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FROM	Chief, KUDESK	DATE	1 MAY 1959
SUBJECT	Transmittal of Paper, <u>Clandestine Subversive Activities by Sino-Soviet Bloc Representatives in Public Information Media</u>	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED		<input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

REFERENCE(S)

1. The attached paper is forwarded as operational background information for field station personnel. At the discretion of the field stations concerned, it may also be distributed to foreign liaison services, with the exception of those participating in the Baghdad Pact Liaison Committee (The United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran). These services have already received essentially the same paper, transmitted to them as a contribution to the Baghdad Pact meeting held in Karachi in January 1959.
2. The paper, based upon reports from KUBARK field stations and various members of the intelligence community, has been assembled as part of a continuing KUDESK study of political action and psychological warfare operations conducted within the Free World by countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The KUDESK objective is to uncover identities and activities of Bloc clandestine assets (organizations, groups, press media, individuals) used in covert political action and/or psychological warfare against non-Communist countries, and to produce operational aids setting forth whatever international operational patterns may emerge as the study continues.
3. The local Communist parties and local and international front organizations which for long have been subjects of operational and intelligence interest are obviously an enormous political action complex in themselves, but inadequate attention has so far been directed at other instruments through which Bloc political action and psychological warfare operations are conducted. One aspect of Bloc activity in the field of black and unattributable propaganda is the covert use of Free World press assets for this purpose. Currently available information on this aspect is synthesized in the attached paper. Studies on other aspects of covert Bloc political action and psychological warfare operations will be prepared and will be distributed for field information as completed.
4. The usefulness of the KUDESK project of which this paper is a part depends primarily upon the support of field stations. KUTUBE and KUCAGE personnel are therefore requested to forward for KUDESK attention information which in their opinion is relevant to the subject discussed in the enclosed survey and to all other known or suspected covert Bloc political action and psychological warfare activities within their areas.

Attachment (1)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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CLANDESTINE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY SINO-SOVIET BLOC
REPRESENTATIVES IN PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA

December 1958

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CLANDESTINE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY SINO-SOVIET BLOC
REPRESENTATIVES IN PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA

I. INTRODUCTION

Based upon admittedly fragmentary information, this report represents a tentative rather than an authoritative analysis of a still obscure subject. The operations discussed in this paper must be considered as a strategically significant complement to the three other basic propaganda programs of the International Communist Movement:

1. The conventional overt propaganda and public information operations of Soviet Bloc governments.
2. The propaganda operations, both overt and clandestine, conducted by individual Communist parties in the Free World.
3. The overt propaganda operations, at both the international and national level, conducted by the primary international Communist front organizations and their national affiliates.

The paper treats the following main topics:

1. Objectives of Soviet Bloc clandestine subversive activities.
2. Techniques employed for gaining covert access, influence, and control of public information media.
3. Exploitation of clandestinely controlled press assets.

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Communist Direction and Coordination of Subversive
Activities in Public Information Media

Since the propaganda tasks carried out through these operations are essentially of a deceptive character, consistency between the themes and arguments employed therein and the themes and arguments employed by avowed or recognizable Communist-controlled vehicles is not essential. Problems of coordination, such as those which arise in the propaganda campaigns of front organizations, are therefore minimized. They are not, however, eliminated completely, since in many instances, particularly in the Afro-Asian and Latin America areas, the clandestine effort is intended to pave the way for front campaigns, or to supplement them. Where the character of a clandestine campaign is in fact affected by the desire to conform to the themes and lines used by front organizations, there may be important contradictions between it and the general policy of the corresponding Communist party, which can lead to conflicts and disagreements. In general the security standards imposed by Soviet Bloc governments on many such operations are so demanding that even the majority of the leadership of the local Party is likely to be unaware of the existence and specific objectives of the operations. Conventional security service operations against the local Communist movement are, therefore, not likely to uncover the more sensitive of such operations.

II. THE OBJECTIVES OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC CLANDESTINE
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA

Covert subversive activity by Soviet Bloc agents in public information media, as distinguished from both conventional activity in the propaganda field and propaganda activity organized and directed by national Communist parties, has been employed for the following purposes:

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1. To support agitational campaigns by:

a. providing ostensibly independent and "unbiased" confirmation for accusations and purposeful editorial interpretations of events being propagated by avowed Soviet Bloc and CP outlets;

b. providing in the public domain, the initial story or report upon which a general propaganda campaign can be based;

c. supplementing from apparently unbiased sources a general Communist propaganda campaign with material designed either to induce specific reactions from anti-Communist, ultranationalist groups, to discredit such groups, or to increase the susceptibility of target national groups, particularly in the political center and left, to the general Communist calls for action in a specific campaign;

d. inducing, in anticipation of a planned Soviet Bloc/ Communist agitational campaign, prior action and statements of policy by target groups which would refuse to act or would act cautiously on a subject if they were aware of the existence of an identifiable Communist campaign on the specified theme.

2. To provide cover and support for covert political action operations directed toward the manipulation of ultranationalists, ultrareactionary, and other extremist groups and individuals, not otherwise susceptible to Communist manipulation.

3. To provide cover and channels for the purposeful and carefully timed insertion into intelligence channels and governmental circles of distorted or fabricated -- or

occasionally true -- information of a provocative, divisive, or deceptive character likely to affect national policy decisions in a manner favorable to long-range Soviet objectives.

Promotion of Communism as an ideology has not been an essential factor in the operations discussed below. The objective in every case has been to promote Bloc policy lines of the moment, and to compromise, discredit, and ultimately destroy the governments, organizations and individuals most likely to block the increase of Communist and Bloc power in the area concerned. In some instances, however, particularly in the Afro-Asian area, the covert operation has in fact provided indirect support for the propagation of the Communist ideology.

III. TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED BY SOVIET BLOC GOVERNMENTS FOR GAINING COVERT ACCESS TO, INFLUENCE OVER OR CONTROL OF PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA

1. Direct activities of Soviet Bloc official representatives abroad through non-Communist publications.

a. Newspapers and periodicals.

Publication of Sino-Soviet Bloc propaganda material in the Free World is frequently assured through cash or equipment subsidies to newspapers which have no connection with the local Communist parties or Communist-front organizations. The subsidies are frequently granted to publications which accept the assistance because of their own financial difficulties rather than because of any particular sympathy with Communism or the Communist countries. It is a technique which is in particularly active use at this time in the countries of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The subsidies are given in various forms:

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Direct financial payment, made in cash and with no demand for receipts, by the Press Sections of Soviet Embassies in the Middle East and by both Soviet and Chinese Communist Embassies in South-east Asia. In some cases, payment to a given publication is made in a lump sum, at intervals of two or three months, for propaganda articles published during the period concerned. In one case, in a Middle Eastern country, a non-Communist (and non-fellow-travelling) newspaper which was in serious financial difficulty was approached by a local Communist member of Parliament who offered to "find enough money to keep the firm's creditors satisfied for two years," on condition that he be allowed to appoint a man of his own choice to the board of directors of the firm and to dismiss three or four of the paper's top employees. (In this case information is insufficient to determine whether the Communist politician was acting on behalf of his Party, or as go-between for a Soviet or Chinese Communist principal.)

Contract agreement. In some areas, newspapers have been asked to work on contract with the local Soviet Embassy, with payment of a fixed sum at monthly or bimonthly intervals in return for publication of one-half page a day of "news" articles supplied by the Embassy. In these cases also, it was with the Press Section of the Embassy that the arrangement was made.

Payment at advertising rates for publication of special news supplements. This practice is widespread in certain areas of the Middle East and has been reported from one Latin American

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country. The news supplements concerned are in the overt-propaganda category, issued in connection with special events such as the annual Soviet celebration of the October Revolution, Soviet trade exhibits held in the locality concerned, May Day observances, and so forth.

Payment at advertising rates for publication of "news stories," feature articles and editorials supplied by the local Soviet Embassy.

Supplying of or paying the cost of engraving blocks for material supplied by the Soviets and for the routine stories carried by the newspaper concerned.

Supplying or financing the purchase of printing presses and other basic equipment. Reported occasionally for Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In a recent instance in Southeast Asia, the newspaper concerned was not in its country's capital, and the assistance was given by the local Consulate of Communist China.

Supplying newsprint without cost or at a sales price which is so low as to amount to a subsidy. In particularly active use in the Middle East. Supply of newsprint and engraving blocks seems to be a very common form of subsidy.

Guaranteed purchase of a certain number of copies of the publication is an easily hidden form of subsidy.

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The use of several of the above forms of subsidy for a single publication has been noted in several instances, but use of only one or two of them for any given publication seems to be the more common practice.

The method of transmission of the propaganda texts to subsidized newspapers is adapted to local and probably to individual circumstances. In the cases in which the Soviet Embassy has contracted with an editor for publication of a daily half-page of material, the texts have been sent through the mail each day. In other cases, editors have been told that if they prefer not to take the risk of receiving texts and engraving blocks they can accept cash subsidies and copy their material from certain other newspapers in the same general area.

According to one usually reliable source, a practice used widely by the Soviets and less commonly by the Chinese Communists is financing of press subsidies with local currency acquired through local sale of Bloc-produced machinery, cars, newsprint, and so forth.

b. News Agencies

One case is known, in an Asian country, of payment of a monthly subsidy to a news agency by the local Soviet Embassy. The purpose of the subsidy is to insure the inclusion of TASS material in the daily press bulletin issued by the news agency.

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2. Individual journalists.

In addition to the practice of subsidizing publications and news agencies, reports from Latin America and the Middle East indicate that covert employment of local journalists by Soviet press representatives is also commonly used. In some cases, this has taken the form of lump-sum payment by the Press Information Section of a Soviet Embassy, at regular quarterly or bimonthly intervals, for articles the journalist has written and placed in local publications during the period covered. In others, local journalists have been employed for writing and placing specific articles on designated subjects. An instance of this type occurred in Cairo about three years ago, when a misinformation article (in this case, a false news story concerning alleged activities of the U.S. Government in another part of the world) appeared in a Cairo newspaper. The article was traced to its source -- a local journalist who claimed that he had been paid by the Cairo representative of TASS for writing and placing the article. Instances of subsidies or single-article payments to local journalists have also been reported from Latin America.

3. Assumption of direct covert control over Communist Party members in the public information field.

Using techniques already well described in connection with such exposed Soviet intelligence operations as the Sorge case, the Jacob Golos case in the United States, and the operation of the KGB in Australia (see Royal Commission report), Soviet official representatives, working through trusted contacts in key party positions (e.g., cadre commission, control commission, organization bureau, party secretariat, etc.) have made direct clandestine contact with established party members in the

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public information field in order to support and direct them in clandestine subversive activity. Such persons are ordinarily required to sever all contact with the party, and may even be "expelled" from the party in order to conceal or at least obscure their continuing collaboration with the Communist movement.

4. Exploitation of writers' clubs and "study clubs".

A device which has been reported from Latin America and from the Middle East is the establishment of writers' clubs or "study clubs" whose members are professional writers, journalists, and research workers. The clubs are used as a means of directing and coordinating the work of their members in (a) preparing and finding non-Communist outlets for articles and speeches promoting the Soviet Bloc propaganda line, particularly in its pro-nationalist and anti-imperialist or anti-West aspects; and (b) placing members in key positions in the press and radio outlets in the country concerned.

An organization of this type is the SYRIAN LEAGUE OF ARAB WRITERS, consisting of Communist Party members, Communist sympathizers and ultranationalists. According to a report received from a reliable source in the first quarter of 1958, this group "has performed yeoman work for the Soviet cause.... The achievements of the League are underscored by examples of the influence some of its prominent members exert. Muwahib Kayyali, a founder of the League, for some time has written a weekly anti-West column for the Syrian Army weekly magazine, al-Jundi. The magazine has the largest circulation of any publication in the country. In late 1957 Said Qudmani became co-editor of the once pro-West Damascus daily al-Qabas, and has succeeded in changing the policy of the paper to pro-Soviet. Nassib Al-Ikhtyar, another

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member of the group, is supervisor of news and editorial output on Radio Damascus, which for over a year has been more and more openly pro-Soviet and anti-U.S."

Another example is a "study club" in Latin America which consists of an elite group of anti-American, pro-Soviet intellectuals who attempt to influence public opinion against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Bloc through their lectures and publications. Several of the individual members are sufficiently prominent in their respective professional fields (politics, economics, banking, etc.) that their activities in writing and placing slanted articles, speeches and research studies, and in some cases as advisers to highly placed government personalities, constitute a rather powerful propaganda weapon. The president of the club works in what amounts in practice to a sub-agent/principal-agent relationship with a local Soviet propaganda agent who in turn works covertly with an official of the Soviet Embassy. The two local members of this trio are economists and, in addition to directing the remarkably widespread and complex activities of the study club, each has wide contacts in the financial and economic fields which he uses in his propaganda activities. A close friend of the principal agent, for example, is an influential pro-Communist banker who has been used at times by the principal agent as a means of presenting suggestions to the president of the country concerned and of slanting the presentation of economic questions to the local authorities. The principal agent himself is not, so far as known, a member of the Communist Party, but his sympathies are frankly pro-Communist.

The sub-agent mentioned above is reportedly a member of the Communist Party and the study club itself, while not officially connected with the Party, is

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closely linked with local Communist front organizations (World Peace Council, Soviet Friendship Society, etc.) through its heavily Communist and pro-Communist membership. The club maintains small local branches in various provincial centers, which are used as centers of pro-Communist agitation and propaganda. Closely but unofficially connected with the club are a magazine (also targeted at intellectuals) edited by the son of the principal agent mentioned above, and a confidential newsletter of small circulation which is targeted primarily at businessmen.

5. Use of expatriate Communist journalists and of foreign Communists as correspondents for selected press organs.

There is a rather substantial corps of Communist journalists whose careers develop on an international rather than a local level. In some cases these individuals are expatriates (voluntary or otherwise) who write as foreign correspondents for publications in their native countries and other areas. Others retain residence in their own countries, acting as correspondents on local affairs for publications abroad. A group characteristic of these journalists is that they are inveterate travellers, coordinating their professional activities through personal contacts in various parts of the world. At times members of this group manage to obtain positions as foreign correspondents for non-Communist publications whose editors are unaware of their status as professional pro-Communist propagandists, but in most cases this status is so apparent in their writing that their employment is limited to publications which are themselves Bloc propaganda vehicles.

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6. Use of books, authors, and publishing houses.

In addition to the vast quantities of overt propaganda literature published within the Communist Bloc and transmitted direct from there to individual or mass targets, there are numerous publishing and distribution points outside the Bloc which handle both attributable and non-attributable propaganda. In many cases, Bloc propaganda literature is printed in one country of the Free World for transmission to target audiences in other Free World areas, in order to hide its Bloc origin.

An incident which is believed to be an example of Soviet use of the hidden-authorship technique occurred about two years ago, when a book (in several volumes) designed to show the compatibility of Communism and Islam was published in Beirut and subsequently reprinted in Iraq. The book was well written and was obviously based upon serious scholarly study. It elicited a good deal of interest -- and surprise -- in Shiite circles in Beirut because its ostensible author was a Lebanese Christian who until the book appeared had shown no propensity toward scholarship, but was considered by people who knew him as a playboy who happened also to be a Communist sympathizer. The alleged author personally paid the publishing costs of the book and acted as its distributor for Lebanon, apparently in order to increase sales by eliminating any middleman and thereby giving the retailers the middleman's profit. The real origin of the manuscript has never been definitely established, but in view of its subject matter and the general agreement that the individual who claimed authorship could not possibly have written it, it seems reasonable to assume that the incident may have been a fairly successful Soviet propaganda operation.

Other books that have given rise to some speculation along the same lines are those printed in

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India under the alleged authorship of R.K. Karanjia of Blitz. The three most recent works are (a) SEATO: Security or Menace?, (b) The Dagger of Israel, (c) Arab Dawn. They are highly tendentious and inflammatory propaganda tracts, and could not by any stretch of the imagination be described as scholarly works. Vast research would have been required, however, to obtain the many quotations from obscure sources which have been skillfully strung together to form and fill out the propaganda line of the books. It is difficult to imagine that Karanjia, who is an extremely active individual, would have found time to do a research job of this magnitude, and in view of his obvious position as a Soviet Bloc and UAR propaganda agent, it seems entirely possible that this may be another case of use of the hidden authorship technique.

There have been reports from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America of the use of local publishing firms (such as Dar al-Fikr in Cairo) as distribution points for locally printed Bloc propaganda, both attributable and unattributable. From the same areas have come other reports of the use of firms which combine publishing and retail bookshop facilities under the same management. One example of this is a bookshop in Southeast Asia, which is described as one of the two largest distributors of Chinese Communist material in the country concerned. The bookshop went into the publishing business in the spring of 1958, when it launched a daily tabloid newspaper combining the reader appeal of sensational scandal and adventure stories with news reporting slanted to fit the Chinese Communist propaganda line. The author of two serialized books (both innocuous adventure tales) with which the newspaper began its existence is employed in Hong Kong as a scriptwriter for a Communist-front motion picture studio.

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Another example is the Egyptian Bookhouse in Cairo which began as a small, dingy hole-in-the-wall shop and has since blossomed into one of the most attractive and well-arranged bookstores in the city. The bookshop serves locally as an overt commercial outlet for all Sino-Soviet Bloc publications and maintains its own publishing house, devoted largely to pro-Soviet propaganda material. The firm distributes its books in various ways; by mailing copies directly to bookstores, or to individuals in Egypt and other countries who distribute the books on a commission basis within their own areas or countries. One report states that while the publications of the firm are kept out of Jordan and Lebanon by censorship, "a few copies are mailed to interested parties, and Egyptian travellers carry small amounts."

A Latin American example is a combined art gallery, bookstore, cultural and hobby center established in a South American capital during the summer of 1958. The center has no overt connection with the local Communist Party or any of its front organizations, but its list of stockholders and directing personnel runs heavily to individuals who are Communists or have Communist connections.

The company conducts an active trade in imports of books and other merchandise and their re-export to neighboring countries under its own shipping address. Since Soviet Bloc propaganda can legally be imported into the country in which the shop is located, but is illegal in neighboring countries, it is believed that the shop is acting as a re-mailing point for such material in order to avoid its confiscation by the postal authorities of the neighboring countries.

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Other Sino-Soviet subversive efforts in connection with use of non-Bloc book, publishing and printing firms include such cases as (a) that of the USSR Commercial Counsellor in an African country who arranged with a local book dealer to supply the bookshop, at nominal cost, with Soviet books and periodicals imported through the diplomatic pouch "in order to speed up delivery," and (b) the offer of the Press Attache of the Soviet Embassy in an African country to pay all the salaries of the employees of a local printing plant in return for the firm's agreement to print "anything the Soviet Embassy wished when the Embassy so desired."

One case of an unsuccessful Soviet effort to prevent publication of a non-Bloc book occurred during the summer of 1958, when the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in an Asian country asked a well-known local author to visit him at the Embassy. The author did so, whereupon the First Secretary asked him not to publish a book he had just written, which ran counter to Soviet propaganda interests in the area. In order to make the idea attractive to the writer, the First Secretary offered to "work out a deal with the local Communist Party" to pay him for the full press run in lieu of publication. The role the Communist Party was to play remained unclear, since the First Secretary assured the writer that he could have the full payment ready, in cash, within twenty-four hours.

IV. EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINELY CONTROLLED PRESS ASSETS

The subsidies to newspapers and periodicals discussed in Paragraph III., 1., a. above are frequently -- perhaps usually -- given as a means of insuring publication of overt, attributable propaganda material issued by the Sino-Soviet Bloc governments

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(TASS and NCNA releases, special supplements, etc.). Scattered in various countries throughout the world, however, are a number of publications, usually having little or no recognizable organizational connection with local Communist parties or Communist front organizations, which function as consistent purveyors of "black" or unattributable propaganda and misinformation items of various kinds, including propaganda forgeries. Publications falling within this "black propaganda" category seem to be of two kinds:

1. Publications used primarily as propaganda vehicles.

a. Blitz, weekly, published in Bombay, India, directed by R.K. Karanjia. In 1947 Karanjia stated that he had once been a CP member, but had left the Party. He has since denied ever having been a member. He has consistently used Blitz, however, as a vehicle for pro-Soviet (and, since 1955, also pro-Nasser) propaganda. Blitz followed a policy of ignoring the local Communist Party or mentioning it only with a mildly disapproving attitude, until mid-1957, when the paper began moving in the direction of approval of Indian CP actions. In the summer of 1958, Karanjia made his first step toward official identification with Communist-sponsored organizations when he attended the World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm and was elected to membership in the World Peace Council. On the return journey to India, he stopped in London, Paris, and Cairo (where he conducted a widely-publicized interview with UAR President Nasser). In addition to a small staff of correspondents (several of whom are active members of the Indian CP) in various parts of

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India, Blitz maintains a string of foreign correspondents. Several of the foreign correspondents are individuals, such as London correspondent Paula Wiking, who have long records as Communists. Others, such as Eslanda Robeson (wife of the American singer Paul Robeson), are simultaneously employed in their own countries as writers for Soviet publications.

b. La Patrie, small periodical published in Bangkok. La Patrie has no official connection with the Thailand CP, but is a consistent channel for Soviet Bloc propaganda of the sensational, hate-mongering type, including the familiar plot charges and propaganda forgeries.

c. Al-Masaa of Beirut. As of late summer 1958, this was an outlawed, clandestinely circulated newspaper, reportedly maintaining close ties with the pro-Soviet Cairo newspaper of the same name. Its content runs heavily to releases from TASS and other Soviet Bloc news agencies. The paper distinguished itself during the summer of 1958 by acting as surfacing point for a propaganda forgery known as the "John H" letter, which was promptly picked up for wider propaganda relay by the official press and radio media of the USSR and Communist China.

The list could be extended to include every area and many of the countries of the Free World. Like the operational-cover newspapers discussed below, most of the newspapers concerned are of small circulation. In the case of several of them, there is evidence of a curious interwoven pattern of personal contacts which suggests that the publications

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concerned may in fact be a part of a single internationally directed or internationally coordinated propaganda, misinformation, and political action complex.

In addition to their use for routine publication of pro-Bloc propaganda, including the continual stream of charges of plots, aggression plans and so forth which are a staple item therein, it is almost invariably papers of this type that are used as the non-Bloc surfacing and relay points for propaganda forgeries. There has been a progressive increase in use of forgery as a propaganda weapon during the past two years. The surfacing and overt relay of these propaganda forgeries were handled, for the most part, by official Communist-Bloc and UAR press media and the official and clandestine radios of the Soviet Bloc and UAR. The only other overt surfacing and relay points that came to our attention during the period concerned were:

Blitz, India

The Mirror, Burma

La Patrie, published in Bangkok

Bintang Timur, Indonesia

Berita Minggu, Indonesia

The Delhi Times, New Delhi

Antara, Indonesian news agency

So far as known, the incident in which Antara was involved was one of the rare cases in which a reputable publication or news agency picks up in good faith a forgery which a Bloc propaganda agent has managed, directly or

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indirectly, to convey to it as an authentic news item. The other publications on the list, however, are without exception newspapers of the type discussed just above.

It should be noted, in connection with propaganda forgeries, that distribution is not effected through overt channels alone. In addition to the overt distribution which is made, there have been several instances in the past two years of similar forgeries which were not published, but were transmitted as "confidential information" to the Foreign Ministries and, in some cases, to the heads of the governments of Free World countries. In other cases, surfacing and relay through overt media has been supplemented by relay of the same material, unchanged or in slightly modified form, into Free World intelligence channels in the guise of "clandestine intelligence reports," and by transmission of copies of the forged letters to various diplomatic missions by certain non-Bloc diplomatic representatives.

2. Publications used as cover for political action operations.

The publications of this type which have so far come to our attention have had two common characteristics: (a) Each uses a consistent pro-Bloc slant and (b) each has a circulation so low as to remove any possibility of its effective use as a medium of mass propaganda (or even, in some cases, any possibility of its use as a means of financial support for its personnel).

One example is a "camouflaged-Communist" newspaper which is published biweekly in one of the West European countries bordering on the Soviet Bloc. The publication is supported by funds its staff members collect on personal trips to the neighboring Bloc country. Direction

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by the Bloc country is complete, extending even to reading of galley proofs before publication of each issue. The newspaper is occasionally used for publication of special propaganda editions running as high as 50,000 copies, but its normal circulation is so small that its propaganda value is almost nil. The publication is used, however, as a rallying point in drawing together and guiding the propaganda of various small, non-Communist, political, theological and pacifist organizations in the area.

A more ambitious operation, in another European country, is handled by a covert team of local agents who maintain clandestine contact with the Soviet Embassy. The agent team consists of:

A professional political-action agent whose overt contacts are limited entirely to ultranationalist political and industrial groups of the Right and who receives much if not all of his financial support from industrialists of the ultraconservative, ultranationalist Right. His political mission consists primarily in acting as chairman of a privately organized, covertly run committee of parliament members and industrialists and, on behalf of the committee, directing the day-to-day maneuvers of his group on the floor of parliament and in the parliamentary committees. His cover for this activity is his position as a professional journalist engaged in running a small confidential newsletter devoted to economic and industrial affairs. The members of his committee and his "normal" outside contacts regard him solely as the agent of the conservative industrialist group mentioned above. They are unaware that he is in fact co-chairman rather than sole chairman of the committee, working in covert hour-to-hour contact with a silent partner.

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The silent partner is the director and owner of a small weekly newspaper which is frankly a vehicle for ultranationalist propaganda of the pro-Soviet variety. The paper has no connection with the local Communist Party or front groups, and its staff is an odd mixture of down-at-the-heel apolitical journalists, pro-Communists, and members of extreme-right groups who in some cases write for this publication under one pen name and for a local fascist newspaper under another.

Aside from its propaganda content, the paper is badly written and its circulation figure is very low. Its director uses his status as a professional journalist as a means of entree in political, press and diplomatic circles, and has developed a wide circle of contacts which he uses in:

- a. Verbal promotion of rumor and person-libel campaigns which are geared to promotion of Soviet propaganda needs of the moment.
- b. Picking up libelous gossip which is then worked into "intelligence reports" and submitted (through a member of his newspaper staff who poses as an informant on the activities of the newspaper and its director) to the police services of his own country and locally stationed representatives of foreign intelligence services. (This is a particularly ingenious operation, since in several cases the same material has been fed into the extreme-Right groups to which other members of his staff have access, to reappear in police and intelligence channels as apparently independent confirmation from "anti-Communist" organizations of the far Right.)

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c. Through intensive cultivation of diplomatic contacts, he has at times been able to obtain classified information concerning diplomatic negotiations of his own country, and to publish the material in his newspaper at a moment chosen to cause a maximum of embarrassment to his government.

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Book Dispatch No. 1191

Date _____

74-7-50.983

No Indexing Required

TO : Certain Chiefs of Stations and Bases

FROM : Chief, SR

SUBJECT: General - REDCAP/LCIMPROVE

Specific - SIS No. 4: Use of SOVEKSPORTFILM Cover by the RIS

Action Required: None.

1. In order to answer a field query concerning the current use of SOVEKSPORTFILM cover by the RIS, the attached compilation was made from available information as of March 1959. It was felt that the subject would be of interest to all REDCAP/LCIMPROVE stations.

2. At present identified SOVEKSPORTFILM representatives are located in 23 of the countries under consideration (See Attachment I); five of these representatives are known RIS and nine are suspect RIS (See Attachment II). It should be noted that SOVEKSPORTFILM representative is equally likely as a cover designation for either service of the RIS.

Enclosure:

I - List of 41 Countries

II - Use of SOVEKSPORTFILM
Cover by RIS

S E C R E T

Field Distribution:

2 - []
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -

3 - []
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
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2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -

AC/AF [] []

2 - []
3 - COS, Vienna, w/atts.
2 - COS, Germany, w/atts.
2 - COB, Bonn, w/atts.
2 - COB, Frankfurt, w/atts.
2 - COB, Berlin, w/atts.
2 - COB, Munich, w/atts.
2 - COB, Hamburg, w/atts.
2 - []
2 -

NE/FI [] []

EE/COP [] []

2 - []
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
5

2 - []
2 -
2 -
2 -
2 -
3 -
2 -
3 -
3 -
3 -
2 -
2 -

FE/FI [] []
for CFE

3 - []
2 -
2 -

WE/FI [] []

C/WH []

S E C R E T

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Headquarters Distribution:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 - AF/Ethiopia, w/atts. | 1 - WH/II/Argentina, w/atts. |
| 1 - AF/Libya, w/atts. | 1 - WH/II/Uruguay, w/atts. |
| 1 - EE/G, w/atts. | 1 - WH/III/Mexico, w/atts. |
| 1 - EE/S, w/atts. | 1 - WE/1/CE, w/atts. |
| 1 - EE/AH/A, w/atts. | 1 - WE/2/B, w/atts. |
| 1 - FE/THB/B, w/atts. | 1 - WE/2/N, w/atts. |
| 1 - FE/THB/T, w/atts. | 1 - WE/2/L, w/atts. |
| 1 - FE/MIA/A, w/atts. | 1 - WE/3, w/atts. |
| 1 - FE/MIA/I, w/atts. | 1 - WE/4, w/atts. |
| 1 - FE/VCL/C, w/atts. | 1 - WE/6/UK, w/atts. |
| 1 - FE/JAO/J, w/atts. | 1 - WE/6/C, w/atts. |
| 2 - FE/ESEC, w/atts. | 1 - SR/COP, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/2/Sudan, w/atts. | 1 - SR/COP/CE, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/2/Saudi Arabia | 1 - SR/2, w/atts. |
| 1 - AF /Rabat, w/atts. | 1 - SR/3, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/4/Tehran, w/atts | 1 - SR/4, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/5/Pakistan, w/atts. | 1 - SR/5, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/5/Afghanistan, w/atts. | 1 - SR/10, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/6/Ceylon, w/atts. | 1 - SR/RP, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/6/India, w/atts. | 1 - SR/CE/P, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/7/Syria, w/atts. | 2 - SR/CE/R, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/7/Lebanon, w/atts. | 2 - SR/CE/A, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/7/Egypt, w/atts. | 1 - CI/R&A, w/atts. |
| 1 - EE/K, w/atts. | 1 - CI/OPS, w/atts. |
| 1 - NE/8/Turkey, w/atts. | 1 - SR/6, w/atts. |

SR/CE/KG:mg/9 April 1959

SR/6 NR

SR/COP Q

CI/R&A IRH

C/SR [
Releasing Officer

CI/OPS je

SR/COP/CE [
Authenticating Officer

S E C R E T

COUNTRIES WITH A SOVEKSPORTFILM REPRESENTATIVE:

Argentina	Japan
Austria	Lebanon
Belgium	Mexico
Burma	Norway
Cambodia	Pakistan
Denmark	Sweden
France	Switzerland
Germany (FEDREP & DDR)	Thailand
Great Britain	UAR (stationed Cairo)
Greece	
Holland	
India	
Indonesia	
Iran	

COUNTRIES IN WHICH NO SOVEKSPORTFILM REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED:

Afghanistan	Libya
Canada	Luxembourg*
Ceylon	Morocco
Ethiopia	New Zealand
Finland	Sudan
Ghana	Turkey
Iceland	United States
Iraq	Uruguay
Italy	Yemen

* Believed handled by Belgium SOVEKSPORTFILM Representative

USE OF SOVEKSPORTFILM COVER BY RIS

1. COUNTRIES WHERE SOVEKSPORTFILM REPS ARE KNOWN OR SUSPECT RIS:

- Burma Known KGB
- France (2 Reps) Suspect RIS (2)
- Germany (FEDREP) Highly suspect RIS, probably KGB
- Great Britain Suspect RIS, probably GRU
- Greece Known KGB
- India (2 Reps) Suspect RIS (2)
- Iran Known RIS, probably KGB
- Japan Suspect RIS
- Lebanon Suspect RIS
- Pakistan Known RIS
- Thailand Known RIS, probably KGB
- UAR (stationed Cairo) Suspect RIS, probably GRU

2. COUNTRIES WHERE SOVEKSPORTFILM COVER WAS RECENTLY USED AND IS PROBABLY NOW USED:

- Belgium Predecessor was suspect KGB
- Germany (DDR) Predecessor had KGB housing
- Indonesia Predecessor was known RIS