

DRAFT

~~SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY 3  
PSB D-32  
April 11, 1952

REPORT ON  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN  
COLD WAR OPERATIONS

Prepared by Henry Loomis  
April 11, 1952

*Classified by oer/B  
10/20/53*

~~SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL~~

Security Information  
CONFIDENTIAL

COPY  
PSB D-32  
April 11, 1952

SUMMARY

PAGE

I. THE RELATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH TO COLD WAR OPERATIONS..... 1

Research in the social sciences, though relatively a new field, can make a significant contribution to cold war operations by improving the bases upon which decisions can be made.

II. PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE GOVERNMENT..... 4

Since World War II, the Federal Government has become a major supporter of social science research. Over 20 separate organizations within a dozen agencies committed \$\_\_\_\_\_ in fiscal 1952 for such research of potential assistance in winning the cold war.

III. DEFECTS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM..... 11

Lack of clarity in national objectives, overlapping and changing areas of responsibility of Government agencies, the rapid growth of research organization, the shortage of trained scientists and administrators, and lack of awareness by top management of potentials of social science research have all led to serious inefficiency. Requirements for research are faulty; the distribution of research funds is not related to the missions; no central clearing house for coordinating such research exists.

IV. POSSIBLE MEANS OF PROVIDING A COHERENT PROGRAM..... 17

Coordinated leadership for Government social science research can be provided either by the creation of central authoritative direction, by the establishment of a central coordinating mechanism, or by providing separate coordinating units to deal with different areas.

V. POSSIBLE METHODS FOR COUNTERACTING THE YOUTH OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.. 23

The Government can encourage both the training of social science research personnel and the training of Government operators and planners in the use of such research.

VI. CONCLUSIONS..... 24

Better integration of social science research can materially increase its contribution to the cold war. Leadership can best be provided by delegation of the responsibility for coordination by the National Security Council to the Psychological Strategy Board.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS..... 25

The Psychological Strategy Board should take the initiative in having a suitable directive prepared for approval by the National Security Council which delegates responsibility for coordination to the PSB and establishes an individual as coordinator presiding over a coordinating committee.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY  
D-32  
April 11, 19I. THE RELATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH  
TO COLD WAR OPERATIONS

The invaluable contribution from research in the natural and biological sciences to modern military operations is well recognized. The potential assistance from research in the social sciences in the present period of tensions without full-scale war is less understood or accepted. Nonetheless, it is considerable and unique.

Dr. Conant differentiates science from the accumulation of data and from the development of practical methods for dealing with every day problems, and points out that the "practical arts" at first run ahead of the science. Only after the science has developed does it affect "practice" to a greater extent that "practice" affects it. In the case of the natural sciences, physics and chemistry overtook the art of building pumps and primitive metallurgy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The biological sciences have only very recently overtaken medicine and agriculture. The social sciences are probably not yet abreast of such "practices" as personnel selection and economic controls. While the transition from leadership by practice to leadership by the science in the case of the social sciences will undoubtedly be gradual, there is reason to believe that we are on the threshold and that the relatively near future will witness as dramatic changes in "social practice" as have occurred in the past in the practice of medicine.

Research contributes to all three of Dr. Conant's areas: the accumulation of data, the improvement of the practical arts, and the development of the science. In the social sciences, it may aid the practical operator or government official in roughly the same manner that medical research aids the physician, since both fields are concerned with the study of a multitude of dependent variables, some "physical" and some "mental", far too numerous to permit an understanding of the whole. The practical man today must frequently act without sufficient knowledge, either because there is insufficient time to learn what is known or because research has not progressed sufficiently

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

to permit reliable answers to his questions. The physician, having at his disposal the results of centuries of medical research, is in a much more favorable position to arrive at his decisions. Similarly, social science research can lead to the formation of hypotheses based on critical, exhaustive, investigation of facts and opinions. While research can not completely solve the practical man's problem, give him specific directions on how to conduct his business, or even give him complete and rigorous answers to many of his questions, it can aid him by bringing the parts of the problem into better focus, presenting facts in an orderly manner, and offering hypotheses which may aid in the formation of plans or policy.

The work of Dr. Alex Leighton and his group during the last war is an outstanding example of the contribution which social science research can make to practical decisions. Using the techniques of social science, he showed that the almost universally held belief in the impossibility of a Japanese surrender was a myth. He predicted that the Japanese would surrender in large numbers, emphasized the unique importance of the emperor, described the conditions necessary for surrender, and continuously assessed Japanese morale. Later events and captured documents have shown that he was substantially correct.

Bearing in mind that research in the social sciences can potentially make an enormous contribution to the waging of the cold war, it becomes necessary to determine whether this potential is being fully exploited and, if not, what should be done about it. This latter, in turn, breaks down into two further questions: How can research effort and expenditure best be channelled into projects contributory to the waging of the cold war, and how can the utilization of the results of social science research by operational personnel be improved? A study of these questions is the purpose of this paper.

While it is realized that no definition can be completely satisfactory, research is considered herein as that effort which attempts to bring order to unrelated facts and thus to increase the store of human

knowledge. An attempt has been made herein to separate research from intelligence gathering and from quick analyses made for an individual operational decision. Thus, no attempt has been made to assess the large governmental and private mechanisms for assembling, as distinct from evaluating, the facts: i.e., the intelligence services, the foreign service, and news services. An attempt has also been made to exclude from consideration that work primarily intended to be used only once or for a limited period of time - i.e. spot intelligence. Furthermore, while an understanding of the United States itself is of vital importance to any decisions in the cold war, research on the internal United States is separate and has been excluded from this study. Any social science research considered of value to the cold war has been included in this study, even though it may also be directed to hot war requirements. The social sciences have been defined broadly to include the humanities, economics, and parts of geography and psychiatry in addition to the regular social sciences. Since all of these dividing lines are a matter of judgment, the figures in this study should be considered as indicating an order of magnitude of effort, rather than precise amounts.

## II. PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE GOVERNMENT

The present stage of development of the social sciences corresponds roughly to that of the natural sciences during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and to that of the biological sciences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For the first time, it appears possible for the social sciences to develop theories which can be partially checked by experiment and which provide a tentative basis for explaining and predicting observed facts. As during the early stages of the other two sciences, the experimental techniques are far from adequate, since they still permit arrival at erroneous results and the proposal of contradictory theories at the same time. Nonetheless, during the last few decades the practical application of the social sciences, such as economic controls and the selection of personnel, has improved remarkably and many feel that they are on the threshold of major advances.

Due to the limited stage of development of these sciences, however, it is almost impossible to judge the quality of the research objectively. While the calibre of the research personnel varies considerably, it is probably not too different, on the average, from the quality of the natural and biological research scientists.

Due to the youth of the disciplines, there are far fewer trained research personnel than is the case in the natural sciences. There are 34,000 members of U. S. social science professional societies as compared to 175,000 in the natural and biological sciences. There are 7,500 psychologists as compared to 70,000 chemists. In addition, there are about 400,000 engineers who, though not themselves scientists, are essential to the process of making the results of research in the natural sciences useful.

Among the social scientists, area and language specialists are in particularly great demand by the Government. Not only are they few in number, but their distribution is most uneven, the largest percentage

specializing in Western Europe and South America. Reputedly, there are only 160 individuals in the United States with knowledge of Indonesia.

The Federal Government first gave major support to social science research during World War II. While much of this effort was concerned with economic controls and the selection, training and effective use of our troops, some work was also done on psychological warfare, with particular emphasis on studying the strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemy. After the war, this support virtually ceased for several years. Since 1947, however, it has increased rapidly until at the present time the Federal Government is one of the major sponsors of social science research.

Federally sponsored research is undertaken in order to fulfill requirements which, in theory, are determined by the operators and planners of each agency with the intent to utilize the product of the research as the basis for making the decisions which are the responsibility of the agency. These requirements are then submitted to the agency research administrators and serve as the basis for planning their research programs. In practice, however, most requirements are so broad that they permit many research projects quite unconnected with agency responsibilities to be undertaken. In addition, many research administrators detect gaps in their programs which they attempt to fill by undertaking research justified only by the broadest interpretation of the stated requirements. The scientists themselves also originate projects, either because of particular interest or unique qualifications, seeking financial support from a Government agency. (2)

About a dozen separate Government agencies support some social science research of potential value to waging the cold war. In fiscal 1952, the total sum obligated to research in this category was on the order of \$ \_\_\_\_\_; which is about a 20% increase over 1951. Although the present plans of most research administrators call for a similar increase in 1953, there seems little doubt that this will be reduced during the budgetary review.

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIALPSB D-32  
April 11, 1952

In addition to the \$ \_\_\_\_\_ spent on this type of research, the Federal Government spends on the order of \$36 million a year in "general purpose statistical activities" in such organizations as the Office of Business Economics, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Census. The Department of Defense spends an additional \$10 million annually for social science research concerned with selection and training of manpower. Total Federal Government obligations for research in 1952, exclusive of social science research, amounted to \$2.7 billion, of which \$2 billion was obligated by the Department of Defense.

Outside of the Government, in fiscal 1952 the foundations, particularly the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations, spent over \$6 million in the support of social science research of value in the cold war and when the Ford Foundation becomes fully operational this figure will probably be increased by several million dollars. The five major radio networks spend over \$2 million for social science research, attempting to determine their effect on audiences. Private advertising firms reputedly spend on the order of \$30 million a year for market analyses. Several of the major corporations operating overseas spend over a half a million a year in attempting to determine foreign reaction to their presence. Thus, it is apparent that, while the amount of money being spent in the Government on social science research of potential value to waging the cold war is insignificant - less than \_\_\_% of the money it spent on hardware research - nevertheless, it represents the major source of funds in social science research, being \_\_\_\_\_ times as large as the amount granted annually by the foundations.

Of this \$ \_\_\_\_\_ spent for social science research of value to the cold war, the Department of Defense contributes between \$6 and \$7 million, or more than \_\_\_\_\_. The Department of State spends about \$3½ million. Other Government agencies such as MSA, Commerce, and Agriculture, each contribute less than \$1 million. CIA contributes \$\_\_\_\_\_. Within the Department of Defense the Air Force is by



PSB D-32  
April 11, 1952

far the largest contributor, providing over \$4 million or more than the entire State Department. The Navy is second with about \$1½ million and the Army spends less than \$1 million in this field.

Since the research program within each agency is compartmentalized, a more meaningful breakdown is by individual research organizations. (Balance of this paragraph has been deleted on grounds of security. It discussed the relative size of expenditures of the Office of Research Reports and the National Intelligence Survey within CIA, the Air Targets Division and the Human Resources Research Institute within the Department of Defense, and the Office of Intelligence Research and the International Information Administration within the State Department).

Reverting to the \$ \_\_\_\_\_ spent by the Government in this field, of this total approximately \$ \_\_\_\_\_, or more than 80% is spent within the Government laboratories. About \$ \_\_\_\_\_ of this \$ \_\_\_\_\_ is spent within the organizations to which the funds are appropriated; with the remaining \$ \_\_\_\_\_ being sub-contracted from one Government agency to another. OIR within State received over \$ \_\_\_\_\_ through such transfer of funds and the Library of Congress received the bulk of the remainder.

The \$ \_\_\_\_\_ not spent within the Government, constituting less than \_\_\_% of the total, is contracted to non-government organizations, primarily universities. The Department of Defense, principally the Air Force, provides about 2/3 of these contract funds, with the IIA of State providing the next largest amount. CIA has only one non-government contract of any size. The percentage of research done on contract varies widely, the two extremes being HRRI of the Air Force, which contracts out virtually all of its research, retaining less than 10% largely for administration, and OIR of State, which has no external research contracts whatsoever.

When this \$ \_\_\_\_\_ is broken down by functions, it will be seen that approximately \$ \_\_\_\_\_ or 3/4 is spent on background studies. These include all of the studies which attempt to determine

the characteristics of foreign areas and peoples, including their psychological and economic strengths and vulnerabilities. Defense spends about \$4 million for background studies and the State Department about \$2½ million. CIA spends \$\_\_\_\_\_ for this purpose. Only \$3 million, or less than \_\_\_% of the total \$\_\_\_\_\_, is spent on the evaluation of either past action or proposed future action; Defense and State each providing about \$1 million. About \$1½ million, or \_\_\_% of the total, is earmarked for fundamental research either on methodology or on basic human factors such as panic, and about 2/3 of this is contributed by the Department of Defense. This figure may well be incomplete, however, since much research undertaken primarily for background study purposes or for evaluation has also contributed markedly to the improvement of the methodology of the sciences.

Geographically speaking, of the \$\_\_\_\_\_ spent by the Federal Government, roughly \$8 million is spent on studies of the Soviet orbit: i.e. Russia, the European satellites, and China. Although the remainder is spread throughout the world, a large majority is devoted to Western Europe.

As between the social sciences, slightly more than \$8 million are spent on economic studies. No other scientific discipline can be separated out since practically all social science research is conducted as a team operation where several sciences are brought to bear on a common problem. (3)

In excess of 80% of the research paid for by Federal funds is classified and not generally available to the public.

Coordination within the Government of the research programs of the various agencies is hampered by the fact that the administrators of the Government research agencies usually justify their programs through the regular budgetary review mechanism of their respective agencies. Within the limits of their approved budgets, they have a relatively free hand, being able to undertake the programs which in their judgment best meet the requirements for research which they receive from the operating portions of their agencies. Even where there are several (2)

research organizations within one agency, they operate independently, in most cases, although naturally informal liaison exists to greater or lesser extent at the working levels.

Within the Department of Defense, the situation is somewhat more complicated by the review powers of the Research and Development Board, but in the area of social science research of potential interest to the cold war, the Research and Development Board has not affected the programs of the three Services to any great extent. The Research and Development Board has attempted to maintain a file of social science research supported by the Department of Defense, but this file contains only that research classified as social science and reported to the Committee on Human Resources. It does not contain research undertaken by any of the military intelligence agencies or by the two special contract agencies - RAND of the Air Force and ORO of the Army - and is, therefore, of limited usefulness. No other formal mechanism exists anywhere in the Government for determining what research projects are being undertaken within the Government laboratories.

The External Research Staff of OIR in State executes the external research contracts for State Department and CIA and has a complete file of these contracts. By informal means, they have also acquired a quite complete listing of all contracts supported by the Defense Department, but have made no attempt to ascertain the details of the internal governmental research program.

There is no central index to which an administrator of a research organization can turn in order to find out quickly and easily what others are doing.

Coordination of non-governmental research is somewhat better because the External Research Staff of OIR in State has developed excellent informal relations with most of the private research organizations and universities. It has a large file, by titles and authors, containing the majority of social science research projects undertaken within the universities, and receives the annual reports from over 40 foundations.

As a result, there is probably a better knowledge within Government of privately sponsored research than there is of that sponsored by the Government itself. Since many of the foundation executives and many of the university scientists serve on government review boards as consultants or as contractors, there is probably a fair knowledge of the government program within private institutions.

Utilization of the results of all this research is conditioned by the fact that the research performed within the Government laboratories in response to a stated requirement is usually of an applied nature and of obvious use. Since the researcher usually knows who is going to utilize his results, his liaison with the operators in his agency is relatively close, and he feels that his work is being utilized. These internal research reports are usually circulated within the research organization itself and are sent to the operating branch concerned. When appropriate, many are used in the formulation of national estimates and affect in some measure the formulation of policy. By and large, the research reports done in one agency are not circulated widely among other agencies except as they are incorporated in such an estimate. For example, the results of research performed within the Office of the Special Representative of ECA in Paris are virtually unknown in this country.

On the other hand, there is sometimes uncertainty as to who will actually use reports initiated by a research administrator or by a scientist. This is particularly true of some of the larger and more ambitious external contract programs which are usually more long-range. Their tendency to be written in more technical language and organized in scientific fashion results in it being more difficult for an agency operator to comprehend what has been discovered, particularly what hypotheses have been proposed. The implications for action are seldom stated in these reports, nor are the scientists often encouraged to do so. Normally, there is little direct contact between the researcher and the ultimate users with the result that the researcher feels his efforts are wasted and the operator feels that research has not given him anything useful. These reports, however, are usually circulated fairly widely within the various Government agencies.

III. DEFECTS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The foregoing statement of the existing situation makes it clear that the current contribution to cold war operations from social science research is far from satisfactory. One cause of this situation is that since World War II our national objectives have been neither clear, consistent, nor generally agreed to. In particular, the different opinions concerning the likelihood of war with Russia and the different emphasis on containment as against aggressive action short of war have made it extremely difficult for any agency to assign priority to various broad areas of research. Since research is necessarily a time-consuming process, this uncertainty has tended to encourage a collection of heterogeneous research projects rather than a logical program.

Another cause is the overlapping and changing designation of the areas of responsibility of Government agencies. Partly due to the different interpretations of the national objectives, but more directly resulting from major reorganizations within the Government, such as the Defense Act of 1947, the establishment of ECA, the establishment of the "R" Division within State, and the emergence of IIA, the area of responsibility of each agency and sub-group has been constantly shifting and subject to different interpretations. Considerable overlap between the missions of many research agencies has resulted.

Finally, the youth and rapid growth of governmental research programs have made adequate coordination difficult. The overwhelming majority of the Federal research agencies have come into being since World War II - two during the current fiscal year. Most have been continuously expanding ever since their inception, leading naturally to confusion and to difficulty in detecting and weeding out the less desirable programs or in finding out what others are doing.

The confusion concerning objectives, coupled with the booming growth, has resulted in a high percentage of unsatisfactory research requirements. Some are of such short range that they are not properly research requirements, but resemble more closely requests for spot

intelligence. Others are so broad and vague that a host of research projects might be justified under them. For example, a research requirement sent from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Research and Development Board authorizes "research and development on new and improved methods of determining feasible psychological warfare goals and targets and for developing strategies for the attainment of specific goals." Many research requirements issued by the operating or planning branches of one agency for the guidance of its agency research program overlap requirements issued by another agency to its research organization. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also requested the Research and Development Board to undertake "research and development of new and improved methods for studying the nature of critical foreign populations and the extent of their conditioning by rival propaganda and control". This would appear to be very similar to the major research requirement which led to the formulation of the IIA research program within State. Of eleven specific research requirements issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, 1951, almost half can be considered to overlap either the State Department, CIA, or Civil Defense.

Due to the confusion and the broad overlapping research requirements, most research administrators have, moreover, tended to consider their programs as separate entities and have attempted to distribute their effort without sufficient consideration of the work undertaken by others. The difficulty encountered by administrators in attempting to learn in detail what others are currently doing or even the results of much of the completed research has undoubtedly increased this tendency. This independence has resulted in the concentration by a number of agencies on the same obvious problems, such as the nature of the Soviet Government, and in neglect by all of other areas. For example, much of the research done by the Department of Defense deals with broad problems with which the State Department should be primarily concerned. At the same time, with the exception of two RAND reports on the Soviet army and air force and one Office of Naval Research (ONR) report on Soviet submariners, there have been no studies of the psychological strengths and weaknesses of the

April 11, 1952

armed forces of any of our friends or any of our foes similar to Leighton's work on the Japanese Army and the excellent studies of the Wehrmacht done during World War II. There are no thorough studies of the North Korean army, the Chinese army, the satellite armies; the strengths and weaknesses of the French and British armed services; nor the potentials of the East and West German armies. All of these and many more are primarily the concern of the Department of Defense.

Another example of a grossly undeveloped area is research on the goals, methods, strengths and vulnerabilities of para-military operations. While one program is underway within the Army's ORO, it has made little headway due to a series of administrative problems. Several groups of operators, believing that the methods they developed during World War II are the best, have been operating with different sets of assumptions. The complexity of para-military operations themselves and their interaction with political considerations offers an opportunity for the social scientists to make a contribution and reduce the area of speculation.

As a result of the rapid growth and changing organization, the distribution of research funds has not paralleled the logical distribution of responsibility. The most glaring example of this imbalance is the State Department, whose mission is certainly central to much of the cold war. Yet, it has been able to allocate only \$3 $\frac{1}{2}$  million for research - far less than has Defense, and even less than the Air Force alone. (Relative size of CIA expenditure deleted.) It is not easy for the State Department to correct this situation in view of its generally tight funds resulting from its difficulty in obtaining adequate appropriations. By default, the Defense Department has sponsored as much research in foreign areas as has the State Department, with resultant confusion and resentment. Furthermore, the difference in availability of funds causes widely varying standards of living within the different research agencies. Within the State Department's OIR, for instance, funds are exceedingly tight and no funds can be spared for longer range external research contracts. Many of the Defense agencies, on the other hand, have been under considerable pressure to expand the magnitude of their effort in order more nearly

to balance the large expenditures for research on military end items. Most of the Defense research agencies are, therefore, more willing and able to undertake the more ambitious research projects. They tend to use the device of external contracts with universities as a means for committing rapidly funds which they cannot readily absorb due to the rapidity of their growth.

In addition to this lack of cohesion throughout the whole Federal program, the comparative youth of the social sciences as noted above introduces a major problem. The social sciences do not possess sufficient knowledge or adequate techniques with which to answer many of the pressing problems of today, just as medical research is not able to cure cancer at the present time. This appears to be particularly true in the case of evaluation of past or proposed actions, which is analogous to the cancer problem. In fact, there appears to be less effective evaluation done now, particularly within the Department of Defense, than was done during the last war. (1)

Another result of the youth of the social sciences is the shortage of all types of personnel mentioned above, which becomes particularly acute in the case of the senior scientists and research administrators. The number of trained social scientists has been increasing very rapidly during the past decade as has the number of natural and biological scientists, but the absolute numbers were so small 20 years ago that there are few able scientists with long experience in the social sciences. The administration of large social science programs is virtually a new profession, because, prior to World War II, only a few of the major foundations required research administrators.

The youth of the social sciences also has the effect that there is a general lack of understanding of them among top management levels and among operators and planners. Most senior administrators who are responsible for a general research program or who are concerned with the balance between research, planning, and operations are ignorant of the capabilities and limitations of social science research. Since the dollar volume is



relatively small, they can not justify the time required to become familiar with the problems. This is particularly acute in the case of the Department of Defense, where, for example, in one department, the three top levels of research administrators were unfamiliar with their own social science research program. Each had supported it primarily because his next junior recommended it and because it was monetarily insignificant. Many operators and planners have either over-estimated the contribution available from the social sciences, being aware of what the physical and medical sciences have been able to contribute, or they have gone to the other extreme and feel that social science is not a science and can contribute nothing worthwhile. This situation appears to be gradually improving as all hands gain more experience.

Finally, the social sciences present an unique security problem in two ways. The first is that, by definition, the scientists most informed on Communism are the most suspect. A chemist is expected to immerse himself completely in his subject and his political beliefs have little or no effect on his ability as a chemist. But if a social scientist desires to study Communism, he must read much Communist literature and associate with many Communists, ex-Communists, and fellow-travelers, if he is to acquire any intimate knowledge of the way Communists think and act. This very association makes him automatically a doubtful security risk!

The second problem unique to the social scientist is that he is in a position to distort his research results in a subtle manner very difficult to trace to Communism. Thus, Trofim Lysenko, the Russian geneticist, distorted his research results to conform with Marxist theories of environment, but, biology being a more exact science, experiments were available to discredit him immediately. Such deliberate distortion by a Communist social scientist is harder to detect and much harder to prove.

A third problem, increased by security considerations, but not unique to the social sciences, is that of assembling all the data pertinent to the subject to be studied. Data comes not only from a multitude of open sources but also can come from any of the intelligence agencies. The lack of suitable methods makes it difficult for the social scientists to check

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

PSB D-32  
April 11, 1952

each possible source and to get all the necessary information together in time. In addition, many of the intelligence agencies are unaware of the type of data of importance to the social scientists and therefore make no attempt to acquire this information.

-16-

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

PSB D-32  
April 11, 1952SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIALIV. POSSIBLE MEANS OF PROVIDING A COHERENT PROGRAM

There appear to be at least four possible mechanisms for providing coordinated leadership to Government social science research: create authoritative central direction, establish a central coordinating mechanism, provide separate leadership for different areas, or merely improve definition of objectives and areas of responsibility.

1. The most extreme of such methods would be to establish authoritative central direction, and the most drastic form of this authoritative direction would be the creation of a single, separate research agency with its own funds and responsibility for performing all research. An example of this type of organization would be the wartime OSRD or the Office of the Director of Guided Missiles, established in 1950, reporting to the Secretary of Defense. These examples are not strictly comparable since the OSRD did not attempt to control the military research program, merely conducting its own separate program, and Mr. Keller, the Director of Guided Missiles, does not have his own budget, merely recommending to the Secretary of Defense the guided missiles budgets of the three Services.

Another form which authoritative direction could take would be that of a single reviewing agency with budgetary powers. The Research and Development Board in the Department of Defense is an example of this type of agency which has power to direct any service to withdraw funds from any project or to direct that more funds be spent in any area. This type of organization does not undertake research itself, merely reviews that of others.

The advantage of any strong central system is that it permits a more rapid filling of gaps or a more rapid change of emphasis of the program as the situation changes and would undoubtedly cut down on duplication.

There are many other possible means of providing a coherent program. The first of these is the creation of a central reviewing agency with budgetary powers. The Research and Development Board in the Department of Defense is an example of this type of agency which has power to direct any service to withdraw funds from any project or to direct that more funds be spent in any area. This type of organization does not undertake research itself, merely reviews that of others.

-17-  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

There are, however, several major disadvantages inherent in authoritative central direction. The first is that major legislation would be required to establish either of the two variants described above. Such a solution, furthermore, is at variance with the general concept of organization of our Government and this problem can hardly be considered important enough to warrant making an exception. Moreover, such a central organization would transgress on the areas of responsibility of every agency involved in social science research and would, therefore, be bitterly resisted. Finally, it would have the disadvantage inherent in all dictatorships that faulty direction at the top could defeat the entire program. On the political side, a single agency with its own budget would be particularly vulnerable to drastic overall cuts in the budget.

2. A second and less drastic means of providing central leadership would be to establish a formal mechanism for central coordination. An NSC directive delegating the responsibility for coordination of Federal social science research to some one agency would be required to effectuate this solution. The appointment of an individual to be the coordinator and the establishment of one or more committees on which each agency would have membership to perform the actual coordination would also be necessary.

The advantage of this approach would be that it would establish for the first time a group primarily concerned with the overall problem. Such a formal mechanism would undoubtedly increase the contacts of the different agencies at the working level and should result in more intimate knowledge by each of the other's programs. It should be flexible enough to permit the formation of task forces to concentrate rapidly all of the resources required for a given problem. Such a method of organization conforms with the normal governmental pattern and there is less possibility of faulty direction seriously harming the program since it is always possible for an agency to circumvent such an organization if it becomes necessary. The inherent disadvantages are that the coordinator has no real authority

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIALPSB D-32  
April 11, 1952

and that the entire success of the mechanism is dependent on his skill and personality. Without a doubt such a coordinating mechanism runs a greater chance of being totally ineffective than does an authoritative director..

There are several possible forms which such coordination could take with many varying degrees of formality and methods of composition of committees. The most difficult problem would appear to be the decision as to which agency is to be delegated the responsibility for coordination. While it is conceivable that the NSC might retain this responsibility, this appears unlikely in view of its general method of operation.

The NSC might delegate the responsibility to the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and such course would have several advantages. The intelligence agencies are now performing the bulk of the research and would probably be amenable to IAC leadership. The IAC is now performing a similar function in the area of foreign economic research. Delegating responsibility to the IAC would undoubtedly result in a closer tie between research and the intelligence gathering mechanism. However, at present, the research performed by the non-intelligence agencies is not closely tied in with the intelligence sponsored research and delegating responsibility to the IAC might further widen this breach. A second disadvantage would be that the IAC might feel it necessary to further delegate the responsibility of coordination to the CIA, with the result that the coordination responsibility would be conferred not on an impartial higher organization but on a major operator in the area.

A second alternative would be to delegate the responsibility to the Bureau of the Budget, There would be some precedence for this since the Federal Reports Act of 1942 gave the Bureau of the Budget the responsibility of reviewing, with minor exceptions, all questionnaires prepared by the Executive Branch of the Federal Government which request information of more

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIALPSB D-32  
April 11, 1952

than ten persons (except federal employees considered as such). The Office of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of the Budget has been discharging this responsibility and in addition has provided considerable leadership to the Federal statistical effort under the general authority of the Executive Office of the President. The major deterrent to delegating the responsibility for leadership in social science research to the Bureau would be that it does not now have close contact with the operating personnel within the agencies for whom the research is performed.

It would also be possible for the NSC to delegate the responsibility of coordination to the Psychological Strategy Board, with the advantage of creating a closer tie between research and operations. This solution should also promote a closer tie between the intelligence area and the remaining research, but would suffer from the youth of PSB and the uncertainty concerning the general area of PSB responsibility and its degree of authority.

NSC could also delegate the responsibility for coordination to one of the three major agencies in the social science field, CIA, Defense or State. Such a course would permit the coordinator to have intimate knowledge of at least one segment of the program and, since he would be running a large program on his own, he would have contact at all levels with the other research agencies. However, since in each of the three agencies mentioned, interests are specialized, over-emphasis of some area would probably result. Certainly, also, the existing inter-agency rivalry would hinder any attempt of one of these agencies to provide leadership for the others.

3. A third method for providing coherence would be to establish separate leadership for each of several areas rather than a single coordinator for all. The present Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC), which is concerned with research on foreign economics, is an example of such a solution. It was established by NSC Directive ID 15 and is responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence. The use of this method would require several NSC directives, each defining the area to

③

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

PSB D-32  
April 11, 1952

to be coordinated and each delegating responsibility for research coordination within that area to a single agency.

The various areas for which separate leadership would be provided could be divided several ways. One would be by functional interest with a committee concerned with coordinating background studies; a committee concerned with evaluation and evaluation research; and a committee concerned with fundamental and methodological research. A second scheme would be to divide the areas along geographical lines, viz: a committee concerned with Russia, one with Western Europe, etc. A third possibility would be to divide the areas along the lines of the scientific disciplines. The existing committee on Economic research is an example, and there could be others for public opinion research, demographical research, and the like.

The principal advantage of separate leadership for each of several areas in this manner would be that each such area would be relatively homogeneous and presumably more manageable. Improvement could be achieved in some areas without the necessity of major changes and long delays, and the difficulties encountered in some other more controversial area would not slow down the whole effort. The disadvantages, however, are formidable. Division into separate areas formalizes and solidifies lines of demarcation which are artificial at best and no rigid system of division can be satisfactory in all cases, since each problem should be considered functionally, geographically and scientifically. As for division along scientific lines, with the exception of economics the movement has been away from identifying research by discipline and towards the team approach. Delegating the responsibility for coordinating research in any of these areas to one agency would, moreover, probably be opposed by the others.

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

4. The fourth major possibility for solving the problem of lack of coherence would be to institute no organizational changes, merely continuing the effort for a clearer statement of our national objectives and better definition of the areas of responsibility of each agency. This proposal assumes that no major improvement in research leadership is possible until national objectives and responsibilities are clearly defined and that, once they are, research will automatically fall into line.

If it were possible to clarify our national objectives and areas of responsibility, one of the major causes of confusion in research would unquestionably be removed. However, many attempts have been made since World War II to accomplish these ends and, while progress has undoubtedly been made, it appears that radical improvement of definition of responsibility would be more difficult to accomplish than the coordination of research. Even if it were accomplished, it would remove only one of the several causes of confusion.

The principal advantage of this method is that no additional action is required.



V. POSSIBLE METHODS FOR COUNTERACTING THE  
YOUTH OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.

In addition to providing administrative leadership in the Federal research program, there are several actions which the Government might take in order to increase the contribution potentially available from social science research. The goal would be to increase the research resources in the long run and the cost would be the diverting of some of the present resources into training. The problem is analogous to the diversion of a portion of a limited steel output into fabrication of new steel mills.

The principal step should be the encouragement of training programs for the several categories of individuals involved both in performing and in utilizing social science research. Operators and planners should be encouraged to take sabbatical leaves in order to bring themselves up-to-date. More emphasis could be placed in the War College and other Government schools on the capabilities and limitations of the social sciences. Mr. Rockefeller has just established a fund to permit "selected Government officials" to study at any university of their choice and each agency should encourage its most able personnel to take advantage of this opportunity. The Government should also do what it can to encourage the training by others of research scientists in the social fields by providing scholarships similar to those provided by the AEC and by other means. As a minimum, the Government might consider increasing contracts with the lesser known universities as a means of improving the training in these institutions. If foundation funds prove inadequate, the Government should continue its limited support of fundamental research.

It is essential that every effort be made to increase the supply of research administrators and to encourage them to enlarge their central staffs as schools for ~~training future~~ administrators. An attempt should also be made to recruit able management personnel from industry and from the universities, since research administration is fundamentally a problem of management not of science.

Security regulations must be kept flexible so that a man's potential usefulness can be balanced against his possible bias and the degree of uncertainty concerning his trustworthiness.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

The contribution to the cold war obtained from the current research program in the social sciences could be materially increased by better integration of the more than 20 separate Government organizations now performing such research, and particularly by providing leadership at the national level.

Authoritative central direction of the program is neither justified nor feasible at this time.

Dividing the program into homogeneous parts and providing separate leadership for each is not as desirable as establishing central leadership.

Leadership of the social science research effort can best be provided by delegation of the responsibility for coordination of research by the NSC to an existing agency. The agency should delegate the responsibility to an individual coordinator and one or more committees made up of representatives of the interested agencies.

PSB is best equipped to handle this responsibility.

Every effort should be made to increase the nation's resources for social science research by supporting training programs and encouraging fundamental research.

The limiting factor on the research effort is more personnel resources than financial support. The present order of magnitude of fiscal support is about right; it can not be increased drastically or rapidly, though a slow increase is justified as the resources are enlarged.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following steps should be taken in sequence in order to provide central leadership for the social science research program.

1. PSB should approve the conclusions of this report in principle, particularly the desirability of providing central coordination of social science research.
2. After approval, the PSB should procure on a temporary basis an able individual, the potential coordinator, with instructions:
  - a. To study existing organizations in detail.
  - b. To recommend the directive he thinks workable.
  - c. To negotiate acceptance of the proposed directive at the staff level.
3. After approving the proposed directive in principle, the PSB should request the NSC to issue a similar directive which would:
  - a. Delegate the responsibility for coordination to the PSB
  - b. Establish an individual as coordinator.
  - c. Establish a coordinating committee with representation from each agency.