It was transferred and stored in a castle near TROPPAU, SUDETENLAND, and although I do not know into whose hands it has fallen, it was certainly never destroyed.

As the extent of sabotage especially in the occupied territories was still on the increase in 1944 my department (later IV A 2 a) was forced to make a new collection which was then kept at the Ausweichlager "Dachs II" near TREBNITZ in BRANDENBURG. It was in no way to be compared with the first one and was only a substitute to continue with the training of specialists.

See 2 on Page 12.

Courses for leading executive and lower ranking officials from all parts of the Reich and also the occupied territories took place at II A 1, later at IV A 2 and eventually at IV A 2 a. They were combined with a thorough instruction at the Kriminaltechnischen Institut of the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt in BERLIN with which the Sabotage Department of the Gestapo worked in the closest connection.

See 3 on Page 12.

The main task of the Sabotage Department was the publication of known facts and directives. During the war two volumes dealing with sabotage were published from which the "Blue Book" (Blauer Heft) was produced by IV A 2 and the big sabotage Atlas in several colours produced in conjunction with the Kriminaltechnischen Institut. They were issued to the Staatspolizei Stations and Kommandeure. The latter was so compiled that current amendments could be added. This work alone employed the majority of the staff and was one of the principal tasks of the department.

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See 4 Page 12.

In the Occupied Territories the Kommandeur-Dienststellen dealt with Sabotage, while inside the Reich it was dealt with by the Staatspolizeistellen. During the War the Department could only take active measures against Sabotage within the Reich, while all cases of Sabotage in the Occupied Territories, i.e. Poland, Belgium and Holland, were only registered at the Department as they were increasing steadily.

Up to the end of 1943 it was possible to keep Statistics in three systems of all cases which occurred. In 1944 owing to the disruption of communications, great difficulties arose which were increased by the loss of the Sabotage Index through the bombing of the office in BERLIN, KURFURSTENDAMM. In spite of difficulties the indexing continued modestly, but could not give a complete picture of the Sabotage during the war.

The information about Sabotage in the Occupied Territories was contained in the News-sheets published by the Kommandeure, which were issued fortnightly, later on they included all Political crimes as well.

A similar increase of Sabotage was noticed in the Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union. Here it grew from a few single cases to mass organised Sabotage, which was caused by the formation of Soviet Partisans in the rear of the German lines. To give a description of the diversionary activities of the Soviets behind the German lines, White Russia could be taken as an example where not less than a 1,000 and up to 5,000 demolitions or demolition attempts were made on the main lines of communication a few days before the Soviets launched their great offensives. It was impossible here to take steps against single cases. Therefore it was no longer the job of the Staatspolizei to deal with the Partisans but was the responsibility of the chief of the Bandenkampfverbände (Anti-Partisan units), who was appointed by the Reichsführer SS,

The situation in the Western occupied Territories was similar, but the various National Resistance Movements in the different countries had British support. The enquiries and handling of the cases came under the Commandant of the Sicherheitspolizei in the area.

- (15) A few outstanding cases which were dealt with by IV A 2, taken over by the Gestapo)

The most famous case of sabotage during the years 1941-43 were the ones directed against the BERLIN railway stations and a few others in Germany, carried out by members of the Polish Resistance Movement. They were mainly organised by ZO (ZWLAZEK ODWEDU) i.e. Society of Regaliation which was a branch of ZWZ, later PPS or even PZP. These acts of sabotage were carried out by Polish Patriots who entered Germany as Civil Workers and deposited in the cloak-rooms of the BERLIN railway stations, suit-cases containing explosives with timed detonators. The ANHALTER railway station in BERLIN, was hit the hardest. There a whole wing collapsed and burnt out. This act was carried out by the Organisation "White Eagle" which was responsible for the attempted sabotage. of two railway station in the industrial area of UPPER SILESIA.

The saboteurs were not found, but as mentioned before it was recognised as the work of the organisation "White Eagle".

Further acts occurred at the Stettiner-Alexanderplatz stations and the Friedrichstrasse station in BERLIN. The most successful attempt was the latter one, where a suitcase containing explosives was left behind on a platform, and killed a number of people, who were thrown by the blast on to the railway line and run over by an in-coming train. These acts were not intended to destroy human lives, but were reprisals against the measures taken by the Germans in Poland.

Two acts of sabotage in BERLIN, against the Air Ministry and Police Headquarters, were possibly carried out by Germans. Apart from death of a few people, only little damage was caused, but considerable excitement and rumours spread in the capital.

The British sabotage equipment entered Germany via BELGIUM (beginning of 1940,) in goods-trains. Chemical time-detonators were put into the lubricating-boxes of the railway wagons.

A second British attempt at sabotage in Germany was discovered by the Staatspolizei station KLAGENFURT, when the railway-line, VILLACH-SKT, CANDIDO, was to have been out. The agents, who were Austrian, were organised in Jugoslavia, and equipped with English manufactured material. It was at the time of the agreement between Germany and Italy regarding the supply of coal to Italy.

Most cases of sabotage in Germany occurred in Austria. It was always a group of railway employees who joined together to carry out the acts of sabotage. They were exclusively communist who were dismissed after the unrest in February 1934 and who were trying to make themselves noticed after (iii) the annexation of Austria.

The following is worth mentioning about sabotage within the German Area, during the war, as dealt with by the office IV A 2.

The Gestapa expected a great increase in sabotage activities at the commencement of the war. Contrary to expectations these did not take place, this being due to

(a) The German-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939.

(b) The foreign workers keeping quiet.

Even though the damage to W.D. property in war industry increased from year to year it never passed a maximum of 100 to 200 cases per month for the whole area of the Reich. Most of the sabotage was of a small nature was committed by either Germans or Foreign workers. Their intentions were to cause a break in production by damaging machinery in industry, so that they could change their place of employment. These crimes were individual acts not in connection with an organisation or under instructions. As mentioned before it was noticed only in Austria that the extreme Left-Wingers were receiving orders from abroad for acts of sabotage.

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The Polish Resistance Movement in Germany caused my department much trouble by the use of poisons and bacteris. About 1943 the Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei and SD in CRACOW succeeded in discovering a complete laboratory, as did also the Staatspolizeistelle ant POSEN in the beginning of 1944. In these laboratories dangerous germs and bacteria were scientifically bred. These germs were intended for use against Police Officials and to poison food used in Wehrmacht Kitchens and Canteens. In the case of POSEN they started to employ these methods against German doctors and leading personalities of the town whereby a few people were killed.

(iv)

The following means were mainly used:-

Mucus, Typhus and Cholera-germs as well as Lungpowder which was dusted into the seats of Railway carriages. The Polish resistance Movement in one instance went so far as to send Agents to the COLOGNE and STUTTGART areas who supplied the various local leaders of the Movement with the above described material. These methods however wer not employed in Western Germany.

Other exceptional cases of Sabotage in Germany still remain to be mentioned; e.g. The explosion incident at the entrance of the Royal Palace in VIENNA which was presumably a demonstration against Gauleiter SCHIRACH by the Viennese population and the attempt at blowing up the big railway bridge over the River Sieg (Tributary of the Rhine). The explosive used in the latter case was stolen from a Camp near FRANKFURT/M.

See 5 Page 12.

A special expert in Department IV A 2 was occupied with the study of all thefts of explosives and arms in the whole of Germany. Cases of disappearance of explosives and detonators from factories, Army and Air Force ammunition dumps and whilst in transit to the front were not rare. The Staatspolizei had also to deal with these cases, as Sabotage was always presumed to be the underlying factor.

(16) Fight against assassinations as far as Dept IV A w was concerned.

Only in the spring of 1944 was the work dealing with assassinations handed over to the department. Until that time this work was dealt with by Dienststelle (Dept.) IV A 4 a which was also responsible for the protection of leading personalities. Five to ten enquiries into suspicious incidents, resulting from anonymous denunciations took place ina month. The Reichsfuehrer-SS gave strictest orders that every case in which even the slightest suspicion of assassination was apparent had to be gone into.

It therefore often happened that people with a leaning towards clairvoyancy wrote down their visions and my department was forced to follow up these stories which never produced any positive results.

The most striking assassination attempt against leading personalities was the one on the 9th November 1939 against the Fuehrer in Hofbraeuhaus in Munich. A special commission from the Gestapa and the Reichkriminalpolizei in BERLIN together with the Stapo and Kripo in MUNICH solved this case. I took no part in this commission. The culprit, a German subject called ~~ELSER~~ ^{who attempted an} ~~was~~ ^{assassination on} ~~was~~ ^{Hitler 9th Nov 1939} arrested whilst trying to cross the Frontier into Switzerland. ELSER confessed that he had prepared and carried out the attempt entirely on his own owing to a fanatic hatred of National-Socialism. Several months of preparation were necessary to install the time-bomb in the column at the Hofbraeuhaus in front of which the Fuehrer spoke. He had obtained the explosive from a store and being a skilled mechanic was able to construct the mechanism himself. No trial took place owing to a strict order by Hitler and as far as I remember ELSER was living under favourable conditions in Dachau Concentration Camp until the collapse of Germany in 1945. A special workshop was put at his disposal in which he reconstructed the complete bomb which later became part of the Instruct. Sabotage Collection of Dept. IV A 2.

The second big assassination event was the attack on HEYDRICH Deputy Reichsprotektor for BOHEMIA-MORAVIA and Chief of the Sipo.

The attack was carried out, as is well known, by Czech patriots who had been dropped by parachute in BOHEMIA. I myself visited the scene of the crime but had nothing to do with the enquiry that was made because a special Commission was set up to go into the matter. This was done through the Leiter of the Staatspolizeileitselle and the Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer SS-Gruppenfuehrer FRANK who were directly instructed by the Reichsfuehrer SS to not only to solve the case but also to take counter measures against the Czech population.

During the time that IV A 2 (and later Dept. IV A 2 a) was concerned with the office side of combatting assassinations (1944), Gauleiter KUBE who was Generalkommissar for White Russia was assassinated, and attempts were made on the lives of Gauleiter KOCH, Reichskommissar for the UKRAINE living in ROWNO and SS-Obergruppenfuehrer VON GOTTBURG who was KUBE'S successor.

The case of KUBE.

It was known for some time that the Soviet Intelligence Service was trying by means of partisan groups behind the front to put suitable people in touch with leading personalities in order to kill them. The first case of this kind was the successful attempt against Gebietskommissar Gauleiter KUBE in MINSK. KUBE had a number of Russian women servants working for him from which "NADJA" the maid was recruited by the partisans of the district to carry out the assassination. This girl had the Gauleiter's complete confidence and one day places a time bomb under the mattress of his double-bed, which killed him that night. "NADJA" fled and as was later

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learnt from a captured partisan she had returned to her partisan group near MINSK who had given her orders. From there she was taken by aeroplane to MOSCOW where she was regarded as an example of the Fighting Women Soviet Youth and was decorated with the Order of Lenin.

The Case of VON GOTTLBERG.

VON GOTTLBERG was KUBES successor. One day a German Flight Lieutenant decorated with the Iron Cross 1st. Class came to his A.D.C. in MINSK and asked to see the SS-Obergruppenfuehrer. He was given permission as he was believed to be an officer from the front and was in possession of a personal letter written by the Chief of the Sipo and the SD- SS-Obergruppenfuehrer KALTENBRUNNER. The letter was a forgery. In the presence of GOTTLBERG the Lieutenant put his pistol on the table and declared that he did not have the courage to shoot him, though he still intended to do so while entering into his room.

The motives for this action was as follows:-

The Flight Lieutenant, whose name I have forgotten, was taken prisoner by the Russians in 1941 and joined the "Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland" through the "Offizierbund". He took part in several Propaganda front line broadcasts by means of loudspeakers etc for the Russian Intelligence and successfully led a reconnaissance patrol disguised as Germans into the Fortress Area of Vitebsk for which he was decorated by the Soviet Authorities. It is interesting to note the fact in this case that the Flight Lieutenant carried a smoke bomb with which he hoped to cover his retreat after carrying out the assassination. The enquiries made by the Kriminaltechnische Institut at BERLIN proved that in reality this smoke bomb was a grenade which would have killed him in the moment he withdrew the pin.

The Case of KOCH.

KOCH'S case is similar to the one of KUBE. KOCH and his Staff were to be poisoned but this did not succeed. Later a Captain of the Wehrmacht fired shots at the Reichskommissars car in ROWNO and escaped without being recognised. KOCH however was not in the car at the time, the occupant of which was his Deputy DARGEL. In a similar way the assassination of a high SA-Fuehrer of KOCH'S Staff was successfully out.

(17) The attempt on the Fuehrer's life on the 20 July 1944 at the Fuehrer's H.Q. in East Prussia (see attached sketch)

As sabotage specialist I was appointed to lead the enquiry into the attempted assassination of the Fuehrer on the 20th July 1944 to give the exact facts and especially find out the origin of the explosive.

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On the same day I was sent with a staff of assistants which included Kriminaltechnische Institut Officials to WOLFSCHANZE in East Prussia in order to obtain a detailed account of the incident. In BERLIN the Dendlerstrasse Putsch and its plans had been made known, which was followed soon afterwards by the execution of the assassin Colonel STAUFFENBERG and his assistants from the Army General Staff and from the Staff of the Reserve Army H.Q. in Dendlerstrasse.

The incident occurred in the "Wolfschanze" within Restricted Area No. 1, where Hitler stayed with only a small staff, in a bunker where Conferences were held, situated about 50 metres from the Fuehrer's bunker. The daily conference as to the military situation took place in a large room round a large rectangular table in the Fuehrer's presence. This room was completely destroyed and in the floor was a hole of approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ metres where the brief case containing the time bomb had been placed. The room itself was an OT Wooden-structure which was covered by concrete as a protection against incendiary bombs. It was only owing to the fact that the blast could escape easily as a result of the wooden structure with its thin wood and cardboard-composition walls that all those taking part at the Conference, including the Fuehrer Himself, were not killed. If the room had been completely constructed with concrete the blast effect of the mass of explosive used would have been sufficient to kill all the occupants.

The whole rubble was sifted with painstaking thoroughness by me and my assistants and nearly all the tools used in the construction of the bomb were found. From my knowledge of nearly all the time bombs used by all the enemy powers during the war for sabotage purposes I was able to establish at once by means of the remains found that the explosive used was not encased and that it was detonated by an English "Time-pencil". The suspicion that the assassination attempt originated in British quarters could not be taken into account as there were many English "Time-pencils" in German possession. The material used by England for sabotage purposes in the west and captured by the Germans was placed at the disposal of the SD - Amt VI and the Amt Mil. by the Commanders of Western Occupied Territories owing to the prevailing shortage of German material at the time. It was possible that from there were taken these English time fuses. This presumption was later confirmed.

The assassin - Colonel Stauffenberg - had been requested to take part at a conference on the war situation in the Fuehrer's H.Q. on the 20th. July to discuss the formation of new units. Stauffenberg was at this time Chief of Staff to the Commander of the Reserve Army in Berlin.

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Colonel Stauffenberg, who flew with a number of high ranking officers to the Fuehrer's H.Q. brought the mechanical-chemical time bomb in his brief case which he took to the midday conference. Shortly before the conference commenced he took the bomb to another bunker and by means of a pair of pincers took out the fuse. He had to use pincers to do this as he was a war invalid and could only use his left arm.

After placing the brief-case near to the Fuehrer on the large Conference table Colonel Stauffenberg left a few minutes later and daringly tricking the guards at the barrier reaching his aeroplane at Rastenburg which was ready to take off for Berlin. Arriving in Berlin he led the Putsch firmly convinced that the assassination had been a success. The same evening the Putsch was smashed and Stauffenberg together with a number of other implicated officers were shot in the courtyard in Dendlerstrasse by other officers.

According to a statement given by a Lt/Cpl, who was interrogated by the Commission in "Wolfschanze", it was discovered after several days that Colonel Stauffenberg had thrown a second explosive charge from his car into the ditch whilst driving from the Fuehrer's H.Q. to the aerodrome at Rastenburg. This was proved after much tedious work. The enquiries showed that Stauffenberg had intended to kill the Reichfuhrer-SS with this bomb in case he arrived at the Fuehrer's H.Q. immediately after the assassination.

In the course of the investigation it came to light that the assassination was planned in three phases. It was originally intended to have taken place on the 11th and 15th. July at a war conference on the ODESSALZBERG but owing to adverse circumstances it was postponed until the 20th.

The origin of the explosive was proved beyond doubt. Altogether the explosives and fuses were obtained three different times since the Autumn of 1943; twice from OKW stores (Amt Ausland - Abwehr II) and once from an Engineer Park Stores on the Eastern Front.

As regards the origin of the explosive I can give further information resulting from the investigation. I have only a slight knowledge of the measures taken against the people concerned and of the attempted Putsch itself.

Particularly as to the political side of the matter I am unable to give detailed information. The names of those taking part are mostly known to me only by hearsay, from Gestapa experts dealing with these people and ordering their arrest.

Those taking part were: -

- (Generalfeldmarschall ~~von~~ Witzleben (retired)
- (Generaloberst ~~Hoeppner~~ (retired)
- (Generaloberst ~~Beck~~ (retired)
- (General of Signals ~~Fellgiebel~~ (Chief of Army Signalling)
- (Generalleutnant ~~Thiele~~ (Fellgiebel's Deputy)
- (Generalmajor ~~Stieff~~ (Army G.H.Q. Staff)
- (General der Artillerie ~~Wagner~~ (Quartermaster General)
- (Oberst ~~Mertz~~ (Dept. Chief of the C. in C. of the Reserve Army)
- (Oberst ~~Melxner~~ (Dept. Chief (?) of the Wehrmachtsfuhrungssth
in Berlin)
- (Generalmajor ~~von Tresckow~~ (Divisional Commander on the Eastern
Front and later "Ia" of a German
Army Corps in the East)
- (General ~~Thomas~~ (as far as can be remembered in charge of
armament requirements in Berlin)
- (Hauptmann ~~Kuhn~~ (Capt. of Engineers in Army G.H.Q. Staff)
- (Oberleutnant ~~Haften~~ (Stauffenberg's A.D.C.)
- (Hauptmann ~~Clausing~~ (at BdE in Berlin)
- (Oberst) ~~Freytag von Loringhofen~~ (Chief of Abwehr Dept. II at
OKW and later heard of
Heerwesenabteilung in "Anna")
- (Oberst leutnant ~~Schrader~~ (Staff Officer in Heerwesenabteilung
Army H.Q.)
- (Oberstleutnant ~~Klamroth~~ (Staff Officer at Chief of Operations
Dept. Army H.Q.)
- (Major ~~Klamroth~~ (Armaments Expert)
- (Generaloberst ~~Prumm~~ (C. in C. Reserve Army and Chief army
Armament)

and a number of other officers, whom I might recall later.

From the purely political group I remember the name of

- (Oberbürgermeister ~~Bordeler~~,
 - Legationrat ~~Trott zu Solz~~ (Foreign Office)
 - (Graf ~~von Schulenburg~~ (Former Ambassador in Moscow)
 - (Graf ~~von der Schulenburg~~ (arrested as an Army Capt.)
 - (Graf ~~Schwerin~~ (do not confuse with Schwerin-Krosigk)
 - WV ~~Leuschner~~ (as far as I know leading Left Wing Trade Unionist
before 1933)
 - (Graf ~~Bismark~~ (Regierungspresident in Potsdam)
 - (Graf ~~Holldorf~~ (Chief of Berlin Police)
- As far as I can remember the last German Ambassador in
London whose name I have forgotten.
Former Socialdemocrat Member of the Reichstag ~~Leber~~ and others.

(Admiral) ~~Canaris~~, who at this time was no longer
Chief of Military Intelligence, which had been absorbed
into the Sipo and Sd, was also arrested. He was doubtless
implicated in the plot in some way. As far as I can remember
he was charged with further misdeamours undertaken
in previous years with illegal foreign contacts.

- (18) Dept. IV A 2 work dealing with Forgery of Passports for
political purposes.

This is a relatively small sphere of activity.
The greater part of the forgeries which were motivated
by economic reasons e.g. forgery of Food Ration Cards
were dealt with by the Kripo. There was no special section

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dealing entirely with political passport forgeries but a technical institution compared and checked by means of collected specimens all captured false documents in order to ascertain from which Intelligence Service they originated. Special attention was given to complete forgeries which arrived from time to time. The resulting evidence was sent to the various departments and the Stapo Stations. The production of fals papers was dealt with by Amt VI which had at its disposal the Wannsee-Institut where it was possible to go into the matter more fully. Recognised political forgeries were sent round as circulars especially to Land and Sea Frontier Posts.

- (19) The Fields of activity of Dept. IV A 2 b centered on:-
a) Counter Intelligence and
b) Combatting Agents dropped by parachute.

Counter Intelligence, that is to say the link between Intelligence and Counter Espionage, was particularly occupied with parachute agents of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. Dept. IV A 2 b, which also dealt with broadcasting, played the first tricks from Berlin with the Soviet Intelligence Service. Parachuted Soviet W/T Agents were "turning" after giving away their technical and idealistic background and the enemy Intelligence Service was deceived into believing that their own agent was transmitting genuine news.

Most cases of the "turning" of W/T agents in Germany were connected with the Soviet Political and Military Intelligence Service. Only in a few cases was it possible to "turn" and employ English W/T agents and then not for long Dept IV A 2 b in Berlin only once succeeded and without great result. I will come back to this later.

One should not draw the conclusion however that the "turning" of British controlled Parachute W/T agents failed completely. This was possible to a large extent in HOLLAND and later in FRANCE. These stations worked independently in FRANCE together with the Abwehrleitstelle PARIS, whilst in HOLLAND even the Office side was done by the Military Intelligence.

While the RSHA IV A 2 b reserved the right to direct the policy and give the text of the various messages in Germany itself this was impossible in occupied Russian territory and still more in the western occupied countries.

The first operation of turned W/T agents with the Soviet Union started in 1942 after having an agents message had been deciphered which mentioned the name of a German Luftwaffe Lieutenant SCHULZE-BOYSEN of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium. This deciphering was the first sign and the start of the investigation which led to the rounding up of the biggest Russian espionage organisation in Germany, Belgium and France known to the Gestapo during the war. This organisation was given the cover name of ROTE KAPELLE by the office. A special commission from IV A 2 was formed to round up this movement in Germany whilst other special commissions took over the work in Belgium and France.

The Soviet Intelligence Service had left transmitting sets with a number of BERLIN Agents through the channels of the Soviet Embassy in BERLIN at the outbreak of war in Summer 1941. Seven transmitting stations were discovered in Berlin itself.

Rote Kapelle *cit: Germany*
 The spiritual leader of the Espionage network was (Oberleutnant der Luftwaffe) ~~HARRC~~ SCHULZE-BOYSEN who having an important position in the Attache Group of the Luftwaffe H.Q. Staff in BERLIN was able to get inside information regarding the Luftwaffe. SCHULZE-BOYSEN was paid for his treachery, but his main motive was a strong leaning towards Bolshevism.

His wife, who came from a German aristocratic family helped him in his treacherous activities and was the link between a large number of people in high positions.

cit: Germany
 Besides SCHULZE-BOYSEN a leading roll was played by (Ober-Regierungsrat) ~~HARNACK~~ of the Wirtschaftministerium, who was a cousin of the former Regierungspraedsident in MERSEBURG VON HARNACK.

Others taking part were:

Agents of the Rote Kapelle Network

OBERST GEHRTS of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium who supplied Schulze-Boysen with information.

Adams KUCKHOFF the Prag-Film A.G. producer, with his connections with film and stage artists, obtained important information.

Rudolf VON SCHELIHA who was Legationsrat 1st Klasse in the Foreign Office gave important information from his office to the Journalist ILSE ~~STROEBE~~ in Berlin.

Hers HEILMANN who was an Officer Cadet working in the Cipher Dept. of the OKW gave code keys to Schulze-Boysen.

cit: Germany
 There was hardly any Government Office without some employee ready to co-operate and give information. About one hundred arrests were made almost exclusively in BERLIN. The depth of Soviet Intelligence Service infiltration can be seen in the case of an Administrative Inspector of the RLM (Air Ministry) who gave away to a intermediary the most secret documents, of which only a few copies existed, concerning the strenght of the Luftwaffe and the rising production output figures. Even in the OKW and the OKM were officers to be found who were ready to co-operate out of idealistic motives.

(20) Operation of "turned" W/T agents against the U.S.S. R.

As a result of the above described activities the first cases of use of turned W/T agents against MOSCOW began in 1943. The Soviet Intelligence Service, still under the impression that the whole organisation was intact, dropped a number of parachute agents in BRANDENBURG who were caught and "turned".

By means of these first experiments with turned W/T agents from BERLIN the names of a number of Soviet Intelligence Agents were found out who had been left behind in Germany in 1941 and whose co-operation had been greatly counted on. In this connection I can give a few names which are still in my memory:

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cit: Germany
rote Kapelle Agent
In the Counter-Espionage Dept of the Gestapo Krim. Inspektor LEHMANN was caught as a result of these counter moves. He had been recruited for the Soviet Intelligence Service by the Russian Embassy in BERLIN years before the war. As an old official LEHMANN had a considerable insight into the activities of Abwehrabteilung III, especially as regards to espionage in the East.

M-2
Furthermore (Prince) SWIATOPOLK-MIRSKI *cit: Poland?* who was a Wehrmacht Sonderfuehrer owning a large estate in the area of Poland occupied by the Russians in 1939 and who had returned from the MAREK area with the resettlement scheme was to be contacted by a Soviet parachute agent in BERLIN. SWIATOPOLK was not in BERLIN but was finally arrested by the Military Police with his Unit in the BALKANS. While being brought back he escaped in the MARBURG/KRAIN district and joined TITO'S Forces. SWIATOPOLK was to have been given important missions on contacting the agent.

Moreover engineers at Siemens and AEG (Allgemeine Elektrizitaets-gesellschaft) were also discovered to be Soviet agents who had passed on their news to the Soviet Trade Delegation in BERLIN before 1939 and were now expected to continue with this work.

cit: Germany
The most striking case in this connection was the one of KUMMEROW who was an engineer at Telefunken A.G. in BERLIN employed on research work in the most secret "finishing" workshop. KUMMEROW and his chief who was a Chief Engineer were ready to give away to an agent of the Stapo pretending to be a parachute agent the latest developments in radio-optical construction and a few weeks later handed them over for onward transmission to MOSCOW. This concerned the latest applications to night fighters and ballistics in which the optical eye played an important part, KUMMEROW from his own initiative outlined a plan to assassinate Reichsminister (Dr) GOEBBELS to the Stapo agent.

By means of the operation of enemy W/T agents an engineer of the Luftwaffe Research Laboratory Adlershof near Berlin was later discovered.

The woman journalist STOERE already mentioned in the chapter about the "Rote Kapelle" received the order in a W/T message from MOSCOW to visit Reichsminister SCHLACHT and discreetly get to know his feelings towards the Nazis at that time. Measures taken against SCHLACHT and the meeting of STOERE and SCHLACHT were dropped.

The persons parachuted into Germany by the Soviet Intelligence Service were, in the beginning of 1943, mainly German emigrants who had gone to Russia in 1933 as a result of their strong communistic leanings. There were only very few as compared with the large scale employment of Soviet parachute agents by the Military Intelligence of the Soviet Union. The majority of agents dropped into Germany were German soldiers who had been given an extensive and almost astonishing training in the Soviet Union. Even Hitler Youth Leaders had submitted to this training and were willing to carry out intelligence duties in Germany. In addition they were exposed to physical and psychological pressure being German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union so that they accepted any available opportunity in order to return to Germany. The proportion of German soldiers and officers giving themselves up to us was therefore very great.

A legal procedure only took place if actual wireless contact had been made and information sent to the Soviet Union. All other German soldiers who entered Germany in this manner and for whom no use could be found as turned W/T operators were handed over to the Wehrmacht but on no account were they sent back to the Eastern Front.

24. The 4 Phases of employment of Agents by the Russians.

(1) The first phase has already been described in connection with the rounding up of the "Rote Kapelle" and the placing of Communist Refugees in German Territory.

(2) The second phase concerned the masses of W/T parachute agents used in occupied Russian territory. Defensive measures were mainly the responsibility of military establishments in the East, who succeeded only in a very small way in penetrating into the mass W/T groups or in catching parachute agents with a view to turning them with intent to deceive the enemy.

(3) With the great 1944 breakthrough of the Red Army into the German Eastern Front, which in consequence had to be withdrawn to East Prussia and Poland, a new era in the use of Soviet Parachute Agents commenced. In the provinces of East Prussia, West Prussia, Posen, and Silesia appeared a great number of Soviet Reconnaissance groups who were dropped by parachute. These groups already described as being mainly German prisoners of war were to be used for military reconnaissance only. Owing to the large number of military personnel used, the Wehrmacht H.Q. Staff saw a good opportunity to deceive the Soviets by military means.

Later on the Gestapo co-operated with the Wehrmacht H.Q. Staff in this sector. The former dealt with all technical matters whilst the latter looked after the military side. By these measures the Red Army General Staff was deceived into believing that the German Forces on the Eastern Front were much stronger than they really were and consequently a number of divisions could be withdrawn and sent to the Western Theatre.

(4) After the renewed breakthrough by the Red Army in the East the tactics described in para.3 became useless. Nevertheless as the front became stabilised on the River Oder the Soviet Military Intelligence Service renewed its use of agents in Brandenburg, Saxony and Mecklenburg who received similar orders to those given to agents dropped previously in the Eastern Provinces (Observation of Railway Transport and thoroughfares, reporting of Troop-concentrations, movements and reinforcements and amongst other tasks the capture of German Officers who had to be taken back across the front line for interrogation by Russian Units).

In addition a number of groups and single agents were captured or voluntarily gave themselves up, who had received for the first time, with their instructions, directives as to the line to be taken in the case of Germany being occupied by the Western Allies. I can only repeat these cases from memory,

- (a) Staatspolizeistelle Breslau used the two Greulich sisters, who were turned Soviet W/T agents, against the Russians. These sisters were the daughters of a former officer of the Reichswehr. Their mother emigrated to the Soviet Union and took the two girls who were 9 to 10 years old at that time with her. Both had undergone an extensive training in intelligence work and could be regarded as first class agents. Owing to military developments they had to be removed from Breslau and operated from Kolgbus. Here Rosemarie Greulich received order by W/T to return at once to the Red Army using a given password to cross the front line whilst her sister was to continue with the work. From a number of further wireless messages exchanged the reason for her withdrawal was defined as follows: She was to receive further orders in Munich which was in the zone to be occupied by the Americans. Greulich was sent back by the Germans about ten days before the collapse on the Oder front so that I am unable to give any further details as to her employment.

- (b) In Erfurt a German Colonel whose name began with Eor F gave himself up voluntarily (6). This case was of special importance to us because until that time only officers up to the rank of Captain had been used and it was known that the Russian Military Intelligence Service never approached Wehrmacht Staff Officers for these jobs. Colonel F. had extensive spying orders for the whole of German territory and for the West and possessed the military and civil papers of an Armament Commissioner. He was operated against the Russians from Potsdam. Colonel F. was able to give quite new information when interrogated regarding his training and personal contact with high Soviet NKWD Officers, amongst whom was General Iwanoff, and different from that obtained, for example from NCO's or Lieutenants who never had anything to do with these personalities. The Colonel described how that at several of these meetings these high NKWD Officers had openly expressed their strong dislike of England and in various conversations had repeatedly pointed out that with the collapse of Germany the war in Europe was by no means finished. The next phase would be that the Soviet Union would take the leading position in Spain which Germany had prevented in 1936/37. Iwanoff went on to say that the pincers would close as a result of this development in the Mediterranean as they closed on England during the war when the Soviet advance in the North (Scandinavia) could not be checked.

Colonel F. who entered Germany through the Balkans and Austria brought with him 2 transmitting sets, approximately 50,000 RM and an ex-Wehrmacht Signaller called Thiel, who had been a prisoner of war in Russia, to service these sets. The main areas of his espionage mission were great Berlin, Stettin, Lower Silesia and Hamburg. There was no mention in his orders that he should continue to work in any other area once the war was at an end.

In spite of the war and security checks on travel it was possible for him as a former colonel to move about freely provided his papers looked good enough. Colonel F's papers were such excellent total forgeries that he was able to get as far as Erfurt without any difficulty.

- (c) At the end of January and the beginning of February 1945 a group of German parachute agents sent from the SU were captured in the Torgau area. They were led by a Wehrmacht Captain who wore the Ritterkreuz (7). Western Saxony was their main espionage target. Their mission was of a military nature. The leader had been ordered on no account to let himself be overrun by the westward advance of the Red Army but to move forward at the right moment. The group had to move in the direction of the English occupied zone and try to legalise itself there. For the time being the W/T traffic was to be abandoned but it should be recommenced a month later at the latest.

The Soviet Intelligence was interested in the following details in this area:-

- (i) Measures of Administration issued by the English Occupation Authorities.
- (ii) Attitude of the English Civil Administration towards the German population.
- (iii) To what extent the Germans will be employed, particularly in civic post (e.g. Town Hall-
- (iv) Which Armament Industries will be restarted and which will be left idle in the English Zone of Occupation.

(v) What output do these Armament Industries have and to whom is the material sent.

(d) Another group of soldiers was dropped in the neighbourhood of Straussberg near Berlin at the end of February 1945 under the leadership of a Berlin Optical Assistant whose name I have forgotten. They were in possession of a complete transmitting set with the necessary Cipher and W/T instructions. The group was 'turned' by IVA 2 b and were given the covername "Optiker". They were to be used for deception purposes but this never really put into action. Their mission was military and political espionage in Greater Berlin. Theirs was different from other cases in the fact that they had strict orders not to make themselves known to Red Army Organisations such as the Soviet Police when Berlin was taken by the Soviets. After hostilities had ceased they should in any circumstances recommence their radio activity from the Russian occupied Berlin with the main base station, in order to obtain further instructions. The "resident" had already been told before leaving that further work had been envisaged in the Hannover area as soon as the Russians reached Berlin and he must find a means of transporting the W/T apparatus there as discreetly as possible. Further details about the place of operation and the target were not given to him and he was told that he would be informed later by W/T.

As it was presumed at this time (from the German side) that the Russians would only advance as far as the Elbe we came to the conclusion that this group was intended for service in the West.

(c) Two cases still require consideration in this connection. The interest of the Soviet Military Intelligence was extraordinarily strong as regards all events in the Baltic. A great number of groups of agents consisting of SS Men as well as ordinary POW were sent to the Baltic Ports, especially to Elbing Koenigsberg/Pr Danzig-Gotenhafen, and Stettin-Swinemuende. The major interest of the Baltic Military Intelligence Service was the movement of German Warships.

OTTO PUENTER
ALEXANDER RADO
ALEXANDER FOOTE
Switzerland
during WWII


In the Funkspiele "Kiebitz" in Danzig and in the "Seeschwalbe" in Swinemuende the agents received the orders not to let themselves be overrun but in the case of Swinemuende to move to Luebeck and to make the Dockyard LMG (Leubecker Maschinen Gesellschaft) their main objective. In the case of Danzig they had to move to Cologne where the agent's relations were living and from where he should continue his radio activity.

22. Further cases which were dealt with during the war by IV A 2 b

There was for instance the attempt by the Soviet Espionage Group "Rote Drei" by which the Soviet Intelligence Service obtained extensive information from leading circles of the German General Staff, which was relayed to Moscow by three Swiss transmitters in Lausanne, Verreux near Geneva and on the Monte Bree.

Almost all the Soviet Agents active in Switzerland were recognised. Amongst them was RADO the Hungarian leader, and other such as Puenter, the Debendorfer couple, the Swiss Left wing Radical Politician Nicol and an Englishman called Foote about whom it was uncertain as to whether he was working for both sides or not. In Germany this was never decided although there were several factors which pointed in this direction.

Alexander



The traffic contained hundreds of W/T messages of a military nature mostly from the Eastern Theatre and the Balkans but also from Central Wehrmacht Establishments. A study of this deciphered W/T traffic by the Chief of Operations Dept. at OKH itself showed that 40 to 50% of the information was useful. I can give further information about this matter.

23. The Cleaning up of the "Free Germany National Committee" movement in Germany.

IV A 2 obtained a fairly comprehensive inside view of the "Free Germany National Committee" and the affiliated "German Officers League" movements founded by the SU, from the interrogations of Soviet Parachute agents. By the intelligence work of some confidential informers of the Dept. in Berlin combatting these special Soviet tactics it was discovered that in 1944 the first attempt at forming a Central Committee of the Communist Party under the name of "National Committee" took place. The head officials were the Berlin Communists ~~Baestlein, Jacob, and Saefkow~~. Berlin members found the main body. It was worth while noting that two leading Social-Democrat Officials before 1933 contacted this triumvirate in order to form a United Front. These two men later appeared in connection with the 20th July incident where under Goerdeler's new Government they were to be Home Minister and Minister for Public Worship and Instruction respectively. I would like to mention two further points on this subject. The "National Committee" succeeded in contacting a relatively large number of Officers and men who were prepared to collaborate. Two Wehrmacht doctors from Spandau and Magdeburg had supported this movement even though the one from Spandau was a National Socialist "Fuehrungsoffizier". In Germany itself a number of communist members of Reichstag and Landtag were found out and arrested, who were already active and who had formed similar groups in their districts.

I am ready to give information about the following cases which were dealt with under my leadership :-

Assassination plot against the Soviet General Vlassow who later worked for Germany.

Soviet Intelligence Service Agents' expeditions in Germany itself.

Concerning Dept. IV A 1 a - Knowledge about Communism in general and Russia, especially the latest development concerning the "Free Germany National Committee" and the methods used in the employment of German POW for political and spying aims (Antifaschulen)

24. The "Nibelungen" Scheme.

Dept. IV A 2 until about Autumn 1944 dealt only with Ib work whilst the Ia side was done by Military Intelligence, later by AMT MIL. and in general by AMT VI. In 1944 R.F.S.S. who was temporarily in charge of the Elsass-Lothringen Army Group on the Upper Rhine established the fact that the information coming from Alsace-Lorraine which was of importance for the carrying out of the war was insufficient. He was very angry about it and I remember that the Chief of the Sipo was admonished in consequence. As a result of this the Chief of the Sipo ordered that not only Amt VI but also Amt IV and Amt III of the RSHA had to send Agents into the areas of Germany occupied by the enemy. I received the order from Gruppenfuehrer Mueller through my Gruppenleiter and I started on this work through Dept. IV A 2b. The material situation in Amt IV as regard this work was catastrophic. There was not only a shortage of agents but also of instructional personnel, schools, equipment and especially W/T equipment. Improvisation of these things was necessary because of war and furthermore I was unable to obtain anything from official sources and schools as Amt VI and Amt Mil were able to do.

Nevertheless agents, some of whom, particularly W/T operators, were very suitable both from a technical point of view and for undercover work, were trained for several months in Berlin and were sent to areas not yet occupied by the Allies. From these areas a communications exercise with Berlin HQ was to be started which would give the assurance that when necessary military information could be received at Army HQ. I must mention however that in this "Nibelungen" scheme no acts of sabotage were ever intended by these people because in the first place no equipment existed and secondly it was the exclusive job of Amt VI, Amt Mil., and SS - Jagdverbaende..

The W/T communications from these agents to Berlin never took place as the main transmitter which should have been built by the Orpo had to be transferred to Hof in Bavaria owing to the heavy air raids on the capital and the continuous lack of current. This transmitter was built at Hof but was never used again. It was at the time of the American advance towards the Czechoslovak Border.

Where it was taken and what became of it is beyond my knowledge, as communication was cut off with the Southern Group and the military situation changed so fast. I do not think that it would be reconstructed again at the time. As the agents were now left high and dry at their respective stations and being unable to send their information by courier but exclusively by wireless means I decided at all costs to take the radio and cipher instructions with me on leaving Berlin and try to find a place where it would be possible to build a transmitter in a short period of time which would be able to pick up these agents still at work. I made enquiries to this end at the Research Dept. in Eutin and was told that they had saved a 70 Watt transmitter from a danger zone and that this would be put at my disposal. My request could not be accepted at the Research Dept as they were already overcrowded but I was assured that room could be found in a barracks on the Kieler Foerde opposite Laboe where main station could be built.

As all the instructions were kept by the Northern Group who had moved from Schwerin to Breiholz (North of the Kiel Canal) it was arranged that they should be sent to Kiel in about 8 or 14 days which was the time required by the Research Dept. to build the station. Neither of these two things were accomplished. On the orders of the Deputy Gruppenleiter of IV B the instructions were burnt in a wood on the road to Ostenfeld and consequently any further work on this matter was useless.

The actual work of the Agents

About 25 agents were trained and equipped in Berlin in four months of whom only ten to fifteen were sent to their area of activity, in German territory not yet occupied. The remainder had not finished their training as it becomes more difficult to find personnel with some knowledge of signalling. Germans, Flemings, Russians, Poles and as far as I can remember 2 Frenchmen were used for this job. I am unable to give their names or aliases at the moment but will try to bring them back to mind later. I still vaguely remember the areas to be covered however; near Saarbrucken, Koblenz district, and Godesberg on the Rhine. I think if I remember rightly that a Frenchman called ~~Benoin~~ Benoin was to be used in the Godesburg, in the Neckar district, in the region of the Stapostelle Frankfurt/Oder at ~~Litzmannstadt~~ Litzmannstadt.

German W/T agent ww II

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25. The "Siegrune" Scheme.

More and more German territories were lost in the first months of 1945 owing to the military developments in the West and in the East, and as a result the activities of whole Stapostellen (Stations) were crippled. As each Stapostelle had a number of Confidential Informers at its disposal the order was given by Gruppenfuehrer Mueller at the request of the Chief of the Sipo to all still existing Stapostellen in the areas threatened with immediate occupation that intelligence service centres had to be found which would make use of the existing informer system.

These centres should have sent their messages through the front to the Gestapo Stations in the rear (8). A Report to Berlin should not be sent. In-coming messages should be sent immediately to the appropriate military establishment, without being too elaborate. It was really much more important that every Stapo Station saw to it that henceforth in the case of great danger the work could be carried on.

Note : ^{Poland} The name of one agent employed at Cologne has just occurred to me. It is the Polish subject Viktor Krolkowski whose aliases I have forgotten.

26. Affairs at the Skoda Works in Pilsen

In the course of my work I had to deal three times with the Skoda Works in Pilsen. In one instance I only know the matter through a colleague in the office or from reading the file.

(a) The Stapostelle in Prague (Later Commander of the Sipo in Prague) operated a turned W/T agent against Russia under the cover-name of "Reichsapfel". Concerned in this scheme were two Soviet agents who were arrested whilst crossing the frontier from the General Government (Poland) into the Protectorate (Czechoslovakia). They had orders to spy in Bohemia with the Skoda Works as the main object. The W/T work done for us was actually carried out from Pilsen. The orders given to the agents on departure and these received by W/T were as follows :-

- (i) Report on the extent of armament production in all branches of the works and which weapons were now being produced that were previously made in Germany.
- (ii) Nature and extent of damage done to the works by Anglo-American air raids.
- (iii) Deceptive information which magnified the air raids damage was sent to the Soviet Intelligence Service through military establishments in Prague.

(b) A Second group of agents was caught in Bohemia-Moravia which also had orders to spy on the Skoda Works. No turned W/T agents were started in this case by the Stapo as there was no more Wehrmacht material available and the "Reichsapfel" traffic was already very useful against the Soviet Intelligence Service.

(c) Early in 1944 I believe a Swedish Commission consisting of two or three persons of Swedish nationality stayed in Prague, and discussed armament questions with an Armament Commissioner of the Protectorate. In conversation the Swedes hinted that England wanted the future production capacity of the Skoda works to be cut down or the Western Allies would be obliged to carry out heavy air raids on the factory. In this connection I would like to mention a case of the Stapo in Bruenn where a Soviet agent was 'Turned' by the Germans. Several times he received strict orders by W/T from Moscow that he had to carry on his work in such a camouflaged manner that even after the allied victory over Germany he could continue with it in the Protectorate under all circumstances. This skilled agent sent news mainly about the Bohemia-Moravian Armament Industry (Kolben-Dannek) Oluetzer Maschinenfabrik and Prague Aircraft Works. I do not know if he was to cover Pilsen after the Allied victory. I believe that Minister Obergruppenfuhrer Frank would be in a better position to give information on this subject.

27. The penetration of the Anglo-American Intelligence Service through BBC

As is known, British and American agents were given BBC messages on being sent on their mission with which they could prove their identity with the Resistance Movements in occupied territory. These messages which were mostly transmitted by Daventry were for a long time a complete mystery to the German Intelligence Service and it was supposed that they belonged to groups of persons of different country actions in allied service. The first big penetration into this BBC System was accomplished by the HQ of the C-in-C Sipo at Paris who had captured a number of English agents in Northern France belonging to the so called "French Section" movement. Through them the Sipo Dienststelle in Paris was able to get a rough idea from these messages which ones belonged to the "French Section" and those belonging to a section still unknown.

As regards the date of the invasion these agents said that in the case of imminent invasion two phases were to be differentiated (or perhaps three). The solution to these would be given in BBC messages. I still remember that in the first phase widespread sabotage was to have been started which would be on a larger scale than ever before. Means of communication should also be destroyed. In the second phase when the BBC gave further more definite messages acts of violence against persons were to be started, especially against Sipo Executive personnel stationed in France. When the third phase was signified the invasion could be expected in 24 to 48 hours and that was the signal for all the Resistance Movements to go into action.

The above described phases were picked up by radio at the beginning of June 1944. I remember distinctly that on the 5th June towards 1900 hrs the news came in from Paris that according to the BBC messages the Anglo-American invasion was to be expected in the next few days. In actual fact the attack started shortly after midnight on 6.6.44. I would like to emphasize that the eventual date of the attack was obtained from these BBC transmissions but as regards the main target of the attack, which would have been more important, absolutely nothing was obtained.

28. Facts about the "Buntschuh" Scheme

The "Buntschuh" scheme was not started by RSHA Amt IV but by the Personalamt (Amt 1). The order which was issued about it was sent direct to the Stapo Stations and Commanders by Amt 1 and was never seen by me nor received in any department of Amt IV. I got to know about this matter through a casual talk with the departmental chief of Amt IV who explained to me in a very outspoken manner that Amt 1 had to deal with the subjects which had nothing to do with the Dept. and which would be of no use whatsoever in the prevailing military situation. As far as I can remember from Gruppenfuhrer Mueller's words it was an order to all Stapo Station Chiefs instructing them to let their subordinate officials "submerge"

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amongst the population should their area become occupied. I do not know if these officials were to carry out any illegal activity such as "Werewolf" which was propagated by Promi. This order was not sent to the Sub-offices and Departments of Amt IV. Presumably a member of the Stapo Stations could give complete information regarding this matter (9).

29. My Journeys Abroad for the Gestapo during the war

- (1) 1939- Flight to Moscow with German Commission to reach an agreement over the withdrawal of German minorities from Bessarabia and the Russian occupied areas of Poland.
- (2) 1940- Trip to Sofia to inspect British explosives captured (?) by the Bulgarian Political Police.
- (3) 1940- Trip to Belgrade. Discussion with the Yugoslav Political Police on order to stop the infiltration of Saboteurs into Austria.
- (4) 1942 - Trip to Stockholm. Exchange of technical information as regards to sabotage of ships.

Political co-operation or conversations were to be avoided with the various Police Forces of these countries. The Gestapo only wanted a technical exchange of views in order to maintain connections abroad.

(5) Journey to Rome in about 1943 to visit the Political Police (Sicuranza). Several copies of the German Sabotage Atlas were presented to the Chief of the Italian Police.

30. Supplement to notes on the Espionage Organisation "Rote Kapelle" activity in Belgium and France.

It only became possible to penetrate the SOVIET "rote Kapelle" Organisation in Germany by means of the Belgian sector of the Organisation. The head of this section was a Russian Captain called Kent. *Victor SUKOLOV*
This man had to go from Belgium to Berlin in order to exchange information on procedure (Wireless programme and code) with Luftwaffen-Offizier Schulze-Boysen whereby the latter was in a position to send coded messages from Berlin to Brussels from where they could be transmitted to Moscow. Kent conversed with a number of other persons among whom was a Finn in a commission business which had concluded trade contracts with the OT and the Wehrmacht. The "net proceeds" went straight to the Soviet Intelligence Service which was working in conjunction with a certain Gilbert in Paris. Whilst Kent was the so called sub-leader of the organisation Gilbert played the role of Leader for all West European territories. Gilbert was in direct W/T contact with Moscow just as Kent was. They were attached to the Soviet Military Intelligence and not to the NKWD. In both instances, turned W/T agents, under the code names of "Mars" and "Marianne", were operated from Marseilles and Paris respectively by Stapo organisation against Moscow. This was carried on for 1½ years, that is to say right up to the very last. These operations gave an interesting inside view into the Soviets aims, especially in France, particularly as they were not only of a military nature but also of a political one. If necessary I can give specified details about this. Kent himself was taken back to Germany and Gilbert escaped whilst walking with a Stapo Official in Paris and was caught again.

Agent in Rote Kapelle network in Paris, France