

SECRET/NOFORN

TO : Chiefs of Certain Stations  
and Bases

Book Dispatch No. 2054

Hqs File No. 74-5-10

FROM : Chief, SR

Date 8 AUG 1960

SUBJECT: REDCAP/LCIMPROVE

Soviet Intelligence Series, SIS No. 8:  
GRU Legal Residencies

No indexing required

Action Required: None. For your information

1. Forwarded herewith is SIS No. 8 entitled "GRU Legal Residencies." This guidance paper was prepared by SR/CE and its purpose is twofold: to provide rapid orientation for station personnel and to serve as a guide for discussion with liaison services. Station copies should remain attached to this covering dispatch and may not be passed to liaison services. If the stations believe that passing would serve a useful need beyond the purposes stated, however, individual requests for liaison copies will be considered by Headquarters.

2. During recent months SR/CE has been reviewing information on known and suspected intelligence activities and personnel of GRU legal residencies throughout the world. The anticipated outcome of this program is an analysis of trends and patterns, world-wide and by area, in structure and function of GRU legal residencies. Hopefully, common factors and clues will be detected which will advance our insight into GRU legal operations and improve our ability to identify GRU legal residencies.

3. To date, estimates of GRU legal residencies have been prepared by SR country desks and some field stations. They are being reviewed by SR/CE along with pertinent cases and personality files. In some instances commentary is being prepared for the Headquarters desks and field stations concerned. In the course of this program, field stations may be asked to prepare estimates or comment on estimates. At this point the attached paper will be useful for it provides the pertinent data and the already known or probable common factors concerning GRU legal residencies

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE: NET#05 EXEMPTION 3020  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

Book Dispatch No. 2054  
Page 2

4. For your information and possible future use, the estimates include the following items concerning each probable member of a given residency:

- a. name, overt assignment, dates of assignment
- b. traces - previous assignment, defector identifications, etc.
- c. overt position - function; extent engaged in these functions; predecessors, and their RIS affiliation, if any; overt activities which indicate an intelligence function; contacts with foreigners, cultivation of particular types of people by profession, nationality, etc.
- d. contacts with other Soviets which may be indicative of guilt by association - shared residencies, previous occupants of residence, shared vehicles, chauffeurs of these vehicles, if any, etc.
- e. covert activities - operations in which involved, how involved, and other indications of clandestine activities and contacts
- f. languages spoken and how well

From this data, each individual is rated according to the criteria set forth in paragraphs 7-10 of the attached SIS, and his probable position in the residency is determined. This consistent coverage of the same points is obviously the backbone of any attempt to discern trends and patterns in structure and functions of GRU legal residencies.

Enclosure:  
SIS No. 8



Field Distribution (continued)

Headquarters Distribution:

- 2 - [
- 2 .
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 - ]

- 1 - AF/N/CI
- 1 - AF/W
- 1 - AF/S/USA
- 1 - AF/E
- 1 - EE/G
- 1 - EE/S
- 1 - EE/A
- 1 - EE/K
- 1 - C/FE/CI
- 1 - FE/CHI
- 1 - FE/KOR
- 1 - FE/TBM
- 1 - FE/PIA
- 1 - FE/FI
- 1 - FE/VCL
- 1 - FE/JAO
- 2 - FE/ESEC
- 1 - NE/1/Turkey
- 1 - NE/2/CE
- 1 - NE/3/UAR
- 1 - NE/4/Iran
- 1 - NE/5/Pakistan
- 1 - NE/5/Afghanistan
- 1 - NE/6/Ceylon
- 1 - NE/6/India
- 1 - NE/7/Lebanon
- 1 - WE/1/CE
- 1 - WE/2/B
- 1 - WE/2/N
- 1 - WE/2/L
- 1 - WE/3
- 1 - WE/4
- 1 - WE/5
- 1 - WE/6/UK
- 1 - WE/6/C

NE/C/CI/[ ]

- 2 - [
- 2 .
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 3 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 3 -
- 3 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 - ]

C/WE/FI [ ]

- 2 - [
- 2 .
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 -
- 2 - ]

C/WH/FI [ ]

SECRET/NOFORN

Book Dispatch No. 2054  
Page 5

Headquarters Distribution (continued):

- 1 - WH/FI
- 1 - SR/COP
- 1 - SR/COP/CE
- 1 - SR/2
- 1 - SR/3
- 1 - SR/4
- 1 - SR/6
- 1 - SR/9
- 1 - SR/10
- 1 - SR/Rpts
- 1 - SR/CE/P
- 1 - SR/MC
- 2 - SR/CE/R
- 2 - SR/CE/A
- 1 - CI/R&A
- 1 - CI/OG
- 1 - RID/FI

SR/CE/R:HM:mg/13 July 1960

SR/10                  

SR/2                  

SR/3                  

SR/4                  

CI/R&A                  

CI/OG                  

C/SR           
Releasing Officer

         SR/COP           
Authenticating Officer

SECRET/NOFORN

S E C R E T

GRU LEGAL RESIDENCIES

August 1960

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

GRU LEGAL RESIDENCIES

INTRODUCTION

1. A legal residency (legalnaya rezidentura) of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye: GRU) of the General Staff, USSR Ministry of Defense, is an intelligence establishment in a foreign country which is comprised of staff personnel having cover as Soviet diplomatic, trade, and other official and quasi-official representatives as well as other Soviet citizens (students, for example) residing abroad semi-permanently. A GRU legal residency operates under the cover of service (Army, Navy, Air Force) attaches wherever service attaches are part of the official Soviet representation. Other official cover (such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tass, Sovinformburo and trade missions) is used both with and without the presence of service attaches. Broadly speaking, the legal residency establishes and maintains two types of operations--collection of intelligence through clandestine agents, and the support of GRU illegal residency (nelegalnaya rezidentura) operations.<sup>1</sup> Its major target area may be the country in which it is or another country.

2. Without elaborating on the structure of GRU legal residencies prior to the KI (Komitet Informatsii: Committee of Information) of which the GRU was a part between 1947 and mid-1948, it can be said that GRU legal operations in a given country now are less compartmented than in the pre-KI period. In 1941 Ismail AKHMEDOV (GRU defector in 1942) was head of a residency in Turkey with four case officers working against Germany, reporting to and receiving orders from GRU Headquarters. Other GRU legal residencies in Turkey operated similarly, as did the Naval Intelligence Directorate's legal residency in Turkey. For the most part each residency had no knowledge of another residency's operations, and sometimes not even of the other's personnel.

---

1. A GRU illegal residency differs from a legal residency in that its staff personnel are wholly operational and use nonofficial cover, i.e., they are Soviet citizens with false documentation showing citizenship of a country other than the USSR.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

3. Possibly when the GRU withdrew from the KI in 1948, and certainly by the early 1950's each type of operation (scientific and technical, illegal support, strategic intelligence and naval intelligence) was handled by a separate residency, each having a legal resident. Scientific and technical, illegal support and strategic intelligence residencies were responsible to a "chief legal resident" who reported to GRU Headquarters, while a naval intelligence residency had its own chief legal resident responsible directly to the Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Naval Ministry. It is probable that chief legal residents in a given country co-ordinated certain requirements and reports, although not operational matters, of the several legal residencies there.

4. Since 1953, GRU legal residencies are thought to have adhered to a new structural and organizational concept coincident with the reorganization of GRU Headquarters. In 1953 all Soviet military forces were merged into one Ministry of Defense and the Naval Intelligence Directorate was created in the GRU. Concurrently the Scientific and Technical Department and the Illegals Operations Department were withdrawn from the Strategic Intelligence Directorate and each was upgraded to a Directorate. Administration of legal residencies and appointment of legal residents remained the responsibilities of the Strategic Intelligence Directorate. The Strategic Intelligence Directorate was divided into three Directorates--Anglo-American, European and Eastern--in 1957, but their responsibilities are the same today as were those of the Strategic Intelligence Directorate. The relationship of various legal residency components to their parent directorates in GRU Headquarters (the Illegals, Scientific and Technical, and Naval Directorates, besides the Anglo-American, European and Eastern Directorates) likewise has stayed the same.

CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFICATION OF A SOVIET AS A MEMBER OF THE GRU

5. The composition of a GRU legal residency may be estimated by evaluating all available information concerning known and suspect GRU personnel and operations under quasi-official cover and cover of official Soviet installations. The following paragraphs discuss the criteria for assessing the GRU affiliation of individual Soviets and for synthesizing interrelated information into the established organizational pattern of GRU legal residencies.

6. A known GRU member is a Soviet who has been identified (a) as such by defector(s), (b) through double agent operation(s) involving already known GRU personnel (see paragraph 7 below), (c) by documentary and technical sources which state or prove conclusively GRU affiliation, or (d) as a member



S E C R E T

of Soviet service attache staffs abroad. Regarding point (d), overtly the Department of Foreign Relations (Otdel Vneshnikh Snosheniy: OVS) is directly subordinate to the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense and has the responsibility of external liaison between Soviet service attaches and military organizations of foreign countries where they are stationed. Covertly, however, the OVS is a component of the GRU and has the responsibility of assigning service attaches on behalf of the GRU. The use of service attache slots as Soviet military intelligence cover is a long-standing practice which probably originated soon after the attache system was established. It has been reported by defector sources and observed to have been the case without change up to and including the present time.

7. Concurrently with the above there have been no indications that the Soviet state security organs have used service attache cover. Affiliation of the Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti: KGB) with service attaches is presently limited to the co-opting of one or more GRU staff members in a legal residency as counterintelligence (SK) informants. KGB and GRU legal residents do maintain contact with each other, however, and at the operational level a GRU case found to be doubled is turned over to the KGB, which has the responsibility for counterespionage. Such turnover may result in the appearance of a KGB case officer. This places the only reservation upon item (b) of paragraph 6 and demonstrates a primary reason for distinguishing between KGB and GRU operations, rather than referring to them merely as "RIS" operations.

8. Other than individuals who are "known GRU," the categories of persons constituting possible membership in the GRU legal residency are "known RIS, probably GRU" and "suspect RIS, possibly GRU." The term "known RIS," is applicable to a Soviet who has been identified (a) by defector(s) as an intelligence officer, but whose service is unknown, (b) in a double agent operation where the opposing service is unknown, (c) as having clandestine contact with known Soviet agents, and (d) fulfilling intelligence support functions such as servicing of dead drops. The refinement "probably GRU" may be added on the basis of the intelligence officer's overt or clandestine association with known or probable GRU officers, his frequenting of GRU installations or operational sites, his use of GRU telephone numbers and/or his appearance in GRU vehicles. Modus operandi and targets cannot be used exclusively as the basis of an evaluation as "probably GRU" but are appropriate when considered in the light of the foregoing indications. A case developing in a manner similar to other GRU cases, or a preponderance of military targets in a case, may

S E C R E T

suggest that the GRU is the Soviet service involved, but experience has shown that such data alone are insufficient to identify a Soviet as being affiliated with the GRU.

9. In the absence of factors indicating "known RIS" the term "suspect RIS, possibly GRU" may be used when defector identifications are vague, but evidence of association with GRU personnel exists. Overt successors to known or probable GRU members in official, non-service attache positions may fall in this category when there are no other data associating them with the RIS. As yet no significant world-wide patterns in the use of non-military official cover by GRU personnel have emerged, and any Soviet official position abroad, except that of ambassador, conceivably can be occupied by a member of the GRU. It has been observed that sometimes within a particular country one specific cover is handed on from one GRU officer to another over a period of years; however, identical clandestine tasks are not necessarily passed along where such a transfer of cover occurs.

10. Finally, the term "co-opted GRU" may be applied to personnel of an official Soviet installation who are not GRU staff members but who have been enlisted to perform operational tasks for the GRU residency. Co-opted personnel perform these tasks in addition to fulfilling their official duties and receive no salary from the GRU. They are not readily distinguished from operational persons in the other categories which have been discussed and therefore can only be identified by sources having actual knowledge of their status.

CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF A GRU LEGAL RESIDENCY

11. A legal residency has from three to five functional groups, and the type of clandestine activity, not the cover position held, determines this functional grouping. The structure of individual residencies varies from country to country in accordance with the operational situation and the importance attached by the GRU to the use of particular countries as bases of operations. For example, residencies targeted against countries having no navies naturally have no functional group to handle naval intelligence operations.

12. In attempting to identify a legal resident, several points should be kept in mind. The resident often, but not invariably, is the senior service attache in countries in which the Soviet diplomatic corps include service rep-

S E C R E T

resentation.<sup>2</sup> Because he is an administrative and executive officer, his role in GRU operations normally is not exposed. He rarely participates in agent meetings or in intelligence support activities.

13. While some residencies are known to have deputy chiefs, it cannot be said that all residencies have them. In small residencies, a section chief may serve as acting resident when necessary. It is known that in two instances the senior-ranking service attache was the legal resident and the senior ranking assistant service attache was the deputy resident.

14. A GRU legal residency is normally composed of two to four operational sections and an operational support section. The operational sections may include an operations section, an illegal support section, a naval section and a scientific and technical section. All residencies are believed to have operations, illegal support and operational support sections, but in areas where naval operations or scientific and technical operations are not extensive enough to warrant more than one or two officers being assigned to each type of operation, these officers are administratively subordinate to the chief of the operations section. Each of the operational sections has a chief responsible to the resident and deputy resident, but it is not known whether the operational support section has its own chief or is headed by the resident/deputy resident.

15. The basic mission of the operations section is the collection, through clandestine agents, of positive intelligence on military, political and economic matters affecting both the strategic and tactical military programs of the USSR. This section may be targeted against adjacent countries, in addition to the country in which the residency is located, and against foreign military personnel and installations situated within these countries. It is not known whether officers are specifically assigned to work against foreign elements within the target countries, e.g., American troops in France. Officers of this section are subordinate to one of the three area directorates of the GRU, the Anglo-American, European and Eastern Directorates.

---

2. Non-military officials or assistant service attaches in a few legal residencies are believed to be legal residents. This suggests that the GRU is attempting to remove the legal resident from the intelligence limelight which accompanies ranking service attaches.

S E C R E T

16. The illegal support section takes its name from the purpose of its intelligence support activities and operations; to contribute to the "legal" appearance of illegal residents and agents. Its functions serve the needs of illegals currently abroad and also of illegals to be dispatched in the future. In support of future operations, the illegal support section collects valid non-Soviet documents such as passports, birth certificates, diplomas, etc., through staff members working under the cover of regular consular activities, and by means of agent operations. Agents of this section are also used to backstop documentation used by illegals and to collect specific items of information in line with the section's responsibility for reporting on travel and living conditions in the locale of the residency. The information which they gather includes data on geography, laws and regulations, varieties of documentation and their uses, and local customs. Such information is used for the training and backstopping of illegals. In addition, the illegal support section supports current illegal operations by recruiting indigenous agents who (a) provide accommodation addresses to receive mail from illegals, (b) assist members of illegal residencies to acquire additional documents which strengthen their cover, (c) provide cover employment for members of illegal residencies, and (d) serve as couriers and cutouts between legal and illegal residencies. Officers of the illegal support section may also meet directly with illegals to provide them with documentation to be used by the illegals while they are in or passing through the area, to instruct newly arrived illegals on procedures for contacting the illegal residency to which they are destined and/or to transmit instructions from GRU Headquarters. In addition, they sometimes service illegal residency dead drops. Personnel of this section are responsible to the Illegals Directorate of GRU Headquarters.

17. The basic mission of the naval section is the collection, through clandestine agents, of positive intelligence on naval forces, harbors and shipping in the residency's target area, as well as on military forces, harbors, etc., elsewhere to which agents as ship crew members have access. Members of this section (or sub-unit of the Operations Section) are naval intelligence officers, assigned by and responsible to the Naval Intelligence Directorate of the GRU Headquarters.

18. The basic mission of a scientific and technical section is the collection of positive intelligence, through clandestine agents, concerning applied technical developments as they pertain to current and future capabilities of all military forces represented within a residency's target area. (Where scientific and technical operations are limited in scope they are handled by a sub-

S E C R E T

group of the operations section.) Case officers of this section presumably have had technical and scientific training; they are assigned by and are ultimately subordinate to the Scientific and Technical Directorate of GRU Headquarters.

19. The operational support section consists of residency cipher clerks, agent communications instructors and drivers and stenographic, clerical and administrative personnel.

USE OF OVERT SOURCES

20. GRU legal residency requirements are also fulfilled and/or supplemented by overt means. Cutting freely across covert sectional lines described above, requirements are given to residency members on the basis of access to likely sources. For example, questions on military orders of battle are handled by Soviet service attaches who in their official capacity are in contact with military representatives of other countries. Information gathered during travel by residency members includes not only positive intelligence but also data useful in mounting and supporting illegal operations. Newspapers, magazines and other literature which will answer requirements are procured personally by residency members. In some countries to which Satellite service attaches are also accredited, the Soviet service attaches meet with the Satellite officers and often levy overt collection requirements on them. This is particularly true where Satellite attaches have better access to information because their travel is less restricted.