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AIR

BOOK DISPATCH NO. 304

TO: Certain Stations (those with
Soviet Diplomatic Representation)

FROM: Chief, SR
GENERAL - Operational/LCIMPROVE

SUBJECT: SPECIFDO - RIS Cultivation of US Official Personnel

1. Evidence has been received during the past year that the Soviet Intelligence Services are increasing their effort to penetrate US official installations abroad. Soviet approaches to higher-ranking US foreign service officers and service attaches are generally fully reported. Social contact and any subsequent Soviet approach to US clerical, guard, indigenous employees, and the lower-ranking US officers have not received the same attention. The Soviet approaches are not limited to specific areas but are world-wide. Furthermore, the Soviets are obviously concentrating considerable effort and man power on the target. This dispatch is to call your attention to the current RIS offensive against the US target; to warn you of the danger; and to emphasize the need for careful examination of all Soviet/American social relationships in your area.

2. A brief look, from the Soviet point of view, at the intelligence potential of the lower-ranking US employees makes it clear why they present a desirable and possibly more vulnerable target than the higher-ranking officers. The clerical staff of any US installation has access to vital information, i.e., communications, all typed reports, administrative records, and the usual word-of-mouth information; they receive lower salaries; they are frequently single and dependent on the local scene for social activity, which makes them more accessible. The Marine Guard personnel have possession of keys and know all physical security measures; they generally have a complete roster of personnel and know in which offices sensitive material is filed and who works with such material. The indigenous employees are used for translation in advisory capacity regarding promotion of US programs and as domestics, cleaning staff, chauffeurs, etc. Obviously indigenous employees have considerable information of interest to the Soviets, as well as access to official installations and to quarters.

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3. Soviet approaches to members of the clerical staffs and lower-ranking officers are too numerous to cite, US female clerks have been approached in social gatherings, in "accidental" meetings, and through any other apparently casual encounter. The usual gambit is to attempt a flirtation and, thus, if successful, develop an emotional tie (certainly one of the oldest intelligence techniques known). In one area an RIS officer specifically instructed a local double agent to obtain all information concerning the family, personal habits, weaknesses, etc. on the chief clerk of the US embassy. In another area a local double agent reported that his Soviet case officer instructed him to obtain all available data on seven US clerks, all women, in the US embassy. These are only a few of the RIS approaches to clerical employees reported in 1956-57. It must be assumed that there have been many more than reported to either KUBARK representatives abroad or at headquarters.

4. The Marine Guards assigned to US installations have been targets in several areas. The Soviet approaches have been through indigenous girl friends and by striking up an acquaintance in bars frequented by the Marines during their free time.

5. The problem of indigenous employees is well known to all KUBARK representatives working abroad. There is concrete evidence that the Soviets examine the histories, families, financial circumstances, etc. of all employees over whom they have the slightest element of control or to whom they gain access.

6. Observed Soviet modus operandi exploits loneliness; social maladjustment; any feeling of persecution or resentment based on assumed discrimination against Negroes, Jews, first generation Americans; any liberal tendencies or expressed criticism of US; any remote or close family connection with the USSR. The RIS also looks for personal vulnerabilities such as debts, excessive drinking, love affairs or sexual deviation to be used as blackmail and control.

7. Inasmuch as the general security of US as well as the security of KUBARK personnel is threatened, the current RIS offensive is more than simply a security problem for the ODAGID security officer; it is a problem to which every KUBARK officer must be alert.