

TO : Chiefs of Certain Stations
and Bases

Book Dispatch No. 2081

FROM : Chief, SR

Date 2 NOV 1960

SUBJECT : REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Transmittal of SIS No. 10

No Indexing Required
Hqs File No. 74-6-413

Action Required: Passage to Liaison Where Applicable

1. Attached hereto is SIS No. 10 entitled "RIS Illegal Support Agents." This paper is another in the Soviet Intelligence Series prepared by the Research Section of SR/CE. Passage of sterile copies of SIS No. 10 has been authorized to the following liaison services: [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]. Distribution to other liaison services is not authorized; however, the contents of this paper (with the exception of paragraph 19) may be used as background for discussion with such services.

2. In reference to Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 16, 17 and 18 of SIS No. 10, Headquarters collects and systematically records complete details on documentation (using photographs wherever possible) and cover and legend material passed to the RIS, with or without the consent of KUBARK, ODENVY, and other PBPRIME services as well as foreign services. This material will be the subject of a separate book dispatch.

3. We are in the process of compiling a central index of RIS accommodation addresses (see Paragraphs 11, and 19 through 21 of SIS No. 10), together with identifying data on the senders, including the results of comparative and graphological examinations, and plan to process this into machine records. A cryptonym for the operational exploitation of this index has been assigned, and it bears the Headquarters file number 74-6-413.

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RIS ILLEGAL SUPPORT AGENTS

Soviet Intelligence Series
SIS No. 10

August, 1960

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RIS ILLEGAL SUPPORT AGENTS

Introduction

1. This paper summarizes the outstanding features of RIS illegal support activities, and suggests methods by which these activities may be exploited to provide leads to RIS illegal residencies. It is based on evidence concerning the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (GRU) and the Soviet State Security Service (KGB). Since both of these services probably follow essentially the same modus operandi in illegal support activities, no distinction between them is drawn in the following paragraphs, with the exception of paragraph 13, and they are referred to by the collective term "RIS."

2. One of the major counterintelligence problems regarding RIS illegal support agents is that of identifying the RIS intentions for the agents, i. e., illegal support work, soon enough to anticipate the course of the operations and thus to exploit fully the opportunities presented. The RIS rarely informs these agents of the purpose of their assignments. (For similar reasons of security, it is inadvisable for counterintelligence services opposing the RIS to brief doubled illegal support agents as to their role.)

Terminology

3. Illegal support agents are persons who have been recruited by RIS legal residencies for the ultimate purpose of providing RIS illegal residencies with backstopping of false documentation, authentic documentation, information to be used in illegals' cover and legend, accommodation addresses, personal cover for illegals, courier service, and funding mechanisms. An illegal residency is an RIS component abroad composed of staff personnel ("illegals") documented as non-Soviets, lacking diplomatic or other official status, and engaged in espionage and/or sabotage activities. A legal residency, on the other hand, is an RIS component abroad composed of staff personnel who possess diplomatic or other official status as representatives of the Soviet Union but who, nevertheless, are engaged in espionage activities and activities in support of illegal residencies. Legal residencies and at least some illegal residencies also have information collection agents. These agents are nonstaff personnel who wittingly or unwittingly provide the RIS with positive intelligence and, sometimes, additional intelligence which can be used in mounting and conducting operations. (Among certain intelligence services, but not the Soviet ones, information of the latter type is termed "operational intelligence.")

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RIS Handling of Illegal Support Agents

4. Prior to and sometimes immediately after their formal recruitment by legal residencies, illegal support agents usually are given assignments to collect positive intelligence. Besides helping the RIS to fulfill its intelligence collection requirements, such assignments provide a means of establishing the bona fides of the agents, whose information is compared with that received from tested sources. During this early stage, it is impossible to differentiate between illegal support agents and agents who are destined to be exclusively collectors of positive intelligence. Thus, even though the RIS case officer who recruits and handles an agent is known to be a specialist in illegal support work, it does not necessarily follow that the agent will be used in this type of work. For instance, it is known that RIS illegal support officers occasionally recruit agents on behalf of other elements of the RIS, and that, after an agent has been recruited for illegal support work, he may soon thereafter be shifted to concentrate purely on the procurement of positive intelligence. An agent's information targets or his case officer's specialization in illegal support work thus cannot be solid foundations upon which to judge the ultimate course of the RIS operation. The second phase of the operation must be awaited.

5. In the second phase illegal support agents normally follow one of two courses:

- a. They are directed to backstop falsified documents; or
- b. They are asked to provide authentic documentation, information to be used in illegals' cover and legend, accommodation addresses, or any combination of these functions.

From the second phase onward, illegal support agents may be instructed from time to time to gather positive intelligence, to meet an urgent requirement levied in Moscow on all or many appropriate RIS assets. Also from the second phase onward, the subordination and function of an illegal support agent may change. He may be transferred from legal residency control to become an information collection agent for an illegal residency. An illegal support agent, however, probably would not be converted into an information collector for a legal residency once he has entered the second phase of illegal support activity.

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6. Certain agents who provide authentic documentation, cover and legend material, and/or accommodation addresses progress to a third phase, wherein they furnish cover employment and safehouses for illegals, possibly serve as international couriers for illegal residencies, and act as funding channels to illegal residencies. Any one of these roles normally affords an illegal support agent the opportunity to have personal contact with illegals, something which never occurs during the first phase and infrequently during the second phase. Conceivably, illegal support agents with long-standing experience in the third phase of this activity could be integrated into an RIS illegal residency and thus become, by organizational concept, illegals, but there is no known instance of such a development in recent years.

Description of Illegal Support Activities

7. However difficult it may be to categorize an individual illegal support agent, at least seven types of illegal support activity are readily distinguishable. In the following paragraphs, therefore, the seven types are treated separately.

8. Backstoppers of False Documentation - Crucial to the establishment of any illegal residency are the illegals' documents, which not only must give the appearance of being authentic but must also have the backstopping to withstand inclusion in governmental records. Having access to official records, backstoppers of false documentation make false entries and provide blank documents such as passports, birth certificates, etc. (They probably do not concurrently participate in any other form of illegal support work.) The agents may backstop more than one illegal. Although for obvious security reasons the RIS tries to avoid demanding consecutively numbered blank documents and contiguous false entries, blocks of this sort are believed to exist. In certain instances the RIS may be able to arrange to be alerted should particular records come under unusual examination.

9. Sources of Authentic Documentation - The two purposes of RIS procurement of authentic official and unofficial documentation are: (a) to meet the constant requirement for information on format, paper, inks, etc., as a basis for forging documents; and (b) to have on hand documents which can be amended to fit the cover, legend, and description of illegals. Not all persons who furnish authentic documentation can be regarded as illegal support agents, however, for the RIS also draws upon casual, one-time-only sources who lend or "lose" their personal documents to the RIS. Known and suspect members of Communist Parties have been document sources of this type, as have agents

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who otherwise were used exclusively as information collection agents. RIS recruits with continuing access to the authentic documents of others, such as travel agency employees and consular officials, are illegal support agents. Only in infrequent cases has it been clearly established that a specific document was used by an illegal without prior alteration.

10. Informants for Cover and Legend Material - Often mingled with the strategic intelligence tasks of an agent are seemingly innocuous requests by the RIS for him to provide information on local conditions which superficially does not affect local internal security. Illegal support and other agents, during and after the period in which their bona fides is being determined, have been called upon for a wide range of this information which is believed to have been used subsequently by illegals for their cover and legend. The examples of this activity are numerous, typical of them being demands for data on the organization and faculty of a university, immigrants' procedure in settling and acquiring citizenship, employment procedures, and means of opening a business firm. (Simultaneously, members of legal residencies draw upon overt sources, including government publications, for similar information.)

11. Accommodation Addressees - RIS accommodation addresses are one avenue of communications from illegals to their headquarters case officers. Mail goes via accommodation addressees who are in the same country as the illegals and/or, more frequently, in a third country. When the latter is the case, these illegal support agents are persons who can logically receive from a third country mail which is addressed to them in their true names. Alternatively, the agents rent post office boxes under assumed names and receive mail sent to notional persons at the agents' homes or places of business. The agents so recruited are seldom told the true nature of the type of mail they are receiving, and more than one RIS case officer has implied to his agent that the mail was from an extramarital contact. Initially mail sent to an accommodation addressee represents a further RIS test of his bona fides. The recruiting officers themselves or their colleagues in other countries are the senders, and it is suspected that some, if not all, mail sent during the test period contains traps to detect tampering. The mail sent to the true name of an accommodation addressee almost invariably bears an external indicator--underlining the name or the street address is one method--to show the agent that it is to be delivered to his RIS case officer. The messages so sent by an illegal are of three types: (a) a piece of mail in itself reveals to the RIS case officer "safe arrival/existence" of the illegal and/or the illegal's desire for a meeting with an RIS case officer; (b) picture postcards indicate the location of dead drops and meeting sites; and (c) letters and postcards contain open code, secret

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writing, and/or microdot messages of administrative and informational content. When secret writing and microdot messages are incorporated in open mail, sometimes together with open code, there is often an external indicator of this fact for the benefit of the RIS case officer. Illegals encipher the entire secret writing and microdot messages or, on occasion, only those portions which would impinge upon their personal security. One illegal can use two or more accommodation addresses, two illegals can use the same accommodation address, and possibly two illegal residencies can use the same accommodation addresses.

12. Personal Cover for Illegals - Trusted illegal support agents are sometimes instructed by the RIS to provide personal cover for illegals. Their business firms having been established independently or with RIS financial assistance, the agents take illegals on as partners and/or employees, the agents "legitimize" illegals by introducing them in business and social circles, they serve as safehousekeepers for illegals, and it is suspected that some agents are used as formal references by illegals settling in the same or third countries. When an agent previously employed in some other illegal support capacity is brought by his RIS case officer into personal contact with an individual for one of the aforementioned purposes, it is reasonable to suspect that individual of being an illegal, particularly if he claims to be a native of another country.

13. International Couriers - There is no conclusive evidence available that the GRU has made widespread use of illegal support agents as international couriers for illegal residencies during the past ten years, but the KGB has employed non-Soviets for this purpose. It has been reported, however, that certain GRU illegals themselves are designated as couriers, sometimes combining this function with those of agent-intelligence officers of illegal residencies. During the same period RIS illegal support agents have been given a few courier-type missions--servicing dead drops in third countries--but these could have been test assignments.

14. Funding Mechanisms - No appreciable amount of information has been received on illegal support agents who serve as funding mechanisms for illegal residencies, except in instances where they simultaneously furnish personal cover for illegals. Whether agent-funders would fulfill assignments comparable to international couriers is not known.

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Operational Exploitation

15. It is recognized that each illegal support agent presents a different operational situation to the security services seeking to neutralize or penetrate RIS illegal residencies via their support assets. Despite the variety of possibilities for counter-action, each type of illegal support agent offers one or more methods of exploitation for the ultimate purpose of detecting RIS illegals, and these suggested procedures are presented in the following paragraphs. With each type of illegal support agent, the counter-action is not necessarily dependent upon the agent being doubled by a security service opposing the RIS. Where illegal support agents have been doubled by an opposing security service, ordinarily it is preferable to follow the RIS lead of not informing them that they are being used by the RIS to support illegal residencies.

16. Backstoppers of False Documentation (see paragraph 8) - Detection of these agents frequently depends upon detection of specific false documentation--a double entry against a single passport number and substitution of names on numbered birth certificates, for example. Investigation of official records to determine which items lead to illegals is recognizably laborious, but examination of official records can reveal additional falsifications which represent the documentation and aliases in use by other illegals. Logical points of departure for investigations are: (a) examination of the records on documents which the illegal support agent could have backstopped; and (b) verification of numbered documents and of entries adjacent to those already proven false.

17. Sources of Authentic Documentation (see paragraph 9) - The RIS capability to amend and forge documents precludes almost entirely the possibility that documents known to have been supplied by illegal support and other agents will furnish direct operational leads to illegal residencies. By systematically reporting the identifying data on documents passed to the RIS, it may be possible to develop patterns of illegals' cover and legend, especially when compared with legend and cover information given the RIS.

18. Informants for Cover and Legend Material (see paragraph 10) - As with identifying documents passed to the RIS, detailed reporting of legend and cover information gathered by the RIS can develop patterns for identifying illegals. Normally one agent supplies cover and legend material for an illegal by collecting background information in the agent's home country, while another agent--located, more often than not, in another country--furnishes

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authentic documents for the same illegal. Comparison of authentic documents collected in one country against potentially associated cover and legend material collected in another country nevertheless can sometimes produce a more complete picture of particular illegals.

19. Accommodation Addressees (see paragraph 11) - Handwriting and typewriting comparisons are an integral part of the exploitation of accommodation addressees for operational leads. If the writer to one or several accommodation addresses can be said to be the same person, the dates and cities on the postmarks reveal his various locations. Should three or more cities appear, then a comparison of flight manifests, embarkation and debarkation records, etc., might determine the assumed identity of the illegal. For example, an accommodation addressee received from the same writer letters mailed on 10, 12, and 15 June in cities of countries "X," "Y," and "Z"; by the process of elimination, the records will disclose the names of only a few persons travelling among those cities on those dates, thus narrowing the field of investigation. Also, if comparison of writing samples received by a number of accommodation addressees indicates the same writer, it may aid in pinpointing the specific Soviet service and the number of illegals/illegal residencies utilizing the accommodation addresses, and the scope of investigation will be more firmly fixed. Finally, the handwriting of known illegals should be compared with the handwriting on mail sent to accommodation addresses.

20. ~~Graphological~~ examination, although perhaps not refined to desired precision at the present time, may sometimes indicate the severity of the strain under which the illegal is operating, and thus suggest the degree of his susceptibility to additional pressures or a recruitment approach.

21. A dilemma often encountered in an investigation is whether or not to open a letter to an RIS accommodation addressee. Besides the factors of unbreakable enciphered messages and of open code which cannot be interpreted, it must be taken into consideration that the letters may be trapped and that destructive analysis of the letters will leave the accommodation addressee open to RIS suspicion of his bona fides. Some success may be achieved by photographing the contents of letters through envelopes, with the assistance of strong background lighting.

22. Personal Cover for Illegals (see paragraph 12) - Any person introduced by an RIS case officer to an illegal support agent should be subjected to investigation as a possible illegal. The newcomers' documentation, alleged background, and ostensible occupation should be intensively examined to determine their legal status.

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23. International Couriers (see paragraph 13) - Given enough advance warning, it may be possible to put dead drops under surveillance in order to detect illegals using them. Review of the contents of dead drops may not be rewarding, however, since messages therein may be enciphered, in secret writing or microdot, or in open code. Surveillance of illegal support agents who have received RIS orders to deliver messages to and receive messages from a person in a third country could reveal the assumed identity of an illegal.

24. Funding Mechanisms (see paragraph 14) - The suggested means for operational exploitation of funding mechanisms are restricted at present to the statements made in previous paragraphs concerning persons providing personal cover for illegals and concerning international couriers.

Support Agents of a Hypothetical Illegal Residency

25. This summary of activities in support of an illegal residency is based on the modus operandi of the RIS, combined with imaginary circumstances involving fictitious characters. These activities are best described against the background of the illegal residency itself.

26. The hypothetical illegal residency chosen happens to be controlled by the GRU and is composed of two members, a husband-and-wife team living in New York City. The illegal resident is Gavril Iosipovich SKORODUMOV, and his wife, Irina Nikolayevna SKORODUMOVA, serves as the operator of a clandestine radio communicating with the GRU radio station in Moscow.

27. The illegal residency has been supported by seven non-Soviet nationals who have been in touch with the GRU in various parts of the world. Although none of these persons has been informed that he was supporting the illegal residency, one (Anthony SADECKI) was in personal contact with its members and two others (Robert Philippe SEVIER and Hassib TABIT) were prepared to receive mail from the illegal residency. The remaining four (Luis GARCIA Ayala, Rudolfo MENDOZA Bueno, Rafael KELLER Gonzalez, and Maria LOPEZ Castone) have provided background and legend material for the illegals of this residency.

28. This illegal residency is not considered atypical in the support that it received, despite the fact that five illegal support agents, two other non-Soviets, and GRU officers legally stationed in ten countries have been directly associated in its establishment and maintenance.

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29. Luis GARCIA Ayala - From August 1954 to September 1956 SKORODUMOV resided in Ottawa, Canada, as Manuel RODRIGUEZ Cervana, a Spaniard studying English and liberal arts. (In fact, SKORODUMOV was undergoing practical training in Canada preparatory to his assignment to an illegal residency.) Supplying the legend material used by SKORODUMOV in his RODRIGUEZ identity was Luis GARCIA Ayala, a Spanish Loyalist who fled to the USSR during the latter stages of the revolution in Spain. The last of a series of Soviet intelligence and security officials to contact GARCIA in Leningrad was G. Ya. NOSOV, a GRU lieutenant colonel who extracted from GARCIA the personal particulars on a number of his pre-revolutionary friends, including one whose personal history was adapted for "RODRIGUEZ." The RODRIGUEZ passport, birth certificate, and personal papers were complete forgeries, however. Not having been recruited or given assignments by the GRU, GARCIA cannot be considered an illegal support agent.

30. Rudolfo MENDOZA Bueno - For identical reasons, Rudolfo MENDOZA Bueno also cannot be considered an illegal support agent. MENDOZA, a native of Argentina who retained this citizenship since taking up residence in Gera, East Germany, in 1951, was interviewed extensively by Colonel S. A. KRASKO of a GRU unit in Berlin-Karlshorst during the summer of 1955. He provided KRASKO with the names of relatives and other details concerning his friend Jose Juan HERNANDEZ Diaz. SKORODUMOV memorized all of this information while in Moscow from September to December 1956, when he travelled to Mexico City. En route to and in Mexico City SKORODUMOV posed as HERNANDEZ, a native of Argentina, a wolless merchant from Buenos Aires who had recently sold the family business, gone on a trip to Europe, and taken out a Mexican student visa at the Mexican Embassy in Paris. He has held to this background and legend even after moving to New York City in April 1957.

31. Rafael KELLER Gonzalez - A long-time undeclared Communist, Rafael KELLER Gonzalez was recruited by a GRU officer and member of the local Soviet Trade Delegation, A. D. GOLUB, shortly after KELLER gained employment in the Argentine passport office in February 1952. The formal recruitment was preceded and followed by GOLUB's requests for such overt information as procedures for the issuance of Argentine passports, restrictions on the travel of persons using these passports, and the lists of names of KELLER's fellow-employees. GOLUB was replaced as the GRU case officer by N. N. ROMANOV, also of the Soviet Trade Delegation, in December of 1952, and with this development the GRU began to press KELLER for photocopies of Argentine passport records. KELLER complied with these requests. At intervals of about six months, starting in April of 1954, ROMANOV and his

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successors--one of whom was the Soviet Assistant Naval Attache in Buenos Aires--have received from KELLER valid passports which were numbered but blank; KELLER also falsified entries against these numbers in the passport records. One of these passports is in use by SKORODUMOV, with KELLER entering the name Jose Juan HERNANDEZ Diaz against Passport No. 4610889 in the records of the Argentine passport office. The GRU case officers, all members of the illegal support section of the legal residency in Argentina, have sought no other types of assistance from KELLER.

32. Maria LOPEZ Castone - A woman named Maria LOPEZ Castone, the widow of a Mexican businessman, first came to the attention of the GRU as a potential courier for the legal residency in Mexico City. After her formal recruitment in 1956, LOPEZ travelled frequently to the United States and Canada, ostensibly as a tourist but actually as a courier between intelligence agents and the operations section of the Mexico City legal residency. Well proven in this role, LOPEZ was taken over by the Assistant Military Attache, Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Yu. AGAFONOV, of the illegal support section, in October of 1957. At the outset LOPEZ furnished AGAFONOV with her passport and was instructed to remain in Mexico until further notice. While SKORODUMOVA has been using the slightly amended passport and the personal particulars of LOPEZ since going to New York City in January 1959, the latter has served the GRU as an occasional safehousekeeper for illegals transiting Mexico. Should the fraudulent passport come to the attention of U.S. and Mexican authorities, LOPEZ is prepared to declare that her passport was lost, along with a few other papers, in November of 1957.

33. Robert Philippe SEVIER - Robert Philippe SEVIER, a garage mechanic in Geneva, was cultivated and eventually recruited in June of 1950 by I. A. CHUGUNOV, a GRU lieutenant colonel in Switzerland as a chauffeur for the TASS representatives. SEVIER's comparatively abrupt formal recruitment did not involve the transmittal to the GRU of any considerable amount of unclassified information. Instead, CHUGUNOV directed SEVIER to rent a post office box in Geneva in the name of "Gerhard SCHAEFFER," and from July to December of 1950 SEVIER received and passed to CHUGUNOV a total of nine letters, three from Geneva, one from Bern, four from Paris, and one from Rome. Each of these letters was trapped; CHUGUNOV had mailed the four Swiss letters, and his counterparts in illegal support sections of GRU legal residencies in France and Italy had sent the others. His weekly checks at the post office box brought to SEVIER letters mailed by one illegal in Istanbul on 22 August 1952, in Bombay on 27 August 1952, in Bombay on 12 October 1952, and in Istanbul on 14 October 1952; a flow of letters from a second illegal arrived

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from Copenhagen during the period April 1953 to November 1955; SKORODUMOV sent picture postcards to the accommodation addressee from Frankfurt/Main on 7 December 1956, Mexico City on 10 December 1956 and 24 April 1957, and New York City on 30 April 1957; SKORODUMOVA used the SCHAEFFER post office box for letters from Frankfurt/Main and New York City on 12 and 18 January 1959; and finally reports too long for transmission by radio are prepared on microdots by SKORODUMOVA and mailed to this accommodation address. During this period, CHUGUNOV has been replaced both overtly and covertly by the illegal support officers V.S. LUKASHVILI and, later, P. N. BREZHIN.

34. Hassib TABIT - Through his associates in the Soviet Trade Mission, Colonel L.I. KHREPTOVSKIY, the Soviet Military Attache and GRU legal resident in Beirut, was introduced to Hassib TABIT in the spring of 1955. KHREPTOVSKIY, whose residency was too small to have an illegal support section, submitted TABIT's name and identifying data to GRU Headquarters with the proposal that TABIT be used for the procurement of positive intelligence. GRU Headquarters approved TABIT's recruitment but stated that he was to be used as an accommodation addressee. Since he was formally recruited in September of 1955, TABIT has reported a vast amount of personal information, some information which was overtly but not conveniently available to KHREPTOVSKIY, and from time to time (in response to requirements levied by GRU Headquarters) information on Middle East political developments. Test letters, bearing an underlining of TABIT's first name on the envelope, were mailed by GRU illegal support officers in London and Paris to the import-export firm during late 1955 and early 1956. Starting in August of 1956, TABIT has received an average of one letter per month from a GRU illegal resident in Athens and his deputy in Nicosia. TABIT was informed by his current case officer, the Military Attache and legal resident, Colonel D. Zh. BABADZHANYAN, in early 1957 that he may receive mail from the United States (the SKORODUMOV's) bearing an indicator for passage to BABADZHANYAN. Such mail will be sent, however, only if the SKORODUMOV's require an emergency alternate communications channel.

35. Anthony SADECKI - Anthony SADECKI is a Polish refugee who was recruited in Austria in 1950 by the GRU legal residency, Vienna. Having proved himself a reliable informant of positive intelligence, SADECKI was permitted by the GRU to follow his wishes and immigrate to the United States in 1952. Upon his resettlement in Hoboken, SADECKI was ordered to rendezvous in Passaic, New Jersey, with L. V. VLADYSHEV, a GRU illegal support officer in the United States under United Nations cover. (In deciding to allow SADECKI to go to the United States, the GRU transferred his function from that of informant to that of illegal support agent.) The rendezvous in January

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of 1953 was followed by infrequent meetings, at which SADECKI turned in thorough reports on U. S. immigration procedures, loaned his documentation to VLADYSHEV, and submitted details concerning the organization of a small business. After two years, during which SADECKI worked as a clerk in a shipping firm, he formed the import-export establishment in Hoboken, New Jersey using GRU funds. Thereafter SADECKI housed--for periods of from one day to two weeks--three GRU illegals, who supplied the appropriate recognition signals of which SADECKI had been notified through a dead drop he had located on directions from VLADYSHEV. (Meetings with VLADYSHEV were held only in emergency situations, starting in late 1954.) SADECKI was alerted to the arrival of SKORODUMOVA in September 1958, and he dutifully hired her as his secretary shortly after her arrival four months later. He is not aware that she is a Soviet national, or even of Russian descent; nor does he know the true nature of her meetings with an Argentinian named HERNANDEZ, who works part-time in an office on the New York City waterfront.

Final Remarks

36. RIS illegal support activities, like the espionage operations of RIS illegal residencies, so freely cut across international and continental boundaries that the exploitation of illegal support agents as sources of operational leads can rarely be confined to one country. The internal security of one country against an illegal residency operating within or across its borders is therefore dependent upon internationally coordinated exploitation of illegal support agents. Only by cooperation among the security services of nations having a policy of neutrality or hostility to the Soviet Union can the grave threat posed by RIS illegal residencies be effectively countered.