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TSC-1817-36

WATCH COMMITTEE of the

INIELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

No. 99

From: 19 June 1952 To: 25 June 1952 Washington 25, D. C. 26 June 1952

SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

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NR Record

2

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7. USSR: In a note to Sweden, the USSR has publicly announced that its air defense policy is to intercept all foreign aircraft violating the Soviet frontier and in case of resistance to open fire. Although the several recent attacks on aircraft which are not known to have violated Soviet territory or Soviet territorial waters indicate that this policy may be very liberally interpreted, the failure of Soviet aircraft to fire on some reconnaissance aircraft intercepted near the Soviet coast suggests that the USSR applies some undetermined criteria of what constitutes a "violation" before an attack is made.

NR Record

3

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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS NR Record

4

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5

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NR Record

7

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2.	Indications	of Intentions	in Europe.

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for such training. (b)(1) (b)(3) naval amphibious exercises on a rather small scale have been held in this area in former years. (b)(1) (b)(3)	of the establishmer coast tends to substitute deployment of Sovilikely that the element of border conforced by Soviet truthe border opposition be reports of ampli	Area. The announcement by the East German Government ont of a restricted zone, three miles in depth, along the Baltic stantiate previous suggestions that a principal reason for the let troops to this area is for security purposes. It appears ements moved to the Baltic coast are participating in the establish-introlsmanned by East Germans but supervised and reincops. A similar arrangement has been in existence along the Western Zones for several years. There continue to hibious or coastal defense training along the Baltic coast, spossible that some of the Soviet troops in the area are there	(b)(1)
naval amphibious exercises on a rather small scale have been held in this area in former years. (b)(1)	for such training.		
a rather small scale have been held in this area in former years. (b)(1)			(b)(3)
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(b)(3)	a rather small sca		
There has been no information, other than from press sources, con-			(b)(3)


There has been no information, other than from press sources, concerning large-scale Soviet exercises in the Baltic, and it remains uncertain whether the shooting down of the Swedish plane or planes over the Baltic was connected with these alleged maneuvers (see Watch Committee Report No. 98).

NR Record

8

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3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

SOVIET AIR INTERCEPTIONS. As previously reported, the recent increase in Soviet interceptions of, and attacks on, non-Communist aircraft approaching Soviet-controlled territory points to the adoption of a more aggressive air defense policy (see Watch Committee Report No. 98). This week, in replying to a Swedish inquiry as to whether Soviet aircraft had fired on the Swedish DC-3 which disappeared over the Baltic on 13 June, the USSR for the first time publicly announced its policy with respect to air violations of its territory. After asserting that Soviet aircraft "never violate the frontiers of other states, " the Soviet note stated that instructions in force in the USSR provide that, in case of a violation of the state frontier by a foreign aircraft, Soviet airmen "must force it to land at a local airfield, and in case of resistance to open fire at it. " Although the several recent attacks on reconnaissance and other aircraft which have not actually violated Soviet territory or Soviet territorial waters indicate that these instructions may be very liberally interpreted, it still appears that the Soviets have some undetermined criteria of what constitutes a "violation" and apply it before an attack is made.

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
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
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
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Brigadier General, GS Chairman, Watch Committee	

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